Navy failures destroyed the Bonhomme Richard(gcaptain.com)
gcaptain.com
Navy failures destroyed the Bonhomme Richard
https://gcaptain.com/fire-fire-fire-how-navy-failures-destroyed-the-uss-bonhomme-richard/
129 comments
I had a buddy report and then help prevent a major electrical fire in the electrical mains coming from the submarine tender. They drug tested him after his heroic performance, found traces of THC and kicked him out of the Navy. Maybe the sailor saw the smoke and decided he didn't want to get drug tested.
After reading ~50 pages into the USN's own 400+ page Command Investigation report (dated 12 Jul 2020 and 20 Oct 2021, link further down)...the sailor and officer that you mention were no more than a couple little sesame seeds on the top bun of a triple-decker shit-show burger, with ALL the trimmings.
(Based on a quick search of that report for "DCA"...let me politely suggest that you do NOT read the report. Ever.)
(Based on a quick search of that report for "DCA"...let me politely suggest that you do NOT read the report. Ever.)
qwertyuiop_(2)
It's just a guess, but the sailor who saw the smoke may have instead seen the CO2 from the extinguishers being emptied
The one I'm referring to was the first person on the ship who saw the smoke. They then went back to sleep or something like that.
That could be the sailor, but I would bet on the organization and leadership: In many organizations, bearing the bad news just creates enormous work and trouble for yourself, for your teammates, and rarely accomplishes anything.
Rationally, it's absurd to ignore a fire. But I've seen organizations and situations where I would expect it.
Rationally, it's absurd to ignore a fire. But I've seen organizations and situations where I would expect it.
Also a former submarine DCA: a sailor failing to call away smoke speaks to an egregious cultural problem in how the crew treats damage control (unless this was an absolutely brand-spanking-new nonqual).
Could you believe that the culture might become that bad?
Also, isn't fire on a submarine far more critical than fire on a surface ship in port?
Also, isn't fire on a submarine far more critical than fire on a surface ship in port?
I'd say training more than culture. The response to smoke onboard a ship should be automatic, not requiring any contemplation (even if it's just 'trigger alarm').
One story I’ve heard told about the us navy (don’t have a link sadly) is that their current position is in some ways similar to the British navy in a time of dominance and peace (late eighteenth century maybe?) The story talks about a case where an elaborate system of instructions via raised flags directed two ships into crashing into each other somewhat catastrophically and the diagnosis from today is that the navy had fallen out of shape due to not having had to fight large naval battles—a situation that requires actual success rather than successful training exercises—and that their officers lacked the initiative to properly command their ships (e.g. avoiding crashing into each other). The story was particularly relevant with the US navy having recently had an avoidable collision at the time I saw it.
There have basically been no naval conflicts between fairly matched forces since WWII and the story goes that no one knows how to run a navy anymore. I say running a navy in such a conflict is mostly irrelevant because the weapons which may destroy ships (particularly large ones) are so much more effective now that your fleet would be quickly destroyed.
There have basically been no naval conflicts between fairly matched forces since WWII and the story goes that no one knows how to run a navy anymore. I say running a navy in such a conflict is mostly irrelevant because the weapons which may destroy ships (particularly large ones) are so much more effective now that your fleet would be quickly destroyed.
The unspoken secret here is aircraft carriers existed in the 80s as a component of Kissinger's soft power. In 2021 there isn't a single meaningful country you'd waste the cash to park a carrier on the coast of that couldn't immediately send it to a watery smouldering grave. Even punching bags like Iran are a dicey proposition as the proxy soldiers are too asymmetric to reliably expect a destroyer to engage, and the nation itself is armed to the teeth with the latest Russian missile systems and radar. Hell, that they managed to land a high tech us drone is in itself alone enough to pull teeth out of the navy.
Submarines exist to keep the peace. Their real purpose is that they exist and operate in the dated service of mutually assured destruction. Even here the accidents seem to mount lately though as these wandering souls of the doomsday device have seemingly nothing to do
The us navy is in the midst of an identity crisis fuelled by octogenarian politicians that have pedalled the institution into treading cold-war era water with no real direction.
