> There are DOZENS of cases applying Section 230(c)(1) to removal decisions, so for the court to think that it’s spotted something that all of those other courts have missed is laughable…and completely gratuitous…and ultimately inconsequential given that the court still tosses the case.
> The court tries to justify its reluctance on Section 230(c)(1):
>> There is little reason to strain the reach of the immunity in Section 230(c)(1) when, as in this case, the immunity in Section 230(c)(2) leads to the same result.
> NOOOO. There are several excellent reasons to apply both 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2):
> (1) 230(c)(1) doesn’t have a good faith prerequisite, which has mucked up 230(c)(2) jurisprudence and made 12(b)(6) dismissals much more difficult to obtain, jacking up the litigation costs for both sides and giving false hope to bogus claims. Indeed, because the court dismissed this case without prejudice, I’m sure an amended complaint will try again to manufacture bad faith sufficient to kick the case into very expensive discovery;
> (2) removal and leave-up decisions are two sides of the same decision, i.e., every editorial decision about an item of third-party content is either a leave-up or removal decision, so they cannot be separated; and
> (3) the statute and 25+ years of caselaw have established the principle that 230(c)(1) applies to removal decisions.
Neither Imane Khelif nor Lin Yu-ting are transgender [1][2]. There is no possible good faith reason for leevilux to claim otherwise. (It makes me wonder about the overlap between transphobia and misogyny.)
Excerpt about an important Supreme Court precedent that applies here:
> The case has striking resemblance to the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case called Tinker v. Des Moines. Back in 1965, high school students in Iowa wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War after the school threatened to suspend any students who did so. Five students who wore the armbands were suspended.
> Them continuing on such extremely partisan platforms like Truth Social for the left (BlueSky)
Especially but not exclusively due to the fact that whatever "censorship" Bluesky imposes can be avoided with different clients in most cases and different PDSs in worst cases, I'm not going to pretend that Bluesky and Truth Social are anywhere near the same in terms of speech diversity [1] (aside: nor will I pretend that X has more speech diversity than Bluesky). (In the context of this post and thread, I use "censorship" to mean a company's own moderation and censorship to mean speech restrictions backed by government coercion/threats.)
> X bad because it fires a team they'd never needed to have as a social media company just to stay afloat, especially as it was proven that those firings were tacitly necessary for the platform to survive?
By "proven" "tacitly necessary", I assume you mean proven in hindsight, to which I disagree. You're arguing that after Musk bought the company it had to fire its anti-censorship team [2] to "fix" its money situation ($13 billion debt that banks ended up reselling instead of collecting from Twitter/Musk), even though before Musk bought the company it could have continued on with its anti-censorship team for years without losing $13 billion. You're also arguing that post-buyout Twitter is better because sometimes getting revenue may matter more than fighting censorship (which I don't necessarily disagree with), while pre-buyout Twitter was foolish for more heavily prioritizing fighting censorship over getting revenue. (Aside: Musk launched a frivolous lawsuit against advertisers that was bad for both getting revenue and fighting censorship [3].)
> The furor with which Musk pushed Brazil and De Moraes to not censor people on X was awe-inspiring. Something the old Twitter never managed to do in such scale.
Holding the record for most government censorship demands resisted in one incident, does not make up for overall acquiescing more often to censorship demands [4] or for reducing the company's ability to resist censorship demands [2].
> The article link appropriately disqualifies itself of not being partisan
Where does EFF call itself non-partisan, and how is that relevant to Twitter's/X's violations of privacy? Definitions of partisan include [1]:
> An adherent to a party or faction.
> A fervent, sometimes militant, supporter or proponent of a party, cause, faction, person, or idea.
By the second definition and arguably by the first as well, EFF is fundamentally a partisan organization [2]:
> The Electronic Frontier Foundation is the leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world. Founded in 1990, EFF champions user privacy, free expression, and innovation through impact litigation, policy analysis, grassroots activism, and technology development. EFF's mission is to ensure that technology supports freedom, justice, and innovation for all people of the world.
"Reach" was only ever one reason EFF stopped posting on X. Among yet other reasons, EFF had partisan reasons for leaving X [3]:
> Twitter was never a utopia. We've criticized the platform for about as long as it’s been around. Still, Twitter did deserve recognition from time to time for vociferously fighting for its users’ rights. That changed. Musk fired the entire human rights team and laid off staffers in countries where the company previously fought off censorship demands from repressive regimes.
> The EFF's mission statement supports them prioritizing freedom and innovation over privacy.
What about the sentence right before the mission statement? [1]
> The Electronic Frontier Foundation is the leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world. Founded in 1990, EFF champions user privacy, free expression, and innovation through impact litigation, policy analysis, grassroots activism, and technology development. EFF's mission is to ensure that technology supports freedom, justice, and innovation for all people of the world.
> The EFF's mission statement supports them prioritizing freedom and innovation over privacy.
For as long as I've known about EFF (which is less than a decade, I admit), EFF has never seemed to prioritize "innovation" over privacy. As for freedom, privacy often is a prerequisite.
> In 20 years; if we are still using a keyboard & a mouse on a daily basis - it would be as awful as not getting to superintelligence.
