“Dates and times when a file or object was modified are used to sort a user’s information, and checksums of file and photo data are used to help Apple de-duplicate and optimize the user’s iCloud and device storage—all without having access to the files and photos themselves.”
So Apple only encrypts the files but not the metadata? If that's true the encryption is basically worthless because Apple is still able to "see" what files you upload and scan them for CSAM, copyright infringement or videos of 1989 Tiananmen Square.
>Bound to a political party or another
That's the difference between Fox News and RT. Even though the US president is a democrat now, Fox News is still broadcasting Republican views. But as soon as Russia replaces its president, RT is going to broadcast exactly his or her views.
That's really cool. I'm shifting my digital life from my MacBook to my iPhone right now - and blogging from my notes app sounds like an easy way to stay in touch with the world.
Axel Springer's biggest newspaper is BILD - and it's like the German version of The Sun in Great Britain. The reception section in BILD's Wikipedia article has some interesting "highlights" from the paper's history:
> * Apple should be fined to impose such a huge internet traffic for... nothing: each iOS or here macOS minor update weighs hundreds of megabytes, sometimes even gigabytes*
Most YouTube videos and Netflix movies I watch use more bandwidth than Apple‘s updates. Do you want to fine them too?
This gets better every day. It‘s really interesting how Apple destroyed its heavily marketed privacy image in like two days. And instead of stopping they double down with every new press release. That‘s really some courage right there.
The question is why Apple implemented this feature in the first place. There was no reason for them to suddenly expand their image scanning to the devices themselves and risk their position as the self-proclaimed saviors of privacy - and still they did exactly that. There had to be some push from the government behind all of that, otherwise this debacle just doesn't make any sense.
> The same set of hashes is stored in the operating system of every iPhone and iPad user, so targeted attacks against only specific individuals are not possible under our design.
The problem with this sentence is that Apple assumes that they can't target specific individuals because every iPhone and iPad user has the exact same database in their iOS device.
But what if they have a hash in the database where they know that only one person has this exact image on their device? This way you could single out one individual with the same database.
They also could embed the whole database into iOS and activate certain hashes only for certain iCloud accounts. No one would know because the database is encrypted multiple times.
I thought about that as well. They rushed to publish some unpolished PR pieces and FAQs right after the announcement and at very unusual times (3am in Cupertino) trying to damage control so my guess would be as well that they didn't even consider the backlash. Maybe they were really proud about the technology they implemented. It's a little bit sad if you think about it.
My guess is that they're going to put it into the macOS Photos app. Those images are already scanned for people, animals and objects so it should be easy for them to implement the child protection database there.
It's the same as with parents photographing their naked babies in the bathtub. Those images won't be flagged because they aren't in the database provided to Apple. Only verified illegal photos should be in the database. So you and your girlfriend will be fine.
> Can non-CSAM images be “injected” into the system to flag accounts for things other than CSAM?
Our process is designed to prevent that from happening. The set of image hashes used for matching are from known, existing images of CSAM that have been acquired and validated by child safety organizations. Apple does not add to the set of known CSAM image hashes.
The problem is not that Apple can't add images to the database but that organizations from the outside can inject any hashes to the new, constantly sniffing system at the heart of iOS, padOS and macOS. Apple has no way to verify those or any hashes before they get injected into the database.
If the system detects any matches only some overworked and underpaid content checker from Bangladesh is there to stop your life from being destroyed by some SWAT team crashing through your front door at 3am, killing your barking dog. And who knows if those foreign sweatshops are even trustable.
https://support.apple.com/guide/security/advanced-data-prote...
So Apple only encrypts the files but not the metadata? If that's true the encryption is basically worthless because Apple is still able to "see" what files you upload and scan them for CSAM, copyright infringement or videos of 1989 Tiananmen Square.