Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity (1994)(naturalism.org)
naturalism.org
Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity (1994)
https://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/death/death-nothingness-and-subjectivity
33 comments
Now go see The Prestige.
Could someone explain to a layman what this article is trying to say?
Something akin to: "When you die you're dead, so you can't "experience" nothingmess, hence death can't be nothingess".
In other words, he just means "death is not an experienced nothingness".
Well, big deal. It's still nothingness, as far as we're concerned as living beings now (when we consider our death).
In other words, he just means "death is not an experienced nothingness".
Well, big deal. It's still nothingness, as far as we're concerned as living beings now (when we consider our death).
When people like Asimov expressed their view on death--nothingness--they probably meant the same thing this Author is trying to say here.
I would say when most people say death is nothingness, they don't mean there will be a remnant of them expericing nothingness, they just mean nothingness.
I feel this author is just intentionally misinterpreting people's words.
People have different ideas of what this common idea of "nothingness" after death even means. I hadnt considered that. But it is perhaps irrelevant, within the framework of thinking I have about these things.
If there's nothing after death. That will last forever. This nothingness will be an infinite nothingness after death. Then, even if the experience of nothingness is timeless/instantaneous, the infinitude of this nothingness becomes qualitatively different. Because you can't have infinity pass instantaneously. Say there's some point after which there's infinitely no life. Then, and only then, this forever of nothingness is as good as experienced. A paradoxically instantaneous yet infinite time of non experience. Essentially a non experience, that we can't experience, forever. At that extreme it becomes akin to an experience. This is how I could agree one could imagine there is nothingness forever after death.
Still there remains the issue of whether or not this nothingness actually occurs. If it's the case that it does, how are we not there already? Almost surely, I'd find myself in the infinitely dead timespan of the universe rather than in the relatively zero sized timespan of the universe in which life exists. The infinitely unconscious tail end of the universe would be like an inescapable trap.
The idea that if infinite experience of any sort exists I would be experiencing it already also requires some justification. To me, I lean more toward the ideas of determinism, and that time isn't so absolute as we tend to experience it. The block universe, perhaps. I think that the theories of relativity lend credence to this seeing as they show us that time is very real but that there is no absolute reference frame from which time is ticking along at the same rate always for everyone within it. Add to these ideas that you could have woken up at any time in the past, as someone living hundreds of thousands of years ago, but did not. Equally, there's no reason why you didn't wake up as anyone in the future. Contentious, I know, but that goes along with my "b theory" belief of time. And we are living in the future, compared to those who found themselves waking up in the past. Why did you wake up into this particular body? Why not one of the past or future? Why not as anybody else? Why did I wake up as me? And then imagine, if ever I "wake", just as I woke into this body, into some experience that is infinite, then I will be trapped forever.
If there's nothing after death. That will last forever. This nothingness will be an infinite nothingness after death. Then, even if the experience of nothingness is timeless/instantaneous, the infinitude of this nothingness becomes qualitatively different. Because you can't have infinity pass instantaneously. Say there's some point after which there's infinitely no life. Then, and only then, this forever of nothingness is as good as experienced. A paradoxically instantaneous yet infinite time of non experience. Essentially a non experience, that we can't experience, forever. At that extreme it becomes akin to an experience. This is how I could agree one could imagine there is nothingness forever after death.
Still there remains the issue of whether or not this nothingness actually occurs. If it's the case that it does, how are we not there already? Almost surely, I'd find myself in the infinitely dead timespan of the universe rather than in the relatively zero sized timespan of the universe in which life exists. The infinitely unconscious tail end of the universe would be like an inescapable trap.
