The Universe Knows Right from Wrong(nautil.us)
nautil.us
The Universe Knows Right from Wrong
http://nautil.us/issue/89/the-dark-side/the-universe-knows-right-from-wrong
107 comments
> But the problem for .. anyone who tries to ground moral truth in the natural world, is that moral truths, like mathematical truths, are necessarily true, which means that it’s impossible for them to be false.
What a bizarre argument. Mathematical truths are defined to be true -- entirely the opposite of what the author is trying to claim about moral truths, so this is about as absurd a comparison as one could make.
I'm no expert but this article reads to me like hand-waving psychobabble.
What a bizarre argument. Mathematical truths are defined to be true -- entirely the opposite of what the author is trying to claim about moral truths, so this is about as absurd a comparison as one could make.
I'm no expert but this article reads to me like hand-waving psychobabble.
> Mathematical truths are defined to be true
Perhaps a nitpick, but: axioms are defined to be true. Mathematics, roughly speaking, is the business of exploring the consequences of chosen sets of axioms. Sometimes published mathematical theorems turn out to be wrong.
Perhaps a nitpick, but: axioms are defined to be true. Mathematics, roughly speaking, is the business of exploring the consequences of chosen sets of axioms. Sometimes published mathematical theorems turn out to be wrong.
I don't follow what you're taking issue with. Naturally by "mathematical truths" I meant axioms and statements that are reducible to axioms - there isn't really anything else for it to mean, after all. On the "sometimes published theorems are wrong" part you've lost me entirely.
> by "mathematical truths" I meant axioms and statements that are reducible to axioms
That distinction is important, and it seemed to me you'd skimmed over it.
Axioms are directly defined to be true for the purposes of mathematical inquiry, and as such can't really be wrong. At worst, a set of axioms can be inconsistent.
Emergent properties are different; they're not directly defined to be true. This is of practical consequence, as mathematicians sometimes get them wrong.
That distinction is important, and it seemed to me you'd skimmed over it.
Axioms are directly defined to be true for the purposes of mathematical inquiry, and as such can't really be wrong. At worst, a set of axioms can be inconsistent.
Emergent properties are different; they're not directly defined to be true. This is of practical consequence, as mathematicians sometimes get them wrong.
Do you think? I'd say that axioms were just taken; there's no commitment to their truth (since there is no need for it, and mathematics likes economy).
Axiom are just taken but over time we picked the most useful ones. This is why they map well to the physical world.
The baffling thing is how few and simple axioms we need for them to be useful.
The baffling thing is how few and simple axioms we need for them to be useful.
In math "true" is essentially just a name for a symbol. Saying that an axiom is true is like saying that 3 comes after 2 - it doesn't imply any kind of truth in the usual "consistent with reality" sense.
It also doesn't make sense to define axioms as true. What if later it turns out that the axioms were a mutual contradiction?
Truth is tricky. If I state "The sky is blue", I can look out of the window, the sky is blue, my statement corresponds to the state of the world, my statement is true, right? But in mathematics there is no window, everything is internal, abstract, so what does "truth" mean when there is no state of the world with which to compare? More importantly, would the mathematics be any different if the axioms are declared to be true? No, it wouldn't make any difference at all. So let's leave "truth" to the physicists and philosophers.
That's the first error of the objectivists. Mistaking "blue" as a property of the sky.
Color happens in your head.
That is why trichromacy, tetrachromacy, pentachromacy, dodecachromacy etc. is a thing.
Color happens in your head.
That is why trichromacy, tetrachromacy, pentachromacy, dodecachromacy etc. is a thing.
This is perhaps not all that relevant to your point, but "the sky is blue" so often being used as an example of an obvious truth is amusing to me, because very often the sky is not all that blue at all.
If I look outside right now, the sky is probably better described as cyan; quite obviously a different colour from the blue exercise mat that happens to be on my floor.
The sky can also be described by many of the other colours depending on weather or the time of day.
If I look outside right now, the sky is probably better described as cyan; quite obviously a different colour from the blue exercise mat that happens to be on my floor.
The sky can also be described by many of the other colours depending on weather or the time of day.
It's almost as if defining anything as a "mathematical truth" is definitionally wrong and anyone having done so should be called out as a liar.
Only the person who responded to the person who made such a statement were more polite about it, hence this "discussion".
Only the person who responded to the person who made such a statement were more polite about it, hence this "discussion".
This might be a good time to look up the definition of axiom: "a statement accepted as true as the basis for argument or inference".
Yes, but I think that's "accepted" in the sense of "until we run into a contradiction", at which point you have to start over with new axioms. I.e. it turned out your axioms weren't all true.
I think that in the definition you gave "accepted" should be replaced by "assumed".
I think that in the definition you gave "accepted" should be replaced by "assumed".
"John can dig a hole ten feet deep in an hour. How long would it take him to dig a hole five feet deep?"
The first sentence of that problem is an axiom. It is absolutely 100% true, within the context of that story problem. It could contradict another axiom, but it can't turn out to be false, because it's not a statement about the real world.
The first sentence of that problem is an axiom. It is absolutely 100% true, within the context of that story problem. It could contradict another axiom, but it can't turn out to be false, because it's not a statement about the real world.
Thank you, I took the same issue you did when reading this.
There are not "truths" in mathematics, it's literally a system of logic with definitions at the bottom (axioms) and then a following of the results based upon the agreed upon logic.
There are not "truths" in mathematics, it's literally a system of logic with definitions at the bottom (axioms) and then a following of the results based upon the agreed upon logic.
The argument echos Kant...which is too big a sea to boil in a comment. So at geostationary orbit, Kant's metaphysics says we cannot have absolute knowledge of the empirical world, only knowledge mediated by the a priori conditions of human experience, space and time. However, we can have absolute knowledge of morals because such knowledge is not dependent on the aforementioned a priori conditions of human experience.
Going further, in Critique of Pure Reason Kant uses mathematics as an example of synthetic a priori knowledge. This is the lever he uses to overturn the traditional halving of all knowledge into either analytic and a priori or synthetic and a posteriori (empirical). The halving was the basis for Hume's radical skepticism and it's predecessors.
Going further, in Critique of Pure Reason Kant uses mathematics as an example of synthetic a priori knowledge. This is the lever he uses to overturn the traditional halving of all knowledge into either analytic and a priori or synthetic and a posteriori (empirical). The halving was the basis for Hume's radical skepticism and it's predecessors.
Maths is what happens when you take nonsense very seriously.
For some odd reason a subset of all the possible non-sense maps really well to the real world.
For some odd reason a subset of all the possible non-sense maps really well to the real world.
I think the terms used in Mathematics are a tad more precise than those in natural language e.g. 1 is fairly clear, "moral" is not as clear.
The reason Maths works is because it is based on intuitions (counting, space) that are presumably shadows of the physical world cast on the evolving brain via coarse perception. The effectiveness of Mathematics in Physics is probably not unreasonable at all.
The reason Maths works is because it is based on intuitions (counting, space) that are presumably shadows of the physical world cast on the evolving brain via coarse perception. The effectiveness of Mathematics in Physics is probably not unreasonable at all.
Clear to whom? The meaning of "1" is conventional/socially constructed.
For the sake of argument I can conveniently forget what "1" means, and then you can try and explain it to me like I am from another planet.
Semantics are a non-trivial matter.
For the sake of argument I can conveniently forget what "1" means, and then you can try and explain it to me like I am from another planet.
Semantics are a non-trivial matter.
To be extremely precise: 1 is the successor of 0. Anywhere that there is a natural numbers object, there's a semantics for this statement. What is socially constructed here is the choice of topos which hosts the natural numbers object!
SUCC(0) is no explanation of 1, until you explain 0.
