A Partisan Solution to Partisan Gerrymandering: The Define–Combine Procedure(cambridge.org)
cambridge.org
A Partisan Solution to Partisan Gerrymandering: The Define–Combine Procedure
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-analysis/article/partisan-solution-to-partisan-gerrymandering-the-definecombine-procedure/B0792DD0A49332944F2AF5FF6828E275
205 comments
Yes, but we have to consider what is politically feasible or plausible.
The US is not going to switch to proportional representation at any point in the near to medium future. It's just not going to happen. There's zero public awareness or desire -- right now we're having a hard enough time just making the much smaller incremental improvement of ranked voting.
On the other hand, there's no strong tradition of any kind behind drawing districts. If someone really can come up with a fair, objective way of doing it, it's far easier to see it getting adopted. Gradually at first (state by state), and then possibly nationally. Still difficult, but within the realm of possibility (unlike PR).
The US is not going to switch to proportional representation at any point in the near to medium future. It's just not going to happen. There's zero public awareness or desire -- right now we're having a hard enough time just making the much smaller incremental improvement of ranked voting.
On the other hand, there's no strong tradition of any kind behind drawing districts. If someone really can come up with a fair, objective way of doing it, it's far easier to see it getting adopted. Gradually at first (state by state), and then possibly nationally. Still difficult, but within the realm of possibility (unlike PR).
They're not switching to a new apportionment formula that doesn't politically benefit the party in power either
That's why I said gradually and state-by-state.
Honestly I think a main way it could be adopted is imposition by the courts -- we've seen increasing cases of "stalemates" where states can't seem to produce maps acceptable to the courts at all. So courts do have the ability to say, "if you can't produce a satisfactory map, we will, and this is it."
I'm not saying it's easy or quick, I'm just saying it's in the realm of the possible, unlike PR.
Honestly I think a main way it could be adopted is imposition by the courts -- we've seen increasing cases of "stalemates" where states can't seem to produce maps acceptable to the courts at all. So courts do have the ability to say, "if you can't produce a satisfactory map, we will, and this is it."
I'm not saying it's easy or quick, I'm just saying it's in the realm of the possible, unlike PR.
Some states used to have at-large seats in addition to districts. But the court basically killed that in the 60s. There might be a clever legislative solution that would still be in the bounds of the 'one person, one vote' requirements the court set.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/At-large#U.S._House_of_Represe...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/At-large#U.S._House_of_Represe...
> None of the countries using PR suffer from the sillinesses arising from FPTP
Frankly, I'd be surprised if they did. It seems much more likely that they'd suffer from the problems of PR instead.
Frankly, I'd be surprised if they did. It seems much more likely that they'd suffer from the problems of PR instead.
I wanted to add some additional thoughts on what the problems of PR might be...
- Clusters of minority populations tend to not get as much representation, because they are but a small voice in a bigger ocean of voices.
- Representatives can't focus on representing a smaller geographic area, including field offices, outreach, constituent services, etc as easily, because they have to represent a much broader geographic area.
- A lack of community ties, as representatives are representing a broader geography, the representative is less likely to know the names, places, and small cultural quirks associated with the communities they represent.
U.S. house districts are like 700k persons. The local community knowledge is already not happening
I think these are all minor quirks that can be addressed in some ways. The biggest "quirk" of PR is that you tend to get coalition governments, which isn't always so easy to strategize on as a voter.
Coalitions aren't a PR quirk. UK uses FPTP and has had several coalition governments, most recently in 2010-2015.
The US House of Representatives currently has an uneasy coalition masquerading as a FPTP majority.
Yes, I acknowledge that their are ways to address them, but I wouldn't call them minor.
I meant compared to getting coalition governments that most voters didn't want.
> Clusters of minority populations tend to not get as much representation, because they are but a small voice in a bigger ocean of voices.
This would be true if not for gerrymandering. Look at minority populations in states like Texas and Alabama and then look at the distribution of state and federal representatives. These voters are packed and cracked and would have a greater voice in a proportional system.
> A lack of community ties, as representatives are representing a broader geography, the representative is less likely to know the names, places, and small cultural quirks associated with the communities they represent.
My house rep lives 100 miles away from me in a town with very different demographics than mine. I am very confident that he does not know the cultural quirks associated with my community, except that he thinks that we are all cultural marxists indoctrinating children to be communist heathens.
This would be true if not for gerrymandering. Look at minority populations in states like Texas and Alabama and then look at the distribution of state and federal representatives. These voters are packed and cracked and would have a greater voice in a proportional system.
> A lack of community ties, as representatives are representing a broader geography, the representative is less likely to know the names, places, and small cultural quirks associated with the communities they represent.
My house rep lives 100 miles away from me in a town with very different demographics than mine. I am very confident that he does not know the cultural quirks associated with my community, except that he thinks that we are all cultural marxists indoctrinating children to be communist heathens.
I agree that gerrymandering destroys the community advantage of geographic representation.
I generally follow a political philosophy that the larger the geography of the political body, the fewer laws they should make, and the less those laws should impact daily life of most individuals. For example, (in the USA) the Federal government shouldn't make as many laws as the State, and the laws they make should focus on Federal issues, like national defense and interstate commerce. States shouldn't make as many laws that impact daily life as the counties and cities do, etc. Likewise, more taxes should be levied and paid (as a proportion, not necessarily in aggregate) locally than nationally.
I generally follow a political philosophy that the larger the geography of the political body, the fewer laws they should make, and the less those laws should impact daily life of most individuals. For example, (in the USA) the Federal government shouldn't make as many laws as the State, and the laws they make should focus on Federal issues, like national defense and interstate commerce. States shouldn't make as many laws that impact daily life as the counties and cities do, etc. Likewise, more taxes should be levied and paid (as a proportion, not necessarily in aggregate) locally than nationally.
Sounds like subsidiarity? "Subsidiarity is a principle of social organization that holds that social and political issues should be dealt with at the most immediate or local level that is consistent with their resolution."[0]
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subsidiarity
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subsidiarity
I am also in favour of proportional voting systems.
But with a party list system, there can be a perception that the party machine has more control over who gets elected. If a party can realistically expect a vote share of 20-30%, and ten candidates are being elected proportionally, then the top two candidates on the list are pretty much guaranteed a seat, whether or not they work or campaign very hard. This puts a lot of power in the hands of the people who decide the party list.
But to be honest, FPTP has a very similar problem with safe seats.
But with a party list system, there can be a perception that the party machine has more control over who gets elected. If a party can realistically expect a vote share of 20-30%, and ten candidates are being elected proportionally, then the top two candidates on the list are pretty much guaranteed a seat, whether or not they work or campaign very hard. This puts a lot of power in the hands of the people who decide the party list.
But to be honest, FPTP has a very similar problem with safe seats.
These are all valid issues.
Germany addresses them by doing a FPTP pass and then filling the remainder of the parliament such that the overall parliament has PR according to a second, independent vote given at the same time. This creates some other issues again, but works surprisingly well for the most part.
Germany addresses them by doing a FPTP pass and then filling the remainder of the parliament such that the overall parliament has PR according to a second, independent vote given at the same time. This creates some other issues again, but works surprisingly well for the most part.
Worth mentioning that the Germans didn’t come up with this system - it was the allied forces: US, UK and France, drawing on their experience on the deficiencies of their own systems.
It was successful enough that it also served as a blueprint for the Eastern European countries once the Soviet Union fell.
Always puzzles me why these three countries never took the opportunity to learn from their very own experiment.
It was successful enough that it also served as a blueprint for the Eastern European countries once the Soviet Union fell.
Always puzzles me why these three countries never took the opportunity to learn from their very own experiment.
I heard it was a bit of a compromise since the Germans were used to PR, but felt it had shown weaknesses in the Weimar period, but the US and UK preferred the familiar to them single winner district system.
> Always puzzles me why these three countries never took the opportunity to learn from their very own experiment.
It's very difficult to change the existing system because the people currently in power are there because of the way the system is built, so any change will almost by definition be disadvantageous for the people who have the power to change it.
It's very difficult to change the existing system because the people currently in power are there because of the way the system is built, so any change will almost by definition be disadvantageous for the people who have the power to change it.
Because they had a unique opportunity to design a government off a clean slate, whereas to change their own governments would mean working through the requirements of each individual government.
Which in the US is actually 51 separate governments consisting of the Federal government which only has enumerated powers, and also the 50 sovereign states.
Which in the US is actually 51 separate governments consisting of the Federal government which only has enumerated powers, and also the 50 sovereign states.
New Zealand has a similar system - the MMP (mixed member proportional) system we use is better than FPTP but I suspect vote-ranking systems are better than MMP.
In NZ, citizens vote for a candidate in each of the 60 electoral districts and so they get the representative that they vote for. Similar to Germany? Also our citizens vote for a party, and the other 60 seats of parliament are filled from lists of candidates (one list created by each party). The 60 seats are allocated to candidates from the lists, selected so that that we have the same percentage of members in parliament to match up the percentages of party votes by citizens.
New Zealand gets members of parliament that were chosen by the party. That is a problem because those members have no constituency: citizens can't really vote out someone (because a party selects some of its members).
I personally think that a critical feature of democracy is being able to vote out someone we dislike. I'm sure we can think of undemocratic countries where they would love to vote out a disliked politician. MMP fails here: citizens can't vote out some of our members of parliament.
the party list gives disproportionate (force multiplied) political power to a few key players in each party.
The second problem is also a feature: we often get small parties that get outsized influence. To get 50% control of parliament multiple parties join together in a coalition. Coalitions are an emergent property of MMP: and coalitions create some terrible incentives for parties to do misrepresentative things.
Outsized power is misused particularly by one celebrity politician with 5% of the population voting for him. The guy is a tool.
In theory a small party should be able to focus on a single cause. In practice, The Green Party gets 10% of the seats but it then refuses to form a coalition with our "conservative" party. The Green Party gives up its minority power, because the thei politicians are too strongly greenie and they won't compromise. The idiots fail to make green tradeoffs against economic policies. They are idiots because the planet is strictly worse because of their political failings.
New Zealand avoids the worst excesses of a two party system. However MMP is no panacea: politicians do the same political things.
In theory a left wing and a right wing party should form a coalition together to run the country. In practice such a coalition can't form.
Humans are shit at making good compromises.
In NZ, citizens vote for a candidate in each of the 60 electoral districts and so they get the representative that they vote for. Similar to Germany? Also our citizens vote for a party, and the other 60 seats of parliament are filled from lists of candidates (one list created by each party). The 60 seats are allocated to candidates from the lists, selected so that that we have the same percentage of members in parliament to match up the percentages of party votes by citizens.
New Zealand gets members of parliament that were chosen by the party. That is a problem because those members have no constituency: citizens can't really vote out someone (because a party selects some of its members).
I personally think that a critical feature of democracy is being able to vote out someone we dislike. I'm sure we can think of undemocratic countries where they would love to vote out a disliked politician. MMP fails here: citizens can't vote out some of our members of parliament.
the party list gives disproportionate (force multiplied) political power to a few key players in each party.
The second problem is also a feature: we often get small parties that get outsized influence. To get 50% control of parliament multiple parties join together in a coalition. Coalitions are an emergent property of MMP: and coalitions create some terrible incentives for parties to do misrepresentative things.