The idea that if infinite experience of any sort exists I would be experiencing it already also requires some justification. To me, I lean more toward the ideas of determinism, and that time isn't so absolute as we tend to experience it. The block universe, perhaps. I think that the theories of relativity lend credence to this seeing as they show us that time is very real but that there is no absolute reference frame from which time is ticking along at the same rate always for everyone within it. Add to these ideas that you could have woken up at any time in the past, as someone living hundreds of thousands of years ago, but did not. Equally, there's no reason why you didn't wake up as anyone in the future. Contentious, I know, but that goes along with my "b theory" belief of time. And we are living in the future, compared to those who found themselves waking up in the past. Why did you wake up into this particular body? Why not one of the past or future? Why not as anybody else? Why did I wake up as me? And then imagine, if ever I "wake", just as I woke into this body, into some experience that is infinite, then I will be trapped forever.
Imagine a star trek transporter was a real thing. In that show, I think the common explanation was that the transporter didn't send you places, but merely created a copy of you somewhere else and destroyed the original.
Now imagine if it were possible to instantly and cheaply travel to Paris this way. Many people would likely be just fine with doing this.
Now imagine that one day, the transporter doesn't destroy the original you and now two copies of you exist. From that moment on, the individual experiences diverge but each copy believes it's the original.
If ten days after that a technician came and said "ok, time to disintegrate you, don't worry, your copy in Paris is A-OK" I think that most people wouldn't agree to be disintegrated just because another mostly identical consciousness is alive.
And yet, if it were to happen flawlessly and instantaneously, likely that same existential fear doesn't exist. Most people think the star trek transporter is pretty cool.
But why? We have to realize that our consciousness is really an evolutionary trick that's expedient for our continued survival. The idea that the survival of my own ego and continuous conscious experience is pretty much the basest mechanism I have that makes me value staying alive.
But there's a paradox in the case of my exact copy. Logically, I shouldn't care of the star trek transporter works instantaneously or not. Let's say that it makes a copy that exists for twenty minutes before disintegrating me, but I have no way of knowing that and instead just sit in a room bored for twenty minutes until disintegration. Functionally that's a nearly identical experience to instant transport, but also seems a lot more like the broken transporter scenario.
But let's say this is the future of travel and everyone accepts the fact that my continued conscious experience is what's really important, so I'm willing to be disintegrated painlessly as long as a copy of me exists somewhere else in the universe.
That's not too big a leap to make, but it seems strange, right? Why am I not then just fine being disintegrated as long as any consciousness continues to exist?
My answer to that question is that it's an evolutionary advantage to want to live, therefore we want to live. A bit of circular reasoning. It's also our species' biggest unquestioned assumption too - that consciousness and self-awareness is better than the alternative. But "better" might just be "important to the survival of the human species."
I think the article touches on that.
Now imagine if it were possible to instantly and cheaply travel to Paris this way. Many people would likely be just fine with doing this.
Now imagine that one day, the transporter doesn't destroy the original you and now two copies of you exist. From that moment on, the individual experiences diverge but each copy believes it's the original.
If ten days after that a technician came and said "ok, time to disintegrate you, don't worry, your copy in Paris is A-OK" I think that most people wouldn't agree to be disintegrated just because another mostly identical consciousness is alive.
And yet, if it were to happen flawlessly and instantaneously, likely that same existential fear doesn't exist. Most people think the star trek transporter is pretty cool.
But why? We have to realize that our consciousness is really an evolutionary trick that's expedient for our continued survival. The idea that the survival of my own ego and continuous conscious experience is pretty much the basest mechanism I have that makes me value staying alive.
But there's a paradox in the case of my exact copy. Logically, I shouldn't care of the star trek transporter works instantaneously or not. Let's say that it makes a copy that exists for twenty minutes before disintegrating me, but I have no way of knowing that and instead just sit in a room bored for twenty minutes until disintegration. Functionally that's a nearly identical experience to instant transport, but also seems a lot more like the broken transporter scenario.
But let's say this is the future of travel and everyone accepts the fact that my continued conscious experience is what's really important, so I'm willing to be disintegrated painlessly as long as a copy of me exists somewhere else in the universe.
