Net Neutrality Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal Was Written by Comcast Attorney(theintercept.com)
theintercept.com
Net Neutrality Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal Was Written by Comcast Attorney
https://theintercept.com/2017/12/14/that-net-neutrality-op-ed-in-the-wall-street-journal-was-written-by-a-comcast-attorney/
79 comments
In case you were wondering like what "motte and bailey" means:
https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Motte_and_bailey
https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Motte_and_bailey
I agree that the described debating tactic exists (thank you for sharing the explanation), what I find most interesting is the bailey example given isn't that controversial ("cultural knowledge is just as valid as scientific knowledge"). I suppose it depends on the context in which it was used, but I can think of plenty of examples where such a statement would be banal.
The question is not whether there is just as valid cultural knowledge, but whether culture as a source of knowledge is just as valid as science, which it is not. If cultural knowledge happens to align with sciencific knowledge, then it is valid as well, but what establishes validity is science/the scientific method, not culture.
> "The question is not whether there is just as valid cultural knowledge, but whether culture as a source of knowledge is just as valid as science, which it is not."
Science only truly works in when the properties being explored can be accurately quantified. There are plenty of experiences and occurrences which cannot be accurately quantified. There is a common misconception amongst scientifically-minded people that science can explain everything just because it can explain a wide range of events, from the big bang to the splitting of an atom. The truth is there are certain parts of our experience that make no sense to put a number on, and science will never excel in those spheres.
Science only truly works in when the properties being explored can be accurately quantified. There are plenty of experiences and occurrences which cannot be accurately quantified. There is a common misconception amongst scientifically-minded people that science can explain everything just because it can explain a wide range of events, from the big bang to the splitting of an atom. The truth is there are certain parts of our experience that make no sense to put a number on, and science will never excel in those spheres.
> Science only truly works in when the properties being explored can be accurately quantified.
What about the scientific method makes it so that this supposedly is the case?
> There are plenty of experiences and occurrences which cannot be accurately quantified.
Mind giving an example (for which you also think the scientific method is not applicable)?
> There is a common misconception amongst scientifically-minded people that science can explain everything just because it can explain a wide range of events
I doubt that that is a very wide-spread misconception among scientifically minded people, for the simple reason that a very central aspect of science is to say "I don't know" if ... well, if you don't know. That directly contradicts the supposed belief that "science can explain everything", as saying "I don't know" implies "I don't think science can explain this, at least not yet". If anything, it seems to me like that is a wide-spread misconception among not so scientifically minded people about what scientifically minded people think.
However, the mere fact that science can not explain something does not mean that anything else can, and so far nothing has been demonstrated that could explain anything that science can't.
> The truth is there are certain parts of our experience that make no sense to put a number on, and science will never excel in those spheres.
What does putting numbers on things have to do with any of this?
What about the scientific method makes it so that this supposedly is the case?
> There are plenty of experiences and occurrences which cannot be accurately quantified.
Mind giving an example (for which you also think the scientific method is not applicable)?
> There is a common misconception amongst scientifically-minded people that science can explain everything just because it can explain a wide range of events
I doubt that that is a very wide-spread misconception among scientifically minded people, for the simple reason that a very central aspect of science is to say "I don't know" if ... well, if you don't know. That directly contradicts the supposed belief that "science can explain everything", as saying "I don't know" implies "I don't think science can explain this, at least not yet". If anything, it seems to me like that is a wide-spread misconception among not so scientifically minded people about what scientifically minded people think.
However, the mere fact that science can not explain something does not mean that anything else can, and so far nothing has been demonstrated that could explain anything that science can't.
> The truth is there are certain parts of our experience that make no sense to put a number on, and science will never excel in those spheres.
What does putting numbers on things have to do with any of this?
> "What does putting numbers on things have to do with any of this?"
Before we explore the rest of your questions, we need to establish the fundamentals.
Science is built upon testability. If something can't be tested, we can't extend our scientific understanding of it. The scientific method works by first establishing a hypothesis to test, and then conducting experiments to assess whether the hypothesis was accurate. If you can't verify if the hypothesis is accurate or not then the scientific method doesn't work. You can only verify if something is accurate or not if you can accurately measure it. Measuring something relies on being able to quantify it. Do you disagree with any of the above?
> "I don't think science can explain this, at least not yet"
It's the "at least not yet" that I'm referring to as the misconception. Some things do not lend themselves to measurement, so in some cases it's much more honest to admit we'll probably never be able to accurately measure some things.
To give a simple example, let's say I ask you...
"On a scale of 1 to 10, how unhappy do you feel today?"
Let's also imagine I ask multiple people the same question. What can I infer from this data set? Am I measuring the perception of sadness? What role does the strength of memory play on this? Would I have got a different answer if I asked you 5 minutes later? Is a 7/10 from one person comparable to a 7/10 from another person?
Note that even though the data set is nonsense, the decision on which number between 1 to 10 was based on something (or rather a group of different things), it's just not something that can be boiled down to an accurate model. Any attempt to do so will require such high levels of abstraction that the end result is too far divorced from reality.
To give a more famous example, Douglas Adams' meaning of life being 42, even if you understood the variables used to arrive at this number, what relation does that number have to reality?
In summary, science attempts to describe the order in the chaos, but there are certain aspects of life that do not lend themselves to being reduced in this way. If you accept that, then you can accept that even if science has merit in some fields, it also has its limitations.
Before we explore the rest of your questions, we need to establish the fundamentals.
Science is built upon testability. If something can't be tested, we can't extend our scientific understanding of it. The scientific method works by first establishing a hypothesis to test, and then conducting experiments to assess whether the hypothesis was accurate. If you can't verify if the hypothesis is accurate or not then the scientific method doesn't work. You can only verify if something is accurate or not if you can accurately measure it. Measuring something relies on being able to quantify it. Do you disagree with any of the above?
> "I don't think science can explain this, at least not yet"
It's the "at least not yet" that I'm referring to as the misconception. Some things do not lend themselves to measurement, so in some cases it's much more honest to admit we'll probably never be able to accurately measure some things.
To give a simple example, let's say I ask you...
"On a scale of 1 to 10, how unhappy do you feel today?"
Let's also imagine I ask multiple people the same question. What can I infer from this data set? Am I measuring the perception of sadness? What role does the strength of memory play on this? Would I have got a different answer if I asked you 5 minutes later? Is a 7/10 from one person comparable to a 7/10 from another person?
Note that even though the data set is nonsense, the decision on which number between 1 to 10 was based on something (or rather a group of different things), it's just not something that can be boiled down to an accurate model. Any attempt to do so will require such high levels of abstraction that the end result is too far divorced from reality.
To give a more famous example, Douglas Adams' meaning of life being 42, even if you understood the variables used to arrive at this number, what relation does that number have to reality?
In summary, science attempts to describe the order in the chaos, but there are certain aspects of life that do not lend themselves to being reduced in this way. If you accept that, then you can accept that even if science has merit in some fields, it also has its limitations.
> Science is built upon testability. If something can't be tested, we can't extend our scientific understanding of it.
Yes.
> If you can't verify if the hypothesis is accurate or not then the scientific method doesn't work.
No. Science never verifies, science only falsifies. If something were to be verified successfully, that would mean that falsification would be impossible. If something is not falsifiable, it is not testable, and therefore not science, therefore science does not verify.
> You can only verify if something is accurate or not if you can accurately measure it.
What does "accurate(ly)" mean here?
> Measuring something relies on being able to quantify it.
No, unless you mean that in the very abstract sense that any information can be encoded as numbers.
> It's the "at least not yet" that I'm referring to as the misconception. Some things do not lend themselves to measurement, so in some cases it's much more honest to admit we'll probably never be able to accurately measure something.
I'll take the "to accurately measure something" to mean "to explain something scientifically", as I don't understand what you mean by "accurately measure something", see above.