Submarines exist to keep the peace. Their real purpose is that they exist and operate in the dated service of mutually assured destruction. Even here the accidents seem to mount lately though as these wandering souls of the doomsday device have seemingly nothing to do
The us navy is in the midst of an identity crisis fuelled by octogenarian politicians that have pedalled the institution into treading cold-war era water with no real direction.
> there isn't a single meaningful country you'd waste the cash to park a carrier on the coast of that couldn't immediately send it to a watery smouldering grave.
Carriers don't go anywhere alone, and they never stop moving except when in port. They are part of a carrier strike group which includes extensive anti-missile capabilities, both from escorting ships and patrol aircraft (LAMPS.)
> Submarines exist to keep the peace. Their real purpose is that they exist and operate in the dated service of mutually assured destruction.
Submarines are not only for launching nuclear ballistic missiles, as indicated by the relatively large number of submarines that are not designed to carry them. They're used for patrol, surveillance, special ops, escort, etc.
Carriers don't go anywhere alone, and they never stop moving except when in port. They are part of a carrier strike group which includes extensive anti-missile capabilities, both from escorting ships and patrol aircraft (LAMPS.)
> Submarines exist to keep the peace. Their real purpose is that they exist and operate in the dated service of mutually assured destruction.
Submarines are not only for launching nuclear ballistic missiles, as indicated by the relatively large number of submarines that are not designed to carry them. They're used for patrol, surveillance, special ops, escort, etc.
> Carriers don't go anywhere alone, and they never stop moving except when in port. They are part of a carrier strike group which includes extensive anti-missile capabilities, both from escorting ships and patrol aircraft (LAMPS.)
That sounds very nice but I think whatever is on the land side can store more missile than anti-missile missile on ships.
The reality is that the protection of the ship came from the desire to not have a full out war with the US. Once that is out of the picture, and given the adversary is not a punching bag like Iraq, all of them have the potential to rapidly sink on a massive attack. Though if it comes to that, the survivability of the fleet isn't the very first concern...
That sounds very nice but I think whatever is on the land side can store more missile than anti-missile missile on ships.
The reality is that the protection of the ship came from the desire to not have a full out war with the US. Once that is out of the picture, and given the adversary is not a punching bag like Iraq, all of them have the potential to rapidly sink on a massive attack. Though if it comes to that, the survivability of the fleet isn't the very first concern...
I think the bigger problem is that the economic incentives are totally out of step with war readiness or even just wise stewardship of taxpayers' money.
I think the collision you are referring to is the one between HMS Victoria and HMS Camperdown in 1893.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Victoria_(1887)#Camperdown...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Victoria_(1887)#Camperdown...
That sounds believable to me. I had thought it was sailing ships but I guess not.
As with the collisions in the western Pacific several years ago, I don't see anyone addressing the overwhelming workload and lack of resources provided to the US Navy. I read much about those collisions, not such much about this fire, so the following is based mostly on the former.
In absolute terms, they are very well funded of course. But what I read over and over is that there isn't time for training, because the demand we put on them - the world is a very large place - is much higher. They are told to cut training and deploy. After the collisions, they decided that officers (at least some positions) were too overworked and discussed (maybe implemented) limiting their workweeks to 100 hours.
Think of any organization; when the choice is product or training, many managers will cut the latter, even at the obvious long-term cost. The pressure and immediate demand are too great. If someone is working over 100 hours per week, if they can get a break by cutting training, that actually seems like a valid choice - they need to function.
In absolute terms, they are very well funded of course. But what I read over and over is that there isn't time for training, because the demand we put on them - the world is a very large place - is much higher. They are told to cut training and deploy. After the collisions, they decided that officers (at least some positions) were too overworked and discussed (maybe implemented) limiting their workweeks to 100 hours.
Think of any organization; when the choice is product or training, many managers will cut the latter, even at the obvious long-term cost. The pressure and immediate demand are too great. If someone is working over 100 hours per week, if they can get a break by cutting training, that actually seems like a valid choice - they need to function.
> the overwhelming workload and lack of resources provided to the US Navy
If you think it's bad now, wait until there's a war.
The military needs to be able to operate under conditions of overwhelming workload and lack of resources, because that's what it will be like if it ever actually has to fight.