Outsized power is misused particularly by one celebrity politician with 5% of the population voting for him. The guy is a tool.
In theory a small party should be able to focus on a single cause. In practice, The Green Party gets 10% of the seats but it then refuses to form a coalition with our "conservative" party. The Green Party gives up its minority power, because the thei politicians are too strongly greenie and they won't compromise. The idiots fail to make green tradeoffs against economic policies. They are idiots because the planet is strictly worse because of their political failings.
New Zealand avoids the worst excesses of a two party system. However MMP is no panacea: politicians do the same political things.
In theory a left wing and a right wing party should form a coalition together to run the country. In practice such a coalition can't form.
Humans are shit at making good compromises.
I'll just note that the above has a lot of opinion with respects to NZ politics that a lot of other NZers would disagree with.
Also with respect to "can't vote out a list MP" I think this is exaggerated. "Bad" MPs are very common in constituencies in many countries. They are often hard to get rid of since they have local support and control their local party organisation. Whereas a list MP can be pushed down or off the list placing even if they cannot be made to resign their seat.
You can't vote out a constituency MP if 2/3s your neighbors like him. Or will always vote for his party no matter who they put up as a candidate.
Also with respect to "can't vote out a list MP" I think this is exaggerated. "Bad" MPs are very common in constituencies in many countries. They are often hard to get rid of since they have local support and control their local party organisation. Whereas a list MP can be pushed down or off the list placing even if they cannot be made to resign their seat.
You can't vote out a constituency MP if 2/3s your neighbors like him. Or will always vote for his party no matter who they put up as a candidate.
The first point indicates a lack of familiarity with the actual history of PR systems.
The resulting problems are actually the opposite: very small clusters of voters typically end up wielding a disproportionate amount of power. That's because PR invites people that are ideologically affine, to run separately, effectively campaigning against their "friends". It's obviously better, for any given politician, to be the head of a 5% party than being a "rank&file" in a 30% one. The resulting fragmentation has to be later recomposed with alliances to form a government, which will go on bickering constantly; and it often results in executives that can count on very thin majorities, increasing overall uncertainty to bad overall effects (instability, higher borrowing costs, etc). Such executives then have to spend inordinate amounts of political (and often monetary) capital, appeasing very narrow interests. One of the most infamous expression of such dynamics is the Italian experience from 1948 to 1994, but also France before Napoleon III, Weimar, etc.
This is why modern PR systems end up with forceful thresholds, where a party with less than 2 to 6% is kept out of parliament - but that's literal, direct disenfranchisement, not particularly better than the indirect one resulting from FPTP.
IMHO the better approach is FPPT but with ranked voting to reach 50%. This reduces the worst distortions of FPPT (i.e. "winners" literally hated by 60-70% of the electorate), while promoting a balanced approach to minority interests.
The resulting problems are actually the opposite: very small clusters of voters typically end up wielding a disproportionate amount of power. That's because PR invites people that are ideologically affine, to run separately, effectively campaigning against their "friends". It's obviously better, for any given politician, to be the head of a 5% party than being a "rank&file" in a 30% one. The resulting fragmentation has to be later recomposed with alliances to form a government, which will go on bickering constantly; and it often results in executives that can count on very thin majorities, increasing overall uncertainty to bad overall effects (instability, higher borrowing costs, etc). Such executives then have to spend inordinate amounts of political (and often monetary) capital, appeasing very narrow interests. One of the most infamous expression of such dynamics is the Italian experience from 1948 to 1994, but also France before Napoleon III, Weimar, etc.
This is why modern PR systems end up with forceful thresholds, where a party with less than 2 to 6% is kept out of parliament - but that's literal, direct disenfranchisement, not particularly better than the indirect one resulting from FPTP.
IMHO the better approach is FPPT but with ranked voting to reach 50%. This reduces the worst distortions of FPPT (i.e. "winners" literally hated by 60-70% of the electorate), while promoting a balanced approach to minority interests.
> The resulting fragmentation has to be later recomposed with alliances to form a government, which will go on bickering constantly;
I mean what are political parties under FPTP other than alliances to form a government? Bickering is rather common within them.
Democratic politics always requires a broad coalition of different interests and groups to assemble a majority. I'm not convinced voting system changes that much, but tensions may erupt in different ways under different systems.
I mean what are political parties under FPTP other than alliances to form a government? Bickering is rather common within them.
Democratic politics always requires a broad coalition of different interests and groups to assemble a majority. I'm not convinced voting system changes that much, but tensions may erupt in different ways under different systems.
> Bickering is rather common within them.
"Within" being the key word. It's a completely different level, believe me.
The last 6 years of UK political life have been exceptional, and the overall sentiment is that they were pretty bad. They were also absolutely run of the mill from a PR perspective: a new executive every few months, elections every 3 years or so, a constant fight to reconcile fundamentally un-reconcileable positions, extreme public brinkmanship, etc etc. PR will fix nothing of that, it will only make it worse.
"Within" being the key word. It's a completely different level, believe me.
The last 6 years of UK political life have been exceptional, and the overall sentiment is that they were pretty bad. They were also absolutely run of the mill from a PR perspective: a new executive every few months, elections every 3 years or so, a constant fight to reconcile fundamentally un-reconcileable positions, extreme public brinkmanship, etc etc. PR will fix nothing of that, it will only make it worse.
I would point out that some of the issues you've called out are particular to a parliamentary system. The USA forms executive governments differenty. The closest analogy would be the speaker of the house, where the USA has already seen significant infighting recently.
Where I think a broader range of parties would benefit the US system is reducing the degree by which measures and bills are passed and opposed along consistent party lines. With more parties, there would be coalition building that would encourage more negotiation and cooperation.
Where I think a broader range of parties would benefit the US system is reducing the degree by which measures and bills are passed and opposed along consistent party lines. With more parties, there would be coalition building that would encourage more negotiation and cooperation.
The US House Speaker was voted out primarily by Democrats, not Republicans. There were only a handful of Republicans that voted to remove McCarthy. It took the Republicans a while to get enough voted to replace him. Certainly plenty of infighting in both Democrat and Republican parties, but the Speakership contest was the entirety of the House Democrats allying with a very few extremest House Republicans.
Yes, that's useful information to those who aren't familiar with the situation but I would say that the way the Democrats voted in lockstep is a great example of the partisan lack of compromise that a two party system encourages.
Indeed and it’s also good to not look at the grandparent comment and draw any sort of false equivalence here. The sort of problems grandparent describes certainly do exist in PR systems, but GP is describing a system that gets it something like 90% right vs FPTP which is completely and utterly broken beyond repair
> - Representatives can't focus on representing a smaller geographic area, including field offices, outreach, constituent services, etc as easily, because they have to represent a much broader geographic area.
There are lots of practical reasons why geographical constituencies make sense. But nobody ever questions them as the natural way to group voters in elections. I've always wondered what politics would look like if constituencies were based on other criteria. For example, age group, profession, gender, marital status & number of children, or income-bracket.
There are lots of practical reasons why geographical constituencies make sense. But nobody ever questions them as the natural way to group voters in elections. I've always wondered what politics would look like if constituencies were based on other criteria. For example, age group, profession, gender, marital status & number of children, or income-bracket.
One way to combat the issues you bring up is to add more members to the House of Representatives. Keep the same districts, but have each district elect five members.
A cluster of a minority population might be able to elect 1 of 5 members, instead of being shut out.
Representatives would still represent the same geographic area and have the same community ties.
The main argument against is the difficulty of running the House with ~3000 members. There isn't a room big enough, and there isn't time for all to get their 5 minutes to speak on each bill. That said, there is no constitution requirements for either. Changes would have to be made to accommodate.
A cluster of a minority population might be able to elect 1 of 5 members, instead of being shut out.
Representatives would still represent the same geographic area and have the same community ties.
The main argument against is the difficulty of running the House with ~3000 members. There isn't a room big enough, and there isn't time for all to get their 5 minutes to speak on each bill. That said, there is no constitution requirements for either. Changes would have to be made to accommodate.
> - Clusters of minority populations tend to not get as much representation, because they are but a small voice in a bigger ocean of voices.
This is largely solved by the districtized version:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual-member_proportional_repre...
In fact I had been writing up a little paper about another system like this, but I've been busy with other things.
This is largely solved by the districtized version:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual-member_proportional_repre...
In fact I had been writing up a little paper about another system like this, but I've been busy with other things.
Interesting! Sort of like MMP, except that each representative still has a "home district."
I think any system which has complications is going to seed distrust today.
For instance because you have the electoral college in the US you have the possibility of the electoral college going in the opposite direction of the popular vote. An event like that reduces the mandate of the winner.
If a PR system or single transferable vote or something like created events that were hard to explain on the news that's trouble.
For instance because you have the electoral college in the US you have the possibility of the electoral college going in the opposite direction of the popular vote. An event like that reduces the mandate of the winner.
If a PR system or single transferable vote or something like created events that were hard to explain on the news that's trouble.
I get what you mean, looking back that sentence reads like a tautology. I guess what I should've said is "FPTP leads to far more silliness than PR and therefore countries using PR have healthier political discourse and systems"
What are those though?
I strongly disagree. Its not just the ratio that matters, but whether your representative is geographically close to you.
The American ideal is NOT just that you have a Representative, but that Representative knows YOUR community.
Proportional representation could result in all my States Representatives coming from LA or SF, but not the rural areas.
Ideally, I'd like Representatives that I'd have realistically met before in normal day to day living in the community. We need it representative for every 25,000 people, in my opinion. and that representative coming from my local community of 25,000 or so people.
The American ideal is NOT just that you have a Representative, but that Representative knows YOUR community.
Proportional representation could result in all my States Representatives coming from LA or SF, but not the rural areas.
Ideally, I'd like Representatives that I'd have realistically met before in normal day to day living in the community. We need it representative for every 25,000 people, in my opinion. and that representative coming from my local community of 25,000 or so people.
I see this the opposite way. In a proportional system, I can usually vote for someone from my community, and they have a reasonable chance of getting elected. In a system with single-representative districts, this is often not possible. I would have to choose between candidates with no chance of getting elected and candidates outside my community.
For many people, the most important communities are not based on geography. And even if your geographical community is important to you but you live in a city that elects multiple representatives, single-representative districts may prevent you from voting for your local candidates.
Also, proportional systems are often not fully proportional. You can guarantee some geographic representation by combining local administrative units into districts that elect a reasonable number of representatives each.
For many people, the most important communities are not based on geography. And even if your geographical community is important to you but you live in a city that elects multiple representatives, single-representative districts may prevent you from voting for your local candidates.
Also, proportional systems are often not fully proportional. You can guarantee some geographic representation by combining local administrative units into districts that elect a reasonable number of representatives each.
I don't disagree, but the actual situation in America does not match this ideal at all.
It absolutely does not meet this ideal...ever since the capped the number of Representatives to 435 in 1918...a travesty against the Constitution, in my opinion. I don't care if it looks silly to have a stadium of reps.
Look a this:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_congressional_ap...
Our House should go back to something like 1 per 75,000.
Our House should go back to something like 1 per 75,000.