"at least not yet" means "it's not possible now, possibly it will never be possible, possibly it will be possible at some point", right? So, where does that contradict the "admission" that "we'll probably never be able" to make that a misconception? Aren't you saying essentially the same thing with different words?
> Let's also imagine I ask multiple people the same question. What can I infer from this data set? Am I measuring the perception of sadness?
With noise, as all measurements are, but yes, what else would you be measuring?
> What role does the strength of memory play on this? Would I have got a different answer if I asked you 5 minutes later?
All perfectly fine scientific question that one could investigate, no?
> Is a 7/10 from one person comparable to a 7/10 from another person?
Maybe, maybe not, how is the precision of a measurement relevant to the question of whether it is a measurement?
> Note that even though the data set is nonsense, the decision on which number between 1 to 10 was based on something (or rather a group of different things), it's just not something that can be boiled down to a model. Any attempt to do so will require such high levels of abstraction that the end result is too far divorced from reality.
Are you saying that you think the answers you would get would be completely random with no connection to people's actual emotional state? Do you think that if you asked this question to a population of people whose loved ones were murdered the night before you ask them, they would be just as likely to answer 1 as they would be to answer 10 or any number in between, and the distribution of answers would be indistinguishable from when you asked a population of people who just found new love and won a million bucks in the lottery?
Or in other words: Are you saying that you think the model/concept that we commonly refer to using the label "happiness" in the English language does not map to anything in reality?
> To give a more famous example, Douglas Adams' meaning of life being 42, even if you understood the variables used to arrive at this number, what relation does that number have to reality?
Erm ... the relation described by the method that is used to arrive at this number? Is that a trick question?
> In summary, science attempts to describe the order in the chaos, but there are certain aspects of life that do not lend themselves to being reduced in this way.
Such as? Can you justify that position in any way? So far, this seems to be a completely unsupported assertion on your part.
> If you accept that, then you can accept that even if science has merit in some fields, it also has its limitations.
Which is precisely what I said: It is a very important part of science to say "I don't know", that is exactly the recognition that scientific knowledge has limits.
Yes.
> If you can't verify if the hypothesis is accurate or not then the scientific method doesn't work.
No. Science never verifies, science only falsifies. If something were to be verified successfully, that would mean that falsification would be impossible. If something is not falsifiable, it is not testable, and therefore not science, therefore science does not verify.
> You can only verify if something is accurate or not if you can accurately measure it.
What does "accurate(ly)" mean here?
> Measuring something relies on being able to quantify it.
No, unless you mean that in the very abstract sense that any information can be encoded as numbers.
> It's the "at least not yet" that I'm referring to as the misconception. Some things do not lend themselves to measurement, so in some cases it's much more honest to admit we'll probably never be able to accurately measure something.
I'll take the "to accurately measure something" to mean "to explain something scientifically", as I don't understand what you mean by "accurately measure something", see above.
"at least not yet" means "it's not possible now, possibly it will never be possible, possibly it will be possible at some point", right? So, where does that contradict the "admission" that "we'll probably never be able" to make that a misconception? Aren't you saying essentially the same thing with different words?
> Let's also imagine I ask multiple people the same question. What can I infer from this data set? Am I measuring the perception of sadness?
With noise, as all measurements are, but yes, what else would you be measuring?
> What role does the strength of memory play on this? Would I have got a different answer if I asked you 5 minutes later?
All perfectly fine scientific question that one could investigate, no?
> Is a 7/10 from one person comparable to a 7/10 from another person?
Maybe, maybe not, how is the precision of a measurement relevant to the question of whether it is a measurement?
> Note that even though the data set is nonsense, the decision on which number between 1 to 10 was based on something (or rather a group of different things), it's just not something that can be boiled down to a model. Any attempt to do so will require such high levels of abstraction that the end result is too far divorced from reality.
Are you saying that you think the answers you would get would be completely random with no connection to people's actual emotional state? Do you think that if you asked this question to a population of people whose loved ones were murdered the night before you ask them, they would be just as likely to answer 1 as they would be to answer 10 or any number in between, and the distribution of answers would be indistinguishable from when you asked a population of people who just found new love and won a million bucks in the lottery?
Or in other words: Are you saying that you think the model/concept that we commonly refer to using the label "happiness" in the English language does not map to anything in reality?
> To give a more famous example, Douglas Adams' meaning of life being 42, even if you understood the variables used to arrive at this number, what relation does that number have to reality?
Erm ... the relation described by the method that is used to arrive at this number? Is that a trick question?
> In summary, science attempts to describe the order in the chaos, but there are certain aspects of life that do not lend themselves to being reduced in this way.
Such as? Can you justify that position in any way? So far, this seems to be a completely unsupported assertion on your part.
> If you accept that, then you can accept that even if science has merit in some fields, it also has its limitations.
Which is precisely what I said: It is a very important part of science to say "I don't know", that is exactly the recognition that scientific knowledge has limits.
> "No. Science never verifies, science only falsifies. If something were to be verified successfully, that would mean that falsification would be impossible. If something is not falsifiable, it is not testable, and therefore not science, therefore science does not verify."
It's the hypothesis that determines whether we're looking for the presence or absence of something, or in other words what the implications of a positive or negative result are. Perhaps you need to understand the roles that models play in science to see it. For example, when the standard model of physics predicted the Higgs boson, the purpose of searching for the Higgs boson was neither to verify or falsify the standard model, but rather to see whether it existed. The outcome either way was helpful in extending scientific knowledge. As it turns out, the Higgs boson was discovered, which is an example of science confirming something, which therefore negates "science only falsifies".
> "No, unless you mean that in the very abstract sense that any information can be encoded as numbers."
You're missing out on the fact I'm trying to suggest accurate quantification over simple quantification. You can attach a number to anything, that much is true, but the question is, does that number give you any power to predict outcomes? Or in other words, is it a useful number? I gave the example before of a sadness number. You can attach a number to perceived sadness, but does it tell you anything universal about the nature of sadness, or is it purely subjective? Note that subjective implies that it depends on the person in question and all environmental factors that exist at the time, which a single number would not account for.
> "I'll take the "to accurately measure something" to mean "to explain something scientifically", as I don't understand what you mean by "accurately measure something", see above.
"at least not yet" means "it's not possible now, possibly it will never be possible, possibly it will be possible at some point", right? So, where does that contradict the "admission" that "we'll probably never be able" to make that a misconception? Aren't you saying essentially the same thing with different words?"
See above. To give you this same point in the form of a question, if you have a measurement, but it doesn't give you the power to predict anything, is that measurement scientifically useful?
> "With noise, as all measurements are, but yes, what else would you be measuring?"
> "All perfectly fine scientific question that one could investigate, no?"
The point I was trying to make that clearly wasn't clear enough was, you don't have enough control over the variables, nor do you know what the important variables are, as not only are there a vast range to choose from, but the important variables may vary from person to person. If you have no way of determining whether confirmation/denial of your prediction was based on scientific understanding or chance, what have you really understood about how the world works? As I suggested previously, science is an attempt to create order out of chaos. Some chaos is simple enough for us to accurately model and predict, other chaos is simply too complex, too impenetrable, too hard to test in a controlled manner. If you consider that physics is a vast subject, and that this concerns the simplest of all phenomena in life, how much more complex do you think the science that studies, with the same level of detail, the affect of something even more unruly, such as the way society shapes its inhabitants. Sociology already exists, but the approaches that work in physics do not work in sociology, and the knowledge we do gain is fragmented and dependent on the society of the time. Our body of scientific knowledge in such fields will forever be limited because of that.
> "Maybe, maybe not, how is the precision of a measurement relevant to the question of whether it is a measurement?"
The whole purpose of having measurements in science is to be able to use past knowledge to guide more in-depth questions. If you cannot use a measurement to form future predictions/hypotheses, what value does it have for science?