> If someone is working over 100 hours per week, if they can get a break by cutting training
Then someone has the wrong definition of "training". Training is properly done as part of actual operations. You don't "train" to do something and then do it. You train by doing it, while others more senior to you are watching you while they're doing their part of the operations. For example, the officers who made the bad decisions that caused the collisions you refer to should have been training on ship handling and navigation as part of transiting the ship from place to place, routinely. You shouldn't have to set aside special "training" time for those things.
Firefighting is actually an exception to the above rule, for obvious reasons, so there is a good reason to have special training time for that. But you can do that while other things are going on as well.
> when the choice is product or training, many managers will cut the latter
Your use of the word "managers" suggests to me the root cause of the problem: our military doesn't need "managers", it needs leaders. You don't "manage" a military organization; you lead it. And the collisions several years ago and this fire point to a lack of leadership in our military.
If you think it's bad now, wait until there's a war.
The military needs to be able to operate under conditions of overwhelming workload and lack of resources, because that's what it will be like if it ever actually has to fight.
> If someone is working over 100 hours per week, if they can get a break by cutting training
Then someone has the wrong definition of "training". Training is properly done as part of actual operations. You don't "train" to do something and then do it. You train by doing it, while others more senior to you are watching you while they're doing their part of the operations. For example, the officers who made the bad decisions that caused the collisions you refer to should have been training on ship handling and navigation as part of transiting the ship from place to place, routinely. You shouldn't have to set aside special "training" time for those things.
Firefighting is actually an exception to the above rule, for obvious reasons, so there is a good reason to have special training time for that. But you can do that while other things are going on as well.
> when the choice is product or training, many managers will cut the latter
Your use of the word "managers" suggests to me the root cause of the problem: our military doesn't need "managers", it needs leaders. You don't "manage" a military organization; you lead it. And the collisions several years ago and this fire point to a lack of leadership in our military.
> our military doesn't need "managers", it needs leaders.
Funny, that's exactly what I said 40-plus years ago when I got out. (Naïve youth that I was, I even wrote a letter to Admiral Rickover about it; IIRC, the response was a bland thank-you letter from some functionary — but Rickover was famous for having said about certain managers, there but for the grace of God goes God.)
Funny, that's exactly what I said 40-plus years ago when I got out. (Naïve youth that I was, I even wrote a letter to Admiral Rickover about it; IIRC, the response was a bland thank-you letter from some functionary — but Rickover was famous for having said about certain managers, there but for the grace of God goes God.)
> that's exactly what I said 40-plus years ago when I got out.
I saw many of the same problems when I was in the Navy 30-ish years ago. But some seem to have gotten worse; from the report to Congress that was linked to upthread, what jumped out at me was the increasing micromanagement from flag officers and the lack of teaching basic ship handling and warfighting skills.
I saw many of the same problems when I was in the Navy 30-ish years ago. But some seem to have gotten worse; from the report to Congress that was linked to upthread, what jumped out at me was the increasing micromanagement from flag officers and the lack of teaching basic ship handling and warfighting skills.
> Then someone has the wrong definition of "training". Training is properly done as part of actual operations. You don't "train" to do something and then do it. You train by doing it, while others more senior to you are watching you while they're doing their part of the operations.
I have a hard time understanding that. We all know that enormous amounts (maybe most) training is done outside actual operations, both in the military and otherwise. Obviously you are aware of that, so do you mean this in a specific context? Is the US Navy somehow different (and are you in the USN)?
I have a hard time understanding that. We all know that enormous amounts (maybe most) training is done outside actual operations, both in the military and otherwise. Obviously you are aware of that, so do you mean this in a specific context? Is the US Navy somehow different (and are you in the USN)?
> We all know that enormous amounts (maybe most) training is done outside actual operations
The fact that this happens to be the case now does not mean it's right, or that it was always done this way.
> Is the US Navy somehow different
I would imagine that all branches of the US military have similar issues, but the article that prompted this thread only discusses the Navy.
> (and are you in the USN)?
I was, years ago, but I'm not now.
The fact that this happens to be the case now does not mean it's right, or that it was always done this way.
