On Killing Tanks(mwi.usma.edu)
mwi.usma.edu
On Killing Tanks
https://mwi.usma.edu/on-killing-tanks/
170 コメント
That’s true, but to make them hide, you have to be able to kill them.
http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html: ”the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field”
http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html: ”the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field”
This was also the successful approach of the Royal Navy against the German Imperial Navy in WWI: one significant battle followed by the IN (surface fleet at least) no longer being an issue for the rest of the war.
And tactically, the Allies actually lost the battle too. But it was enough to make the German fleet stay home for the rest of the war. Of particular interest is how this "asset" fared through to the end of the war. In 1918, with Germany's situation on the ground hopeless, the still-intact capital fleet was ordered to charge the Allies and win a decisive battle. Of course, the sailors refused, and the ships were scuttled in the end anyway
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kiel_mutiny
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kiel_mutiny
You see this a lot in RTS/Moba style games. One bad fight, even if won by sheer luck and suddenly everyone is scared about entering a similar position.
And in WWII. And in the Falklands war.
Was it? I’d be interested in learning more.
As far as German navies go (perhaps you were thinking of a different example) the Kriegmarine switched pretty heavily to subsurface ships, even for resupply in the “field” (ocean in this case). Not sure the extent of ocean going surface vessels except in the Baltic. Their empire was land based. The UK never lost control of the Mediterranean which definitely ultimately blocked German African activity and kept them from repelling allied supply for the battles in Mediterranean fronts. But had they built much surface shipping?
In japan the opposite was true: the IJN was dominant until at least late 1942 and as it was reduced it was less through this kind of battle and more due to losing ships and the reduction of manufacture of replacement due to bombing and supply line restrictions (my parents were both children in the middle of those “supply lines” in different areas of the pacific theatre during that war).
Curious about the falklands!
As far as German navies go (perhaps you were thinking of a different example) the Kriegmarine switched pretty heavily to subsurface ships, even for resupply in the “field” (ocean in this case). Not sure the extent of ocean going surface vessels except in the Baltic. Their empire was land based. The UK never lost control of the Mediterranean which definitely ultimately blocked German African activity and kept them from repelling allied supply for the battles in Mediterranean fronts. But had they built much surface shipping?
In japan the opposite was true: the IJN was dominant until at least late 1942 and as it was reduced it was less through this kind of battle and more due to losing ships and the reduction of manufacture of replacement due to bombing and supply line restrictions (my parents were both children in the middle of those “supply lines” in different areas of the pacific theatre during that war).
Curious about the falklands!
The Kriegsmarine had quite a significant surface fleet that actually siphoned away men and resources from the much more effective U-boats. The most famous vessel would have to be the Bismarck, followed by the Tirpitz. Also notable are the Graf Spee. Most of these ships didn't do much over the course of the war, though they did tie up the Home Fleet, which was afraid of what would happen if they managed to break out into the North Sea and contest the supply convoys from the US.
The Falklands War was similar in that the Argentine Navy had both a large cruiser (General Belgrano), as well as an aircraft carrier (Veinticinco de Mayo). The Belgrano was torpedoed with a large loss of life by HMS Conqueror, and after that the Argentine Navy stayed in port; though it's air wings fought well over the islands.
The Falklands War was similar in that the Argentine Navy had both a large cruiser (General Belgrano), as well as an aircraft carrier (Veinticinco de Mayo). The Belgrano was torpedoed with a large loss of life by HMS Conqueror, and after that the Argentine Navy stayed in port; though it's air wings fought well over the islands.
thanks!
It's easy to kill tanks when you have unchallenged air superiority.
How to kill tanks when you don't, now that's a more interesting question.
How to kill tanks when you don't, now that's a more interesting question.
I can say that a well trained artillery properly positioned and being able to move rapidly can take out tanks. Artillery can hit something they can't see. Tanks are not known for hiring targets 2 hills/5km away, Artillery is. A lot depends on the terrain and the intel available.
By artillery I don't mean super ebganced guided missile systems by good old Howitzers 105, 155.
By artillery I don't mean super ebganced guided missile systems by good old Howitzers 105, 155.
Well trained tanks are quite familiar with dealing with artillery. They are highly mobile, can cross many kinds of terrain (not just roads), and are well aware of using terrain, random speed, and random directions to avoid artillery fire.
