A hackrf is less expensive than a flipper and more capable in every way, except the dolphin gifs.
The flipper's primary use is that looks like a children's toy, which makes it far more effective for demos of how bad an orgs security is to not-especially-technical stakeholders than something like a hackrf or chameleon
There is much better hardware available to security researchers (chameleons, hackrf, and actually research-grade (much more expensive) equipment).
The flipper is basically an Arduino pre built with a bunch of static antennas. It's fine and in a decent form factor, but I really haven't found it useful.
Do you have any links to actual research (not children playing "researcher") done with flipper hardware?
The fury X was a beast for a consumer card, sadly limited by having a mere 4gb of (hbm) VRAM, and a non-refillable AIO. But back when games could fit in 4gb, it was incredible.
I'd absolutely buy another hbm consumer GPU if it had at least 8gb (and if I got the vibe/hope AMD will actually support for a couple years...)
> TPM isn't for "security" in the abstract, it's fundamentally for authentication
What on earth do you think I make my users present keys for???
You know all those guides saying "you should never copy an ssh private key over the network. Make a new one for each device" that every idiot dev ignored? Now I can enforce that.
This article's method is bad, basically the same as systemd-creds (not itself bad, just extremely compatible), take a look at tpm-ssh-agent or gnupg for how to do that part the right way (the party they don't do right is bind/sign to pcrs, which is just low hanging fruit in today's day and age...)
If you run into the link to this, is love to read it. Proper, modern, pcrphase binding with a signing key should remove these firmware update issues irt the raw pcr value changing
I set up my orgs SPF/DKIM/DMARC (we self host, they have feelings about corporate data sovereignity...) it look about 30 min having never touched them before, and maybe another 15 to write an ansible playbook to rotate the keys.
We do have a _tremendous_ amount of spam fail these checks, as well as a few legitimate organizations.... Some of our peer companies have sent out notices that they will bounce anything that fail these checks in the coming years, and we're probably going to to do the same before too long.