> "Are you saying that you think the answers you would get would be completely random with no connection to people's actual emotional state? Do you think that if you asked this question to a population of people whose loved ones were murdered the night before you ask them, they would be just as likely to answer 1 as they would be to answer 10 or any number in between, and the distribution of answers would be indistinguishable from when you asked a population of people who just found new love and won a million bucks in the lottery?
Or in other words: Are you saying that you think the model/concept that we commonly refer to using the label "happiness" in the English language does not map to anything in reality?"
The short answer is; any factor not in your control could skew the results, and in this case there are too many factors outside your control. Perception of happiness is just one example of a factor outside your control. As a side note, individuals react to trauma in different ways, and some of those ways are informed by social conditioning.
> "Erm ... the relation described by the method that is used to arrive at this number? Is that a trick question?"
See points above about the purpose of measurement / scientific models.
> "Such as? Can you justify that position in any way? So far, this seems to be a completely unsupported assertion on your part."
I gave you an example of quantifying sadness.
> "Which is precisely what I said: It is a very important part of science to say "I don't know", that is exactly the recognition that scientific knowledge has limits."
Not the same. "I don't know, but I believe we will in the future" is not the same as "I don't know, and I don't believe we ever will know". One statement has faith in the scientific method to conquer all obstacles at its core, the other has skepticism about the ability of the scientific method to overcome all obstacles at its core.
It's the hypothesis that determines whether we're looking for the presence or absence of something, or in other words what the implications of a positive or negative result are. Perhaps you need to understand the roles that models play in science to see it. For example, when the standard model of physics predicted the Higgs boson, the purpose of searching for the Higgs boson was neither to verify or falsify the standard model, but rather to see whether it existed. The outcome either way was helpful in extending scientific knowledge. As it turns out, the Higgs boson was discovered, which is an example of science confirming something, which therefore negates "science only falsifies".
> "No, unless you mean that in the very abstract sense that any information can be encoded as numbers."
You're missing out on the fact I'm trying to suggest accurate quantification over simple quantification. You can attach a number to anything, that much is true, but the question is, does that number give you any power to predict outcomes? Or in other words, is it a useful number? I gave the example before of a sadness number. You can attach a number to perceived sadness, but does it tell you anything universal about the nature of sadness, or is it purely subjective? Note that subjective implies that it depends on the person in question and all environmental factors that exist at the time, which a single number would not account for.
> "I'll take the "to accurately measure something" to mean "to explain something scientifically", as I don't understand what you mean by "accurately measure something", see above.
"at least not yet" means "it's not possible now, possibly it will never be possible, possibly it will be possible at some point", right? So, where does that contradict the "admission" that "we'll probably never be able" to make that a misconception? Aren't you saying essentially the same thing with different words?"
See above. To give you this same point in the form of a question, if you have a measurement, but it doesn't give you the power to predict anything, is that measurement scientifically useful?
> "With noise, as all measurements are, but yes, what else would you be measuring?"
> "All perfectly fine scientific question that one could investigate, no?"
The point I was trying to make that clearly wasn't clear enough was, you don't have enough control over the variables, nor do you know what the important variables are, as not only are there a vast range to choose from, but the important variables may vary from person to person. If you have no way of determining whether confirmation/denial of your prediction was based on scientific understanding or chance, what have you really understood about how the world works? As I suggested previously, science is an attempt to create order out of chaos. Some chaos is simple enough for us to accurately model and predict, other chaos is simply too complex, too impenetrable, too hard to test in a controlled manner. If you consider that physics is a vast subject, and that this concerns the simplest of all phenomena in life, how much more complex do you think the science that studies, with the same level of detail, the affect of something even more unruly, such as the way society shapes its inhabitants. Sociology already exists, but the approaches that work in physics do not work in sociology, and the knowledge we do gain is fragmented and dependent on the society of the time. Our body of scientific knowledge in such fields will forever be limited because of that.
> "Maybe, maybe not, how is the precision of a measurement relevant to the question of whether it is a measurement?"
The whole purpose of having measurements in science is to be able to use past knowledge to guide more in-depth questions. If you cannot use a measurement to form future predictions/hypotheses, what value does it have for science?
> "Are you saying that you think the answers you would get would be completely random with no connection to people's actual emotional state? Do you think that if you asked this question to a population of people whose loved ones were murdered the night before you ask them, they would be just as likely to answer 1 as they would be to answer 10 or any number in between, and the distribution of answers would be indistinguishable from when you asked a population of people who just found new love and won a million bucks in the lottery?
Or in other words: Are you saying that you think the model/concept that we commonly refer to using the label "happiness" in the English language does not map to anything in reality?"
The short answer is; any factor not in your control could skew the results, and in this case there are too many factors outside your control. Perception of happiness is just one example of a factor outside your control. As a side note, individuals react to trauma in different ways, and some of those ways are informed by social conditioning.
> "Erm ... the relation described by the method that is used to arrive at this number? Is that a trick question?"
See points above about the purpose of measurement / scientific models.
> "Such as? Can you justify that position in any way? So far, this seems to be a completely unsupported assertion on your part."
I gave you an example of quantifying sadness.
> "Which is precisely what I said: It is a very important part of science to say "I don't know", that is exactly the recognition that scientific knowledge has limits."
Not the same. "I don't know, but I believe we will in the future" is not the same as "I don't know, and I don't believe we ever will know". One statement has faith in the scientific method to conquer all obstacles at its core, the other has skepticism about the ability of the scientific method to overcome all obstacles at its core.
> Not the same. "I don't know, but I believe we will in the future" is not the same as "I don't know, and I don't believe we ever will know". One statement has faith in the scientific method to conquer all obstacles at its core, the other has skepticism about the ability of the scientific method to overcome all obstacles at its core.
I will skip the rest of what you have written for now to first address this fundamental misunderstanding, I might get back to it when we have cleared this up.
I agree that those two statements are not the same. But neither is the standpoint of science generally. "We don't know, at least not yet" does not mean "we don't know but we will know", it means "we don't know and we don't know whether we will ever know", so it is skeptical towards both claims, that we will know, and that we won't know. Not being convinced of some claim does not imply being convinced of the negation of that claim, it is possible, and often rational, to be skeptical of both.
OK?
I will skip the rest of what you have written for now to first address this fundamental misunderstanding, I might get back to it when we have cleared this up.
I agree that those two statements are not the same. But neither is the standpoint of science generally. "We don't know, at least not yet" does not mean "we don't know but we will know", it means "we don't know and we don't know whether we will ever know", so it is skeptical towards both claims, that we will know, and that we won't know. Not being convinced of some claim does not imply being convinced of the negation of that claim, it is possible, and often rational, to be skeptical of both.
OK?
> "I will skip the rest of what you have written for now to first address this fundamental misunderstanding, I might get back to it when we have cleared this up.
I agree that those two statements are not the same. But neither is the standpoint of science generally. "We don't know, at least not yet" does not mean "we don't know but we will know", it means "we don't know and we don't know whether we will ever know", so it is skeptical towards both claims, that we will know, and that we won't know. Not being convinced of some claim does not imply being convinced of the negation of that claim, it is possible, and often rational, to be skeptical of both.
OK?"
The point I'm making which you're overlooking is that those two viewpoints are not equally likely. Just look at it logically. If science needs the accumulation of evidence to build an accurate understanding, but some parts of our world are highly resistant to this process, it is not at all likely that we will break that barrier. Like it or not, "We don't know, at least not yet" implies hope, I'm suggesting there are some parts of our experience that are fundamentally hostile to scientific inquiry, and the sooner we accept that science (whilst very useful in some fields) has fundamental limits, the easier it'll be to take a more holistic view of what constitutes wisdom.
To be clear, I have no problem with the scientific process whatsoever, I think it has been a fantastic tool in helping humanity advance. The issue I have is with stretching that tool beyond the point of utility, but giving it a pass because it's science.