Pretty impressive that the ground pressure of a M1 abrams tank is less than half of my mountain bike with 2.6" tires.
On anywhere close to equal footing artillery is a pretty dangerous thing to shoot, as soon as your position is triangulated you'd best shut down and move.
Sure direct fire from tanks is 2-4km, but there are tank fired indirect fire weapons as well. Like say the XM1007. On equal footing I'd rather be in a tank (moving at say 20 mph on an unpredictable course and speed) than hoping for the best with artillery. After all even if you get lucky with 1 tank, there's never just one tank.
Even air superiority isn't as useful as it was. A drone up in the air for 5 minutes with a targeting laser can ruin your day.
Seems pretty weird these days to be investing in tanks, but not investing in the A-10 Warthog.
Pretty impressive that the ground pressure of a M1 abrams tank is less than half of my mountain bike with 2.6" tires.
On anywhere close to equal footing artillery is a pretty dangerous thing to shoot, as soon as your position is triangulated you'd best shut down and move.
Sure direct fire from tanks is 2-4km, but there are tank fired indirect fire weapons as well. Like say the XM1007. On equal footing I'd rather be in a tank (moving at say 20 mph on an unpredictable course and speed) than hoping for the best with artillery. After all even if you get lucky with 1 tank, there's never just one tank.
Even air superiority isn't as useful as it was. A drone up in the air for 5 minutes with a targeting laser can ruin your day.
Seems pretty weird these days to be investing in tanks, but not investing in the A-10 Warthog.
Seems like drones would make artillery more deadly vs tanks as it'd make it easier to score indirect hits with fewer spotters and lower comminication latency vs radio. I imagine most tanks are big enough to allow a drone to spot one from outside the effective range of a regular machine gun.
[deleted]
But a hidden tank becomes an armoured, sealed, high-endurance OP, with a hugely powerful sensor and comms suite.
You think you're fixing them - but really are they fixing you?
You think you're fixing them - but really are they fixing you?
Yes, although there's an old joke about how a modern tank that can't shoot is just a very heavy and incredibly expensive mobile phone.
Also, it needs to keep an engine running to power its sensor and comms suite.
Also, it needs to keep an engine running to power its sensor and comms suite.
The engine is generally a auxillary power unit mounted in the bussel rack of an m1a2 for example. Some may assume parent is referring to the main engine which on m1's consume quite a lot of fuel.
[deleted]
It did not destroy 93 tanks.
The wiki page you link even spells it out. They air campaign destroyed an order of magnitude less, maybe even as few as 3 tanks. They hit decoys or fuck all. Far from levelli g the playing field ethinic cleansing rate increased as the air campaign was waged.
The Kosovo air campaign was one of the most total an utter failures of recent times yet people still try and paint it as a success. Unbelievable.
The wiki page you link even spells it out. They air campaign destroyed an order of magnitude less, maybe even as few as 3 tanks. They hit decoys or fuck all. Far from levelli g the playing field ethinic cleansing rate increased as the air campaign was waged.
The Kosovo air campaign was one of the most total an utter failures of recent times yet people still try and paint it as a success. Unbelievable.
> It did not destroy 93 tanks...the wiki page you link even spells it out
The Wikipedia article [1] confirms the ninety-three figure.
"When it came to alleged hits, 93 tanks...were believed to have been disabled or destroyed with certainty.
The Department of Defence and Joint Chief of Staff had earlier provided a figure of 120 tanks...and a Newsweek piece published around a year later stated that only 14 tanks...had actually been obliterated...not that far from the Yugoslavs' own estimates of 13 tanks... However, this reporting was heavily criticised, as it was based on the number of vehicles found during the assessment of the Munitions Effectiveness Assessment Team, which wasn't interested in the effectiveness of anything but the ordnance, and surveyed sites that hadn't been visited in nearly three-months, at a time when the most recent of strikes were four-weeks old."
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_bombing_of_Yugoslavia#Mil...
The Wikipedia article [1] confirms the ninety-three figure.
"When it came to alleged hits, 93 tanks...were believed to have been disabled or destroyed with certainty.
The Department of Defence and Joint Chief of Staff had earlier provided a figure of 120 tanks...and a Newsweek piece published around a year later stated that only 14 tanks...had actually been obliterated...not that far from the Yugoslavs' own estimates of 13 tanks... However, this reporting was heavily criticised, as it was based on the number of vehicles found during the assessment of the Munitions Effectiveness Assessment Team, which wasn't interested in the effectiveness of anything but the ordnance, and surveyed sites that hadn't been visited in nearly three-months, at a time when the most recent of strikes were four-weeks old."