Note how you are reaching for complex/abstract ideas (like a "topos" and "natural numbers") to explain simple/intuitive ones (like 0 and 1).
"toposes" and "sets" (of "natural numbers") are socially constructed in the subculture of Mathematicians.
Outside of that shared experience, they are pretty meaningless.
I guess you are on the "discovered" side, and I am on the "invented" side of Mathematics ;)
Note how you are reaching for complex/abstract ideas (like a "topos" and "natural numbers") to explain simple/intuitive ones (like 0 and 1).
"toposes" and "sets" (of "natural numbers") are socially constructed in the subculture of Mathematicians.
Outside of that shared experience, they are pretty meaningless.
I guess you are on the "discovered" side, and I am on the "invented" side of Mathematics ;)
Humans are what, about 99.9% similar to each other on average? So that gives me 3 nines belief that yes, if I can understand, then you can understand; we're just humans after all. I think that you're being sarcastic; once we define categories, Cartesian closed categories, and elementary topoi, then categorical set theory is a straightforward sequence of diagram schemata. But I understand your point!
You're super-close to a deep realization: all words are only sensical to certain subcultures. IOW there's no absolute meaning to any word. In that perspective, we're both right; "1" is meaningless and 1 is categorical, and it's just a question of pointers vs. names.
Another quick and deep corollary is that reality is socially constructed; whenever a quorum of humans is mutually intelligible during a conversation, then they are agreeing on the local nature of reality. Humans can't construct global maps of reality, though, since they can't observe the Universe all at once. Indeed global maps of reality are forbidden by the Kochen-Specker Theorem.
Edit: To clarify for the audience, I have no appeal to higher categories here, and the definitions of category theory are not some sort of categorization or classification process, but axiomatic definitions akin to set theory.
You're super-close to a deep realization: all words are only sensical to certain subcultures. IOW there's no absolute meaning to any word. In that perspective, we're both right; "1" is meaningless and 1 is categorical, and it's just a question of pointers vs. names.
Another quick and deep corollary is that reality is socially constructed; whenever a quorum of humans is mutually intelligible during a conversation, then they are agreeing on the local nature of reality. Humans can't construct global maps of reality, though, since they can't observe the Universe all at once. Indeed global maps of reality are forbidden by the Kochen-Specker Theorem.
Edit: To clarify for the audience, I have no appeal to higher categories here, and the definitions of category theory are not some sort of categorization or classification process, but axiomatic definitions akin to set theory.
Heh, how did I know you are going to appeal to infinity-categories at some point?
"defining categories" and their respective categorisation rules is the process of classification. They don't account for the classifiers themselves.
You are super-close to a deeper realisation even.
If any notation is meaningful (even one that uses symbols like ∞), then it's Turing-recognisable.
Type-0 Chomsky grammar. In formal languages syntax is semantics.
In so far as understanding (comprehension?) goes, you could say that I subscribe to the axiom of unrestricted comprehension. It's rather un-Mathematical doing so.
"defining categories" and their respective categorisation rules is the process of classification. They don't account for the classifiers themselves.
You are super-close to a deeper realisation even.
If any notation is meaningful (even one that uses symbols like ∞), then it's Turing-recognisable.
Type-0 Chomsky grammar. In formal languages syntax is semantics.
In so far as understanding (comprehension?) goes, you could say that I subscribe to the axiom of unrestricted comprehension. It's rather un-Mathematical doing so.
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This part of the universe, me, knows that the article is wrong. So yes. But the same part of the universe also knows that the rest doesn't know shit. No evidence required, you can trust me, I'm from the universe.
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Panpsychism is a pretty interesting idea, but this article does a poor job of explaining it and then making its own moral argument. I'd say skip the article and read this instead:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/
One line of argument for panpsychism that I don't often see mentioned is that humans/animals assume that we're the only form of consciousness in the universe. This strikes me as rather myopic, at least as a baseline assumption. It seems like the starting point should be assume that other bodies in the universe are constituted in similar ways and not animals on Earth are exceptionally, unexplainably unique.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/
One line of argument for panpsychism that I don't often see mentioned is that humans/animals assume that we're the only form of consciousness in the universe. This strikes me as rather myopic, at least as a baseline assumption. It seems like the starting point should be assume that other bodies in the universe are constituted in similar ways and not animals on Earth are exceptionally, unexplainably unique.
Here is my take:
All knowledge is ultimately based on assumptions, and those assumptions ultimately hang in thin air. We rely on our senses to observe the world around us, and we rely on our mental faculties to interpenetrate what we observe. But we have no way of knowing if our senses, and our mental faculties, can be trusted, if they are accurate to some objective reality.
It might very well be that what we take in from our surroundings and environment isn't an "objective reality", but an incredibly twisted and mangled version which is has more falsehoods, inaccuracies and errors, than any truths. To say that the sky is blue is an incredibly "human" observation, which relies on our eyes having divided the light spectrum into arbitrary ranges we call colors. There is no grounding to distinct colors, other than what our eyes and brain arbitrarily imposes to make sense of what it's taking in. It's a clever, but arbitrary, way to look at the light spectrum.
But we do the best with what we have, there is no point in wallowing in pity, we simply work with the tools we are given. Now, even if we cannot justify it, it does appear to us that murder is morally wrong. We are repulsed by it, we wish to avoid it, we want to minimize it, we label those who do it as being flawed and broken, and we have all sorts of theories and ideas about how murder doesn't fit in with how human life operates.
Even though I cannot point you to any objective anchoring as to why murder is wrong, I can neither point you to any objective anchoring for anything. I cannot prove that what I see, touch, feel, smell and hear is really there, nor that what I am observing is in any way accurate. Even the most basic mathematical facts are suspect, if you can't verify the mental faculties behind it.
So why reject the moral facts I cannot verify, but accept the observable, evidential, mathematical facts that I cannot verify? Who gets to choose which ones gets a pass? I think murder is wrong for the same reason I think the sky is blue: because that's what my senses, body and mind tells me.
All knowledge is ultimately based on assumptions, and those assumptions ultimately hang in thin air. We rely on our senses to observe the world around us, and we rely on our mental faculties to interpenetrate what we observe. But we have no way of knowing if our senses, and our mental faculties, can be trusted, if they are accurate to some objective reality.
It might very well be that what we take in from our surroundings and environment isn't an "objective reality", but an incredibly twisted and mangled version which is has more falsehoods, inaccuracies and errors, than any truths. To say that the sky is blue is an incredibly "human" observation, which relies on our eyes having divided the light spectrum into arbitrary ranges we call colors. There is no grounding to distinct colors, other than what our eyes and brain arbitrarily imposes to make sense of what it's taking in. It's a clever, but arbitrary, way to look at the light spectrum.
But we do the best with what we have, there is no point in wallowing in pity, we simply work with the tools we are given. Now, even if we cannot justify it, it does appear to us that murder is morally wrong. We are repulsed by it, we wish to avoid it, we want to minimize it, we label those who do it as being flawed and broken, and we have all sorts of theories and ideas about how murder doesn't fit in with how human life operates.
Even though I cannot point you to any objective anchoring as to why murder is wrong, I can neither point you to any objective anchoring for anything. I cannot prove that what I see, touch, feel, smell and hear is really there, nor that what I am observing is in any way accurate. Even the most basic mathematical facts are suspect, if you can't verify the mental faculties behind it.
So why reject the moral facts I cannot verify, but accept the observable, evidential, mathematical facts that I cannot verify? Who gets to choose which ones gets a pass? I think murder is wrong for the same reason I think the sky is blue: because that's what my senses, body and mind tells me.
Consider that even murder isn't universally considered bad. Examples include wars, self defense, proponents of the death penalty, the sentinelese, etc. Debates can get particularly heated when one gets into things like abortion and ethical dilemmas.
