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bem94

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bem94
·قبل شهرين·discuss
I have only read a few passages (and some of the excellent quotes others have shared here), but I find the underlying message here so much more compelling than those found in the various "manifestos" which come out of Silicon Valley.

I think reading this helps me imagine a version of the future I'd actually like to live in. A version where technology is used well (rather than preaching for abstinence from technology) and where values other than "intelligence" (in whatever guise) are on an equal footing.

Even writing that makes me feel naive (and to an extent I know it is) but I think it would be inconsistent for someone who cheers for humanity's efforts to solve/chip away at "impossible" problems (like LLMs were thought to be not so long ago) to shirk from the challenge of making the world better for _everyone_.
bem94
·قبل شهرين·discuss
All national agencies I'm aware of do not support QKD except in "very specific cases" and instead recommend Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).

From the UK NCSC [1]:

> QKD does not provide authentication, nor do any other quantum techniques. Therefore, in practice, QKD must be combined with other cryptographic services to provide security against the threat from quantum computing, and therefore should not be relied on as a mechanism that provides substantial security value. [...] The NCSC will not support the use of QKD for government or military applications. PQC is the best mitigation to the threat to cryptography from quantum computers.

And the German BSI (and partners)[2]:

> Together with European partner agencies from France, the Netherlands and Sweden, the BSI has published a Position Paper on QKD. The paper concludes that QKD can only be used in niche use cases due to its technological limitations and that QKD is not yet sufficiently mature from a security perspective. Therefore, in light of the necessary migration to quantum-safe schemes, the clear priority should be the migration to post-quantum cryptography.

This is despite different choices for which PQC algorithms to use. E.g. NIST (and many others including the UK) have gone initially with ML-KEM for key exchange, while Germany/BSI have selected FrodoKEM and Classic McEliece.

[1] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/paper/quantum-networking-technologie... [2] https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Themen/Unternehmen-und-Organisati...
bem94
·قبل 4 أشهر·discuss
I'd expect a finding / paper like this to be submitted to the IACR ePrint server [1] to bring it to the attention of the cryptographic community. I can't see that it's been submitted yet.

Venue should not imply credibility but in this case it would certainly help bring the proper scrutiny.

[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/