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_bombing_of_Yugoslavia#Mil...
How can it be called a failure? It achieved it's goal: Serbs were on the brink of defeating Albanians and totally cleansing Kosovo before it started, and ended with Yugoslav defeat and Kosovar independence (and somewhat indirectly, Yugoslavia's final dissolution a year later). Without Americans ever needing to put any boots on the ground, only by air power.
Winning a war isn't about killing your enemies... It's about achieving your goals. You can't deny they were fully achieved, solely with air power. To me it sounds like anything but a defeat.
Winning a war isn't about killing your enemies... It's about achieving your goals. You can't deny they were fully achieved, solely with air power. To me it sounds like anything but a defeat.
I agree.
It is often psychologically more appealing to win battles rather than achieve long term goals. For instance someone wants to get to work faster, but instead they get in a fist fight with the driver in the car ahead of them because the driver was driving too slow.
Clausewitz hit the nail on the head when he said, "war is the continuation of policy by additional means". A rational strategy uses battles to achieve policy goals. Losing a battle by minimizing your own losses to win a war is rational with that context.
- In German "Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln" Politik with all its varied meaning: often translated into english as politics or policy or political.
It is often psychologically more appealing to win battles rather than achieve long term goals. For instance someone wants to get to work faster, but instead they get in a fist fight with the driver in the car ahead of them because the driver was driving too slow.
Clausewitz hit the nail on the head when he said, "war is the continuation of policy by additional means". A rational strategy uses battles to achieve policy goals. Losing a battle by minimizing your own losses to win a war is rational with that context.
- In German "Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln" Politik with all its varied meaning: often translated into english as politics or policy or political.
But in this case, they actually did won the battle. Yes Serbs preserved the vast majority of their military equipment, except planes. But only by hiding i.e. not using them in battle. Losing a war as a result because they weren't much better equipped this way than the Albanians, and the field was leveled.
If they tried to use the equipment to the fullest, they'd just lose it, as Saddam tried in 1991, and result would have been pretty much the same. In a way, it even benefitted Americans because it couldn't be told that they won the war by massacring Serbs (hardly 500 of Serbian military plus about same number of civilians were killed - if they tried to properly operate their military equipment it would be destroyed along with crews and mean a lot higher casualties).
If they tried to use the equipment to the fullest, they'd just lose it, as Saddam tried in 1991, and result would have been pretty much the same. In a way, it even benefitted Americans because it couldn't be told that they won the war by massacring Serbs (hardly 500 of Serbian military plus about same number of civilians were killed - if they tried to properly operate their military equipment it would be destroyed along with crews and mean a lot higher casualties).
Killing 500 civilians would be considered a war crime if anyone else except US military does it.
NATO also deliberately targeted Serbia's power grid and deliberately targeted a radio/TV station during the war. Both of those things would cause uproar in the US media if an opponent of US geopolitical interests did them.
>NATO also deliberately targeted Serbia's power grid and deliberately targeted a radio/TV station during the war.
Targeting a state owned radio and TV station is well with in the laws of war assuming of course the the radio/TV station is actively aiding the war effort. In this specific case NATO targeted this radio/TV building because it acted as an important command and control node to transmit orders to Serbian military forces.
You can read more about it in the U.N.'s report on the investigation of possible NATO warcrimes in the Kosovo war: 'Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'
This report also claims with regard to targeting of power facilies
"74. Of the electrical power transformer stations targeted, one transformer station supplied power to the air defence co-ordination network while the other supplied power to the northern-sector operations centre. Both these facilities were key control elements in the FRY integrated air-defence system."
>Both of those things would cause uproar in the US media if an opponent of US geopolitical interests did them.
Russia and the Syrian targeted hospitals regularly for years and while it get coverage people in the US didn't care much able it. Hospitals are the most protected category of civilian infrastructure according to the laws of armed conflict and Russia bombed them so often there is a wikipedia article about it[1].
[0]: https://www.icty.org/sid/10052#IVB4
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian%E2%80%93Syrian_hospita...