“Looks silly” is putting it lightly. That would only increase the already ridiculous level of dysfunction that your government suffers from, and would require vast procedural changes to even get back to those levels.
You provide no evidence for your claims.
More representative, more locally bound, less tied to corporate interests because you don't need to raise that much money to run a campaign for 20,000 citizens you represent. That means instead of spending half their day, every day, fundraising, they can attend to business.
More representative, more locally bound, less tied to corporate interests because you don't need to raise that much money to run a campaign for 20,000 citizens you represent. That means instead of spending half their day, every day, fundraising, they can attend to business.
It's also an incredibly effective way of getting fascists elected - who can then use their platform to gain legitimacy and support. I look at Europe and see fascist parties gaining seats in every country - except the UK, because in the UK FPTP will ensure they never get one. Even UKIP, never won a seat, despite being hugely influential populists.
UKIP won a seat in the 2015 general election, and previously won one in a by-election. They were also extremely successful in achieving their goal of getting the UK to leave the EU - the conservative manifesto promise to hold a referendum was directly due to the threat from UKIP.
Disenfranchisement is a double-edged sword. Those parties prosper on self-victimization, and the best cure for that is to see them co-opted in actual government. Once voters realize they're just as bad as everyone else, the spell is broken. If you never let them in, they'll continue to fester outside, in the real world.
Yes. And to paraphrase Lee Drutman's take in Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop: far-right parties in the EU tend to get about 10% of the vote. And in a way that's bad (they get seats in parliament!). But in another way, it's good: they can't claim to be "the voice of the masses" when only 1 in 10 people votes for them.
Winning seats proportional to a party's vote share grants them legitimacy and support exactly in proportion to the support they already have and that got them elected.
For actual decision-making power, they need a parliamentary majority, which by design requires the support of a majority of voters.
I hope the UK system isn't quite so rigged as to deny any seats even to a party that gets >50% of votes.
For actual decision-making power, they need a parliamentary majority, which by design requires the support of a majority of voters.
I hope the UK system isn't quite so rigged as to deny any seats even to a party that gets >50% of votes.
The existing parties in the United States have already shown to be vulnerable to entryism, so I'm not convinced this makes a difference.
I'd love to know by what distinction Suella Braverman or Mark François does not count as a fascist.
Many of those "fascist" parties (or right-wing populists / conservative nationalists / whatever you want to call them) are similar to US Republicans. The difference is that their support is 20% and not 50%, because proportional representation leaves room for other right-wing parties.
Lol no. The front national makes Republicans look like bleeding heart liberals in comparison. Talking about deporting actual citizens if they are brown or Muslim in Europe is common for those semi mainstream parties (in the FNs case, they came second in the past 2 elections). Even Republicans never talk about stripping citizenships of immigrants and focus on illegal immigrants (not because they love immigrants, but because they know that talking about stripping the citizenship of millions is lunacy in the US). Same for tons and tons of other policy points, like calling for closing mosques in France, the AfD in Germany, etc.
Again, Republicans are (and it's weird to say) literal model examples of diversity and minority inclusion if you compare them to the front national more or less 100% white christian party.
Again, Republicans are (and it's weird to say) literal model examples of diversity and minority inclusion if you compare them to the front national more or less 100% white christian party.
No, fringe fascist parties that scrape by with preferences are just rookies, and the GOP are the professionals. The GOP has way more subtle, systematic, and effective ways of making people’s lives worse. They’ll bang on about hot-button issues to get constituent support, but they mostly still know how to say the quiet part quiet. Rookie conservatives don’t.
Fringe? You realize the FN got 40% of the votes in presidential elections multiple times in France, and is more or less the main "opposition" party? And also controls tons of local governments? Talk about Americans exceptionalism lol, how is a party that is the main opposition and and that was founded by a literal neo Nazi (marine's dad) on a clear "make France white again" agenda better than "subtle GOP tactics"??!?
Regarding the "alternative vote" referendum in the UK: the voting system (also called "ranked-choice voting" or "instant-runoff voting") is an improvement to first past the post, but it's worth noting that it is not proportional representation and would do little to dissuade gerrymandering.
I don't think PR would work for the US, at least in its most common(?) form where people vote for parties and each party has a list of candidates.
A big problem with Gerrymandering is that it favors extremists. When a district is competitive, a candidate must appeal broadly to people of various political positions. When a district is artificially created to cater to party X, a candidate only has to be selected by party X, because then they're practically guaranteed to win. Thus candidates who are more loyal to party X is more likely to be elected, regardless of how they're viewed by the general population.
PR has the same problem - someone who's at #1 position of Party X's list is as good as elected, and the position is determined by internal party politics. Thus, the top positions will be filled by those who always toe the party line and never compromise.
A big problem with Gerrymandering is that it favors extremists. When a district is competitive, a candidate must appeal broadly to people of various political positions. When a district is artificially created to cater to party X, a candidate only has to be selected by party X, because then they're practically guaranteed to win. Thus candidates who are more loyal to party X is more likely to be elected, regardless of how they're viewed by the general population.
PR has the same problem - someone who's at #1 position of Party X's list is as good as elected, and the position is determined by internal party politics. Thus, the top positions will be filled by those who always toe the party line and never compromise.
I don't hear all that much about gerrymandering from Britain. And the referendum to abolish FPTP was IIRC not to abolish single-winner districts.
Although I agree PR is better. The German version also even keeps the districts if you really like them.
Although I agree PR is better. The German version also even keeps the districts if you really like them.
While PR seems good in principle if we look at the actual outcomes they don’t end up so great.
I live in a PR jurisdiction. Please do correct me if I’m wrong but you sound like an American whose idea of being open-minded is to consider alternative voting systems as an engineering interest yet still can’t bring yourself to actually consider the experience of other jurisdictions. If my country, that I’m fairly fond of, moved to FPTP, it would at the very least cause me great anguish, and I’d strongly consider leaving. It’s quite clearly a far worse system, but please do keep your head in the sand.
Whereas FPTP systems are a roaring success?
Unless you have an electorate wide multi-member electorate (not as common as proportional systems rare) you will require geographic electoral boundaries to be drawn.
The UK’s AV referendum was not for proportional representation but instant runoff voting for single member electorates. Which is a better system but in the UK in 2011 clearly would benefit the Lib Dems much more than actual multi member electorates would.
The UK’s AV referendum was not for proportional representation but instant runoff voting for single member electorates. Which is a better system but in the UK in 2011 clearly would benefit the Lib Dems much more than actual multi member electorates would.
Sometimes people slide into Windows discussions telling people they should just switch to Linux instead.
That might on some level be right, but it's completely unhelpful.
That might on some level be right, but it's completely unhelpful.
USA operates under the political delusion that geographicallynlcoalnareas are politically unified.
You can still have those at state level, or even lower, by grouping counties.
The hill people from Appalachia deserve to be represented by someone local. The low lying coastal communities in the outer banks also deserve to have someone that understands them, rather than someone from NYC. The border towns in Texas are better represented by someone from there, rather than someone from Ohio. There is some value to local representation, it doesn't need to be all in.
Romania for example has a hybrid system: it's "first past the post" first and foremost, so people get local representatives, but all the unused votes that would otherwise get wasted (both winning and losing ones) are then put together in a big national pool and then you have the second round of MPs appointed because of that pool. That way popular vote matches the percentages in the parliament, but you also have local representation.
The hill people from Appalachia deserve to be represented by someone local. The low lying coastal communities in the outer banks also deserve to have someone that understands them, rather than someone from NYC. The border towns in Texas are better represented by someone from there, rather than someone from Ohio. There is some value to local representation, it doesn't need to be all in.
Romania for example has a hybrid system: it's "first past the post" first and foremost, so people get local representatives, but all the unused votes that would otherwise get wasted (both winning and losing ones) are then put together in a big national pool and then you have the second round of MPs appointed because of that pool. That way popular vote matches the percentages in the parliament, but you also have local representation.
As someone who lives in the Outer Banks I'd much prefer a random person (our state is 50/50) than the gerrymandered bullshit we deal with now. It doesn't help that the local pool business guy (true story) is our representative when he runs unopposed because of extreme gerrymandering.
Id just use sortition. Someone who didn't want to run for office, is perfect.
Yeah I consistently hear people say "well if we have proportional representation then you won't have access to your representative who is beholden to your needs specifically." My federal district has 600k voters. My house representative lives 100 miles away from me and is a complete asshole who regularly publicly attacks my demographic. I'm sure not able to take him to a baseball game to share my political concerns, let alone get him to care if I send a letter.
but that is a failure of the current system after Congress passd a law to fix a number of representatives in the house. There used to be a much smaller proportion of citizens to representatives than there is today. The excuse they used to fix the number was that it was ridiculous the number of individuals that would be in the House, but personally, I don't care if they have to hold it in a football stadium---- I want a representative that I might have met at my local coffee shop. That's the ideal and we need to get back to it.
Sure, and that's a problem. It is true that uncapping the house and ending up with like 15,000 representatives would achieve a bunch of goals and IMO be a significant improvement, but I personally find this less likely to happen than to change from a geographic model of representation.
Probably, but all this does is lead to more of what we have now: No trust in government because government is far away. No trust in your representative because they are some mega-rich millionaire (or hangs with them) and not only have you not met them, they don't even care about your hometown.
And think of this. Today House members spend all their time mooching for donations, because to get elected requires a BUNCH of money. That money is increasingly dominated by money outside your district. If we have a Representative for every 20,000 citizens for you 15,000 number, that means you can run a small campaign for very little money. Heck you could just knock on doors for no money.
THAT takes a lot of power away from moneyed interests.
Also, 331,000,000 citizens / 50,000 citizens/rep = 6,600 reps
And think of this. Today House members spend all their time mooching for donations, because to get elected requires a BUNCH of money. That money is increasingly dominated by money outside your district. If we have a Representative for every 20,000 citizens for you 15,000 number, that means you can run a small campaign for very little money. Heck you could just knock on doors for no money.
THAT takes a lot of power away from moneyed interests.
Also, 331,000,000 citizens / 50,000 citizens/rep = 6,600 reps
To me, the distance to government doesn't really affect my trust in government.
I agree that uncapping the house would improve things, but I do not think that it is fundamental to improving things.
I agree that uncapping the house would improve things, but I do not think that it is fundamental to improving things.
No, but, say, areas in general have different concerns. E.g. setting a national minimum wage based on what people in cities want is a big problem for employers who are in lower-cost areas.
The area covered by my federal representative is quite large. It contains significant areas of abject rural poverty, some small cities, as well as multiple large universities and their associated college towns. This area does not have meaningful uniform concerns.
You say delusion but I can tell your politics with far far better than random accuracy just by the city you live in. State legislators do actually deal with issues local to the district despite them being drawn increasingly weird.
I don't think we should base our political system on the assumption but I don't think it's unfounded. It's tough to want to have the makeup of my state legislature reflect the will of the population at large while making sure when the pool is distributed my district gets a democrat because anything else would be insane given the political makeup of the area.
I don't think we should base our political system on the assumption but I don't think it's unfounded. It's tough to want to have the makeup of my state legislature reflect the will of the population at large while making sure when the pool is distributed my district gets a democrat because anything else would be insane given the political makeup of the area.
You cut, I choose becomes I choose, you un-cut.