That's not too big a leap to make, but it seems strange, right? Why am I not then just fine being disintegrated as long as any consciousness continues to exist?
My answer to that question is that it's an evolutionary advantage to want to live, therefore we want to live. A bit of circular reasoning. It's also our species' biggest unquestioned assumption too - that consciousness and self-awareness is better than the alternative. But "better" might just be "important to the survival of the human species."
I think the article touches on that.
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Would many people really be totally fine with getting disintegrated and a copy made immediately, if they knew that's what was happening? Even if it's instant I think that if you told someone they would be killed and an exact clone of them could get a free trip to Paris there'd be a very low chance they'd agree to it.
What an enormous amount of words just to say: When you die you are not there anymore to experience the nothingness that you often picture death to be like.
I kept thinking that something profound was coming but no.
Edit: Perhaps it is interesting that so many non-theistic historical figures do reference death as a nothingness and suggest that that nothingness is somehow experienced by some remainder of one’s being, which is of course bit of a spiritual stance. A paradox in their worldview perhaps? Or just a sign that to drop a believe in god does not mean to drop believe in a soul, for some at least?
I kept thinking that something profound was coming but no.
Edit: Perhaps it is interesting that so many non-theistic historical figures do reference death as a nothingness and suggest that that nothingness is somehow experienced by some remainder of one’s being, which is of course bit of a spiritual stance. A paradox in their worldview perhaps? Or just a sign that to drop a believe in god does not mean to drop believe in a soul, for some at least?
I think it is quite profound since many people seem to fear death because they imagine it is nothingness. But nothingness contains neither things to be feared nor a perceiver to fear them if they did.
On the other hand I highly doubt that nothingness actually exists. Why should we expect the arising of experience to be a one off occurrence ?
If the void exists it has a major bug because experience (ie. non-void) somehow arose from it and every programmer knows that bugs always repeat.
On the other hand I highly doubt that nothingness actually exists. Why should we expect the arising of experience to be a one off occurrence ?
If the void exists it has a major bug because experience (ie. non-void) somehow arose from it and every programmer knows that bugs always repeat.
Hmm I guess after attaining my current worldview and dropping religion, I stopped worrying about death as a “state”. Because I was not uncomfortable before I was born I always reasoned. I tell my kids the same if they ask what is after death? I ask them back, what was it like before being born? It will be like that. Of course I still don't want to die.
I think that reasoning makes sense up to a point. But how do you know you weren't uncomfortable before you were born ? There were likely times you were uncomfortable when you were a baby but you don't remember them.
It’s not memory I’m relying on, but evidence. All the evidence, not to mention common sense, points to conscious experience requiring a brain.
> It’s not memory I’m relying on, but evidence.
I'm pretty sure you are relying on memory because how do you know this "evidence" other than by experiencing it as memories ?
What is certain is that this "evidence" is only known to you within conscious experience (either memories, thoughts, or maybe some other kind of experience I haven't thought of) so using it to infer something about the nature of conscious experience itself is a questionable exercise.
I'm pretty sure you are relying on memory because how do you know this "evidence" other than by experiencing it as memories ?
What is certain is that this "evidence" is only known to you within conscious experience (either memories, thoughts, or maybe some other kind of experience I haven't thought of) so using it to infer something about the nature of conscious experience itself is a questionable exercise.
It’s very easy in these philosophical discussions to just throw your hands up in the air and say “well we can never know anything because everything is subjective”, but personally I think that’s boring.
It's interesting that you think the fundamental nature of reality depends on what you find "boring" or not.
In any case I disagree that we know nothing. We know that subjective experience exists. I think it makes sense to start with what we actually know rather than with a bunch of concepts we've invented (like matter) to explain the phenomena we experience. The only basis I see for believing in the reality of these concepts is their apparent consistency and predictability, but even that is largely illusory once you move beyond very simple systems or machines that we've designed to be predictable.