> Is the US Navy somehow different
I would imagine that all branches of the US military have similar issues, but the article that prompted this thread only discusses the Navy.
> (and are you in the USN)?
I was, years ago, but I'm not now.
The military is starting to succumb to the same ills of the modern corporate management culture. Everyone is managing up. Leave port on time because that is what I am measured on. I'm also assumed to be making sure my ship can leave on time, because it is ready, since I have been managing my ship correctly. Which I have not been, because no one is watching that.
Similar complaints are as old as time. I'm sure we can find Ancient Greek hoplites saying the same. How do we distinguish it from the inevitable challenges of managing large institutions?
Fundamentally, the US military is optimized for quality over quantity.
Look at the US Navy: ~400,000 active duty personnel operating ~400 ships (~250 combat, ~150 aux).
Compare to the Chinese PLAN: ~250,000 active duty personnel operating ~750 ships (~500 combat, ~250 aux).
A huge portion of that difference is due to aircraft carriers (11 USN, 2 PLAN), average tonnage per ship, and specifically the USN's lack of frigates.
This arrangement optimizes for the USN's mission of international power projection, where logistics requirements are like an iceberg, with the deployed forces being the above water volume.
However, it does leave a problem of training and experience. If no numerous smaller vessels exist for SWOs and crew to come up through, how do we expect them to have a deep reservoir of experience by the time they're commanding and crewing a destroyer+?
The retirement of the Perry class, subsequent botching of the LCS program (and finally recent selection of a Constellation class design, to be built) left the current USN with ~50 less commands for officers and crew to cut their teeth on.
Look at the US Navy: ~400,000 active duty personnel operating ~400 ships (~250 combat, ~150 aux).
Compare to the Chinese PLAN: ~250,000 active duty personnel operating ~750 ships (~500 combat, ~250 aux).
A huge portion of that difference is due to aircraft carriers (11 USN, 2 PLAN), average tonnage per ship, and specifically the USN's lack of frigates.
This arrangement optimizes for the USN's mission of international power projection, where logistics requirements are like an iceberg, with the deployed forces being the above water volume.
However, it does leave a problem of training and experience. If no numerous smaller vessels exist for SWOs and crew to come up through, how do we expect them to have a deep reservoir of experience by the time they're commanding and crewing a destroyer+?
The retirement of the Perry class, subsequent botching of the LCS program (and finally recent selection of a Constellation class design, to be built) left the current USN with ~50 less commands for officers and crew to cut their teeth on.
And the personnel issue goes deeper than that. Recruitment is seeing some negative trends. You need a lot of people to man the ships. There aren't a ton of people interested in that. Reducing crew numbers was a major consideration in the newer ship designs.
But there is also automation that helps with a lot of tasks that are no longer required to be done manually. I don't have any expertise in ships, but I can give the example of airline aircrafts: 50 years ago you had 4 people in the cockpit (pilot, copilot, navigator, mechanic), then 3 and now just 2 (pilot + copilot) and some companies are toying with the idea (that I don't like at all) to reduce to a single person. From 4 to 2 or from 4 to 1 is possible due to automation. I think it is similar with ships.
Automation in planes is great, but in ships, you risk not having enough physical bodies when it's time to patch a big hole in the side of the ship.
The Zumwalt class are 610 feet long, with 130 crew. Similarly sized WWII cruisers had over a thousand.
The Zumwalt class are 610 feet long, with 130 crew. Similarly sized WWII cruisers had over a thousand.
One responder replied with one possible reason, I will give another based off my time on a rather new LHD. The Navy, to cut cost on construction, uses a lot of hand-me downs. I believe if I remember correctly, some of our engineering gear was repurposed from the USS Kitty Hawk. I dealt specifically with aviation fuels, while carriers often have limitorque values (think automated if unfamiliar), the ship I was on had none, all valves in the Av fuels system was manually operated. Keep in mind, I think construction completed in 2009 (so limitorques were definitely around).
[deleted]
In WW2 sailors fought horrific battles with fire and damage while under fire and trying to keep from dying. Yet today it appears no one gives a shit about training. We dump massive money into building new ships (with tech that often is pathetically bad, see the new aircraft carrier). Maybe our military has been reduced to a money sink for big defense contractors, but that doesn't absolve them from basic training and disciplined planning for disaster which really costs very little to do right.