As for the dichotomy of logical verification given our meat-based fallible physical medium, I'm reminded of Godel's incompleteness theory, i.e. that it is possible for a set of axioms to be internally consistent (e.g. basic algebra), yet we can construct a meta set of axioms to demonstrate that it is impossible to mathematically prove every truth therein.
As for the dichotomy of logical verification given our meat-based fallible physical medium, I'm reminded of Godel's incompleteness theory, i.e. that it is possible for a set of axioms to be internally consistent (e.g. basic algebra), yet we can construct a meta set of axioms to demonstrate that it is impossible to mathematically prove every truth therein.
None of those things is murder, which is unlawful killing, usually premeditated. Maybe there is a society which doesn’t hold murder to be wrong, but I’ve never heard of it, and it’s hard to see how it could last.
One's unlawfulness is someone else's lawfulness. (Eg wars and other conflicts where there are more than one law has to be considered, for example a foreign operative committing an assassination.)
True enough, but even so, in these examples you mentioned, war, self defense, death penalty, people struggle a lot with being mentally harmed by taking lives. I read somewhere that Nazi Germany moved to gassing those they persecuted rather than simply killing them by firing squad because the firing squads couldn't handle it day in and day out. The majority of mankind abhors murder, and has to invent elaborate methods and rules to avoid facing the brute reality of it, even when they say that it's good.
My point is just that to me, and my society as a whole, murder is seen as something bad, as a simple and obvious fact, a safe assumption. If somebody wants to tell me that assumption is wrong and should be removed, I want to see what sort of stuff their assumptions are built out of to justify such confidence.
My point is just that to me, and my society as a whole, murder is seen as something bad, as a simple and obvious fact, a safe assumption. If somebody wants to tell me that assumption is wrong and should be removed, I want to see what sort of stuff their assumptions are built out of to justify such confidence.
I think there are both nature and nurture aspects to why in general we dislike the thought of killing our own kind.
Physiologically we have brain mechanisms that activate when we see a stimulus to another person (yawning and phantom limb experiments being well known examples).
Hypothetically if we had evolved from mantises instead of primates, we might be physiologically conditioned to think eating our sexual partners was the norm. I wouldn't be surprised if our moral framework in that case lead to utterances such as "how dare you not sacrifice your life for your children!"
On the nurture side, the sentinelese are perfectly fine with killing foreigners violently on sight. There are also records in other tribal cultures of the belief that cannibalism was a way to inherit someone's desirable traits. So clearly culture plays a role as well.
Physiologically we have brain mechanisms that activate when we see a stimulus to another person (yawning and phantom limb experiments being well known examples).
Hypothetically if we had evolved from mantises instead of primates, we might be physiologically conditioned to think eating our sexual partners was the norm. I wouldn't be surprised if our moral framework in that case lead to utterances such as "how dare you not sacrifice your life for your children!"
On the nurture side, the sentinelese are perfectly fine with killing foreigners violently on sight. There are also records in other tribal cultures of the belief that cannibalism was a way to inherit someone's desirable traits. So clearly culture plays a role as well.
Yup, agreed. Likewise, concepts such as the taste of sweet, salt, sour; colors such as red, blue and yellow; behaviors such as aggressive, calm, afraid; emotions such as happy, angry, sad; evaluations such as beautiful, ugly, plain;
All of these are from nature and nurture, they don't exist as mathematical laws or any sort of foundational aspect of how the universe works. It's all just subjective and arbitrary inventions we have created to categorize and make sense of what we observe.
Yet they are all immensely important to us! Even though they don't have objective grounding. We base our entire societies, our ways of life, our ways of thinking, around these incredibly non-justified categories of things.
Yet, there is a whole lot of people who seem to want to exclude morality from this box. It has to be thrown out, because it's not objective, not justified, not "real". But in contrast to what exactly?
All of these are from nature and nurture, they don't exist as mathematical laws or any sort of foundational aspect of how the universe works. It's all just subjective and arbitrary inventions we have created to categorize and make sense of what we observe.
Yet they are all immensely important to us! Even though they don't have objective grounding. We base our entire societies, our ways of life, our ways of thinking, around these incredibly non-justified categories of things.
Yet, there is a whole lot of people who seem to want to exclude morality from this box. It has to be thrown out, because it's not objective, not justified, not "real". But in contrast to what exactly?
Because not everyone think the same. We are not machine where everyone run the same software. Some people like chocolate, some people hate chocolate. Likewise some people think murder is good, some people think its bad.
If God didn't mean for people to eat other people, they wouldn't be made of meat. ;)
(To paraphrase Flanders' and Swann's song, "The Reluctant Cannibal"):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qjAHw2DEBgw
"Always be sincere, whether you mean it or not."
"I won't let another man pass my lips!"
(To paraphrase Flanders' and Swann's song, "The Reluctant Cannibal"):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qjAHw2DEBgw
"Always be sincere, whether you mean it or not."
"I won't let another man pass my lips!"
I agree. Your point that "assumptions hang in thin air" removes the need for the universe to supply us with axioms, including moral axioms, which is an idea the author leans on heavily.
We have many thoughts and ideas about life. For example, a person might think, "The ideal life is infinitely long and involves no pain." This probably comes from a logical part of the mind, similar to where statements like "two plus two equals four" are validated and appreciated, but that doesn't mean it's equally objective. We are animals, and staying alive and avoiding pain are strong drives.
We have many thoughts and ideas about life. For example, a person might think, "The ideal life is infinitely long and involves no pain." This probably comes from a logical part of the mind, similar to where statements like "two plus two equals four" are validated and appreciated, but that doesn't mean it's equally objective. We are animals, and staying alive and avoiding pain are strong drives.
Right off the bat it fails epicly in its comparison of Gandhi to Epstein as bastions of good and evil, as apparently the author is completely unaware of Gandhi’s sleeping with children? What a horrible choice for the side of good, given Epstein’s horrendous misdeeds.
What a horribly written horribly reasoned article. Very frustrating to read.
> But if Reality is itself a very general form of consciousness, and my consciousness is a specific form of that general form of consciousness, it follows that Reality is present within my consciousness.
No it doesn’t follow. You are fully capable of experiencing things that are not reality. That’s just poor reasoning.
I work hard to keep my tone online positive but this article is simply religion presenting itself as science, and it enrages me.
What a horribly written horribly reasoned article. Very frustrating to read.
> But if Reality is itself a very general form of consciousness, and my consciousness is a specific form of that general form of consciousness, it follows that Reality is present within my consciousness.
No it doesn’t follow. You are fully capable of experiencing things that are not reality. That’s just poor reasoning.
I work hard to keep my tone online positive but this article is simply religion presenting itself as science, and it enrages me.
> completely unaware of Gandhi’s sleeping with children
I was unaware, and searching suggests you are referring to him sleeping naked in the same bed as a 17 or 18-year-old, without touching them, supposedly to test his celibacy.
Which is, quite frankly, hilariously innocent compared what "sleeping with children" implies, particularly in the context of being contrasted with Epstein.
> None of the women who participated in the brahmachari experiments of Gandhi indicated that they had sex or that Gandhi behaved in any sexual way. Those who went public said they felt as though they were sleeping with their aging mother.
If this is horrible enough to outweigh the good in his life, hell better make room: we're all coming.
I was unaware, and searching suggests you are referring to him sleeping naked in the same bed as a 17 or 18-year-old, without touching them, supposedly to test his celibacy.
Which is, quite frankly, hilariously innocent compared what "sleeping with children" implies, particularly in the context of being contrasted with Epstein.
> None of the women who participated in the brahmachari experiments of Gandhi indicated that they had sex or that Gandhi behaved in any sexual way. Those who went public said they felt as though they were sleeping with their aging mother.