As I sense our debate will soon be winding down, I'll try to leave this on a more positive note. Here's Alan Watts saying in 2 minutes what I've failed to say in much more time:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D4vHnM8WPvU
I agree that those two statements are not the same. But neither is the standpoint of science generally. "We don't know, at least not yet" does not mean "we don't know but we will know", it means "we don't know and we don't know whether we will ever know", so it is skeptical towards both claims, that we will know, and that we won't know. Not being convinced of some claim does not imply being convinced of the negation of that claim, it is possible, and often rational, to be skeptical of both.
OK?"
The point I'm making which you're overlooking is that those two viewpoints are not equally likely. Just look at it logically. If science needs the accumulation of evidence to build an accurate understanding, but some parts of our world are highly resistant to this process, it is not at all likely that we will break that barrier. Like it or not, "We don't know, at least not yet" implies hope, I'm suggesting there are some parts of our experience that are fundamentally hostile to scientific inquiry, and the sooner we accept that science (whilst very useful in some fields) has fundamental limits, the easier it'll be to take a more holistic view of what constitutes wisdom.
To be clear, I have no problem with the scientific process whatsoever, I think it has been a fantastic tool in helping humanity advance. The issue I have is with stretching that tool beyond the point of utility, but giving it a pass because it's science.
As I sense our debate will soon be winding down, I'll try to leave this on a more positive note. Here's Alan Watts saying in 2 minutes what I've failed to say in much more time:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D4vHnM8WPvU
> The point I'm making which you're overlooking is that those two viewpoints are not equally likely.
I am not overlooking that at all, which is why I said "generally". There can be reasons to think one direction is more likely than another to make progress--that in itself is actually again a question open to scientific inquiry. But the point is that the "we don't know yet" does not imply one way or the other, but some of your points assumed that it did, which is why I wanted to clear this up first.
> If science needs the accumulation of evidence to build an accurate understanding, but some parts of our world are highly resistant to this process, it is not at all likely that we will break that barrier.
Yeah, sure. But how do we know which parts of our world are highly resistant to scientific inquiry?
> Like it or not, "We don't know, at least not yet" implies hope
I'm not so sure I would go so far as to call it hope, but it obviously leaves open the logical possibility of progress at a later date, yes. The actual hope that people have of ever finding the answer to a given question, though, varies widely depending on the question.
> I'm suggesting there are some parts of our experience that are fundamentally hostile to scientific inquiry, and the sooner we accept that science (whilst very useful in some fields) has fundamental limits, the easier it'll be to take a more holistic view of what constitutes wisdom.
But how do we distinguish those parts of our experience that are fundamentally hostile to scientific inquiry from those that we simply didn't have the right idea yet how to approach them?
I don't see any problem with the hypothesis that some parts of our experience might be fundamentally off limits to scientific inquiry. What I don't see is any justification for it actually being true, and in particular I don't see any justification for the hypothesis that a particular part of our experience is hostile to scientific inquiry, which would be required for this knowledge to actually be practically relevant (just knowing that something is off limits doesn't help you anything if you have no clue what it is that you are wasting your time on).
Put yourself in the shoes of an educated person in the 10th century. Suppose you were asked to decide where to draw the line between which parts of our experience are fundamentally hostile to scientific inquiry and which parts it's reasonable to have hope of progress in understanding in. What do you think, which branches of modern day established scientific knowledge would you have cut off? Remember, not even optical microscopes have been invented yet. Germs as causes of diseases are unknown. A prevailing theory of disease is the theory of humors. And prevailing not among quacks, but among what you might call the medical elite of the time. You can not use anything we now know to make the decision, and that includes a whole lot of stuff that everyone just knows to be true, it's actually pretty hard to even figure out what you would have to discard to be in the position of that 10th century person, stuff that you have learned in elementary school and just consider an obvious fact of life was still fundamentally misunderstood and centuries away from discovery.
Now, mind you that leaving open the logical possibility of answers at a later date does not imply that you assign it a high probability, and it in no way prevents you from prioritizing other things for investigation. By contrast, if you actually mean "there is no answer to this question", then that implies that you stop any further investigation forever. If you have concluded with absolute certainty that an answer is impossible, it would be nonsensical to search for an answer, as you would be doing what you are convinced to be a waste of time.
I think you will agree that any decision to actually stop inquiry forever into certain parts of our experience in the 10th century based on the best knowledge available then could very well have ended with some very important and useful field of knowledge of today being erased from history? So, what makes you confident that you can pull it off now without the same risk for our ancestors 1000 years down the line? What makes you so sure that you are not as myopic about our future as they would have been about things that now seem trivial? We are now starting to fix genetic diseases in living organisms. They were still thinking about those diseases in terms of humors and demons. We can now reliably distinguish and treat thousands of diseases, compared to four hilariously inaccurate categories of humors. There is still much that could be better, but the precision we have now would have been just unimaginable to the medical elite of that time.
So, what is your justification that distinguishes your position from someone a thousand years ago claiming that the human body is just too complex and demons are fundamentally hostile to scientific inquiry (well, the spirit of that statement, the conceptualization of the scientific method was still far in the future, obviously), and therefore we should accept that science has fundamental limits?
> To be clear, I have no problem with the scientific process whatsoever, I think it has been a fantastic tool in helping humanity advance. The issue I have is with stretching that tool beyond the point of utility, but giving it a pass because it's science.
Well, what is that point of utility, and how did you determine that?
> As I sense our debate will soon be winding down
Well, I'm happy to continue this, and even getting back to your previous post, as well as your still open question elsewhere in the thread, I'm just trying to avoid confusion by not continuing discussion on too many ideas simultaneously.
I am not overlooking that at all, which is why I said "generally". There can be reasons to think one direction is more likely than another to make progress--that in itself is actually again a question open to scientific inquiry. But the point is that the "we don't know yet" does not imply one way or the other, but some of your points assumed that it did, which is why I wanted to clear this up first.
> If science needs the accumulation of evidence to build an accurate understanding, but some parts of our world are highly resistant to this process, it is not at all likely that we will break that barrier.
Yeah, sure. But how do we know which parts of our world are highly resistant to scientific inquiry?
> Like it or not, "We don't know, at least not yet" implies hope
I'm not so sure I would go so far as to call it hope, but it obviously leaves open the logical possibility of progress at a later date, yes. The actual hope that people have of ever finding the answer to a given question, though, varies widely depending on the question.
> I'm suggesting there are some parts of our experience that are fundamentally hostile to scientific inquiry, and the sooner we accept that science (whilst very useful in some fields) has fundamental limits, the easier it'll be to take a more holistic view of what constitutes wisdom.
But how do we distinguish those parts of our experience that are fundamentally hostile to scientific inquiry from those that we simply didn't have the right idea yet how to approach them?
I don't see any problem with the hypothesis that some parts of our experience might be fundamentally off limits to scientific inquiry. What I don't see is any justification for it actually being true, and in particular I don't see any justification for the hypothesis that a particular part of our experience is hostile to scientific inquiry, which would be required for this knowledge to actually be practically relevant (just knowing that something is off limits doesn't help you anything if you have no clue what it is that you are wasting your time on).
Put yourself in the shoes of an educated person in the 10th century. Suppose you were asked to decide where to draw the line between which parts of our experience are fundamentally hostile to scientific inquiry and which parts it's reasonable to have hope of progress in understanding in. What do you think, which branches of modern day established scientific knowledge would you have cut off? Remember, not even optical microscopes have been invented yet. Germs as causes of diseases are unknown. A prevailing theory of disease is the theory of humors. And prevailing not among quacks, but among what you might call the medical elite of the time. You can not use anything we now know to make the decision, and that includes a whole lot of stuff that everyone just knows to be true, it's actually pretty hard to even figure out what you would have to discard to be in the position of that 10th century person, stuff that you have learned in elementary school and just consider an obvious fact of life was still fundamentally misunderstood and centuries away from discovery.