This was my concern too. What's the point in having these ships if the most minor damage will cause a catastrophic loss due to incompetence?
The article assumes you already know the basic story. Here's a more comprehensive article.[1]
This ship was not at sea. It was docked, and partially disassembled for maintenance. Only 118 of the normal crew of 1000 were on board. On the other hand, they had assistance from the shipyard, other ships nearby, and civilian fire departments. Despite that, the ship burned for days and had to be scrapped.
[1] https://news.usni.org/2021/10/19/long-chain-of-failures-left...
This ship was not at sea. It was docked, and partially disassembled for maintenance. Only 118 of the normal crew of 1000 were on board. On the other hand, they had assistance from the shipyard, other ships nearby, and civilian fire departments. Despite that, the ship burned for days and had to be scrapped.
[1] https://news.usni.org/2021/10/19/long-chain-of-failures-left...
What's with the "(b)(6)" censoring in some photos? Presumably deceased?
I've done a lot of FOIA litigation. (b)(6) must refer to a paragraph of the federal FOIA statute - an exemption that prohibits the release of that portion of the image.
Here: Exemption 6 protects information about individuals in "personnel and medical files and similar files" when the disclosure of such information "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. https://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/foia_guide09/exemption6....
Here: Exemption 6 protects information about individuals in "personnel and medical files and similar files" when the disclosure of such information "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. https://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/foia_guide09/exemption6....
I believe no one died in this incident.
1) No one died, mostly because civilian fire departments refused to board it in case they got lost.
There's some interesting parallels with the HMS Stark, which burned after being hit by an Exocet missile in the Falklands War. Their electronic communications and radar systems weren't working properly, they couldn't fight the fire, and the captain was recently assigned from subs. So it was more of an overal systemic failure like the BR than specific to a missile attack - the Exocet was an ignition source, but the failures afterward were leadership-related.
You can watch YT videos on the Forrestall carrier fire, started by electrical faults in Zuni missiles on John McCain's airplane. The Navy supposedly raised fire-fighting skills as a priority after that, but I guess not.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_USS_Forrestal_fire
During WW2, the Franklin carrier burned and when around 100 sailors got blocked off by smoke and flames, they jumped overboard to save their lives. Sadly the captain blacklisted them, and they were interned as deserters in Hawaii.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Franklin_(CV-13)
2) No lives, but multiple billions of dollars, lost.
3) There's a scenario that China could occupy Australia with 10,000 soldiers using their existing troop carriers. The US actually needed the ship that burned.
NTD Media - How China Might Win a War with the US (Dr. Robert D. Eldridge) @4:41
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6oxE5mCOBio
4) My understanding is the fire involved a love triangle. If so, wokeism set back the US military, as expected. I've also heard recently that in time of war, many female personnel are expected to "accidently" get pregnant before deployment, affecting readiness. I bring this up because our current military leadership seemingly can't.
Source: I study WW2, and to a lesser extent, other wars.
There's some interesting parallels with the HMS Stark, which burned after being hit by an Exocet missile in the Falklands War. Their electronic communications and radar systems weren't working properly, they couldn't fight the fire, and the captain was recently assigned from subs. So it was more of an overal systemic failure like the BR than specific to a missile attack - the Exocet was an ignition source, but the failures afterward were leadership-related.
You can watch YT videos on the Forrestall carrier fire, started by electrical faults in Zuni missiles on John McCain's airplane. The Navy supposedly raised fire-fighting skills as a priority after that, but I guess not.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_USS_Forrestal_fire
During WW2, the Franklin carrier burned and when around 100 sailors got blocked off by smoke and flames, they jumped overboard to save their lives. Sadly the captain blacklisted them, and they were interned as deserters in Hawaii.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Franklin_(CV-13)
2) No lives, but multiple billions of dollars, lost.
3) There's a scenario that China could occupy Australia with 10,000 soldiers using their existing troop carriers. The US actually needed the ship that burned.