If this is horrible enough to outweigh the good in his life, hell better make room: we're all coming.
I share your disdain.
Half the people talking about panpsychism are just bloviating in-between hits on DMT and are hoping to achieve Nirvana and merge with some Jungian collective unconscious, but are usually completely ignorant of that entire concept.
Panpsychism doesn't mean everything and everywhere is tripping on acid having a great time. Panpsychism is actually kind of terrifying; just think about what it must feel like to be one of a trillion trillion trillion hydrogen atoms suddenly recruited into a massive supernova and then drifting alone for 5 billion years and being washed through the entirety of life's evolution on Earth, taking part in a trillion different DNA molecules and cell walls; not having any clue about what you've been a part of or why. Being a horrible-looking blood-sucking mosquito downed by a bug-eyed frog, munched on by a croc, farted out a horse...or frozen into a granite hunk in the dark bowels of the Earth for eternity. No, panpsychism doesn't mean your preference for the Yankees over the Mets are somehow the moral code of the universe, or that damn squirrel with a twinkle in its eye is the manifestation of the all-knowing god, you fool (author).
Half the people talking about panpsychism are just bloviating in-between hits on DMT and are hoping to achieve Nirvana and merge with some Jungian collective unconscious, but are usually completely ignorant of that entire concept.
Panpsychism doesn't mean everything and everywhere is tripping on acid having a great time. Panpsychism is actually kind of terrifying; just think about what it must feel like to be one of a trillion trillion trillion hydrogen atoms suddenly recruited into a massive supernova and then drifting alone for 5 billion years and being washed through the entirety of life's evolution on Earth, taking part in a trillion different DNA molecules and cell walls; not having any clue about what you've been a part of or why. Being a horrible-looking blood-sucking mosquito downed by a bug-eyed frog, munched on by a croc, farted out a horse...or frozen into a granite hunk in the dark bowels of the Earth for eternity. No, panpsychism doesn't mean your preference for the Yankees over the Mets are somehow the moral code of the universe, or that damn squirrel with a twinkle in its eye is the manifestation of the all-knowing god, you fool (author).
> just think about what it must feel like to be one of a trillion trillion trillion hydrogen atoms [...]
Usually the models of Panpsychism have a spectrum of consciousness and associate complexity of the thing with consciousness. So sure, let's say atoms have some consciousness, they have as much as is seen by a first look, that is their behavior and intelligence shows it, and it's not much, basically zero. A rock probably has more. It probably has rock-like consciousness, it has rock-behavior and rock-thoughts. It probably likes being a nice rock, hosting all those crystals, flowing through places sometimes slowly, sometimes flying off from a volcano, sometimes dissolving in a melting pool, merging with other rocks' rock-consciousness. Of course there are grumpy rocks too, just like there are many kinds of humans. And so on.
Usually the models of Panpsychism have a spectrum of consciousness and associate complexity of the thing with consciousness. So sure, let's say atoms have some consciousness, they have as much as is seen by a first look, that is their behavior and intelligence shows it, and it's not much, basically zero. A rock probably has more. It probably has rock-like consciousness, it has rock-behavior and rock-thoughts. It probably likes being a nice rock, hosting all those crystals, flowing through places sometimes slowly, sometimes flying off from a volcano, sometimes dissolving in a melting pool, merging with other rocks' rock-consciousness. Of course there are grumpy rocks too, just like there are many kinds of humans. And so on.
"(...) consciousness pervades the universe and is a fundamental feature of it (...)". I'm not sure if it means much. It's like saying that spheres prevade universe. Great, now what? Is cat hunting little bird good or bad? Depends who you ask. Consciousness and forms of life in general are recursions where emergent memory and prediction qualifies it on the wide spectrum of sophistication. Natural selection creates unhappy "recursions" from the moment when one eats the other and discovers it gives great energy boost. Feeling pain/pleasure is emergent feature shaped by natural selection. But there is nothing fundamental about it that says good predictors must have it. Evaluating options on more global scale move you closer to more global rights/wrongs, that's all.
Maybe im missing it, but the argument seems to be morality is objective because everyone thinks it is. How is that not begging the question?
Then there are a bunch of pithy lines, which the author seems to treat as obvious in context revelations, but to me seem to utterly lack evidence/argument.
> "No matter how the universe had turned out, two plus two would equal four and it would have been wrong to torture people for fun."
Umm why? That seems non obvious to me.
>"Pleasure is good and suffering is bad because Reality is essentially directed toward the former and away from the latter"
Is it though? And that's ignoring the whole question of wtf does it even mean for reality to be directed in some direction.
> "My proposal is that the inherently directed nature of Reality entails that it’s objectively good for Reality when it manifests as pleasure and objectively bad for Reality when it manifests as pain."
Umm ok.
>"It is broadly agreed that (all things being equal) pleasure is good and pain is bad..."
Isn't the definition of pleasure, being good. Seems kind of circular - everyone agrees feeling good is good and feeling bad is bad.
>"The reality of objective value is a non-negotiable data-point and we are entitled to make whatever postulations are required to account for it."
'kay then.
Then there are a bunch of pithy lines, which the author seems to treat as obvious in context revelations, but to me seem to utterly lack evidence/argument.
> "No matter how the universe had turned out, two plus two would equal four and it would have been wrong to torture people for fun."
Umm why? That seems non obvious to me.
>"Pleasure is good and suffering is bad because Reality is essentially directed toward the former and away from the latter"
Is it though? And that's ignoring the whole question of wtf does it even mean for reality to be directed in some direction.
> "My proposal is that the inherently directed nature of Reality entails that it’s objectively good for Reality when it manifests as pleasure and objectively bad for Reality when it manifests as pain."
Umm ok.
>"It is broadly agreed that (all things being equal) pleasure is good and pain is bad..."
Isn't the definition of pleasure, being good. Seems kind of circular - everyone agrees feeling good is good and feeling bad is bad.
>"The reality of objective value is a non-negotiable data-point and we are entitled to make whatever postulations are required to account for it."
'kay then.
Yeah, doesn't make sense.
I prefer a simpler argument for why there is a subset of morality that's universal for (vast majority of) humans: argument from shared brain architecture.
We're essentially running the same wetware under the hood, at least on the time scales of human civilization. So while the universe doesn't necessarily privilege a set of values, human brains are. And that's all that really matters (until we meet aliens or start building conscious AIs) - conscious experience is a feature of brains, not laws of physics in general.
I prefer a simpler argument for why there is a subset of morality that's universal for (vast majority of) humans: argument from shared brain architecture.
We're essentially running the same wetware under the hood, at least on the time scales of human civilization. So while the universe doesn't necessarily privilege a set of values, human brains are. And that's all that really matters (until we meet aliens or start building conscious AIs) - conscious experience is a feature of brains, not laws of physics in general.
There is an even simpler explanation: some moral principles push people towards a game-theoretic optimum, so evolution selects for it.
Eg, a society that allows random murders will be at a staggering disadvantage. By magic, most (all?) societies have strong moral arguments against murder. Ditto honesty - honest societies have structural advantages.
Any cooperative species will have something that looks like morality. Even ants practice first aid.
Eg, a society that allows random murders will be at a staggering disadvantage. By magic, most (all?) societies have strong moral arguments against murder. Ditto honesty - honest societies have structural advantages.
Any cooperative species will have something that looks like morality. Even ants practice first aid.
I feel those explanations are complementary. Being a product of evolution, the brain has some game-theoretic principles encoded in it. And with capability of conscious thought, communication, and later language and writing, we learn to recognize and apply game-theoretic principles more abstractly. Culture is, in part, game theory in form of heuristics.
On the other hand, where game theory says some choice is arbitrary, the brain can have a default encoded - and that default will be universal across humans.