Note that this paper contains no optimality proofs.
There's a lot of mathy-looking stuff, but then instead of a proof we get "yeah we took this one particular Markov-chain algorithm and had it play against itself and it failed to generate a gerrymander".
If deployed in real life, an immense amount of power -- and therefore money -- will be at stake: certainly more than enough money to hire persons with intelligence equal to or greater than the creator of "the ShotBurst Algorithm" as consultants.
If an optimality proof is not possible, the only alternative is to test using real humans and (very substantial) real rewards.
Note that this paper contains no optimality proofs.
There's a lot of mathy-looking stuff, but then instead of a proof we get "yeah we took this one particular Markov-chain algorithm and had it play against itself and it failed to generate a gerrymander".
If deployed in real life, an immense amount of power -- and therefore money -- will be at stake: certainly more than enough money to hire persons with intelligence equal to or greater than the creator of "the ShotBurst Algorithm" as consultants.
If an optimality proof is not possible, the only alternative is to test using real humans and (very substantial) real rewards.
We have an analytic solution in the supplementary materials [1]. One of the biggest challenges to optimality proofs is how to capture the importance of geography as a constraint. I don't believe there are any papers on redistricting that include geographic constraints in analytic/formal solutions. That's why we prefer simulations for our main results.
[1]: https://static.cambridge.org/content/id/urn%3Acambridge.org%...
[1]: https://static.cambridge.org/content/id/urn%3Acambridge.org%...
Requiring geometric contiguity allows almost-unchanged gerrymandering through the backdoor.
Here's the Stonewall algorithm to gerrymandering with contiguous Define-Combine:
1. Start by gerrymandering a map with N contiguous districts the usual way.
2. Pick one of the districts to be your "mortar", the others are your "bricks".
3. Shrink all bricks minimally to open gaps between them without changing the population or election outcome.
4. Fill in the gaps with your mortar, so that all bricks are completely enveloped.
6. Split all bricks and the mortar in half, ensuring that one of the mortar halves does not touch any bricks. This gives you your final map of 2N contiguous districts for the second mover to combine.
Then the mortar half that doesn't touch any bricks can only be combined with the other mortar half. And since all bricks are completely surrounded by mortar (which they can no longer be combined with) the second mover can only combine a brick half with the other half of the same brick.
This leads to a map with the same outcome as the original gerrymandered map.
Of course it would be blindingly obvious if anyone actually attempted to do that, but there might be subtler ways to use contiguity to create a forced-choice situation.
Here's the Stonewall algorithm to gerrymandering with contiguous Define-Combine:
1. Start by gerrymandering a map with N contiguous districts the usual way.
2. Pick one of the districts to be your "mortar", the others are your "bricks".
3. Shrink all bricks minimally to open gaps between them without changing the population or election outcome.
4. Fill in the gaps with your mortar, so that all bricks are completely enveloped.
6. Split all bricks and the mortar in half, ensuring that one of the mortar halves does not touch any bricks. This gives you your final map of 2N contiguous districts for the second mover to combine.
Then the mortar half that doesn't touch any bricks can only be combined with the other mortar half. And since all bricks are completely surrounded by mortar (which they can no longer be combined with) the second mover can only combine a brick half with the other half of the same brick.
This leads to a map with the same outcome as the original gerrymandered map.
Of course it would be blindingly obvious if anyone actually attempted to do that, but there might be subtler ways to use contiguity to create a forced-choice situation.
That's a clever argument, though I wonder if it would be defeated by some restrictions on the chromatic polynomial. In your example, the number of 3-colorings up to isomorphism is extremely large, because the colors of any brick and its cobrick can be switched, and the mortar condition implies the districts are 3-colorable.
Of course, the chromatic polynomial is #P-complete, so this may pose some difficulty.
Of course, the chromatic polynomial is #P-complete, so this may pose some difficulty.
Concentric circles, or pie chart design would be problematic also.
The real problem with this strategy is that it accepts self-interested gerrymandering, rather than starting by rejecting it as wrong; immoral; anti-productive.
The real problem with this strategy is that it accepts self-interested gerrymandering, rather than starting by rejecting it as wrong; immoral; anti-productive.
The whole gist of democracy is to start with the assumption that people are immoral and anti-productive. But if we pit them against each other, half of the immoral people will cancel out the other half. It takes only a tiny fraction of informed, intelligent people all arriving at the same solution (because it's correct) to nudge the result in the right way, most of the time.
It would be nice for that to work, because it means that you don't have to overcome the automatic argument of "I'm not immoral and anti-productive, you're immoral and anti-productive". You never have to tell anybody they're wrong or bad. You only have to tell them that they're not in the majority, which is an objective statement.
It would similarly be nice if we could have an objective but blame-free way to resolve the meta-question of electing representatives. Or at least, to have people say to their own partisans, "Hey, this is obviously unfair, could we tone it down a bit?" But the reply is always "If we don't do this unfair thing, the other people will do MORE unfair things, and then it will get even worse".
It would be nice for that to work, because it means that you don't have to overcome the automatic argument of "I'm not immoral and anti-productive, you're immoral and anti-productive". You never have to tell anybody they're wrong or bad. You only have to tell them that they're not in the majority, which is an objective statement.
It would similarly be nice if we could have an objective but blame-free way to resolve the meta-question of electing representatives. Or at least, to have people say to their own partisans, "Hey, this is obviously unfair, could we tone it down a bit?" But the reply is always "If we don't do this unfair thing, the other people will do MORE unfair things, and then it will get even worse".
This is a great example of why the paper's methodology is so utterly bogus. A Markov chain algorithm isn't going to come up with strategies like this, but humans certainly will.
I believe fair cake-cutting algorithms are up there in terms of runtime complexity. O(n^n^n) or so?
It would be computationally feasible for small numbers, but not if the algorithm requires a human to try strategise and act in its own interest for every single step.
It would be computationally feasible for small numbers, but not if the algorithm requires a human to try strategise and act in its own interest for every single step.
I haven't digested the paper, but one thing I wonder - does it matter which party goes first?
Yes, looks like there's an advantage (they argue only a small advantage) to the first mover:
The defined subdistrict plan selected by the Democrats results in three seats for Democrats and two seats for Republicans. [...] Similarly, if the Republicans move first, then in equilibrium the Republicans win three seats and the Democrats win two seats. Thus [...] under DCP there is only a one-seat difference depending on who draws the define-stage map.
The defined subdistrict plan selected by the Democrats results in three seats for Democrats and two seats for Republicans. [...] Similarly, if the Republicans move first, then in equilibrium the Republicans win three seats and the Democrats win two seats. Thus [...] under DCP there is only a one-seat difference depending on who draws the define-stage map.
Part of the problem is the so-called "two-party system" that we effectively had. George Washington had the right idea - political parties will divide and ultimately destroy the nation. We see this happening right now, today, as the Democrats and Republicans argue over high-profile "moral" issues while colluding in the background to benefit the large corporations and disadvantage the individual citizen.
Abolish political parties now, before it's too late. It may already be too late.
Abolish political parties now, before it's too late. It may already be too late.
How would one abolish political parties? What does abolish mean?
Fundamentally, political parties are based on freedom of association.
Freedom of association allows people to form their own groups, for whatever reason. A group of hikers, model railroad enthusiasts, or a group seeking political ends.
Political parties also cross into advocacy, which is/can be petitioning government for redress. Another constitutionally protected thing.
Best option that I can see is having elections ignore party affiliation. Basically the jungle primary thing.
But in my experience, with nonpartisan elections, everybody still knows what ‘party’ the candidates are.
Fundamentally, political parties are based on freedom of association.
Freedom of association allows people to form their own groups, for whatever reason. A group of hikers, model railroad enthusiasts, or a group seeking political ends.
Political parties also cross into advocacy, which is/can be petitioning government for redress. Another constitutionally protected thing.
Best option that I can see is having elections ignore party affiliation. Basically the jungle primary thing.
But in my experience, with nonpartisan elections, everybody still knows what ‘party’ the candidates are.
I agree that we shouldn't try to abolish them entirely... but we can remove various political protections that political parties enjoy today- such as in my state, election judges have to be either registered Democrats or Republicans- the law allows unaffiliated election judges after the polling place has 2 Democrats and 2 Republicans... but almost no election authority hires and pays a additional election judges once they meet the statutory minimum of two dems and two reps, because they don't have the money to do so.
> but we can remove various political protections that political parties enjoy today
Is there any institution that can do that which isn't dominated by these two parties?
Is there any institution that can do that which isn't dominated by these two parties?
There is nothing magic about two parties, in fact there are plenty of other parties even in the US. However due to game theoretic mechanisms [1] in the winner-takes-all system we tend to get two dominant parties.
I'm not sure how this could be avoided in the US system of 2 senators per state. You can't exactly send 2/3ds of a senator to Washington if you had a proportional system.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duverger%27s_law
I'm not sure how this could be avoided in the US system of 2 senators per state. You can't exactly send 2/3ds of a senator to Washington if you had a proportional system.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duverger%27s_law
> I'm not sure how this could be avoided in the US system of 2 senators per state. You can't exactly send 2/3ds of a senator to Washington if you had a proportional system.
Make the state legislatures proportional, impose a deadlock-free contingency procedure and repeal the seventeenth amendment. Either that or random ballot.
Though, I wouldn't necessarily consider either of those good ways of solving that problem, which would probably involve increasing the size of the senate as well somehow.
Make the state legislatures proportional, impose a deadlock-free contingency procedure and repeal the seventeenth amendment. Either that or random ballot.
Though, I wouldn't necessarily consider either of those good ways of solving that problem, which would probably involve increasing the size of the senate as well somehow.
I don't think we can abolish parties, but I think reducing the damages of a two party system starts with proper campaign finance reform. The two parties have considerably more money than other politicians. This means a few things:
- 3rd parties can't compete
- Campaign spending spirals upwards because of the consolidation of money
- Regular people can't run without party support
- Politicians get campaign money in exchange for giving in on policy
- Lobbyists can consolidate their efforts (it's easier to buy one or two parties than many)
- 3rd parties can't compete
- Campaign spending spirals upwards because of the consolidation of money
- Regular people can't run without party support
- Politicians get campaign money in exchange for giving in on policy
- Lobbyists can consolidate their efforts (it's easier to buy one or two parties than many)
freedom of association need not apply to political representatives nor need it be institutionalized.
that means, i think it is reasonable to demand that a political representative be neutral and not have any associations for which it could be argued that they represent a conflict of interest.
parties influence or even control who gets to stand for election. why should that be the case? anyone should be able to stand for election, regardless of affiliation.
in many countries, parliaments have a concept of requiring that members of parliament vote along their party. that should be illegal, MPs should only vote according their conscience. influencing them should be illegal. lobbying should be illegal.
none of this restricts freedom of association.
that means, i think it is reasonable to demand that a political representative be neutral and not have any associations for which it could be argued that they represent a conflict of interest.
parties influence or even control who gets to stand for election. why should that be the case? anyone should be able to stand for election, regardless of affiliation.
in many countries, parliaments have a concept of requiring that members of parliament vote along their party. that should be illegal, MPs should only vote according their conscience. influencing them should be illegal. lobbying should be illegal.
none of this restricts freedom of association.