In any case I disagree that we know nothing. We know that subjective experience exists. I think it makes sense to start with what we actually know rather than with a bunch of concepts we've invented (like matter) to explain the phenomena we experience. The only basis I see for believing in the reality of these concepts is their apparent consistency and predictability, but even that is largely illusory once you move beyond very simple systems or machines that we've designed to be predictable.
> It's interesting that you think the fundamental nature of reality depends on what you find "boring" or not.
I did not say this, I said the discussion is boring because it’s not falsifiable. We might as well just say fairies are real but not perceivable by humans or any device humans can build. It could be true, but who cares? We’ll never know one way or the other by definition.
I did not say this, I said the discussion is boring because it’s not falsifiable. We might as well just say fairies are real but not perceivable by humans or any device humans can build. It could be true, but who cares? We’ll never know one way or the other by definition.
But that example is unlike what we were discussing. If I were making the claim that some completely unknown and unknowable thing exists then your objection would be on point, but that is not what I am doing. What I am doing is challenging your claim that things like matter and brains exist independently of consciousness, because the evidence you have for that claim is tainted by the fact that the evidence itself is known only via conscious experience.
In many ways materialism is more like your example about unknowable fairies than anything I have said because ultimately it postulates that there is something called matter that exists independently of consciousness and yet is knowable only through consciousness. That concept of "bare matter" as a thing in itself looks a lot like your unknowable fairies.
In many ways materialism is more like your example about unknowable fairies than anything I have said because ultimately it postulates that there is something called matter that exists independently of consciousness and yet is knowable only through consciousness. That concept of "bare matter" as a thing in itself looks a lot like your unknowable fairies.
>Why should we expect the arising of experience to be a one off occurrence ?
Given 7.9 billion people alive right now, give or take, I'm not quite sure where the idea it might be a one-off occurrence comes from.
But even if you mean our individual personal experience, I'm not sure what that would mean. A copy of me would think and experience in ways similar to me to a point, but we would still have different and distinct actual individual experiences of being.
Given 7.9 billion people alive right now, give or take, I'm not quite sure where the idea it might be a one-off occurrence comes from.
But even if you mean our individual personal experience, I'm not sure what that would mean. A copy of me would think and experience in ways similar to me to a point, but we would still have different and distinct actual individual experiences of being.
Well, I think that most people don't believe in reincarnation.
> reincarnation
The idea leads to so many questions. In your version, is the reincarnated person conscious of their past selves? If not, is that any different than a clone? What happens between death and reincarnation? How does the math work? Is there an upper limit to the number of human consciousnesses that can be incarnated at once? Non-human consciousnesses? Non-sentient ones?
Along those lines: what is it that links (solely) my body with (solely) my consciousness? Why do I experience only my own experiences and not that of my friend's? How can I prove to myself that I'm not a brain in a vat?
The idea leads to so many questions. In your version, is the reincarnated person conscious of their past selves? If not, is that any different than a clone? What happens between death and reincarnation? How does the math work? Is there an upper limit to the number of human consciousnesses that can be incarnated at once? Non-human consciousnesses? Non-sentient ones?
Along those lines: what is it that links (solely) my body with (solely) my consciousness? Why do I experience only my own experiences and not that of my friend's? How can I prove to myself that I'm not a brain in a vat?
I'm not sure why you say "in my version" because I didn't say I believed in reincarnation, just that the parent's comment kind of only makes sense if you do.
Personally I have no particularly strong views on these matters but some form of non-dualism (in the the sense of advaita vedanta) seems to me to make the most sense.
From that perspective many of your questions kind of go away because at the most fundamental level there is only one consciousness. You don't perceive the experiences of others because consciousness has created a construct within itself that filters out experiences that don't make sense from "your" point of view. The part that I admit is difficult to get one's head around is that it has created not one but many (perhaps even infinitely many) such constructs. We are only able to experience one dream at a time but absolute consciousness/brahman/God/I or whatever you want to call it experiences many.