Now, mind you that leaving open the logical possibility of answers at a later date does not imply that you assign it a high probability, and it in no way prevents you from prioritizing other things for investigation. By contrast, if you actually mean "there is no answer to this question", then that implies that you stop any further investigation forever. If you have concluded with absolute certainty that an answer is impossible, it would be nonsensical to search for an answer, as you would be doing what you are convinced to be a waste of time.
I think you will agree that any decision to actually stop inquiry forever into certain parts of our experience in the 10th century based on the best knowledge available then could very well have ended with some very important and useful field of knowledge of today being erased from history? So, what makes you confident that you can pull it off now without the same risk for our ancestors 1000 years down the line? What makes you so sure that you are not as myopic about our future as they would have been about things that now seem trivial? We are now starting to fix genetic diseases in living organisms. They were still thinking about those diseases in terms of humors and demons. We can now reliably distinguish and treat thousands of diseases, compared to four hilariously inaccurate categories of humors. There is still much that could be better, but the precision we have now would have been just unimaginable to the medical elite of that time.
So, what is your justification that distinguishes your position from someone a thousand years ago claiming that the human body is just too complex and demons are fundamentally hostile to scientific inquiry (well, the spirit of that statement, the conceptualization of the scientific method was still far in the future, obviously), and therefore we should accept that science has fundamental limits?
> To be clear, I have no problem with the scientific process whatsoever, I think it has been a fantastic tool in helping humanity advance. The issue I have is with stretching that tool beyond the point of utility, but giving it a pass because it's science.
Well, what is that point of utility, and how did you determine that?
> As I sense our debate will soon be winding down
Well, I'm happy to continue this, and even getting back to your previous post, as well as your still open question elsewhere in the thread, I'm just trying to avoid confusion by not continuing discussion on too many ideas simultaneously.
> and so far nothing has been demonstrated that could explain anything that science can't.
Science hasn't explained how science works, nor can it. Every precondition of science (causality, mathematics, etc.) goes unexplained by science.
Science hasn't explained how science works, nor can it. Every precondition of science (causality, mathematics, etc.) goes unexplained by science.
OK. So, how do you know that science works? Or do you think that it doesn't work or that you don't know whether it works?
> which it is not
Yes, so you disagree with the prior commenter. You think science is the "validator" of knowledge.
"I know that I am in pain" is not validated by science, and science has no role even to play in "validating" it.
"I know that science works" is not validated by science and science has no role in validating it.
etc.
It would seem there are probably knowledge claims which belong in the domain of culture that are likewise orthogonal to science ("I know that we liked the new Star Wars").
Yes, so you disagree with the prior commenter. You think science is the "validator" of knowledge.
"I know that I am in pain" is not validated by science, and science has no role even to play in "validating" it.
"I know that science works" is not validated by science and science has no role in validating it.
etc.
It would seem there are probably knowledge claims which belong in the domain of culture that are likewise orthogonal to science ("I know that we liked the new Star Wars").
> Yes, so you disagree with the prior commenter.
Possibly.
> You think science is the "validator" of knowledge.
Where did you get that from?
> "I know that I am in pain" is not validated by science, and science has no role even to play in "validating" it.
What is your justification for considering that an instance of cultural knowledge?
> "I know that science works" is not validated by science and science has no role in validating it.
So, how do you know that science works? Or are you saying that it doesn't work or that you don't know whether it works?
> It would seem there are probably knowledge claims which belong in the domain of culture that are likewise orthogonal to science
It would seem that something seeming to you to be the case is not a particularly convincing argument.
> ("I know that we liked the new Star Wars").
Are you saying this claim is not derived from empirical observation of "we" and/or not accessible to falsification (like, you think it is impossible to ask a representative sample of "we" whether they like Star Wars)? If that is what you mean, how do you know it, then? If that is not what you mean, how is that application of the scientific method orthogonal to science?
Possibly.
> You think science is the "validator" of knowledge.
Where did you get that from?
> "I know that I am in pain" is not validated by science, and science has no role even to play in "validating" it.
What is your justification for considering that an instance of cultural knowledge?
> "I know that science works" is not validated by science and science has no role in validating it.
So, how do you know that science works? Or are you saying that it doesn't work or that you don't know whether it works?
> It would seem there are probably knowledge claims which belong in the domain of culture that are likewise orthogonal to science
It would seem that something seeming to you to be the case is not a particularly convincing argument.
> ("I know that we liked the new Star Wars").
Are you saying this claim is not derived from empirical observation of "we" and/or not accessible to falsification (like, you think it is impossible to ask a representative sample of "we" whether they like Star Wars)? If that is what you mean, how do you know it, then? If that is not what you mean, how is that application of the scientific method orthogonal to science?
> but what establishes validity is science/the scientific method
My examples were to show that there are knowledge claims where this fails.
> seeming to you to be the case
That isn't my argument. My argument is inductive over the prior examples.
My examples were to show that there are knowledge claims where this fails.
> seeming to you to be the case
That isn't my argument. My argument is inductive over the prior examples.
> My examples were to show that there are knowledge claims where this fails.
Except that your example was just an equivocation of no substantial relevance to the problem at hand that also doesn't really hold?
First of all, you should be well aware that we were talking about knowledge about external reality, so it's simply irrelevant that you can define knowledge to encompass awareness of individual personal experiences ... yes, you can, but that wasn't the topic of the discussion, and isn't contested by anyone, and thus doesn't contribute anything to the discussion.
Secondly, I hope very much that you were not implying that you can know that what you experience as the cause of pain is in fact the cause, because that is contradicted by phantom pain, which requires scientific inquiry to (a) know about in general and (b) distinguish from pain caused by what you experience it to be caused by in the specific instance. Which is also the only way we know pain is even a common thing amongst people, as well as the reason we know what causes pain in many instances.
And then, well, really, to an extent we can actually observe both causes for pain and whether someone is experiencing pain without the need to rely on self-reports, so the gap between what is purely subjective about the experience of pain and what can be observed about it scientifically is not as massive as you seem to suggest.
Except that your example was just an equivocation of no substantial relevance to the problem at hand that also doesn't really hold?
First of all, you should be well aware that we were talking about knowledge about external reality, so it's simply irrelevant that you can define knowledge to encompass awareness of individual personal experiences ... yes, you can, but that wasn't the topic of the discussion, and isn't contested by anyone, and thus doesn't contribute anything to the discussion.
Secondly, I hope very much that you were not implying that you can know that what you experience as the cause of pain is in fact the cause, because that is contradicted by phantom pain, which requires scientific inquiry to (a) know about in general and (b) distinguish from pain caused by what you experience it to be caused by in the specific instance. Which is also the only way we know pain is even a common thing amongst people, as well as the reason we know what causes pain in many instances.
And then, well, really, to an extent we can actually observe both causes for pain and whether someone is experiencing pain without the need to rely on self-reports, so the gap between what is purely subjective about the experience of pain and what can be observed about it scientifically is not as massive as you seem to suggest.
So, if you restrict the domain of inquiry to the things that science best studies (causes and their origins) then science is the best to study it.
The point was that there are other domains.
The point was that there are other domains.
> So, if you restrict the domain of inquiry to the things that science best studies (causes and their origins) then science is the best to study it.
I didn't restrict anything, I just pointed out that your analogy is irrelevant to the topic at hand. The topic of the discussion was what methods can be used to reliably obtain knowledge about the external world, and being aware of individual personal experience just isn't.
> The point was that there are other domains.
OK, so what other domains of knowledge about the external world are there?
I didn't restrict anything, I just pointed out that your analogy is irrelevant to the topic at hand. The topic of the discussion was what methods can be used to reliably obtain knowledge about the external world, and being aware of individual personal experience just isn't.
> The point was that there are other domains.