On the other hand, where game theory says some choice is arbitrary, the brain can have a default encoded - and that default will be universal across humans.
This is quite hand-wavy and not solidly founded. Some things that fall out from evolution align with advantages some do not. An example might be that 'allowing' a low rate of random murders may not have any practical difference in outcomes but humans are concerned with personal safety an a random event may apply to anyone so everyone (over) reacting would be the norm but not optimal in a game-theoretic sense. Negative bias leading to inaccurate judgements is such an example.
> cooperative species will have something that looks like morality
For the argument of the post to be valid, it has to apply to 'species' rather than a correlated subset.
> cooperative species will have something that looks like morality
For the argument of the post to be valid, it has to apply to 'species' rather than a correlated subset.
"Optimum" is a moral notion. You're begging the question.
I don't think so. In this view, the concepts of what constitutes ethical behavior have arisen from individuals coming to understand what sort of society is most likely to give the best outcome according to their own long-term self interest. This is no more begging the question than the concept of survival of the fittest in theories of evolution, the point being that there is a coherent concept of fitness in that case, and self-interest in this one. In both cases, the question being addressed is "how did we arrive at the current state of affairs, when other outcomes are at least logically possible?"
Not in game-theoretic sense, and not in evolutionary sense.
I like the idea that morality is something that is built by mankind and that needs to be extracted by studies.
For instance, economists have found the value at which US society estimates an American's life by seeing at which point risks balances costs in some hazardous investments.
For instance, economists have found the value at which US society estimates an American's life by seeing at which point risks balances costs in some hazardous investments.
Maybe, but a measure of the phenomenon is not an explanation of how human societies came to have an ethical aspect.
It is also possible that the metric is considering only one aspect of a society's ethical position, especially given that things like trolley problems, and some of the things that are done in the name of nominally ethical religions, suggest that people are not consistently rational in their ethical thinking and behavior.
One might, for example, value another's life purely on the economic value it is to oneself - would that be an ethical position or the absense of one? I don't doubt that one could make some sort of argument for the former, but ethics are really only interesting when they are at odds with perceived self-interest.
It is also possible that the metric is considering only one aspect of a society's ethical position, especially given that things like trolley problems, and some of the things that are done in the name of nominally ethical religions, suggest that people are not consistently rational in their ethical thinking and behavior.
One might, for example, value another's life purely on the economic value it is to oneself - would that be an ethical position or the absense of one? I don't doubt that one could make some sort of argument for the former, but ethics are really only interesting when they are at odds with perceived self-interest.
The idea is to not look at individual choices but at the aggregate of choices made and measure what mankind considers good.
The aggregate of choices is a consequence of what individuals choose, and to try to ignore that is to avoid the issues that determine the outcome.
I am not sure how? Quite the contrary, stating that "good is what the society decides" is a way to solve contradictions in individual choices.
That's not my stance, btw, but that's a morality framework that is coherent.
That's not my stance, btw, but that's a morality framework that is coherent.
> I am not sure how? Quite the contrary, stating that "good is what the society decides" is a way to solve contradictions in individual choices.
It seems to me a way to avoid considering the contradictions in individual choices, which is where many of the interesting issues of ethics lie. This stance may be coherent in its own terms (and quantifiable, 'objective' and so forth), but I am skeptical that it yields much insight, and I think it is wise of you to not adopt it.
Does this stance offer any specific counter-arguments to the specific points I raised in my original post in this thread? Does it, for example, refute my claim that "a measure of the phenomenon is not an explanation of how human societies came to have an ethical aspect?"
It seems to me a way to avoid considering the contradictions in individual choices, which is where many of the interesting issues of ethics lie. This stance may be coherent in its own terms (and quantifiable, 'objective' and so forth), but I am skeptical that it yields much insight, and I think it is wise of you to not adopt it.
Does this stance offer any specific counter-arguments to the specific points I raised in my original post in this thread? Does it, for example, refute my claim that "a measure of the phenomenon is not an explanation of how human societies came to have an ethical aspect?"
> but I am skeptical that it yields much insight
It allowed economist for instance to measure that the price US society is willing to pay to avoid the loss of one random American life is about 8 million USD. I think this is a valuable insight.
As for your last paragraph, I think you can truncate it: "a measure of the phenomenon is not an explanation". I agree, but I am not sure why this is a relevant point. We are talking about ethics, not the history of ethics. Understanding virus biology won't necessarily explain virus evolution to you but is still valuable.
As for your other earlier point, I am not sure I understand your criticism. Economics has proven that many human decisions are irrational or rationally bounded. It is pretty certain that ethics is no different. Why would it make it incapable of producing worthy results?
I am not sure but you seem to assume that "ethics" is a quantity that I propose to measure through a single number. This is not what I am proposing. I think ethics is a domain as large as economics in which some phenomenon can be identified.
I am also proposing that people could then use the ethical models produced as a moral guide and have a coherent morality (but a conservative one: customs and normalcy define "good") and reach it through an objective process.
I consider myself a progressist, so this is not the morality I will adopt, but I recognize that this is a worthy endeavor nonetheless. If only to measure ethical progress within a society.
It allowed economist for instance to measure that the price US society is willing to pay to avoid the loss of one random American life is about 8 million USD. I think this is a valuable insight.
As for your last paragraph, I think you can truncate it: "a measure of the phenomenon is not an explanation". I agree, but I am not sure why this is a relevant point. We are talking about ethics, not the history of ethics. Understanding virus biology won't necessarily explain virus evolution to you but is still valuable.
As for your other earlier point, I am not sure I understand your criticism. Economics has proven that many human decisions are irrational or rationally bounded. It is pretty certain that ethics is no different. Why would it make it incapable of producing worthy results?
I am not sure but you seem to assume that "ethics" is a quantity that I propose to measure through a single number. This is not what I am proposing. I think ethics is a domain as large as economics in which some phenomenon can be identified.
I am also proposing that people could then use the ethical models produced as a moral guide and have a coherent morality (but a conservative one: customs and normalcy define "good") and reach it through an objective process.
I consider myself a progressist, so this is not the morality I will adopt, but I recognize that this is a worthy endeavor nonetheless. If only to measure ethical progress within a society.
>> but I am skeptical that it yields much insight
> It allowed economist for instance to measure that the price US society is willing to pay to avoid the loss of one random American life is about 8 million USD. I think this is a valuable insight.
I see that I was not specific enough, and should have written, "I am skeptical that it yields much insight into the origins of morality and the article author's claim that it is a universal property." I am still doubtful that this observation of current utility provides much insight into the issue that was both the subject of this essay, and of the specific post that you originally replied to.
> I am not sure but you seem to assume that "ethics" is a quantity that I propose to measure through a single number.
While it is clear now that you have a much more thoroughly developed position, it was the only example given in your original post.
We seem to be talking at cross-purposes here, so let me say that I am not questioning the utility of these metrics, but I do not see them as leading to any particular conclusion about the origin and ubiquity of ethics and moral behavior. On rereading your original post in the light of what you have written since, I now take it that your points there are a) morality is something that is built by mankind (as opposed to being universal in the sense that the essay author argues for?); b) the way to find out what a society's ethics are is to measure what it does (as opposed to accepting that its values are what it says they are?) and c) with objective measurements, we can continue to build a better, more effectve morality. If so, I am in complete agreement with b) and share your hope for c). With regard to a), personally I lean more towards TeMPOral's and roenxi's speculation that initial concepts of right and wrong evolved alongside the abilities of self-aware consciousness and the ability to develop a theory of mind, but I am aware that this is just armchair speculation.
> It allowed economist for instance to measure that the price US society is willing to pay to avoid the loss of one random American life is about 8 million USD. I think this is a valuable insight.