NTD Media - How China Might Win a War with the US (Dr. Robert D. Eldridge) @4:41
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6oxE5mCOBio
4) My understanding is the fire involved a love triangle. If so, wokeism set back the US military, as expected. I've also heard recently that in time of war, many female personnel are expected to "accidently" get pregnant before deployment, affecting readiness. I bring this up because our current military leadership seemingly can't.
Source: I study WW2, and to a lesser extent, other wars.
I tend to think the military needs to be split in two. One half to deal with boots on grounds kinetic action and a second to deal with the permanent economic and cyber war. Of course integration of women would be far easier the the latter.
At the end of the day the responsibility rest on the Captain. It is their job to see that those under them are well trained, retrained, and reenforced in that training as a daily operational objective. Every good CO I have ever met when taking over a new station will review in detail the training and readiness status of their command as job 1, and not just review on paper but execute all the drills and observe the results. This is fundamental and is taught in detail in command school. Their should be a full set of court-martial for this failure at the command level.
True...but the USN can make it humanly impossible for a Captain to actually do his job. Imagine that you were a WWII submarine captain sent into battle with these lovely torpedoes: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo Or made the scapegoat for the USN's wretched incompetence killing most of your crew: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Indianapolis_(CA-35)#Court... Or...
I've not heard much good about the USN on this front.
I've not heard much good about the USN on this front.
And becoming a Captain in peace time requires to check some boxes that are not really matching the competence for such a position.
Partially correct. In the shipyard the RMC can override the CO in several situations.
Direct links to sources (far longer, official U.S. Navy) cited by the article:
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/foia/readingroom/HotTopics/BHR%2...
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/foia/readingroom/HotTopics/BHR%2...
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/foia/readingroom/HotTopics/BHR%2...
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/foia/readingroom/HotTopics/BHR%2...
A less-long read, with some good diagrams:
https://news.usni.org/2021/10/19/long-chain-of-failures-left...
And a juicy (and damning) tidbit from the parent's second link - the San Diego (local civilian) Fire Dept, arriving at the ship's pier 30 minutes after FedFire, and at least 45 minutes after the ship's crew knew of the fire, and knowing nothing of the ship's layout or systems, and having to (in effect) ask passing sailors for directions - was the first organization to actually get a hose to the fire, and start doing something useful - before the fire grew out of control.
jwithington's comment about the whole fire response (presumably outside of the municipal crews) being a "clownshow" is profoundly understated.
https://news.usni.org/2021/10/19/long-chain-of-failures-left...
And a juicy (and damning) tidbit from the parent's second link - the San Diego (local civilian) Fire Dept, arriving at the ship's pier 30 minutes after FedFire, and at least 45 minutes after the ship's crew knew of the fire, and knowing nothing of the ship's layout or systems, and having to (in effect) ask passing sailors for directions - was the first organization to actually get a hose to the fire, and start doing something useful - before the fire grew out of control.
jwithington's comment about the whole fire response (presumably outside of the municipal crews) being a "clownshow" is profoundly understated.
Whatever is going on with the Navy, it doesn't seem to be well understood by flag officers. There have been far too many reports of crew exhaustion and confusion, too many reports of faulty or ill-designed user interfaces, and too little exhibition of loyalty downward from flag ranks toward the people who act to keep the ship afloat and moving.
Is crew retention decreasing? It is hard to imagine people putting up with conditions in the Navy while there are so many stories like this going around.
Is crew retention decreasing? It is hard to imagine people putting up with conditions in the Navy while there are so many stories like this going around.
Considering how many FOs the Navy has, it's a disgrace. They could can 1/2 of them without even making a significant dent in the problem.
The leadership problems in the USN have been endemic since Tailhook.
The leadership problems in the USN have been endemic since Tailhook.
Disagree here. The leadership problem is because the navy has introduced a crazy promotion scheme where a sailor gets promoted based on how well they look on paper and not how they actually do their job. I got out 4 years ago and it was sad to see, sailors hitting higher tenure because they couldn't promote. They couldnt promote because they put a priority on making sure their division got it's job done, but were punished with P or MP evals. Meanwhile the dipshit who doesn't know the first thing about their rate, and escaped learning about their rate by collecting pins, got EPs and promoted. Then a few years later, they put on anchors and are expected to lead a division of junior sailors to perform a job, but don't know the first thing about performing the job other than what was needed out of a book to score high enough on exams. Big reason why I got out.