20 years from now, I do not anticipate having any more control over a "superintelligence" than I have today, nor do I think that a superintelligence which could serve my needs (never mind my desires) as well as a computer-mouse-keyboard-internet setup currently does will come to exist.
So far, the three top-level comments by Georgelemental, rayiner, and torstenvl are all ignoring that the very definition of "government" as used in the relevant law [1] explicitly includes individual government officials [2]:
> (4)Government
> The term “government”—
> (A)means—
> (i)a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State;
> (ii)any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and
> (iii)any other person acting under color of State law; and
> (B)for the purposes of sections 2000cc–2(b) and 2000cc–3 of this title, includes the United States, a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of the United States, and any other person acting under color of Federal law.
The section of the statute that defines judicial relief broadly provides [3]:
> (a)Cause of action
> A person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.
If a violation by an individual government official counts as a violation by a "government", how could standing to obtain relief against a "government" not imply standing to obtain relief against the very individual government officials who committed the violation? Have the state officials not consented to receiving federal money through their wages? Nowhere in 42 U.S. Code § 2000cc through 42 U.S. Code § 2000cc-5 is there a mention of consent to be sued, and I could say that the prison guards consented to be sued by choosing employment at a prison that receives federal money! When a state "legalizes" marijuana, any state university receiving federal money must still ban students and staff from smoking marijuana.
TFA explicitly mentions Tanzin v. Tanvir, the Supreme Court case regarding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act which also defines "government" as including individual government officials. In Tanvir, Justice Thomas wrote the opinion (joined by all participating justices) ending with [4]:
> We conclude that RFRA’s express remedies provision permits litigants, when appropriate, to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities.
In Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, Justices Thomas, Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh now go the opposite way by ignoring the very sections of the statute that provide relief "against federal officials in their individual capacities". All six justices in the majority, including Justice Barrett, have chosen to "create a new policy-based presumption against damages against individual officials" even though five of them previously were "not at liberty to do so" [4].
Although I'm glad that the federal government and Google/Cloudflare are in alignment about the need to shorten the PQC schedule, it doesn't feel great to hear a president say
> The second order I'm signing directs federal agencies to transition to what is called quantum... cryptography. Does anybody know what that is?
> In 1999, a case testing these protections made it to the U.S. Supreme Court. In Olmstead v. L.C., two women with mental disabilities sued Georgia, arguing that the state had failed its obligation to provide services that would allow them to return to their communities and that it had continued to institutionalize the women instead, thus violating their civil rights.
> The court agreed that states have a legal responsibility to provide support that integrates disabled Americans into their communities, and for nearly three decades, courts across the country have embraced that interpretation.
[...]
> For decades, Barkoff adds, both Republican and Democratic administrations, including the first Trump administration, proactively enforced federal disability law and repeatedly brought actions against states that relied too heavily on care in large, segregated settings that the law says should be a last resort.
Medicare covers only a minority of the population but (and?) relies heavily on the general US private healthcare system. At minimum, Medicare cost is affected by high drug prices (perpetuated by lobbying-influenced government avoidance of price controls), relatively high coverage denials (which Congress and the executive branch refuse to regulate), and lack of vision or dental coverage unless people use "Medicare" Advantage (which currently gives private insurers too much leeway to raise costs for the government without a corresponding healthcare benefit [1]).
Anyway, I think parent comment to yours is using single-payer in the sense that implies universal healthcare [2].
> I suspect it goes to explain why this new bill is bipartisan. That case failed because the plaintiffs did not have a legal standing to sue.
In that case (Murthy v. Missouri), Missouri and Louisiana did not have standing to sue because they did not demonstrate a minimum of evidence that the government coerced (as opposed to requested) platforms to remove speech.
> This new bill seem to make it much easier to give people a legal standing to sue, thus allowing the supreme court to give a different verdict if a similar situation happen again.
The lack of standing was not due to something like "no law says you can sue for such a violation". This law solves a problem that courts did not consider in Murthy v. Missouri.
> There are DOZENS of cases applying Section 230(c)(1) to removal decisions, so for the court to think that it’s spotted something that all of those other courts have missed is laughable…and completely gratuitous…and ultimately inconsequential given that the court still tosses the case.
> The court tries to justify its reluctance on Section 230(c)(1):
>> There is little reason to strain the reach of the immunity in Section 230(c)(1) when, as in this case, the immunity in Section 230(c)(2) leads to the same result.
> NOOOO. There are several excellent reasons to apply both 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2):
> (1) 230(c)(1) doesn’t have a good faith prerequisite, which has mucked up 230(c)(2) jurisprudence and made 12(b)(6) dismissals much more difficult to obtain, jacking up the litigation costs for both sides and giving false hope to bogus claims. Indeed, because the court dismissed this case without prejudice, I’m sure an amended complaint will try again to manufacture bad faith sufficient to kick the case into very expensive discovery;
> (2) removal and leave-up decisions are two sides of the same decision, i.e., every editorial decision about an item of third-party content is either a leave-up or removal decision, so they cannot be separated; and
> (3) the statute and 25+ years of caselaw have established the principle that 230(c)(1) applies to removal decisions.