>> that means, i think it is reasonable to demand that a political representative be neutral and not have any associations for which it could be argued that they represent a conflict of interest.>>
This statement directly contradicts your view that ‘none of this restricts freedom is association’
Define ‘demand’. Voters demand, like their opinion is they won’t vote for someone who has associations. Or government demands that candidates have no associations.
This statement directly contradicts your view that ‘none of this restricts freedom is association’
Define ‘demand’. Voters demand, like their opinion is they won’t vote for someone who has associations. Or government demands that candidates have no associations.
what i mean is that the right to freedom of association does not protect you from your obligation to avoid a conflict of interest. by rule of law, conflict of interest trumps freedom of association.
it restricts your freedom of association only as much the rule of law already does.
with demand i mean a potential law that demands that representatives be independent: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conscience_vote
it restricts your freedom of association only as much the rule of law already does.
with demand i mean a potential law that demands that representatives be independent: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conscience_vote
I voluntarily join a club. I get benefits from the club and I have responsibilities to the club.
Of course I can eschew those responsibilities and then the club can deny me the benefits or kick me out.
Of course I can eschew those responsibilities and then the club can deny me the benefits or kick me out.
yes, but when that club demands that you vote a certain way in order for you to remain a member, or when the club is responsible that you were listed as a candidate, then you are dependent on them and no longer a neutral representative of those that elected you. and that is whats wrong with the current system, as it doesn't allow you to vote in ways that are actually in the interest of your constituents.
We can’t even achieve this in the judiciary. See Federalist Society.
There was a good (ish) book about this, called Breaking the two-party doom loop.
* There's been an increased focus on federal (vs local) governing. People "over there" now need to adopt the solutions we have "over here". Since federal gov cannot possibly be in tune to all voters micro-needs, a successful federal-first party needs to focus on high-profile outrage-fueled issues.
* The main focus is on proportional representation, where votes for legislators are in proportion to the people who they represent. This avoids winner-take-all elections at congressional level, and removes the need to both pander to moral outrage and gerrymander.
* Another huge factor is increasing the number of seats elected, and pinning it to # of people they represent. This allows minority groups to have their say in congress, rather than having to jump on the bandwagon of "least evil" candidate. Congress has not expanded in a long time.
* There's been an increased focus on federal (vs local) governing. People "over there" now need to adopt the solutions we have "over here". Since federal gov cannot possibly be in tune to all voters micro-needs, a successful federal-first party needs to focus on high-profile outrage-fueled issues.
* The main focus is on proportional representation, where votes for legislators are in proportion to the people who they represent. This avoids winner-take-all elections at congressional level, and removes the need to both pander to moral outrage and gerrymander.
* Another huge factor is increasing the number of seats elected, and pinning it to # of people they represent. This allows minority groups to have their say in congress, rather than having to jump on the bandwagon of "least evil" candidate. Congress has not expanded in a long time.
Easier said than done. They crop up naturally. If there is a way to stop them, it wasn't known when Washington said that.
The fundamental problem with parties appears to be that they're a way to exert undue influence on and ultimately break down democracy. So it seems like measures that increase democracy and reduce the power of any person or organization are what's required.
From a voting perspective, that means things like multiwinner districts and races (improves minority representation and blunts gerrymandering), compulsory voting, paid voting holidays, independent voting commissions that draw maps, ranked choice voting...
It also means either reducing the mechanisms by which capital can be converted into political power or reducing the amount of capital the entities at the top have, or both. So antitrust laws are not only good for the economy, but also for democracy.
The fundamental problem with parties appears to be that they're a way to exert undue influence on and ultimately break down democracy. So it seems like measures that increase democracy and reduce the power of any person or organization are what's required.
From a voting perspective, that means things like multiwinner districts and races (improves minority representation and blunts gerrymandering), compulsory voting, paid voting holidays, independent voting commissions that draw maps, ranked choice voting...
It also means either reducing the mechanisms by which capital can be converted into political power or reducing the amount of capital the entities at the top have, or both. So antitrust laws are not only good for the economy, but also for democracy.
Not going to engage with the hyperbole (except to say that things are actually pretty good, historically, and party-based democracies have outperformed other forms of government almost universally).
But this has to be addressed:
> Abolish political parties now
You can't. "Parties" are just agreements. I want something, she wants something else, you want something different still, etc... I decide to vote with her because she'll support my stuff in return, where you won't. Now we have a party. That's all that a party is, they naturally arise any time you have any kind of collective decision making (not just democracy: treaty coalitions are just geopolitical "parties", etc...).
The two party system, likewise, is a natural evolution of first-past-the-post/winner-take-all voting. If you need 50% to do anything, then you need to get your party to be bigger than that. And the folks left out need to band together in order to get what they want. So the two sides naturally seek (via compromise, coercion, etc...) to an equilibrium where they both win about half the time. Anyone in a "third party" never wins anything.
But this has to be addressed:
> Abolish political parties now
You can't. "Parties" are just agreements. I want something, she wants something else, you want something different still, etc... I decide to vote with her because she'll support my stuff in return, where you won't. Now we have a party. That's all that a party is, they naturally arise any time you have any kind of collective decision making (not just democracy: treaty coalitions are just geopolitical "parties", etc...).
The two party system, likewise, is a natural evolution of first-past-the-post/winner-take-all voting. If you need 50% to do anything, then you need to get your party to be bigger than that. And the folks left out need to band together in order to get what they want. So the two sides naturally seek (via compromise, coercion, etc...) to an equilibrium where they both win about half the time. Anyone in a "third party" never wins anything.
Not entirely true. Political parties are enshrined in many state governments, in the form of Parry registration and primary elections. Its frankly unconscionable.
You can eliminate those "unconscionable"[1] laws and it won't eliminate the parties though. Those are just regulations to prevent new parties from getting a foothold, but the existing parties predate the laws and will survive their passing just fine. Consider: there are no Whigs left, but the two party system hasn't changed.
[1] Again, why the ridiculous hyperbole? It's not like this is some new evil plague; "parties" have been with us for thousands of years!
[1] Again, why the ridiculous hyperbole? It's not like this is some new evil plague; "parties" have been with us for thousands of years!
> You can't. "Parties" are just agreements.
That seems unimaginative. The agreement to create the party is recognized as some sort of incorporated being for the purpose of receiving and spending money. This could be shaped in various ways by taxing authority, or by retroactively changing the pay structure of officers, or by optimizing the valuation of different asset classes for the purpose of taxation. I'm sure others can think of even better ways to pursue abolition without expanding the already expansive controls on how people express the freedom of association.
That seems unimaginative. The agreement to create the party is recognized as some sort of incorporated being for the purpose of receiving and spending money. This could be shaped in various ways by taxing authority, or by retroactively changing the pay structure of officers, or by optimizing the valuation of different asset classes for the purpose of taxation. I'm sure others can think of even better ways to pursue abolition without expanding the already expansive controls on how people express the freedom of association.
The two party system is not a policy, it’s a symptom of First Past the Post elections.
If you want the system to change we need to restructure how elections work, not somehow try to abolish the idea of people working together politically.
If you want the system to change we need to restructure how elections work, not somehow try to abolish the idea of people working together politically.
It’s impossible to abolish parties. It is possible to change the election system so that a plurality of parties form a government.
In theory it's possible to change the election system. In practice, effecting such a change requires the cooperation of at least the party in power and probably both parties, so...
Except for a few absolute monarchies and tiny countries, is there a single modern country without parties? There were parties forming already in his time! I really think they are an inevitable aspect of electoral democracy and finding ways to work with it is the better choice.
The media is the problem much more than the parties. The parties want to focus on their differences, but there's nothing forcing the media to focus on them. Any candidate that steps outside the traditional talking points is ignored/delegitimized:
https://youtu.be/gAL5rMu8N5Y?si=-PtVl3vwIGOAlWRL&t=273
https://youtu.be/gAL5rMu8N5Y?si=-PtVl3vwIGOAlWRL&t=273
Abolishing political parties is not possible, people form factions and coalitions based on common interests, and those coalitions form coalitions in order to achieve their goals. You can have a multi-party system, a two party system or a de facto one party system, the difference is that for the latter two, the final coalitions happen beforehand and are presented to voters as a fait accompli.
Is there any democracy on the planet that does not have political parties?
We can't even prevent private corporations from unlimited funding of campaigns. How on earth would we be able to abolish political parties?
We can't even prevent private corporations from unlimited funding of campaigns. How on earth would we be able to abolish political parties?
What's the alternative? I'd rather have political parties than direct rule by "influencers", say, elected by popularity poll.
I find it especially disingenuous when either party complains about 3rd party spoilers. Of course they could solve that by endorsing something other than FPTP, like IRV. But it's much easier to insulate policy from politics when you can just extort your voters.
The issue is far more basic than you're making it out.
Switching from FPTP to IRV changes the balance of power in any state that is not dominated by one party. The party that stands to gain supports it, the party that stands to lose opposes it. That's it there is no other motivation. If the balance of power were flipped you would see the stances flipped.
You can see the happening right now where the Democrats who initially opposed those state laws meant to undermine the ACA now loudly support them because almost all of them banish government from healthcare extremely broadly where Republicans now want them gone because it inhibits their ability to restrict abortion access.
Switching from FPTP to IRV changes the balance of power in any state that is not dominated by one party. The party that stands to gain supports it, the party that stands to lose opposes it. That's it there is no other motivation. If the balance of power were flipped you would see the stances flipped.
You can see the happening right now where the Democrats who initially opposed those state laws meant to undermine the ACA now loudly support them because almost all of them banish government from healthcare extremely broadly where Republicans now want them gone because it inhibits their ability to restrict abortion access.
> Switching from FPTP to IRV changes the balance of power in any state that is not dominated by one party. The party that stands to gain supports it, the party that stands to lose opposes it.
I guess we have to work state-by-state and county-by-county in swing areas to get IRV/ranked choice voting enacted, then scream very loudly when someone tries to change it back.
https://represent.us/
I guess we have to work state-by-state and county-by-county in swing areas to get IRV/ranked choice voting enacted, then scream very loudly when someone tries to change it back.
https://represent.us/
I only read the abstract and very briefly skimmed the article, but...
So it claims that it doesn't require bipartisan agreement to reach 'optimality'. Fine, I won't argue that point as I haven't looked that deeply into it.
But it still requires the parties to agree to adopt this Define-Combine procedure in the first place! And why would they do that? They're not, when the rubber hits the road, interested in "optimality" (however you define it), but power. Power at the expense of the other party, to be precise.
So it claims that it doesn't require bipartisan agreement to reach 'optimality'. Fine, I won't argue that point as I haven't looked that deeply into it.
But it still requires the parties to agree to adopt this Define-Combine procedure in the first place! And why would they do that? They're not, when the rubber hits the road, interested in "optimality" (however you define it), but power. Power at the expense of the other party, to be precise.
There are a few ways it could happen
1. it's imposed on them by an outside force like through a voter referendum or court order 2. the party is currently in power but thinks it might lose power soon, they could adopt this on the way out to limit the ability of the opposition to get a supermajority but in a way that will be harder for opponents to object to compared to other things they could try.