OK, so what other domains of knowledge about the external world are there?
> "OK, so what other domains of knowledge about the external world are there?"
How do you think we acquired knowledge before the scientific method was devised?
How do you think we acquired knowledge before the scientific method was devised?
Myth and superstition are a huge part of every culture. Cultural knowledge includes ideas such as "sex with a virgin cures AIDS" or "back pain is the result of a black magic curse (Hexenschuss)" which are decidedly less valid than scientific knowledge.
EDIT:Oh, and remember to always be polite during this debate.
Everyone Knows you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar...
EDIT:Oh, and remember to always be polite during this debate.
Everyone Knows you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar...
Why shouldn't someone publish their view?
The issue at hand is not that this view was published, but that the current and highly relevant affiliation of the author was obscured in the disclaimer:
> Mr. Leibowitz was a Democratic commissioner at the FTC from 2004-13 and chairman beginning in 2009. As a partner at the law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell, he represents both technology companies and broadband providers.
quoth TFA:
> However, we do know Leibowitz’s primary broadband client: Comcast, one of the biggest beneficiaries of the net neutrality repeal.
Furthermore that obscurant disclaimer is at the end of the op-ed rather than the introduction.
> Mr. Leibowitz was a Democratic commissioner at the FTC from 2004-13 and chairman beginning in 2009. As a partner at the law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell, he represents both technology companies and broadband providers.
quoth TFA:
> However, we do know Leibowitz’s primary broadband client: Comcast, one of the biggest beneficiaries of the net neutrality repeal.
Furthermore that obscurant disclaimer is at the end of the op-ed rather than the introduction.
Op-eds are generally understood to be opinions, often from stakeholders ina news/policy situation. The problem here is that the author's bio was apparently this:
> Mr. Leibowitz was a Democratic commissioner at the FTC from 2004-13 and chairman beginning in 2009. As a partner at the law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell, he represents both technology companies and broadband providers.
The Intercept's assertion appears to be that Leibovitz's affiliation with recent Comcast deals should be more prominently noted.
> Mr. Leibowitz was a Democratic commissioner at the FTC from 2004-13 and chairman beginning in 2009. As a partner at the law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell, he represents both technology companies and broadband providers.
The Intercept's assertion appears to be that Leibovitz's affiliation with recent Comcast deals should be more prominently noted.
I believe that opinions that some view as harmful should be given more light than they're currently receiving, however withholding this kind of information is actively harmful and WSJ should face repercussions. I'm doubtful they will.
It can take a while to get used to the lingo:
Professional person that agrees with you - expert.
Professional person that disagrees with you - shill.
I’m conflicted on this. I do not think the Obama era measures are the be all and end all of net neutrality legislation, but Trump’s blatant pro big business and anticompetitive instincts are always a threat to consumer interests. Whichever way we as individuals decide or lean, it’s always worth listening to both sides of the argument.
Professional person that agrees with you - expert.
Professional person that disagrees with you - shill.
I’m conflicted on this. I do not think the Obama era measures are the be all and end all of net neutrality legislation, but Trump’s blatant pro big business and anticompetitive instincts are always a threat to consumer interests. Whichever way we as individuals decide or lean, it’s always worth listening to both sides of the argument.
Is it disagreement if it’s paid for? How’s it any different than an ad?
Suppose an attorney for the Electronic Frontier foundation posts an article or opinion piece on a digital rights legal issue. This has happened many times and I don’t remember ever seeing anyone call them a shill, yet they are a professional person paid to argue on these issues in public and in court. How is that different from advertising? How about legal experts on human rights? Environmental activism? Is anyone working for Greenpace as a lawyer or scientific adviser an environmentalist shill? If not, then how can we use that slur against people working for energy companies?
I’m not some corporatist shill making this argument. I’m just making a liberal plea for tolerance and respect in public discourse.
Legal experts on many different sides of many different debates have a reasonable expectation to have their opinions and arguments heard in public without harassment, abuse and intimidation. However there is a reasonable expectation of disclosure of such interests.
The argument in this specific case seems to be n the amount of detail in the disclosure, but the fact is he was a Democrat appointee and he works for a law firm that represents Comcast. There was an attempt at some level of disclosure and he wasn’t actually acting as an attorney for Comcast. I don’t think this is as big a deal as is being made about it.
I’m not some corporatist shill making this argument. I’m just making a liberal plea for tolerance and respect in public discourse.
Legal experts on many different sides of many different debates have a reasonable expectation to have their opinions and arguments heard in public without harassment, abuse and intimidation. However there is a reasonable expectation of disclosure of such interests.
The argument in this specific case seems to be n the amount of detail in the disclosure, but the fact is he was a Democrat appointee and he works for a law firm that represents Comcast. There was an attempt at some level of disclosure and he wasn’t actually acting as an attorney for Comcast. I don’t think this is as big a deal as is being made about it.
I agree with you. The debate is a lot more nuanced, but you would never know that listening to the hyperbole from both sides. Someone can be completely for net neutrality, but against classifying ISPs as common carriers as the solution. The problem with using the FCC classification is that we can a) get flip flops like what just happened and b) it opens up ISPs to unknown potential regulation that in theory could slow down innovation (will the government start regulating pricing?).
I thought this article from earlier this year did a pretty good job laying out the whole issue: https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-tangled-web-of-net-neutrality-an...
I support net neutrality, but would prefer a better long term solution than the FCC classification. Unfortunately, there is still no better law in place, but with the current energy level people should be calling their congress people to get something done.
I thought this article from earlier this year did a pretty good job laying out the whole issue: https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-tangled-web-of-net-neutrality-an...
I support net neutrality, but would prefer a better long term solution than the FCC classification. Unfortunately, there is still no better law in place, but with the current energy level people should be calling their congress people to get something done.
[deleted]
> I keep questioning my decision to have a Washington Post subscription, but I'll sleep better tonight knowing it goes towards something that at least _tries_ to be journalism.
I think you need to seriously consider whether "tries to be journalism" means "is more in line with my opinions."
Furthermore, this was an op-ed piece. Agree with it or not, it isn't, in fact it is expicitly not, objective journalism.
I think you need to seriously consider whether "tries to be journalism" means "is more in line with my opinions."
Furthermore, this was an op-ed piece. Agree with it or not, it isn't, in fact it is expicitly not, objective journalism.
This is exactly the motte and bailey argument that gets under my skin. The motte is "all media/opinions are biased", which is trivially true and easily defended, and the bailey is "this op-ed is acceptable", harder to argue, unless one uses the motte to advance it.
“...motte and bailey...”
removes monocle
Oh yes. Quite.
Did you just learn what “motte and bailey” means or something?
He’s saying look at the section the piece appeared in (op-ed; opposite the editorial page; the OPINION section)
It’s the one part of the paper that is specifically meant for opinions. It has featured climate change deniers, flat earthers, and 9/11 truthers. Because it’s expected that people know what an opinion piece is and can use their own experience and wisdom to form their own opinion.
Second, it’s easy/fun to crap on Comcast, but it’s possible to be pro-net-neutrality AND pro-repeal. See: Marc Andreessen.
removes monocle
Oh yes. Quite.
Did you just learn what “motte and bailey” means or something?
He’s saying look at the section the piece appeared in (op-ed; opposite the editorial page; the OPINION section)
It’s the one part of the paper that is specifically meant for opinions. It has featured climate change deniers, flat earthers, and 9/11 truthers. Because it’s expected that people know what an opinion piece is and can use their own experience and wisdom to form their own opinion.
Second, it’s easy/fun to crap on Comcast, but it’s possible to be pro-net-neutrality AND pro-repeal. See: Marc Andreessen.
[deleted]
I'm not defending this person or the complete absurdity of his statements but an Op-Ed can be written by anyone, the only stipulation being that the not be affiliated with the newspapers editorial board and ethics dictate there should be a disclaimer if needed. The disclaimer here was certainly disingenuous at best though.
