Manhattan Project: Australian physicist alerted Britain to US secrecy plan(cosmosmagazine.com)
cosmosmagazine.com
Manhattan Project: Australian physicist alerted Britain to US secrecy plan
https://cosmosmagazine.com/physics/manhattan-project-australian-physicist-alerted-britain-to-us-secrecy-plan
25 comments
Richard Rhodes writes about these subject in 'The Making of Hydrogen Bomb' and 'Arsenals of Folly', but I wouldn't summarize it the way you did...
Richard Rhodes had a particular axe to grind. I would suggest looking at Atcheson and primary sources before Rhodes. You are also mixing titles - Making of the Atomic Bomb, Dark Sun and Arsenals of Folly.
Making of the Atomic Bomb is amazing... but also bone chilling when you realize that scientists were basically advocating a dictatorship of technocrats.
Making of the Atomic Bomb is amazing... but also bone chilling when you realize that scientists were basically advocating a dictatorship of technocrats.
Given post war history, can you say it would have been much worse than what we've had?
The last 60 years have been a study in how to keep the forms of democracy while making a dictatorship of the billionaires.
The last 60 years have been a study in how to keep the forms of democracy while making a dictatorship of the billionaires.
> The last 60 years have been a study in how to keep the forms of democracy while making a dictatorship of the billionaires.
The political system was even more run by the elites 60 years ago. For one example, we raise issues now that party insiders or elite-written election rules may somewhat distort the results of the primaries (and caucuses that are open to most party-registered voters, though they are more time consuming and for that reason exclusionary than primaries), 60 years ago we had the same partisan duopoly, without even a fig-leaf of meaningful primary elections, where caucused were much more limited in participation.
The political system was even more run by the elites 60 years ago. For one example, we raise issues now that party insiders or elite-written election rules may somewhat distort the results of the primaries (and caucuses that are open to most party-registered voters, though they are more time consuming and for that reason exclusionary than primaries), 60 years ago we had the same partisan duopoly, without even a fig-leaf of meaningful primary elections, where caucused were much more limited in participation.
Yet today we have a system that benefits the rich far more than the one in 1958. This is what I mean by the forms of democracy. We have even quantified it [0].
That we got the vote for blacks in the south isn't much of a win, from then on the poor blacks along with the poor whites have been disenfranchised through other means.
That we don't elect representative in smoke filled rooms doesn't mean much when the control has moved to selecting who gets to vote in the primaries [1].
[0] www.princeton.edu/~mgilens/Gilens%20homepage%20materials/Gilens%20and%20Page/Gilens%20and%20Page%202014-Testing%20Theories%203-7-14.pdf
[1] https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/19/politics/new-york-primary...
That we got the vote for blacks in the south isn't much of a win, from then on the poor blacks along with the poor whites have been disenfranchised through other means.
That we don't elect representative in smoke filled rooms doesn't mean much when the control has moved to selecting who gets to vote in the primaries [1].
[0] www.princeton.edu/~mgilens/Gilens%20homepage%20materials/Gilens%20and%20Page/Gilens%20and%20Page%202014-Testing%20Theories%203-7-14.pdf
[1] https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/19/politics/new-york-primary...
This is an incinderary comment: "benefits the rich far more than the one in 1958."
First, that would require a tremendous amount of data and an inherently biased framework of benefits valuation to support.
Second, you can't demonstrate the opposite, namely, that without the first happening, all others would have been better off. Sometimes wealth and structural freedoms benefit all participants, not to the detriment of the lower end, even when opportunity costs are included.
Not saying you are wrong, but your argument is.
First, that would require a tremendous amount of data and an inherently biased framework of benefits valuation to support.
Second, you can't demonstrate the opposite, namely, that without the first happening, all others would have been better off. Sometimes wealth and structural freedoms benefit all participants, not to the detriment of the lower end, even when opportunity costs are included.
Not saying you are wrong, but your argument is.
It's worth remembering the other people involved in this. Peierls and Frisch worked under Oliphant at the University of Birmingham, and they wrote the memorandum which formed a major part of the Tizard Mission to the US. This also included the much better design for the Cavity Magnetron, also developed in Birmingham by Randall and Boot, who also worked for Oliphant.
In 1943 a British delegation led by James Chadwick (who discovered the neutron and won the 1935 Nobel Prize) went to work on the Manhattan Project, and included Oliphant, Peierls and Frisch, as well as Klaus Fuchs (who it turned out was a Soviet spy) and Tony Skyrme (more famous for his work on what later became known as 'skyrmions'), all from Birmingham, the Danish Physicist Neils Bohr (Nobel Prize winner in 1922) and Lord Cherwell who had invited Bohr to England and who was an advisor to Churchill and who advocated area bombings of Germany. The British techological 'Tube Alloys' programme was absorbed into the Manhattan project.