1. it's imposed on them by an outside force like through a voter referendum or court order 2. the party is currently in power but thinks it might lose power soon, they could adopt this on the way out to limit the ability of the opposition to get a supermajority but in a way that will be harder for opponents to object to compared to other things they could try.
> Power at the expense of the other party, to be precise.
Power at the expense of the people, that is the most important part by far. Gerrymandering corrupts the democracy by devaluing votes, giving more power to current politicians regardless of side.
Giving power back to the people almost never happens.
Power at the expense of the people, that is the most important part by far. Gerrymandering corrupts the democracy by devaluing votes, giving more power to current politicians regardless of side.
Giving power back to the people almost never happens.
Are you just saying that any redistricting method needs to become law?
Gerrymandering is a political process; it can't be "solved" with math. If there were a technical solution to the 'gerrymandering problem' we'd've used any of the standard tools for drawing such maps.
The major sociopolitical issue is that gerrymandering can be used for both good (minority-majority districts) and "bad" (supermajority plural houses when there's only a bare majority; or, worse).
The root of the issue is that map-drawing is unfair and we'd like a fair system. I think for most of the interested parties, you can find middle ground on fair electoral mechanisms. For parties just trying to keep power you can make this argument: gerrymandering moves the election to the primary; the turnout for primaries is abysmal, and the result is that our government is weaker for having gerrymandering.
In my state, Texas, there are some districts where the outcome of the election was decided by as little as 2% of the voters, i.e., only 3.5% of the voters showed up to the primary.
The major sociopolitical issue is that gerrymandering can be used for both good (minority-majority districts) and "bad" (supermajority plural houses when there's only a bare majority; or, worse).
The root of the issue is that map-drawing is unfair and we'd like a fair system. I think for most of the interested parties, you can find middle ground on fair electoral mechanisms. For parties just trying to keep power you can make this argument: gerrymandering moves the election to the primary; the turnout for primaries is abysmal, and the result is that our government is weaker for having gerrymandering.
In my state, Texas, there are some districts where the outcome of the election was decided by as little as 2% of the voters, i.e., only 3.5% of the voters showed up to the primary.
I agree. Matthew Yglesias wrote a great article about this:
=====
"...redistricting is a particularly hard problem to solve because there are a number of different goals that are mostly incompatible:
* It seems like a system should offer partisan fairness such that control of a legislature is typically in line with the population’s overall preference.
* Districts should align communities of interest and correspond in some sense to real places that we can characterize, like “the South Side of Chicago,” rather than just be arbitrary zones, like “some of the suburbs of San Antonio and some of the suburbs of Austin plus a big disconnected patch of rural Texas.”
* Racial minority groups should get fair representation. A state like Georgia that’s 30 percent black shouldn’t have an all-white congressional delegation.
* There should be fair-fight districts with real electoral competition, not just everyone segregated into safe seats that protect incumbents.
* Districts should be compact and look like a nice checkerboard of squares and triangles, rather than a bunch of crazy squiggles.
Sometimes you can make this all work together, but oftentimes you can’t."
=====
We can't have an "optimal" algorithm when we're trying to optimize for several different things, some of which don't even have a formal definition.
[0]: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/11/16453512/...
=====
"...redistricting is a particularly hard problem to solve because there are a number of different goals that are mostly incompatible:
* It seems like a system should offer partisan fairness such that control of a legislature is typically in line with the population’s overall preference.
* Districts should align communities of interest and correspond in some sense to real places that we can characterize, like “the South Side of Chicago,” rather than just be arbitrary zones, like “some of the suburbs of San Antonio and some of the suburbs of Austin plus a big disconnected patch of rural Texas.”
* Racial minority groups should get fair representation. A state like Georgia that’s 30 percent black shouldn’t have an all-white congressional delegation.
* There should be fair-fight districts with real electoral competition, not just everyone segregated into safe seats that protect incumbents.
* Districts should be compact and look like a nice checkerboard of squares and triangles, rather than a bunch of crazy squiggles.
Sometimes you can make this all work together, but oftentimes you can’t."
=====
We can't have an "optimal" algorithm when we're trying to optimize for several different things, some of which don't even have a formal definition.
[0]: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/11/16453512/...
The San Antonio/I35/Austin district you refer to is Lloyd Dogget's; it's a minority-majority district created by MALDEF (Mexican American Legal Defense). It is a prime example of the use of gerrymandering for positive reasons.
Gerrymandering is a political process; it can't be "solved" with math.
I think that's a little too defeatist. It's like saying "tactical voting is a political process" and can't be "solved". But you can adopt voting mechanisms that reduce the effect of tactical voting, and many countries have! It doesn't completely solve the problem, sure, but it helps.
I think that's a little too defeatist. It's like saying "tactical voting is a political process" and can't be "solved". But you can adopt voting mechanisms that reduce the effect of tactical voting, and many countries have! It doesn't completely solve the problem, sure, but it helps.
Let me drill down to Texas, where I am quite active. I have been privy to a conversation[1] with Governor Abbot where he described in detail his horse-trading to swap precincts between Congressional representatives in order to: (1) maximize the number of GOP seats; and, (2) ensure the 'safety' of the win of preferred US reps. Secondary goals include trying to pass (Texas) constitutional amendments to make the following things illegal in Texas: any voting system that's not first-past-the-post; at large proposition mechanisms; independent citizens redistricting committees; etc.
[1] This occurred while I waited in line to vote.
[1] This occurred while I waited in line to vote.
I'm sorry but I respectfully disagree. Maybe I spent too much time in Ohio. You should read up on the maps there and the supreme court fight. Think about human motivations and desires more, and less about a math proof or abstract papers which literally has gone out the window now. People won't follow what a state supreme court jugde tells them, you think a proof will convince them or solve a very deep psychological problem? I don't, I used to, but Ohio cured me of that.
Oh, sure, a math proof alone won't make any of the entrenched players change, it would have to be accompanied by new legislation (good luck with that) or a supreme court ruling.
I'm just saying, if you did somehow legislate for change, what should the change look like? "Stop gerrymandering", sure, but how? This paper offers a potential solution, or at least a path towards one.
I'm just saying, if you did somehow legislate for change, what should the change look like? "Stop gerrymandering", sure, but how? This paper offers a potential solution, or at least a path towards one.
Can't you just draw the N districts that you want, then break out N new districts from those by extracting a "ring" from each. Then you have N districts each fully surrounded by another district. The only way to merge pairs of adjacent districts is to restore the original layout.
Seems like a pretty trivial way to break the algorithm. But I probably misunderstood something.
Seems like a pretty trivial way to break the algorithm. But I probably misunderstood something.
Yes, that would work. The paper has a note about excluding districts like this:
> "Valid districts are contiguous and have equal population. Strict constraints on compactness, geographic splits, or other restrictions are not necessary, but such limitations could be included. However, valid districts may not include “donuts,” where one district entirely encircles another."
> "Valid districts are contiguous and have equal population. Strict constraints on compactness, geographic splits, or other restrictions are not necessary, but such limitations could be included. However, valid districts may not include “donuts,” where one district entirely encircles another."
No, I think you are absolutely onto something -- as you describe it, it is trivial to transform from N -> 2N districts in a manner which makes it impossible to combine them back 2N -> N in any other way than the original map.
Maybe I'm missing something too. That seems like a pretty big deficiency.
Maybe I'm missing something too. That seems like a pretty big deficiency.
On the one hand -- I love this spirit, of trying to adapt the "I cut you choose" technique to something that might work for gerrymandering. We need as many ideas as we can get!
On the other -- unfortunately I don't see how it would actually help, because the first party which defines the half-districts is generally going to "win".
If party 1 is the Republican party which wants to maximize rural votes, they just split up every city like a pie, with each slice extending far into the countryside, halfway to the next city. Then it doesn't matter which slices party 2 (Democrats) combine, because they're always stuck with rural votes outweighing city votes.
While if party 1 is the Democratic party which wants to concentrate city votes, they do the opposite and surround the city with two halves of a ring that is half-urban half-rural, so the city can't be diluted. Party 2 (Republicans) can combine rural areas only with the ring, while the inside remains totally protected.
So one strategy is skinny pointed daggers to invade the cities, the other is about skinny ring shields to protect the cities. By controlling the initial shapes, you control nearly everything.
(Of course with real geography it becomes more complex, but the general principle of districts shaped as skinny daggers or shields is still going to be the primary strategy here -- you're not going to win all the districts, but it'll get you the extra 10% or 15% you need.)
On the other -- unfortunately I don't see how it would actually help, because the first party which defines the half-districts is generally going to "win".
If party 1 is the Republican party which wants to maximize rural votes, they just split up every city like a pie, with each slice extending far into the countryside, halfway to the next city. Then it doesn't matter which slices party 2 (Democrats) combine, because they're always stuck with rural votes outweighing city votes.
While if party 1 is the Democratic party which wants to concentrate city votes, they do the opposite and surround the city with two halves of a ring that is half-urban half-rural, so the city can't be diluted. Party 2 (Republicans) can combine rural areas only with the ring, while the inside remains totally protected.
So one strategy is skinny pointed daggers to invade the cities, the other is about skinny ring shields to protect the cities. By controlling the initial shapes, you control nearly everything.
(Of course with real geography it becomes more complex, but the general principle of districts shaped as skinny daggers or shields is still going to be the primary strategy here -- you're not going to win all the districts, but it'll get you the extra 10% or 15% you need.)
I'm one of the authors. Thanks for reading our paper. Happy to answer any questions.
If you're interested, here is a (still in-progress) simulator I wrote where you can try out Define-Combine on a simple grid. https://mpalmer.shinyapps.io/DefineCombine/
If you're interested, here is a (still in-progress) simulator I wrote where you can try out Define-Combine on a simple grid. https://mpalmer.shinyapps.io/DefineCombine/
Hm. This doesn't seem like it does much if there's a sufficiently high concentration of cracked districts, relative to packed districts.
I gerrymandered during the define phase using classic packing / cracking strategies, such that I had 8 majority-B districts (2:3) and 2 majority-A districts (4:1 and 5:0), and unsurprisingly, the only districts I was able to combine that were majority-A were those that included the packed districts.
If the overall split was, say, 27:23 instead of 25:25 such that we could define 9 majority-B districts in the define phase, then I would only have been able to define a single majority-A district in the combine phase.
(And yes, all of these gerrymandered districts would be considered safe B seats, as one would expect with a 20% margin)
There are also potentially issues if the packed districts are geographically clustered -- we see this a lot in states with a single predominant urban center (e.g. Kansas, Minnesota, Kentucky). In those cases, you might be forced to combine multiple packed districts due to pathological maps. For instance, consider a map where a Democratic bastion is districted into concentric rings -- that satisfies the contiguity requirement, yet only the outermost district abuts any Democratic-minority districts.
I gerrymandered during the define phase using classic packing / cracking strategies, such that I had 8 majority-B districts (2:3) and 2 majority-A districts (4:1 and 5:0), and unsurprisingly, the only districts I was able to combine that were majority-A were those that included the packed districts.
If the overall split was, say, 27:23 instead of 25:25 such that we could define 9 majority-B districts in the define phase, then I would only have been able to define a single majority-A district in the combine phase.