A more disturbing trend is that these same Ed-Op pieces are then referenced and used by shills and politicians as "proof" that this is something that the average citizen wants. See the following:
https://www.mediamatters.org/blog/2017/12/13/procter-gamble-...
A more disturbing trend is that these same Ed-Op pieces are then referenced and used by shills and politicians as "proof" that this is something that the average citizen wants. See the following:
https://www.mediamatters.org/blog/2017/12/13/procter-gamble-...
It seems like your statement was also a motte and bailey. With a softball statement that bad journalism is bad (non-controversial), you'd have us believe our whole economic system is also bad (highly controversial).
> The op-ed contained an unusual disclaimer:
>>> Mr. Leibowitz was a Democratic commissioner at the FTC from 2004-13 and chairman beginning in 2009. As a partner at the law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell, he represents both technology companies and broadband providers.
> The reference to both industries reads as an effort to be upfront about any potential conflict of interest, but also to suggest that Leibowitz has clients on both sides of the issue, so his argument is dispassionate. Tech companies, historically, support net neutrality, while broadband providers oppose it.
The op-ed was prefaced with a contextual paragraph. So this wasn't a "sleeper" influencing public opinion, a la Ender's Game. The WSJ made sure this highly-public person was properly contextualized.
>>> Mr. Leibowitz was a Democratic commissioner at the FTC from 2004-13 and chairman beginning in 2009. As a partner at the law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell, he represents both technology companies and broadband providers.
> The reference to both industries reads as an effort to be upfront about any potential conflict of interest, but also to suggest that Leibowitz has clients on both sides of the issue, so his argument is dispassionate. Tech companies, historically, support net neutrality, while broadband providers oppose it.
The op-ed was prefaced with a contextual paragraph. So this wasn't a "sleeper" influencing public opinion, a la Ender's Game. The WSJ made sure this highly-public person was properly contextualized.
The Op-ed was not prefaced by such a contextual paragraph.
Please see: https://www.wsj.com/articles/everybody-calm-down-about-net-n...
The second paragraph of the commentary by the The Intercept contained your quoted section, which is at the end of the op-ed and not visible in the first page of the paywalled opinion article.
Please see: https://www.wsj.com/articles/everybody-calm-down-about-net-n...
The second paragraph of the commentary by the The Intercept contained your quoted section, which is at the end of the op-ed and not visible in the first page of the paywalled opinion article.
Here's the important dog-whistle:
>Consider the core principles of net neutrality, which I have long supported: unfettered access of the entire (lawful) internet and transparency about broadband providers’ practices. [emphasis mine]
Only Comcast and its cronies feel the need to "contextualize" with "lawful" everyone who actually supports NN doesn't feel that need.
>Consider the core principles of net neutrality, which I have long supported: unfettered access of the entire (lawful) internet and transparency about broadband providers’ practices. [emphasis mine]
Only Comcast and its cronies feel the need to "contextualize" with "lawful" everyone who actually supports NN doesn't feel that need.
From page 7 of the 2015 Open Internet Order ( https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pd... ):
> No Blocking. Consumers who subscribe to a retail broadband Internet access service must get what they have paid for—access to all (lawful) destinations on the Internet. This essential and well-accepted principle has long been a tenet of Commission policy, stretching back to its landmark decision in Carterfone, which protected a customer’s right to connect a telephone to the monopoly telephone network.
They're quoting the official order, written by Net Neutrality supporters.
> No Blocking. Consumers who subscribe to a retail broadband Internet access service must get what they have paid for—access to all (lawful) destinations on the Internet. This essential and well-accepted principle has long been a tenet of Commission policy, stretching back to its landmark decision in Carterfone, which protected a customer’s right to connect a telephone to the monopoly telephone network.
They're quoting the official order, written by Net Neutrality supporters.
I would like to add that many net neutrality supporters were upset with the "lawful" language being included at the time. I'm sure if you look at some old threads here you can see it discussed. It opens the door to blocking protocols (like BitTorrent, which Comcast has been caught blocking in the past) that have a reputation for being used unlawfully. I also wonder if it would be a way to block things like tor, which have an unsavory reputation to many people.
Fair point, but I wouldn't expect to see anything but a corporate friendly op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, nor would I think anyone who regularly reads the Wall Street Journal. Even the New York Times can be pretty corporate/middle of the road.
The WSJ regularly had Op-eds from Obama and other democrats, they even allowed the Iranian president a space to spew his hate. I'd argue they are just as open about who can write in their op-eds as any large newspaper.
Op-eds are often supposed to be seen as different (and interesting) than what the paper's editorial board and columnists typically argue. "Op-ed" is supposed to be an abbreviation for "opposite editorial" -- though of course the pinion editor (who is usually part of the editorial board) has final say in that
I'd never before heard it claimed that "Op Ed" was short for "Opposite Editorial", and had presumed it was short for the catchall "Opinion / Editorial". But you are correct: https://english.stackexchange.com/questions/204681/op-ed-or-....
It seems worth clarifying, though, that "Opposite" is referring to the layout of the page (ie, the "facing the editorial page"), and not to the position in the debate (not "arguing against the editorial position"). The two earliest first cited usages in the OED makes this clear:
It seems worth clarifying, though, that "Opposite" is referring to the layout of the page (ie, the "facing the editorial page"), and not to the position in the debate (not "arguing against the editorial position"). The two earliest first cited usages in the OED makes this clear:
1924 R. H. Lyman World Almanac 25/1
This ‘op. ed. page’ (page opposite the editorial page) is
unique in American newspapers. It is a page of opinion in
all the arts.
1931 J. W. Barrett World, Flesh, & Messrs. Pulitzer iv. 82
Swope developed..the idea of a distinctive ‘opposite
editorial page’ consisting of two ‘columnists’, one book
reviewer and the daily output of the dramatic critic. We
called this the ‘op-ed’ for short.You are correct about the contextual paragraph being at the end of the article and not the beginning.
I try to avoid reading Op-Eds for the most part, but I believe it is quite common (maybe even standard practice?) for them to come at the end of the article rather than the beginning. And if the contextual paragraph comes at the end of the article, then it follows that it would be behind a paywall that only shows the first paragraph to non-subscribers.
I try to avoid reading Op-Eds for the most part, but I believe it is quite common (maybe even standard practice?) for them to come at the end of the article rather than the beginning. And if the contextual paragraph comes at the end of the article, then it follows that it would be behind a paywall that only shows the first paragraph to non-subscribers.
My point is that The Intercept did a better job of including the important information as it was cited up-post in a useful location for the reader than did the actual original article that was (in error) being defended as clear. You can dismiss this, and perhaps everything in the thread and/or the WSJ, but if it's worth posting, it's worth being accurate. But, if it's all so unimportant that nobody on this thread cares, then why post any comments about it at all?
That's my question, because personally I find funny the parts I don't find sad. Seriously, did you watch the comedy videos included in the decision by the chairman and the preceding industry event? They are included in my flagged comment below.
That's my question, because personally I find funny the parts I don't find sad. Seriously, did you watch the comedy videos included in the decision by the chairman and the preceding industry event? They are included in my flagged comment below.
It seems like the author is just looking for something to be angry about. He ascribed his own meaning to a disclaimer in an article and then gets angry that it doesn't meet his expectation. Worse than that is the fact that it really shouldn't matter -- Jon Leibowitz could be head ball-fondler at Comcast for all it matters to his argument. This entire piece is spreading massive amounts of FUD because a guy wrote a thing and wasn't explicit enough for his taste.
My favorite bit:
> To go a step further, Leibowitz’s view is also wrong. Net neutrality supporters fear that kicking enforcement over to the FTC means that broadband providers would only get caught discriminating against websites after the fact. And the FTC is focusing on stopping “deception,” which critics have said could mean that if a company discloses to the customer it will block or throttle certain content, the agency won’t step in.