Targeting a state owned radio and TV station is well with in the laws of war assuming of course the the radio/TV station is actively aiding the war effort. In this specific case NATO targeted this radio/TV building because it acted as an important command and control node to transmit orders to Serbian military forces.
You can read more about it in the U.N.'s report on the investigation of possible NATO warcrimes in the Kosovo war: 'Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'
This report also claims with regard to targeting of power facilies
"74. Of the electrical power transformer stations targeted, one transformer station supplied power to the air defence co-ordination network while the other supplied power to the northern-sector operations centre. Both these facilities were key control elements in the FRY integrated air-defence system."
>Both of those things would cause uproar in the US media if an opponent of US geopolitical interests did them.
Russia and the Syrian targeted hospitals regularly for years and while it get coverage people in the US didn't care much able it. Hospitals are the most protected category of civilian infrastructure according to the laws of armed conflict and Russia bombed them so often there is a wikipedia article about it[1].
[0]: https://www.icty.org/sid/10052#IVB4
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian%E2%80%93Syrian_hospita...
> "74. Of the electrical power transformer stations targeted, one transformer station supplied power to the air defence co-ordination network while the other supplied power to the northern-sector operations centre. Both these facilities were key control elements in the FRY integrated air-defence system."
The winner / the stronger can stretch the fact and the criteria. I'm sure some Bin Laden people considered all the 9/11 targets as legitimate. This still doesn't make neither 9/11 nor deliberate bombing of civilian targets in Serbia right.
The winner / the stronger can stretch the fact and the criteria. I'm sure some Bin Laden people considered all the 9/11 targets as legitimate. This still doesn't make neither 9/11 nor deliberate bombing of civilian targets in Serbia right.
The disparity of power between NATO and Serbia was so great that NATO had no need to resort to measures that would endanger and hurt civilians to the degree that the attacks on the Serbian power grid and media did. Even the conflict inside Kosovo could have been resolved by putting boots on the ground. But NATO nations did not want to risk their soldiers, so they killed Serbian civilians instead.
>Russia and the Syrian targeted hospitals regularly for years and while it get coverage people in the US didn't care much able it.
Probably true, but I'm just talking about the media uproar, whether or not the uproar had much effect among the US public.
The idea that targeting civilian infrastructure is ok because that infrastructure is also being used to support an opponent's military effort seems to me like a slippery slope.
>Russia and the Syrian targeted hospitals regularly for years and while it get coverage people in the US didn't care much able it.
Probably true, but I'm just talking about the media uproar, whether or not the uproar had much effect among the US public.
The idea that targeting civilian infrastructure is ok because that infrastructure is also being used to support an opponent's military effort seems to me like a slippery slope.
[deleted]
What? Of course America/NATO put boots on the ground. That's the whole point. NATO ground forces going into Kosovo stopped the Ethnic cleansing.
The air campaign did nothing. Boots on the ground saved lives.
The air campaign did nothing. Boots on the ground saved lives.
[deleted]
[deleted]
Russian ground forces stopped the ethnic cleansing.
NATO ground forces showing up, ended the conflict.
NATO ground forces showing up, ended the conflict.
[deleted]
>>The wiki page you link even spells it out. They air campaign destroyed and order of magnitude less, maybe even as few as 3 tanks. They hit decoys or fuck all.
You missed the OP brilliant point, NATOs mission was to force Serbs to retreat and to stop tanks from wreaking havoc, NATO doesn't care that Serbia now has some 1960's tanks.
>>Far from levelli g the playing field ethinic cleansing rate increased as the air campaign was waged.
As if Serbs were gonna stop voluntarily
You missed the OP brilliant point, NATOs mission was to force Serbs to retreat and to stop tanks from wreaking havoc, NATO doesn't care that Serbia now has some 1960's tanks.
>>Far from levelli g the playing field ethinic cleansing rate increased as the air campaign was waged.
As if Serbs were gonna stop voluntarily
The NATO air campaign Did. Not. Force. The. Serbs. To. Retreat.
It completely failed in the objective.
However, the second NATO put boots on the ground the Serbs pulled out.
The air campaign was a total failure. Complete, abject, failure.
It completely failed in the objective.
However, the second NATO put boots on the ground the Serbs pulled out.
The air campaign was a total failure. Complete, abject, failure.
As someone with little knowledge of the history of this conflict, could you explain your position a little further?