I see that I was not specific enough, and should have written, "I am skeptical that it yields much insight into the origins of morality and the article author's claim that it is a universal property." I am still doubtful that this observation of current utility provides much insight into the issue that was both the subject of this essay, and of the specific post that you originally replied to.
> I am not sure but you seem to assume that "ethics" is a quantity that I propose to measure through a single number.
While it is clear now that you have a much more thoroughly developed position, it was the only example given in your original post.
We seem to be talking at cross-purposes here, so let me say that I am not questioning the utility of these metrics, but I do not see them as leading to any particular conclusion about the origin and ubiquity of ethics and moral behavior. On rereading your original post in the light of what you have written since, I now take it that your points there are a) morality is something that is built by mankind (as opposed to being universal in the sense that the essay author argues for?); b) the way to find out what a society's ethics are is to measure what it does (as opposed to accepting that its values are what it says they are?) and c) with objective measurements, we can continue to build a better, more effectve morality. If so, I am in complete agreement with b) and share your hope for c). With regard to a), personally I lean more towards TeMPOral's and roenxi's speculation that initial concepts of right and wrong evolved alongside the abilities of self-aware consciousness and the ability to develop a theory of mind, but I am aware that this is just armchair speculation.
You are correct with my positions.
About a) we are not necessarily in disagreement, we just probably talk about different aspects of morality. I am personally not a believer of objective morality but find that the closest we can get to is that "mankind's morality", which can be argued to be at the root of collective decisions like laws and judgements.
You are talking about individual morality, a related but different thing and indeed, collective morality spawns from individual morality so it is unlikely to give insights about individual morality's origin.
About a) we are not necessarily in disagreement, we just probably talk about different aspects of morality. I am personally not a believer of objective morality but find that the closest we can get to is that "mankind's morality", which can be argued to be at the root of collective decisions like laws and judgements.
You are talking about individual morality, a related but different thing and indeed, collective morality spawns from individual morality so it is unlikely to give insights about individual morality's origin.
This conception is highly susceptible to Goodhart's law.
It favours the quantitative over the qualitative which is a good way to trip over the McNamara fallacy.
It favours the quantitative over the qualitative which is a good way to trip over the McNamara fallacy.
I don't think so, if it is done properly. For instance you want a human life to be worth more but the only way for that to happen is to actually spend more to save human lives, which makes the value of life increase.
What is your standard for "properness" ?
In this context, "that can't be tricked the way you propose". If you accurately measure the value human society puts on life (that is, avoiding the bias of, e.g. considering only a part of the population that may be privileged) then your only way to trick the metric is by actually increasing the value of human lives.
What is your standard for "accuracy" ?
Why do every "philosophical" debate ends up with "let's play semantic and never address the question being actually debated?"
Philosophy is about answering real, deep questions, not about trying to find smart ways to pretend your interlocutor is confusing when defining a field that is characterized by the vagueness of the concepts it explores.
Either make an effort to understand what your interlocutor mean or explicit why the ambiguity your perceive is relevant.
I am arguing that morality is something subjective, created by human society, but that can therefore be measured with the tools of human sciences, like economics.
You are arguing that an improper way to measure it would lead to bad outcomes, which I agree with but I fail to see how it addresses the question. Do you think a proper way to measure it is impossible (and the meaning for "proper" here, is, OBVIOUSLY, "that does not lead to the outcomes you outline")? If so can you explain why you think so?
Philosophy is about answering real, deep questions, not about trying to find smart ways to pretend your interlocutor is confusing when defining a field that is characterized by the vagueness of the concepts it explores.
Either make an effort to understand what your interlocutor mean or explicit why the ambiguity your perceive is relevant.
I am arguing that morality is something subjective, created by human society, but that can therefore be measured with the tools of human sciences, like economics.
You are arguing that an improper way to measure it would lead to bad outcomes, which I agree with but I fail to see how it addresses the question. Do you think a proper way to measure it is impossible (and the meaning for "proper" here, is, OBVIOUSLY, "that does not lead to the outcomes you outline")? If so can you explain why you think so?
On the one hand you dislike semantics, on the other hand you want me to understand your meaning. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
I am arguing that the social aspect of morality isn't about measurement, but about whose yardstick we should be using.
Said differently: How do we calibrate our measurement instruments?
Man is the measure of all things. --Protagoras.
I am arguing that the social aspect of morality isn't about measurement, but about whose yardstick we should be using.
Said differently: How do we calibrate our measurement instruments?
Man is the measure of all things. --Protagoras.
Philosophers: arguing that morality can be objective while failing to agree on the meaning of words...
So to rephrase your objection, you think it is impossible to have an objective measurement of something in the human society? Are you arguing in practice or in theory?
Because right now this is a thought experiment, so for now we can assume perfect knowledge of what is happening within a society. You don't need instruments to calibrate, we are making a theoretical, philosophical point.
If we agree that it is possible in practice, then we can talk about how to implement it in our real, imperfect, partly unknown world but it is not even clear we are there yet.
> Man is the measure of all things. --Protagoras.
I don't know the context of the original quote, but in the context of that discussion, that's the negation of objective truth, something I disagree with. If that's your point of view, we have a core disagreement that's going to invalidate the rest of the discussion.
So to rephrase your objection, you think it is impossible to have an objective measurement of something in the human society? Are you arguing in practice or in theory?
Because right now this is a thought experiment, so for now we can assume perfect knowledge of what is happening within a society. You don't need instruments to calibrate, we are making a theoretical, philosophical point.
If we agree that it is possible in practice, then we can talk about how to implement it in our real, imperfect, partly unknown world but it is not even clear we are there yet.
> Man is the measure of all things. --Protagoras.
I don't know the context of the original quote, but in the context of that discussion, that's the negation of objective truth, something I disagree with. If that's your point of view, we have a core disagreement that's going to invalidate the rest of the discussion.
Everything can be measured in principle and in practice.
Are you hungry? Yes.
That trivial question/answer exchange allowed me to measure 1 bit of information about your state or hunger.
Measurement isn’t the difficulty. Objectivity is the difficulty.
For a measurement to become “objective” it requires inter-subjective consensus.
Disagreement is the thing which hinders consensus.
And there is plenty of disagreement to go around when it comes to measuring things like “health”.
Are you hungry? Yes.
That trivial question/answer exchange allowed me to measure 1 bit of information about your state or hunger.
Measurement isn’t the difficulty. Objectivity is the difficulty.
For a measurement to become “objective” it requires inter-subjective consensus.
Disagreement is the thing which hinders consensus.
And there is plenty of disagreement to go around when it comes to measuring things like “health”.
> Maybe im missing it, but the argument seems to be morality is objective because everyone thinks it is. How is that not begging the question?
Let's substitute morality with "facts".
"Maybe I'm missing it, but the argument seems to be that facts are objective because everyone things they are. How is that not begging the question?"
Begging the question only applies to demonstrable truths, not evident or self-evident truths. We do not and cannot and need not demonstrate first principles. The reality of morality is obvious. The only way you can doubt it is through intentional or habitual skepticism, i.e., through some kind of philosophical FUD. I can doubt the existence of my left hand, but it would be insane for me to do so and there would be no way for me to recover my acceptance of the existence of my left hand apart from abandoning my doubt because my doubt was never rational in the first place, only willed arbitrarily.
That doesn't mean there isn't a way to account for morality.
Now, I reject panpsychism because panpsychism is really just a rehashing of Cartesian dualism masquerading as something new. However, it might be a welcome development and provisional stepping stone toward a recovery of telos. Once we finally abandon the stupid Cartesian view of matter we've been enslaved to for 400 years, we can recover the only real understanding of the basis for morality: teleology and the natural law.
Let's substitute morality with "facts".
"Maybe I'm missing it, but the argument seems to be that facts are objective because everyone things they are. How is that not begging the question?"