And all of that Navy is just to intimidate some illiterate Middle Eastern mujahedeen and a few Somalian pirates. This is completely ineffective against anyone with a submarine fleet, which is why you see this particular distribution of submarine fleet sizes: https://www.globalfirepower.com/navy-submarines.php, and which is why, say, Russia doesn't even bother with building aircraft carriers anymore.
[deleted]
Sure seems like the US Navy has lost track of some basic skills.
Unfortunately not an isolated incident [0, 1]
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Fitzgerald_and_MV_ACX_Crys...
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_John_S._McCain_(DDG-56)#20...
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Fitzgerald_and_MV_ACX_Crys...
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_John_S._McCain_(DDG-56)#20...
Another example of the institutional rot that is happening across our county in aging institutions that have little accountability. Will any leadership be held accountable? No. The US Military is a jobs program first and a fighting force a distant second.
There have been major changes in the shipyard since the fire. Navy leadership, RMCs, and ship's force have been more involved at every level. The question to follow now is when will they return to complacency.
The density of these incidents seems to be increasing, ships run by untrained crew crashing into other vehicles, steered by software that does not work.
Now the leadership that created the circumstances and conditions for this mismanagement to flourish, rushes to fix a problem they allowed to create?
Now the leadership that created the circumstances and conditions for this mismanagement to flourish, rushes to fix a problem they allowed to create?
There's a major difference between repair/maintenance fires and the incidences afloat. Shipyard fires are being held to the highest standards ever since Oscar Austin, the submarine, and now LHD.
twofornone(2)
To the Navy’s credit it does appear they’re chopping some heads over it (even calling out the ships previous captain and some civilians) and perhaps this wake up call will help reorient the navy back towards where it needs to be. It’s certainly better than pinning this entire event on whatever E-3 started the fire.
Can’t say I’m super surprised it’s reached this point though, we’ve been running our military like schizophrenic kids on adderall for the last 20+ years.
Can’t say I’m super surprised it’s reached this point though, we’ve been running our military like schizophrenic kids on adderall for the last 20+ years.
>perhaps this wake up call will help reorient the navy back towards where it needs to be.
Maybe. The reports are very clear that most of the problems are lessons learned but not implemented from the Miami in 2012.
> It’s certainly better than pinning this entire event on whatever E-3 started the fire.
Does this ever happen? I've never seen it.
> we’ve been running our military like schizophrenic kids on adderall for the last 20+ years.
Can you explain?
Maybe. The reports are very clear that most of the problems are lessons learned but not implemented from the Miami in 2012.
> It’s certainly better than pinning this entire event on whatever E-3 started the fire.
Does this ever happen? I've never seen it.
> we’ve been running our military like schizophrenic kids on adderall for the last 20+ years.
Can you explain?
Afghanistan, Iraq, countless foreign bases and deployments all around the world, civil crisis response (think weather disasters and the recent Trump unrest shenanigans) and oh also actual "homeland defense" responsibilities somewhere in the mix too. a nation not officially at war and yet... thousands of combat deaths, etc
> Does this ever happen? I've never seen it.
It does. In this specific case, even. https://www.npr.org/2021/07/29/1022514854/sailor-charged-ars...
“The U.S. Navy charged a sailor Thursday with starting a fire last year that destroyed the USS Bonhomme Richard docked off San Diego, marking the maritime branch's worst warship blaze outside of combat in recent memory.”
It does. In this specific case, even. https://www.npr.org/2021/07/29/1022514854/sailor-charged-ars...
“The U.S. Navy charged a sailor Thursday with starting a fire last year that destroyed the USS Bonhomme Richard docked off San Diego, marking the maritime branch's worst warship blaze outside of combat in recent memory.”
The whole arson story is not really believable to me.
I was once interrogated by NIS for 3 days and in the end I almost signed a false statement to get it over with.
NCIS is not a believable policing agency. They use very questionable methods for getting confessions.
In my case they provided a false statement from my roommate and then when I asked for representation they escorted me to a Flag Officer who told me I should tell them everything I know.