Bohr advocated sharing the technological developments with the Russians, and met both Churchill and Roosevelt in attempts to try and convince them of this. The British mission basically left with the passing of the Atomic Energy Act 1946 which prohibited the sharing of nuclear secrets with allies by the US government. It wasn't until a few years after the British developed their own nuclear warheads (the first being the Blue Danube) that cooperation on nuclear warhead technology began again in 1958.
In 1943 a British delegation led by James Chadwick (who discovered the neutron and won the 1935 Nobel Prize) went to work on the Manhattan Project, and included Oliphant, Peierls and Frisch, as well as Klaus Fuchs (who it turned out was a Soviet spy) and Tony Skyrme (more famous for his work on what later became known as 'skyrmions'), all from Birmingham, the Danish Physicist Neils Bohr (Nobel Prize winner in 1922) and Lord Cherwell who had invited Bohr to England and who was an advisor to Churchill and who advocated area bombings of Germany. The British techological 'Tube Alloys' programme was absorbed into the Manhattan project.
Bohr advocated sharing the technological developments with the Russians, and met both Churchill and Roosevelt in attempts to try and convince them of this. The British mission basically left with the passing of the Atomic Energy Act 1946 which prohibited the sharing of nuclear secrets with allies by the US government. It wasn't until a few years after the British developed their own nuclear warheads (the first being the Blue Danube) that cooperation on nuclear warhead technology began again in 1958.
The heart of TFA:
Holden, however, reveals documents that indicate on one occasion he risked leaking information of such potential magnitude that the FBI might well have taken drastic action against him had he been discovered. Certainly, it imperilled the cooperative relationship between the two nations regarding weapons research – by revealing that the cooperation was, in fact, only going one way.
The researcher details a 1944 meeting at Berkeley, California, between Oliphant, Nobel laureate Ernest Lawrence and the military man in charge of the Manhattan Project, General Leslie Groves. At the fiery meeting, Groves – usually a very discreet operator – let it slip that there were some parts of the research that were not being shared with the British.
An imminent visit to Washington DC by one of Winston Churchill’s closest advisors, Lord Cherwell, was to be an exercise in misdirection. Further, Groves revealed, after the end of World War II the US intended to ensure that nuclear weapons manufacture and the storage of nuclear material would happen only in the central portions of North America.
Secretly appalled by this, Oliphant – Holden plausibly suggests – stopped work almost immediately and then travelled, perhaps for three days on a train, to the British embassy in Washington DC, and there sent a confidential memo to the British authorities, blowing the whistle on the US intentions.
Was putting nuclear weapons manufacture and storage in the central parts of the US part of keeping the technology secret?
Holden, however, reveals documents that indicate on one occasion he risked leaking information of such potential magnitude that the FBI might well have taken drastic action against him had he been discovered. Certainly, it imperilled the cooperative relationship between the two nations regarding weapons research – by revealing that the cooperation was, in fact, only going one way.
The researcher details a 1944 meeting at Berkeley, California, between Oliphant, Nobel laureate Ernest Lawrence and the military man in charge of the Manhattan Project, General Leslie Groves. At the fiery meeting, Groves – usually a very discreet operator – let it slip that there were some parts of the research that were not being shared with the British.
An imminent visit to Washington DC by one of Winston Churchill’s closest advisors, Lord Cherwell, was to be an exercise in misdirection. Further, Groves revealed, after the end of World War II the US intended to ensure that nuclear weapons manufacture and the storage of nuclear material would happen only in the central portions of North America.
Secretly appalled by this, Oliphant – Holden plausibly suggests – stopped work almost immediately and then travelled, perhaps for three days on a train, to the British embassy in Washington DC, and there sent a confidential memo to the British authorities, blowing the whistle on the US intentions.
Was putting nuclear weapons manufacture and storage in the central parts of the US part of keeping the technology secret?
Also further away from long range bombers, though I don't know if that was an immediate concern prior to the cold war, but surely anticipated. Fissile materials are made further towards the coasts, but production and assembly is in Kansas City and Amarillo. Not to mention missile fields and bombers also in the central states.
There is an interesting documentary about how Britain dealt with nuclear materials despite not having remote locations like the US. It may be "Windscale: Britain's Biggest Nuclear Disaster", but I'm sorry if that's the wrong title.