Author apparently doesn't understand that the following paragraph is literally the intended outcome of the plan. It's right there in explicit detail on pg 133 of the plan.
> We eliminate the conduct rules adopted in the Title II Order—including the general conduct rule and the prohibitions on paid prioritization, blocking, and throttling. We do so for three reasons...
My favorite bit:
> To go a step further, Leibowitz’s view is also wrong. Net neutrality supporters fear that kicking enforcement over to the FTC means that broadband providers would only get caught discriminating against websites after the fact. And the FTC is focusing on stopping “deception,” which critics have said could mean that if a company discloses to the customer it will block or throttle certain content, the agency won’t step in.
Author apparently doesn't understand that the following paragraph is literally the intended outcome of the plan. It's right there in explicit detail on pg 133 of the plan.
> We eliminate the conduct rules adopted in the Title II Order—including the general conduct rule and the prohibitions on paid prioritization, blocking, and throttling. We do so for three reasons...
I just don't see the issue here. They disclose that his law firm represents broadband providers. That, the fact that it's an Op-Ed, and the content of the article ought to be enough for readers to understand that it's an opinion piece and likely to be biased.
The same way people should be able to discern fake news from real? Sadly, most people just aren't that discerning.
Is it just my techbubble, but how can such a law come through, if the general public opposes it so much?
I mean how corrupt or ignorant have you to be to not notice this.
Net Neutrality repeal was very popular among deceased Americans.
>how can such a law come through, if the general public opposes it so much?
It's not a law, it's a decision made by a federal regulatory agency. Only Congress can enact laws. The FCC commissioners are appointed by the president, so they're more like a branch of the executive branch than anything else. Congress can overrule them, but they're unlikely to do so under the current makeup, because:
>how corrupt or ignorant have you to be
The Republican Party is plumbing new depths of corruption and ignorance by the hour. Nothing would surprise me at this point.
It's not a law, it's a decision made by a federal regulatory agency. Only Congress can enact laws. The FCC commissioners are appointed by the president, so they're more like a branch of the executive branch than anything else. Congress can overrule them, but they're unlikely to do so under the current makeup, because:
>how corrupt or ignorant have you to be
The Republican Party is plumbing new depths of corruption and ignorance by the hour. Nothing would surprise me at this point.
Except it was a Republican who tried to move a NN type law through, and it was the Democrats who only wanted to move forward with the common carrier designation.
https://morningconsult.com/2017/01/23/thune-net-neutrality-r...
https://morningconsult.com/2017/01/23/thune-net-neutrality-r...
Net neutrality itself "not a law, it's a decision made by a federal regulatory agency". It's a government regulation of 2011 (with questionable authority) and now it's lessened in a rather mild way.
These things are not to be decided by majority. For example, you cannot vote up to take someone's lawful property, even if the general public supports this (which, I'm sure, it may be induced to, as we can see with this issue).
I think people need reminding that we are a republic, not a democracy. Regardless of what you think of this Net Neutrality rule change, this is how things work in a republic.
The problem is that there is no law because Congress is bought and paid for and hence never makes laws that disadvantage corporate interests. The FCC was attempting to paper over the lack of law. That attempt only succeeded with the support of the executive branch, which has now removed said support.
Which is how Trump is/was able to do so much. Obama was ruling by executive fiat. If congress (Democrats) was doing its job, it would have passed laws. Executive Orders are not laws and can be instantly reversed. Democrats were just as happy has republicans to have their dictator in power, make your bed and lie in it.
In my memory congress has been controlled by Republicans for most of recent history. When there was Democrat control, the president was a Republican. So there hasn't been a period of time when you can "blame" Democrats for the lack of legislation passed for the benefit of the population rather than big money. This is why for example the ACA had to be rushed, in the time between Obama being elected and Republicans gaining control in Congress.
Both houses of Congress had a Democrat majority for Obama's first two years in office.
They had plenty of time to do a lot of things in those two years.
They had plenty of time to do a lot of things in those two years.
I wish all our energy being spent on NN would go towards breaking ISP monopolies, it would achieve the same goals of NN including better services, cheaper prices.
What would you do to break the ISP monopolies?
I'd decouple the content creation from the network delivery. How soon before cable companies start zero-rating their own content? Also, local regulations granting monopolies have to start being rolled back, or municipalities buy the infrastructure from the ISPs and let them compete to use it.
The end result would be better and the discussion around the lack of a free market in ISP's should be the primary public discourse.
NN doesn't solve that and removing it also doesn't solve that.
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/pgak38/the-fcc-ca...
NN doesn't solve that and removing it also doesn't solve that.
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/pgak38/the-fcc-ca...
While there is a case to be made about news op-eds and their overall influence this article is more noise than content. The disclaimer says he represents broadband providers. There is no coming back even if it says technology companies.
Paraphrasing the most relevant line in any comment on this article.
> Agree with it or not, it isn't, in fact it is expicitly not, objective journalism.
credits: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15931916
> Agree with it or not, it isn't, in fact it is expicitly not, objective journalism.
credits: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15931916
And if you expect the WSJ to be anything other than pro-corporate, I've got a bridge to sell you.
I didn't expect anything different from the WSJ, but it's worth pointing out that pro-net neutrality is also "corporate" in a way. Small to medium size Internet commerce / content businesses have largely been the driving force behind public awareness of net neutrality, in my opinion.
(I've noticed this time around that the largest Internet companies have largely kept quiet about the issue this time around. The fact that there has been such a big public response to this to me shows how important keeping an Internet around that is more than just Google/Facebook/Amazon is.)
(I've noticed this time around that the largest Internet companies have largely kept quiet about the issue this time around. The fact that there has been such a big public response to this to me shows how important keeping an Internet around that is more than just Google/Facebook/Amazon is.)
Who exactly is leading the pack here?
Well heck, the FCC decision^d^d^d^d^d^d^d^d stand-up comedy was written by an Verizon attorney so why not some comedy in the WSJ?
Edited for support: https://gizmodo.com/fcc-chairman-is-laughing-at-americans-wh... https://youtu.be/DzHleu03fxY
Edited for support: https://gizmodo.com/fcc-chairman-is-laughing-at-americans-wh... https://youtu.be/DzHleu03fxY
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WSJ did a really good job with this too. I opened the News app on my iPad after work today and found this story at the top of my feed. Their stories are usually paywalled, so I was surprised they featured anywhere near the top, and I tapped, curious.
The argument did seem pretty fair and balanced. It presented both sides (or seemed to). On reflection (and I wouldn't have reflected if not for The Intercept's story) the article basically echoed Ajit Pai's argument saying anyone who gets up in arms about regulating ISPs is overreacting.
And it almost made me believe I was naive for thinking the repeal was a grave moment in Internet history.
I don't know how they got the story so highly ranked on Apple News, but the pessimist in me wants to say money changed hands.
The argument did seem pretty fair and balanced. It presented both sides (or seemed to). On reflection (and I wouldn't have reflected if not for The Intercept's story) the article basically echoed Ajit Pai's argument saying anyone who gets up in arms about regulating ISPs is overreacting.
And it almost made me believe I was naive for thinking the repeal was a grave moment in Internet history.
I don't know how they got the story so highly ranked on Apple News, but the pessimist in me wants to say money changed hands.
We need to seriously reconsider what we want out of journalism. I don't want to live anywhere where this sort of media is okay. I'm not sure why anyone else is suddenly okay with this either. The "Free Market" was supposed to be a tool to more efficiently organize labor and capital, not enslave us. It is supposed to work for us, it is our tool. But if readers are now _okay_ with literal shilling in media, then that's it. We've been captured by our own tools, slaves to our own machines.
I keep questioning my decision to have a Washington Post subscription, but I'll sleep better tonight knowing it goes towards something that at least _tries_ to be journalism.