Turns out the flag officer was a prosecuting not defense lawyer. One agent was kind enough to mention that. With that information I ran out of NIS headquarters never to hear from them again.
They are not to be trusted.
Now I work in a shipyard and my simple question is: How did MARMAC allow a ship to not have fire stands in a shipyard.
Utter failure on thier part. They are the US Navy contract representatives.
I was once interrogated by NIS for 3 days and in the end I almost signed a false statement to get it over with.
NCIS is not a believable policing agency. They use very questionable methods for getting confessions.
In my case they provided a false statement from my roommate and then when I asked for representation they escorted me to a Flag Officer who told me I should tell them everything I know.
Turns out the flag officer was a prosecuting not defense lawyer. One agent was kind enough to mention that. With that information I ran out of NIS headquarters never to hear from them again.
They are not to be trusted.
Now I work in a shipyard and my simple question is: How did MARMAC allow a ship to not have fire stands in a shipyard.
Utter failure on thier part. They are the US Navy contract representatives.
> NCIS is not a believable policing agency. They use very questionable methods for getting confessions.
That makes them a very believable policing agency, since that's basically an universal trait of such agencies.
That makes them a very believable policing agency, since that's basically an universal trait of such agencies.
Do you have a source for that claim?
You were trying to be helpful so thank you, I do appreciate it and agree this Chicago story is quite horrific. I'm totally with you there.
But an example of a police department in one city run by one corrupt political party is not proof of the claim that any agency that does such a thing is a "believable policing agency"? Nor of the claim that this is "basically an universal trait of such agencies"?
I know there are policing agencies that behave poorly, the poster in this thread talking about NCIS gave another anecdote of it happening. That's not what I was questioning.
But an example of a police department in one city run by one corrupt political party is not proof of the claim that any agency that does such a thing is a "believable policing agency"? Nor of the claim that this is "basically an universal trait of such agencies"?
I know there are policing agencies that behave poorly, the poster in this thread talking about NCIS gave another anecdote of it happening. That's not what I was questioning.
Police are explicitly allowed to lie during interrogations as upheld by the Supreme Court: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frazier_v._Cupp
Persuasive interrogation like this is widely used across the United States to elicit confessions or convince people to accept plea bargains, even in cases where they are innocent, because our justice system does not actually have the capacity to provide everyone an actual trial. The risk of carrying a case to trial, even if you're innocent, can be significantly higher than entering a guilty plea and accepting a bargain.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2018/07/31/are-inno...
An infinitesimal amount of cases actually go to trial in America: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-f...
Persuasive interrogation like this is widely used across the United States to elicit confessions or convince people to accept plea bargains, even in cases where they are innocent, because our justice system does not actually have the capacity to provide everyone an actual trial. The risk of carrying a case to trial, even if you're innocent, can be significantly higher than entering a guilty plea and accepting a bargain.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2018/07/31/are-inno...
An infinitesimal amount of cases actually go to trial in America: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-f...
My question was not what the Supreme Court allowed police to do or what the proportion of cases are the go to trial, etc.
I realize you are just trying to help here, so thanks anyway. Let's wait for the original poster to reply.
I realize you are just trying to help here, so thanks anyway. Let's wait for the original poster to reply.
> The sailor was charged with aggravated arson and the willful hazarding of a vessel, Robertson said.
Charged with arson, so without more details it’s hard to say if they’re just a patsy.
Charged with arson, so without more details it’s hard to say if they’re just a patsy.
Their competence on not burning up does not set a high prior on competence in evaluating the burn up.
Probably incompetent throughout.
Probably incompetent throughout.
> Does this ever happen?
It sure used to. Iowa turret explosion?
It sure used to. Iowa turret explosion?
The fire response read like a clownshow, and this article doesn't even highlight the worst of it. There was a Sailor who saw the smoke and walked by it, thinking nothing of it!
Another officer thought the smoke might have been coming from the diesel generator. Why tf would the diesel generator be running???
It's hard for me to think of the software equivalent of these fundamental errors. Maybe something like finding a spike in network traffic and assuming it's load testing on prod, when you're actually getting pwned?