Begging the question only applies to demonstrable truths, not evident or self-evident truths. We do not and cannot and need not demonstrate first principles. The reality of morality is obvious. The only way you can doubt it is through intentional or habitual skepticism, i.e., through some kind of philosophical FUD. I can doubt the existence of my left hand, but it would be insane for me to do so and there would be no way for me to recover my acceptance of the existence of my left hand apart from abandoning my doubt because my doubt was never rational in the first place, only willed arbitrarily.
That doesn't mean there isn't a way to account for morality.
Now, I reject panpsychism because panpsychism is really just a rehashing of Cartesian dualism masquerading as something new. However, it might be a welcome development and provisional stepping stone toward a recovery of telos. Once we finally abandon the stupid Cartesian view of matter we've been enslaved to for 400 years, we can recover the only real understanding of the basis for morality: teleology and the natural law.
> The [objective] reality of morality is obvious
You really think so? I don't. To me this (that morality has some ground truth and isn't just some sort of subjective opinion in how people should behave) seems like an extraordinary claim that contradicts experience.
If morality is objective why can nobody, even in culturally homogonous groups, agree on what it means to be a good person?
You really think so? I don't. To me this (that morality has some ground truth and isn't just some sort of subjective opinion in how people should behave) seems like an extraordinary claim that contradicts experience.
If morality is objective why can nobody, even in culturally homogonous groups, agree on what it means to be a good person?
Last week, I did some philosophy: I dived into the discussions of Debian-legal of what constitutes open source and licenses apply or not to deep learning model. It was some real philosophy, applied philosophy, on complicated matters, touching technical, legal and moral aspects.
It reminded me why I consider academic philosophy a fraud. I love philosophy, and places where it happens usually call it another name because the academic philosophers really perverted that word.
It reminded me why I consider academic philosophy a fraud. I love philosophy, and places where it happens usually call it another name because the academic philosophers really perverted that word.
I think you _are_ missing the point TBH.
The people who say that there is no real objective value, and that that knowledge is important, are claiming that knowing that nothing has objective value, has value.
> Umm why? That seems non obvious to me.
Because that's how they've defined the words "two", "four", "plus", "equals", "people", "torture", "for fun", and "wrong"?
Neither of those statements makes any empirical claims about the physical arrangement of matter in the universe, so neither of them would be refuted by any possible way the universe could have turned out.
> > Reality is essentially directed toward the former and away from the latter
That this is false is obvious to anyone who has actually bothered to observe reality. People sometimes unnaturally and non-essentially impose such direction, but Reality itself tends toward the opposite.
Because that's how they've defined the words "two", "four", "plus", "equals", "people", "torture", "for fun", and "wrong"?
Neither of those statements makes any empirical claims about the physical arrangement of matter in the universe, so neither of them would be refuted by any possible way the universe could have turned out.
> > Reality is essentially directed toward the former and away from the latter
That this is false is obvious to anyone who has actually bothered to observe reality. People sometimes unnaturally and non-essentially impose such direction, but Reality itself tends toward the opposite.
I agree with 2+2, i disagree with torture is fun. I don't think anything is implicit in the definition, and i can imagine a (very unpleasent) world where that is the case.
Every question beggs another. Münchhausen trilemma
All definitions are (meta)circular. Because language is recursive.
All definitions are (meta)circular. Because language is recursive.
So far, in this brief comment and a brief comment above, you've mentioned Goodhart's law, the McNamara fallacy, and the Munchhausen trilemma. I know nothing of any of these.
I think that you would communicate better if you avoided such references. I'd even venture to suggest that your internal thoughts might be improved by not shoving arguments into such pre-defined categories.
I think that you would communicate better if you avoided such references. I'd even venture to suggest that your internal thoughts might be improved by not shoving arguments into such pre-defined categories.
I think you overestimate the amount of effort people are willing to go to in order to decipher a cryptic comment by someone called "ukj".
Seriously. I'm trying to help you here. At present, you're just wasting your time.
Seriously. I'm trying to help you here. At present, you're just wasting your time.
Medice, cura te ipsum.
I like terseness.
Just because you haven't heard of something it doesn't preclude it from being a well-indexed idea in human folklore.
Google is your friend.
Just because you haven't heard of something it doesn't preclude it from being a well-indexed idea in human folklore.
Google is your friend.
Goodhart's law/McNamara fallacy: when you put value in a measure, you create incentives to trick it.
Here is aa equivalent statement, as terse and clearer, than the comment you made above.
Here is aa equivalent statement, as terse and clearer, than the comment you made above.
So, would that same reasoning apply to putting value in human lives?
Is that an incentive to trick the measurement?
Is that an incentive to trick the measurement?
Not really. I am proposing a theoretical solution to a philosophical problem. You are the one jumping to imagining how it could be implemented in a biased way.
“Arguemnt by analogy is very powerful and entirely fallacious.” —Mr Dawson, my teacher of Theory of Knowledge (epistemology and critical thinking), circa 1997
So... there is this guy, who has an opinion... okay... and?
So... there is this guy, who has an opinion... okay... and?
I am a believer in a form of panspsychism myself, but this article is baffling.
> But the problem for neo-Aristotelians, or indeed anyone who tries to ground moral truth in the natural world, is that moral truths, like mathematical truths, are necessarily true, which means that it’s impossible for them to be false.
The author completely fails to prove why that is the case, not to mention that this isn't even true for Mathematics either, depending on your starting axioms...
> But the problem for neo-Aristotelians, or indeed anyone who tries to ground moral truth in the natural world, is that moral truths, like mathematical truths, are necessarily true, which means that it’s impossible for them to be false.
The author completely fails to prove why that is the case, not to mention that this isn't even true for Mathematics either, depending on your starting axioms...
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I have only a layman's grasp of philosophy. Why doesn't this field challenge its definitions of consciousness more, and why is ethics treated as an axiom? These both seem like anthropocentric positions to me, limiting the discourse. Why can't trees have a conscious experience? And who cares about the morality of a storm cloud?
Bart Streumer is mentioned in the piece. His book "Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements" begins with a pretty cool sentence:
> You cannot believe the view I will defend in this book. I therefore will not be able to convince you that this view is true.
> You cannot believe the view I will defend in this book. I therefore will not be able to convince you that this view is true.
Honestly not a bad approach. I wish more people just shared their ideas instead of trying to persuade and convert me to their position.
How can you really understand someone’s ideas without understanding all the premises?
Isn’t it necessary for then to try to “convince” you insofar as just stating a conclusion without supporting arguments is no different than stating an opinion?
Or put a different way, why would you ever desire to hear opinions without trying to understand them or establish their truth?
Isn’t it necessary for then to try to “convince” you insofar as just stating a conclusion without supporting arguments is no different than stating an opinion?
Or put a different way, why would you ever desire to hear opinions without trying to understand them or establish their truth?
Not sure how you get this from the quote. I meant that I prefer it when the mood of a book is this is interesting/beautiful/insightful and not this is my conclusion, now I’m going to construct an argument to convince you it’s the right one.
I think my reaction stemmed from
> You cannot believe the view I will defend in this book. I therefore will not be able to convince you that this view is true.
This appears as a concession that the truth about the topic cannot be determined. In which case, from a philosophical point of view, what’s the point?
That being said, I often prefer the presentation of “Here are some interesting things I’ve observed and thoughts I’ve had. Do what you will with them.”
> You cannot believe the view I will defend in this book. I therefore will not be able to convince you that this view is true.
This appears as a concession that the truth about the topic cannot be determined. In which case, from a philosophical point of view, what’s the point?
That being said, I often prefer the presentation of “Here are some interesting things I’ve observed and thoughts I’ve had. Do what you will with them.”