(And yes, all of these gerrymandered districts would be considered safe B seats, as one would expect with a 20% margin)
There are also potentially issues if the packed districts are geographically clustered -- we see this a lot in states with a single predominant urban center (e.g. Kansas, Minnesota, Kentucky). In those cases, you might be forced to combine multiple packed districts due to pathological maps. For instance, consider a map where a Democratic bastion is districted into concentric rings -- that satisfies the contiguity requirement, yet only the outermost district abuts any Democratic-minority districts.
Suppose you're defining as Party B, and you draw 8 majority-B districts (2:3) and 2 majority-A districts. Then, when Party A is combining, they would pair each of the majority-A districts with a majority-B district with a smaller margin, resulting in 2 A districts and 3 B districts. This is an improvement compared to if B drew 5 districts unilaterally, where it could draw 4 majority-B districts.
Yes, it is an improvement in this specific scenario, since there's limited granularity in how we can draw the districts.
If instead we had 9 population nodes we could assign to each Define district, then we might be able to draw nine 4:5 districts in favor of B, and a single 9:0 district in favor of A. In that case, A cannot recover any of the unfairness that B introduced.
If instead we had 9 population nodes we could assign to each Define district, then we might be able to draw nine 4:5 districts in favor of B, and a single 9:0 district in favor of A. In that case, A cannot recover any of the unfairness that B introduced.
Biggest potential weakness seems like the ability for the merging party to strategically collapse districts such that two legislators from the opposing party are made to reside in the same district, creating a new district with no incumbent. Not all legislatures require that representatives live in the district, and there would be real trade-offs to doing so, but it would be a pretty powerful hammer to wield against up-and-coming opposition candidates.
It doesn't matter at the abstraction of proportional representation, but it potentially matters quite a bit when you get into the nitty-gritty of actual elections.
It doesn't matter at the abstraction of proportional representation, but it potentially matters quite a bit when you get into the nitty-gritty of actual elections.
You're right that this method doesn't protect incumbents. However, protecting incumbency and avoiding open-seat elections isn't necessarily a bad thing, and could increase electoral competition in some places. Some states don't allow incumbency to be taken into account when redistricting already.
I really appreciate your work. It appears to address one of the biggest issues of our time.
Please do not get discouraged by anyone or anything. We need more of this.
Please do not get discouraged by anyone or anything. We need more of this.
Would it scale to beyond 2 parties?
Potentially in some form, but we haven't investigated it. The utility functions for each party would be very different. Instead of trying to maximize the seats that they win, parties would also need to think about the coalitions that could form if no party won a majority of the seats.
To everyone in this thread who is stuck on the refrain "technical solutions to social problems never work": broadly shared agreement among people of flesh and blood to use a certain technical solution is ultimately a social solution. The value of a fair technical solution is as a rallying point around which a social solution can be formed. Besides, by the same token any democratic voting system would be deemed a "technical solution to a social problem", yet clearly some of those were adopted and now work.
If the analysis holds up in practice (and the methodology looks good at first glance) I really like this. It will allow fair districts to be drawn even by completely divided jurisdictions, without needing any kind of neutral arbitrator to step in.
(The UK has reasonably neutral boundary commissions, but it seems for whatever reason there's no hope of that approach working in the US -- at best there's just an almighty legal battle in state supreme courts.)
(The UK has reasonably neutral boundary commissions, but it seems for whatever reason there's no hope of that approach working in the US -- at best there's just an almighty legal battle in state supreme courts.)
> but it seems for whatever reason there's no hope of that approach working in the US
It's a technical solution to social problems: polarization and intolerance. Those never work.
It would be very hard, but the only thing I see actually fixing the fundamental problem is limiting the degree of policy change per time period to something below what would trigger a backlash. That would lower the stakes, lower the perceived threat level, and maybe allow people to recover their sanity again. I think eventually the country would mellow out.
It's a technical solution to social problems: polarization and intolerance. Those never work.
It would be very hard, but the only thing I see actually fixing the fundamental problem is limiting the degree of policy change per time period to something below what would trigger a backlash. That would lower the stakes, lower the perceived threat level, and maybe allow people to recover their sanity again. I think eventually the country would mellow out.
> It's a technical solution to social problems: polarization and intolerance. Those never work.
Except in this case, polarization itself isn't "organic", but being pushed by large organized entities; and these entities are pushing it because there's a value to be gained from polarization. Reduce ways to capture value from polarization, and you reduce the incentive to push for polarization.
Except in this case, polarization itself isn't "organic", but being pushed by large organized entities; and these entities are pushing it because there's a value to be gained from polarization. Reduce ways to capture value from polarization, and you reduce the incentive to push for polarization.
> It's a technical solution to social problems: polarization and intolerance. Those never work.
The opposite: technical solutions are the only ones that work. Approximately, you can't solve social problems.
The opposite: technical solutions are the only ones that work. Approximately, you can't solve social problems.
Wouldn't limiting the degree of policy change per time period just be a win for whichever side supports the status quo? Why would people being hurt by the current system ever support that?
Right, the status quo as I understand it in many US states is essentially "the current election winner at redistricting time gets to set the boundaries for the next election". That's a terrible status quo (unless you like gerrymandering) and there's very little incentive for anyone to change it (as it benefits the winners, by definition).
The status quo is pretty good compared to eg North Korea or Somalia (for approximately everyone) or even the US 100 years ago for the vast majority of people.
So when you say 'people being hurt by the current system' what the alternative you are implicitly comparing to?
So when you say 'people being hurt by the current system' what the alternative you are implicitly comparing to?
I'm comparing it to the Western European and Nordic democracies.
> It will allow fair districts to be drawn even by completely divided jurisdictions, without needing any kind of neutral arbitrator to step in.
Well, it assumes that there are exactly two sides in politics. Even the UK has more than two relevant parties.
Well, it assumes that there are exactly two sides in politics. Even the UK has more than two relevant parties.
That's true, but favouring two sides fairly evenly is at least better than favouring one side.
Both the problem and the solution are very US-centric, but it's still important work.
Both the problem and the solution are very US-centric, but it's still important work.
I've always felt that a simpler solution would be to just increase the number of representatives.
In 1912 (the last time we added more), the US population was ~90 million, and it's currently at around ~340 mil and we still have only 435 representatives.
1912: 1 rep per 20,000 people
2024: 1 rep per 780,000 people
This doesn't "solve" gerrymandering but it does blunt the effectiveness of it (among hopefully some other positive effects.)
In 1912 (the last time we added more), the US population was ~90 million, and it's currently at around ~340 mil and we still have only 435 representatives.
1912: 1 rep per 20,000 people
2024: 1 rep per 780,000 people
This doesn't "solve" gerrymandering but it does blunt the effectiveness of it (among hopefully some other positive effects.)
I support increasing the legislature because it changes the economics of lobbying. Right now you can wine-and-dine half dozen representatives and lock in a vote. In a larger House the lobbyists would have to spend that much more to "buy" the same representation.
The flaw is it doesn't mean anything so long as there's a 2-party system. Congress is stuck on part-line voting. Lobbyists only have to gain the favor of party leaders and the rest will follow. But one of the barriers to getting 3rd and 4th party candidates elected is there are too few seats that they can compete for.
Both solutions need to be implemented together. An expanded Congress is only useful with a plurality of ideologies. Getting alternative parties into office requires more competitive districts. Doing only one of those wouldn't be enough to significantly change the makeup of Congress.
The flaw is it doesn't mean anything so long as there's a 2-party system. Congress is stuck on part-line voting. Lobbyists only have to gain the favor of party leaders and the rest will follow. But one of the barriers to getting 3rd and 4th party candidates elected is there are too few seats that they can compete for.
Both solutions need to be implemented together. An expanded Congress is only useful with a plurality of ideologies. Getting alternative parties into office requires more competitive districts. Doing only one of those wouldn't be enough to significantly change the makeup of Congress.
You can gerrymander a tiny district just as easily as you can a giant one. Fundamentally it's just a software problem and modern computers are really fast.
You missed a zero with the 1921 figure, but it is an interesting question to consider: what exactly is the optimal size of a national assembly? Does it scale best to the square root or cube root of population? Or some other exponent? What are the constant factors? Do larger multi-regional blocs like the US and EU require different styles of representation, and if so does that change the scaling factors? The US could probably do with at least 600 though, minimum.
> what exactly is the optimal size of a national assembly?
This is indeed an interesting question, and I submit that the US is in an awkward state where the national assembly is simultaneously too large and too small.
I've seen some statistics that suggest that assemblies tend to start degrading in quality when you get past 300 or so: you end up in a situation where too many members just have nothing to do. At the same time, it's almost certainly the case that the US House has too few members for them to be sufficiently responsive to their constituents.
This is indeed an interesting question, and I submit that the US is in an awkward state where the national assembly is simultaneously too large and too small.
I've seen some statistics that suggest that assemblies tend to start degrading in quality when you get past 300 or so: you end up in a situation where too many members just have nothing to do. At the same time, it's almost certainly the case that the US House has too few members for them to be sufficiently responsive to their constituents.
The good thing about this is that it removes the problem of finding selfless competent people to carry out the process impartially.
It works when both sides are cynical crooks.
It works when both sides are cynical crooks.
Dirt don't vote, so why are we drawing circles on a map? Just section off a list a of eligible voter' names or IDs. After all you're not representing area, you're representing unity.
Even better: have representatives who represent people.
We have proper information systems, we can do this. A representative gets qualified by having the appropriate minimum number of people sign up as their constituents. They then represent exactly those people.
We have proper information systems, we can do this. A representative gets qualified by having the appropriate minimum number of people sign up as their constituents. They then represent exactly those people.
For all the examples of doing geographic districts I sometimes wonder why is that specific special interest group that gets privileged with a district separation instead of any other way to split people. Prussia split districts by wealth too but that was a way to give more power to the rich.
How would you section off the list? If you do it uniformly randomly, then every constituency looks identical and you'll get identical results in each constituency. This creates a very non-representative result. Notably, large racial minorities would have their voting power diluted.
The solution to gerrymandering is multimember district with proportional representation inside the districts, whether small (e.g., 5 member districts with STV) or large (whole-legislature “district" with party-list proportional) or hybrid (any form of Mixed Member Proportional).
Better proportionality in representarion also has a whole host of other benefits.
Everything with messing with how you draw lines in single-member winner-take-all districts is just shifting representation problems around and not actually solving them.
Better proportionality in representarion also has a whole host of other benefits.
Everything with messing with how you draw lines in single-member winner-take-all districts is just shifting representation problems around and not actually solving them.
In addition to these big-move structural proposals that will take a long time to actually be adopted, there's something everyone can do now that can have an immediate effect: vote in primaries. Gerrymandering has the effect of making the general election meaningless, so the dominant party's primary becomes the whole game. If you're a Republican in Berkeley, for example, you don't need a lot of Republican and moderate voters to tilt the local Democratic primary, because not a lot of people vote in them.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/primary-el...
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/primary-el...
This solution is still based on a concept of defining districts by presumed voting patterns of the inhabitants. Is it really that hard to define districts sensibly purely based on population density/distribution?
I was thinking something similar.
Carve the geography into small population density based chunks
Identify boundaries like Bisecting Highways, railways, Rivers, mountains, etc.
Create boundary informed population chunk clusters.
Identify features Food Industry Schools
Find the shortest road based path from each bounded cluster to each feature.