Saw that recently on YouTube. A plutonium fire in an air cooled reactor; what a mess.
Luckily the chimney had a filter - known as a cockcrofts folly when it was constructed.
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-cumbria-29803990
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-cumbria-29803990
> Further, Groves revealed, after the end of World War II the US intended to ensure that nuclear weapons manufacture and the storage of nuclear material would happen only in the central portions of North America.
Besides the implications for international cooperation there is a good argument to be made that this was to avoid as much as possible damage after a nuclear accident.
Besides the implications for international cooperation there is a good argument to be made that this was to avoid as much as possible damage after a nuclear accident.
Presumably "only in the central portions of North America" also meant "not in Britain." So not vital to the secrecy, but seemed as though they were planning on stopping Britain from housing or constructing their own.
This was in 1944. Remember that definitely in 1941 (and perhaps even later), there was the very real possibility that Britain would fall to Germany. "Not in Britain" had some very recent and very serious grounds.
And that applied to the knowledge as well. If Britain fell and the information on building a bomb fell into German hands, that was much worse than just Britain falling.
And that applied to the knowledge as well. If Britain fell and the information on building a bomb fell into German hands, that was much worse than just Britain falling.
By 1944, this wasn't much of a risk. Even if you assume it was, it would be a violation of the Quebec Agreement that was signed in 1943. Violating that part of the agreement casts doubt over which other parts of the agreement that they would violate. The US post war strategy was always a concern, more so during what was an election year.
Great Britain's outrage is understandable.
Great Britain's outrage is understandable.
I'd argue that agreements mean much less when genocidal dictators can obtain nuclear weapons.
Also, even if a situation ends, we'll always feel that it's decently probable it can happen again throughout our lifetimes. Ex: Anyone who lived through WWII is much more concerned (and rightfully so) that it could happen again.
The fact that Britain was nearly conquered in 1941 would be enough, with that bias considered.
Also, even if a situation ends, we'll always feel that it's decently probable it can happen again throughout our lifetimes. Ex: Anyone who lived through WWII is much more concerned (and rightfully so) that it could happen again.
The fact that Britain was nearly conquered in 1941 would be enough, with that bias considered.
The deal was signed knowing there was a possibility of the Germans intercepting the bomb. That risk was known, it does not justify reversing the decision.
>Also, even if a situation ends, we'll always feel that it's decently probable it can happen again throughout our lifetimes
Yes, and imagine how terrifying that scenario becomes if the enemy has nuclear weapons and you don't.
>The fact that Britain was nearly conquered in 1941 would be enough, with that bias considered.
Nearly conquered is a massive overstatement for a start. If you consider that too much of a risk to allow Britain to have nukes, the Business Plot was enough to forbid the US from having nukes.
>Also, even if a situation ends, we'll always feel that it's decently probable it can happen again throughout our lifetimes
Yes, and imagine how terrifying that scenario becomes if the enemy has nuclear weapons and you don't.
>The fact that Britain was nearly conquered in 1941 would be enough, with that bias considered.
Nearly conquered is a massive overstatement for a start. If you consider that too much of a risk to allow Britain to have nukes, the Business Plot was enough to forbid the US from having nukes.
Link to abstract: http://www.publish.csiro.au/HR/HR17023
The title suggest he was doing something secretive between three countries but it should be noted that Australia didn’t have non-British passports until 1949 and at that stage Australia was still very much part of Britain.
We might have had British passports, but we were certainly not part of Britain.
We had British passports and British currency. There was a lot of nationalistic work put in after World War 2 so that Australia and NZ would see themselves as completely separate countries.
No we had Australia currency. There certainly was a breakaway from Britain during WWII after Churchill abandoned us and the USA came to our rescue. Curtin pulling the Australian troops out of North Africa was probably the point of no return.
It was a slow divorce from the empire, but it was well advance pre WWII.
In some ways the relationship of Australia (and NZ) was similar to that of the countries of the EU. There was free movement of people (provided you were white) and free trade around the empire, but most people thought of themselves as citizens of their own countries.
It was a slow divorce from the empire, but it was well advance pre WWII.
In some ways the relationship of Australia (and NZ) was similar to that of the countries of the EU. There was free movement of people (provided you were white) and free trade around the empire, but most people thought of themselves as citizens of their own countries.
By "British currency" do you mean the the Australian Pound (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_pound)?
That's not a British currency. The hint is in the name.
That's not a British currency. The hint is in the name.
Lookup the Acheson-Lilienthal Report in 1946. It's a fascinating "road not taken".