EDIT: Sorry I did want to address one of your questions more specifically:
> How can I prove to myself that I'm not a brain in a vat?
I don't think you can, even in principle.
In fact advaita is a lot like that in some ways, or like the simulation hypothesis. Where I think it differs is that "brain in a vat" and the simulation hypothesis are both making assumptions that what's outside the simulation is something like what's inside it. Advaita makes no such assumptions.
Personally I have no particularly strong views on these matters but some form of non-dualism (in the the sense of advaita vedanta) seems to me to make the most sense.
From that perspective many of your questions kind of go away because at the most fundamental level there is only one consciousness. You don't perceive the experiences of others because consciousness has created a construct within itself that filters out experiences that don't make sense from "your" point of view. The part that I admit is difficult to get one's head around is that it has created not one but many (perhaps even infinitely many) such constructs. We are only able to experience one dream at a time but absolute consciousness/brahman/God/I or whatever you want to call it experiences many.
EDIT: Sorry I did want to address one of your questions more specifically:
> How can I prove to myself that I'm not a brain in a vat?
I don't think you can, even in principle.
In fact advaita is a lot like that in some ways, or like the simulation hypothesis. Where I think it differs is that "brain in a vat" and the simulation hypothesis are both making assumptions that what's outside the simulation is something like what's inside it. Advaita makes no such assumptions.
> I'm not sure why you say "in my version" because I didn't say I believed in reincarnation
That was just shorthand for "in what you mean when you say reincarnation".
That was just shorthand for "in what you mean when you say reincarnation".
I actually don't think it's arguing for that typical stance, but rather for conscious experience to always 'be' in some sense regardless of specific physical instantiation. It seems purposefully vague, but it's almost more like Hinduism than the typical atheistic interpretation.
Unfortunately, more often than not, words begin having a life of their own. Speaking of “nothingness,” if we must, isn’t it obvious that the only instance of it is exactly the (absence of the) very person who is dead, and that it’s us still living who experience it?
>The same is true of the time after death. There will be no future personal state of non-experience to which we can compare our present state of being conscious. All we have, as subjects, is this block of experience. We know, of course, that it is a finite block, but since that's all we have, we cannot experience its finitude.
Yeah, you just re-invented nothingness after death, just with more words...
Yeah, you just re-invented nothingness after death, just with more words...
So. Many. Words. What was the point of this article? I'd rather die than read it.
The reification of the nothingness after death is warranted insofar as we compare it to the alternative of not dying. The continued life is certainly a real thing, so there is (negative?) reality to its absence. Otherwise murder wouldn’t be a felony.
By why would that “negative reality” of yours only extend into the future but not also into the past, i.e. the time before birth?
Because there is no hope for an earlier life in the past, as opposed to for a later life in the future. While we mentally live both in the past and in the future (and only little in the present), it’s not symmetric. We usually live for a better future. Depression for example is correlated with hopelessness for the future. You can’t lose hope for the past, because you consider it immutable and (usually) known, whereas the future is in flux and can be influenced, and is yet unknown (to some degree). The prospect of death on the other hand is incompatible with any subjective future one could hope for.
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Being thinking about the question of time and death for some time :p
If ever consciousness still exist after death (that is termination of physical body functions), then it would be out of our material dimension, thus out of time.
So there is no "life after death", because there can be no "after" when out of this dimension.
It could be like consciousness being "disconnected" from the time conveyor belt.
Need another beer...
I once read a bunch of accounts of near-death experiences. Descriptions run the gamut, but the one that stuck with me described it as “turning off a light switch.”
Shout out to Peter F. Hamilton’s Reality Dysfunction trilogy, in which an interstellar humanity is threatened by the discovery that souls persist after death. Recommended for my fellow sci-fi aficionados.
Shout out to Peter F. Hamilton’s Reality Dysfunction trilogy, in which an interstellar humanity is threatened by the discovery that souls persist after death. Recommended for my fellow sci-fi aficionados.