Create convex hulls that enclose bounded population chunk clusters of the target population size and paths to features.
Rerun after every census.
Carve the geography into small population density based chunks
Identify boundaries like Bisecting Highways, railways, Rivers, mountains, etc.
Create boundary informed population chunk clusters.
Identify features Food Industry Schools
Find the shortest road based path from each bounded cluster to each feature.
Create convex hulls that enclose bounded population chunk clusters of the target population size and paths to features.
Rerun after every census.
I wish they could come up with a solution to this that made sense. The things I find particularly troubling about gerrymandering in the US isn’t only that one party gets a few more representatives either way. The reason it’s absolutely terrible in the United States is that it creates uncompetitive districts on both sides and we get extreme candidates that don’t appeal to people in the middle at all and seem to have no ability to compromise and get basic things done. I’m not sure that proportional representation addresses this issue.
How about communities decide themselves which district they want to be part of?
A community is a village, town, administrative parts of a city, etc.
Every 10-15 years, there is a vote across the country in which every community rates adjacent and nearby communities according to who they want to be in the same district as.
Then you run some pre-decided fixed algorithm that uses these ratings to join adjacent communities in a province/state in roughly equal populations. The design of this algorithm is left as an exercise to the reader.
A community is a village, town, administrative parts of a city, etc.
Every 10-15 years, there is a vote across the country in which every community rates adjacent and nearby communities according to who they want to be in the same district as.
Then you run some pre-decided fixed algorithm that uses these ratings to join adjacent communities in a province/state in roughly equal populations. The design of this algorithm is left as an exercise to the reader.
What are the advantages over "I cut, you freeze"?
https://www.cmu.edu/news/stories/archives/2017/november/i-cu...
https://www.cmu.edu/news/stories/archives/2017/november/i-cu...
Couldn't we just use proportional representation?
Both parties heavily invest in gerrymandering
and both parties apepar to (think) they get an
advantage out of doing it.
Neither wants the practice to stop. Politicians will pretend outrage when they personally are negatively impacted by a change of course.
I think there ought to be precise rules and regulations for how and what you can do, but of course for the reason above, this wont happen.
Neither wants the practice to stop. Politicians will pretend outrage when they personally are negatively impacted by a change of course.
I think there ought to be precise rules and regulations for how and what you can do, but of course for the reason above, this wont happen.
Whoa now, I think it's only called gerrymandering when Republicans do it.
The real problem is the “gerrymandering” of state boundaries and the Senate. CA has around 10 million non-Democrat voters who have had zero representation in the Senate since 1992. In fact the entire West Coast hasn’t had any non-Democrat senatorial representation since 2009.
This is why states like the Stare of Jefferson need to be allowed to exist.
This is why states like the Stare of Jefferson need to be allowed to exist.
I always thought a simple geometric solution would make a huge difference (e.g. a district can have no more than 360 degrees of internal arc (with some modification for districts that border non linear state lines).
It would be far from perfect, but it would take the precision out of the gerrymandering process which I think by would be a net positive.
It would be far from perfect, but it would take the precision out of the gerrymandering process which I think by would be a net positive.
What happens when there's collusion, e.g. protecting incumbency at all costs? This tends to be the M.O. here in Florida, where the Democrats in office are satisfied without statewide power as long as their asses continue to be the ones in the allotted seats. Algorithms prevent this situation but your way doesn't.
Even if it's stable in a game theory sense, it depends on the political class being partitioned into exactly two parties. Otherwise the two biggest parties would have an incentive to smother all smaller competitors.
I think the answer has to lie in an algorithmic solution dependent on a high-resolution population density map.
I think the answer has to lie in an algorithmic solution dependent on a high-resolution population density map.
You do still need the controlling party to agree to enact this solution, which is a form of compromise. If you're willing to do that you may as well be willing to cede control to a nonpartisan third party. In either case the outcome will be a reduction in your party's power.
This problem has been solved by mathematicians:
A partisan districting protocol with provably nonpartisan outcomes https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.08781 by Wesley Pegden, Ariel D. Procaccia, Dingli Yu
A partisan districting protocol with provably nonpartisan outcomes https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.08781 by Wesley Pegden, Ariel D. Procaccia, Dingli Yu
There's also at least one method to create N districts canonically -- no human intervention:
https://rangevoting.org/SplitLR.html
https://rangevoting.org/SplitLR.html
> 2 contiguous, equal-population districts
What this seems to ignore is the legitimate desire to keep towns or counties in the same district. Most people would consider it silly to have the dividing line be a side street, or even in between two houses.
What this seems to ignore is the legitimate desire to keep towns or counties in the same district. Most people would consider it silly to have the dividing line be a side street, or even in between two houses.
Is this a generalized version of sharing a cake?
- I get to cut the cake in half
- you get to choose which slice to eat
- I get to cut the cake in half
- you get to choose which slice to eat
The paper states that this is indeed the case, and also cites previous proposals along similar lines:
> Academic researchers have drawn inspiration from the cake-cutting problem to propose processes for fairer redistricting. While this logic has inspired several redistricting proposals (Alexeev and Mixon 2019; Benadè, Procaccia, and Tucker-Foltz 2023; Brams 2020; Ely 2019; Landau, Reid, and Yershov 2009; Pegden, Procaccia, and Yu 2017), none has addressed implementation across the full range of U.S. states and electoral contexts using real-world data. The complexity of previous proposals also precludes real- world applications or even simulation using modern computing techniques.
> Academic researchers have drawn inspiration from the cake-cutting problem to propose processes for fairer redistricting. While this logic has inspired several redistricting proposals (Alexeev and Mixon 2019; Benadè, Procaccia, and Tucker-Foltz 2023; Brams 2020; Ely 2019; Landau, Reid, and Yershov 2009; Pegden, Procaccia, and Yu 2017), none has addressed implementation across the full range of U.S. states and electoral contexts using real-world data. The complexity of previous proposals also precludes real- world applications or even simulation using modern computing techniques.
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This assumes the people doing gerrymandering want a solution
They don’t
The practice of gerrymandering is self acknowledged adversarial social engineering intended to create an unfair split to consolidate power. Is intentional and domination based
The singular and only possible way to execute equitable democracy is enthusiastic engagement by the population in the running of the system.
Until you can create a society that gives individuals the time, space, and resources they need to make fully informed decisions on the complexities and externalities of human action, societies will continue to be run by a small handful of high energy narcissists.
I am unaware of any large scale (>1000 people) human communities that have demonstrated long term peaceful self organized society, spanning the lifetime of a citizen (~100 years) without a major destabilizing event in their community.
They don’t
The practice of gerrymandering is self acknowledged adversarial social engineering intended to create an unfair split to consolidate power. Is intentional and domination based
The singular and only possible way to execute equitable democracy is enthusiastic engagement by the population in the running of the system.
Until you can create a society that gives individuals the time, space, and resources they need to make fully informed decisions on the complexities and externalities of human action, societies will continue to be run by a small handful of high energy narcissists.
I am unaware of any large scale (>1000 people) human communities that have demonstrated long term peaceful self organized society, spanning the lifetime of a citizen (~100 years) without a major destabilizing event in their community.
Haha, like my granny used to say when there was cake to share. "You cut, I choose".
A worthy variation of "I cut you choose" --- the only fair way to divide anything.
"I cut, you choose" is not a fair system if it's difficult to predict or control the cutting. Give the cutting task to your 4yo and then take the obviously big piece, or the one that has the larger, now-exposed, gooey center.
Sounds fair to me, teach the 4 year old the consequences of unfair division --- that's the whole purpose of the exercise.
The cutter _always_ has the ability to divide the whole in a way that will result in an unfair outcome: that's why the choice is given to the other party. The process is unfair when the division _and_ the choice is held by a single party.
The cutter _always_ has the ability to divide the whole in a way that will result in an unfair outcome: that's why the choice is given to the other party. The process is unfair when the division _and_ the choice is held by a single party.
Technology for direct democracy makes the need for elected representatives obsolete.
This is yet another technical solution to what is fundamentally an incentives problem. Whoever benefits from the status quo (gerrymandering) will naturally be incentivized to resist any change which is objectively more 'fair'.
That's the real problem. It's nothing to do with how we draw lines on a map, it's how do you get whoever is currently in power to agree to a more fair system, given that it's (by definition) not in their interest.
That's the real problem. It's nothing to do with how we draw lines on a map, it's how do you get whoever is currently in power to agree to a more fair system, given that it's (by definition) not in their interest.
This methods only works for a two-party electoral system...
Is this actual political science?
If so, where I can I find more?
If so, where I can I find more?
Yes! A lot of modern political science research uses computational methods, big data, etc. Here are some interesting papers on redistricting, by the research group that wrote the package we use in this paper. https://alarm-redist.org/applications.html
And it's made the world such a better place! Please do more of it!
Looks like all the authors of this paper have web pages with more:
Maxwell Palmer: https://maxwellpalmer.com
Benjamin Schneer: https://www.benjaminschneer.com
Kevin Deluca: https://www.kevinmdeluca.com
Maxwell Palmer: https://maxwellpalmer.com
Benjamin Schneer: https://www.benjaminschneer.com
Kevin Deluca: https://www.kevinmdeluca.com
you might google “computational social justice” or “computational social choice” for some political science grounded in math and computer science
The problem isn't that there isn't good solutions to this problem. The problem is that the parties in charge don't want good solutions to the problem.
" One party defines a map of 2 equal-population contiguous districts. Then the second party combines pairs of contiguous districts to create the final map of N districts."
What a load of crap and what dream world do they think that could be accomplished? We can't even get ranked voting to work, and most places this past year where they did use it, it's gonna go away because they didn't get the nutjub they wanted, and this is the age of the nutjub.
Most Americans want to gerrymander, so do their representatives. It's a total myth this will get fixed or people have the will to do it or that you can somehow have these 2 parties work together, at all. Even if that's some silly "contiguous and combine" setup. Shit, one party would get angry with you for even using a word like "contiguous", that's the bar you have to get passed. Good luck with that.
What a load of crap and what dream world do they think that could be accomplished? We can't even get ranked voting to work, and most places this past year where they did use it, it's gonna go away because they didn't get the nutjub they wanted, and this is the age of the nutjub.
Most Americans want to gerrymander, so do their representatives. It's a total myth this will get fixed or people have the will to do it or that you can somehow have these 2 parties work together, at all. Even if that's some silly "contiguous and combine" setup. Shit, one party would get angry with you for even using a word like "contiguous", that's the bar you have to get passed. Good luck with that.
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Gerrymandering is required by federal law to make sure that blacks are able to elect black representatives; this has obvious second order effects in how the rest of the map is drawn under adversarial conditions. Somehow it seems unlikely that this requirement is going away anytime soon, so any proposed mechanism that does not accommodate this constraint is going to be impractical.
Fortunately, the authors consider this and address it in part 4.2. They propose drawing and freezing-in-place the VRA-mandated majority-minority districts as a first step, before applying their technique to the rest of the districts. They test that approach and find that doing it that way still buys you approximately the same degree of neutrality on the overall map, relative to the status quo.
Edit: changed this tautological sounding sentence - "None of the countries using PR suffer from the sillinesses arising from FPTP."