>This objection, though, is jam-packed with value-claims: It claims what we “ought” to believe and references “good” evidence. The very challenge pre-supposes the reality of value.
There's no reason those terms need to be taken as objective. They're as socially constructed as the rest of science and philosophy. We ought to believe things with good evidence because that's what our scientific culture values.
If another culture didn't value that, we'd pity them for being less effective at their goals - it turns out that updating beliefs on evidence makes you more effective. But there's no objective more sense in which they're "bad", they're just less effective.
There's no reason those terms need to be taken as objective. They're as socially constructed as the rest of science and philosophy. We ought to believe things with good evidence because that's what our scientific culture values.
If another culture didn't value that, we'd pity them for being less effective at their goals - it turns out that updating beliefs on evidence makes you more effective. But there's no objective more sense in which they're "bad", they're just less effective.
There is an argument for theism that I find very persuasive, which is that, faith is a ridiculous conclusion but a necessary axiom. The point being it's not something you arrive at through reason after ruling out the alternatives, it's just a point you start at, or not.
It's not an artifact of reason, but it's the other way around, where we can only reason about the things the theistic object of faith has caused. (or even just deistic).
Without too much woo, I'm less circumspect about these beliefs, and think we all believe what we respectively perceive we need to. However, something curious I think I may have discovered is that both faith and fear cannot be experienced simultaneously. If this were true, and fear was just an interpretation of an emergent chemical/biological artifact of life in the universe, it implies that something which necessarily extinguished it could also be just as real.
On the question of what is more absurd, belief in the existence of a superbeing we cannot conceive of yet whose will we can somehow divine, or that our reasoning is sufficient to rule out the existence of such a being, if you have ever tried to argue with a dog or a horse or even a baby, the limits of the latter case seem too stark to provide much confidence in their powers.
It's not an artifact of reason, but it's the other way around, where we can only reason about the things the theistic object of faith has caused. (or even just deistic).
Without too much woo, I'm less circumspect about these beliefs, and think we all believe what we respectively perceive we need to. However, something curious I think I may have discovered is that both faith and fear cannot be experienced simultaneously. If this were true, and fear was just an interpretation of an emergent chemical/biological artifact of life in the universe, it implies that something which necessarily extinguished it could also be just as real.
On the question of what is more absurd, belief in the existence of a superbeing we cannot conceive of yet whose will we can somehow divine, or that our reasoning is sufficient to rule out the existence of such a being, if you have ever tried to argue with a dog or a horse or even a baby, the limits of the latter case seem too stark to provide much confidence in their powers.
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I tried reading "Mere Christianity" by CS Lewis on the strong recommendation of a friend.
Its core claim is that while many of our ideals of morality shift over time, some are absolute and transcend place and time, and therefore they must have been created by something outside of the universe. That claim occupies only the first few pages, and from there he attempts to further conclude that not only is there something, it is specifically the Christian god.
Its core claim is that while many of our ideals of morality shift over time, some are absolute and transcend place and time, and therefore they must have been created by something outside of the universe. That claim occupies only the first few pages, and from there he attempts to further conclude that not only is there something, it is specifically the Christian god.
> some are absolute and transcend place and time
Which ones? I honestly can't think of any of the top of my head for which I wouldn't know a civilization which didn't honor them.
Which ones? I honestly can't think of any of the top of my head for which I wouldn't know a civilization which didn't honor them.
Grounding a discussion of universal morality in Greek philosophy as a basis for condemning Jeffrey Epstein is a remarkable excercise at ignoring the elephant in the room.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pederasty_in_ancient_Greece
(This is not a defence of Epstein but a criticism of the article's argument and coherence.)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pederasty_in_ancient_Greece
(This is not a defence of Epstein but a criticism of the article's argument and coherence.)
"We cannot account for necessary truths in terms of things that could have been different. To take Aristotle’s view: We might have evolved to have natures directed toward cruelty. In such a counterfactual scenario, we would have moral grounds for cruelty, which runs counter to our deepest moral convictions. Any view which tries to ground moral truth in things that might have been different is going to face a similar problem. There will be some counterfactual scenario in which the putative ground of morality is absent or points us toward evil rather than the good."
What is cruelty? He's just juxtaposing abstract "cruelty" with some unspecified hypothetical and assumes it is meaningful. Cruelty presumes opposition to nature, so it makes no sense to say that some act A, understood in the abstract, is cruel.
"Different statues are made of different clay; on the container view in contrast, everything that does, or could, exist is a manifestation of the same Reality."
Prima facie, sounds like a vulgarization of God-as-Being, i.e., all things exist as potentially existing in relation to actually existing things, and actually existing things are like potential things in relation to the act of existence that causes them to be, which is God.
"If we follow Aristotle in grounding moral truth in the goal-directed nature of human beings, then we fail to account for the necessity of moral truths."
The aim was never necessity but nature. The natural law is called thus for a reason. I don't know what "good" or "bad" is apart from the nature of a thing.
"My proposal is that the inherently directed nature of Reality entails that it’s objectively good for Reality when it manifests as pleasure and objectively bad for Reality when it manifests as pain."
He's elevating the world of plural substances to the level of a single substance and referring to it as Reality. But this does nothing to convert the natural moral law into the necessary moral law because you've just reduced the universe to one thing whose nature is such that such-and-such is good for it and such-and-such is not. To accomplish that kind of necessity, he would have to identity nature with necessity and that would require identifying what he called "Reality" with God. If Reality is God, then this is pantheism. But why this need to posit necessity?
"Foundational theories of morality have been locked in a perennial tug of war between the supernaturalism of Plato and the naturalism of his opponents."
Has he explored Thomism? Forms exist only in things and the mind, but also in God. Thus, you have both access to moral truths by knowing the natures of things, but even with the destruction of those things, they continue to exist in God (even if we may not be able to know them). Also, it is bad for human beings to harm others at least because it harms the common good and thus their own good. It is against our own natures to do so.
What is cruelty? He's just juxtaposing abstract "cruelty" with some unspecified hypothetical and assumes it is meaningful. Cruelty presumes opposition to nature, so it makes no sense to say that some act A, understood in the abstract, is cruel.
"Different statues are made of different clay; on the container view in contrast, everything that does, or could, exist is a manifestation of the same Reality."
Prima facie, sounds like a vulgarization of God-as-Being, i.e., all things exist as potentially existing in relation to actually existing things, and actually existing things are like potential things in relation to the act of existence that causes them to be, which is God.
"If we follow Aristotle in grounding moral truth in the goal-directed nature of human beings, then we fail to account for the necessity of moral truths."
The aim was never necessity but nature. The natural law is called thus for a reason. I don't know what "good" or "bad" is apart from the nature of a thing.
"My proposal is that the inherently directed nature of Reality entails that it’s objectively good for Reality when it manifests as pleasure and objectively bad for Reality when it manifests as pain."
He's elevating the world of plural substances to the level of a single substance and referring to it as Reality. But this does nothing to convert the natural moral law into the necessary moral law because you've just reduced the universe to one thing whose nature is such that such-and-such is good for it and such-and-such is not. To accomplish that kind of necessity, he would have to identity nature with necessity and that would require identifying what he called "Reality" with God. If Reality is God, then this is pantheism. But why this need to posit necessity?
"Foundational theories of morality have been locked in a perennial tug of war between the supernaturalism of Plato and the naturalism of his opponents."
Has he explored Thomism? Forms exist only in things and the mind, but also in God. Thus, you have both access to moral truths by knowing the natures of things, but even with the destruction of those things, they continue to exist in God (even if we may not be able to know them). Also, it is bad for human beings to harm others at least because it harms the common good and thus their own good. It is against our own natures to do so.
So in attempting to provide evidence for his claims, Goff creates a weak framing for the necessity of evidence and then attacks the framing?