1. the Serbian military was engaged in ethnic cleansing in Kosovo
2. NATO attempted to use solely air power to stop them
3. Whilst the NATO air campaign was underway incidents of ethnic cleansing increased, not decreased
4. When NATO changed strategy and deployed land forces Serbia withdrew immediately, ending the Ethnic cleansing.
5. Not only did the air campaign fail at its stated goal of stopping ethnic cleansing it also had a miniscule rate of enemy assets destroyed making it a double failure.
2. NATO attempted to use solely air power to stop them
3. Whilst the NATO air campaign was underway incidents of ethnic cleansing increased, not decreased
4. When NATO changed strategy and deployed land forces Serbia withdrew immediately, ending the Ethnic cleansing.
5. Not only did the air campaign fail at its stated goal of stopping ethnic cleansing it also had a miniscule rate of enemy assets destroyed making it a double failure.
You missed some of the most interesting and sordid parts of the war as reported in the press.
European countries contributing soldiers to NATO were extremely averse to even one or two casualties. The result was that "pacts" were made with the enemy dividing up zones, allowing unimpeded ethnic cleansing.
Also, European NATO commanders would sideline their own country's troops to protect them.
Albania so mistrusted NATO that they imported anti-aircraft guns at the time to shoot NATO helicopters down.
European countries contributing soldiers to NATO were extremely averse to even one or two casualties. The result was that "pacts" were made with the enemy dividing up zones, allowing unimpeded ethnic cleansing.
Also, European NATO commanders would sideline their own country's troops to protect them.
Albania so mistrusted NATO that they imported anti-aircraft guns at the time to shoot NATO helicopters down.
NATO did not put boots on the ground. They discussed it a lot and armed Kosovans but did not move into the ground. This Wash Post article is titled " Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won War " for a reason
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/sept99/...
NATO, er USA, has a lot of options to inflict pain and lots of it. A few Tomahwaks can cripple the best factory, power supply etc (they can link it to aiding the military so no war crime). They can escalate until the other side surrenders
NATO, er USA, has a lot of options to inflict pain and lots of it. A few Tomahwaks can cripple the best factory, power supply etc (they can link it to aiding the military so no war crime). They can escalate until the other side surrenders
Someone needs to tell James Blunt he wasn't a soldier in Kosovo then.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11753050
KFOR was a thing, https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_Force
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11753050
KFOR was a thing, https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_Force
after Serbs surrendered, get it?
This isn't accurate.
To quote the KFOR Wikipedia page:
> KFOR entered Kosovo on 11 June 1999 two days after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. At the time, Kosovo was facing a grave humanitarian crisis, with military forces from Yugoslavia in action against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in daily engagements.
Note that daily engagements were ongoing at this point.
To quote the KFOR Wikipedia page:
> KFOR entered Kosovo on 11 June 1999 two days after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. At the time, Kosovo was facing a grave humanitarian crisis, with military forces from Yugoslavia in action against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in daily engagements.
Note that daily engagements were ongoing at this point.
I remember the attacks on their electric power systems towards the end was also effective. Was the Serbian population ready to spend months or years without electricity?
Typically attacks against the populace do not cause governments to fall. In retrospect the strategic bombing campaigns against the UK, Germany, and Japan did not cause a change of regime. And this has been borne out in smaller wars (e.g. Serbia, Chechnya) since then. I don’t understand the psychology of it but regardless that appears to be the case.
Still compromises economic responses, some aspects of C3, and, uh, did this one result in a popular uprising removing the regime?
Belgrade? Not as far as I know.
Strategic bombing didn’t have the effect on German production that annoying would have predicted. Nor did it on Iraq in the first gulf war. I think it had some efficacy against the Japanese shipbuilding capacity but am not certain. Certainly it had no effect on Japanese support for the war effort right up to the day the Emperor gave his famous 1945 radio address.
Strategic bombing didn’t have the effect on German production that annoying would have predicted. Nor did it on Iraq in the first gulf war. I think it had some efficacy against the Japanese shipbuilding capacity but am not certain. Certainly it had no effect on Japanese support for the war effort right up to the day the Emperor gave his famous 1945 radio address.
Milosevic was eventually removed from power by a popular uprising, but I guess that was 4 years after the bombings
s/annoying/anyone/ thanks autocorrect
Did depriving the Serbian population of electricity achieve any policy goal?
I'm obviously not an expert on this but avoiding the killing of tanks also depends on some sort of air-superiority. I'm saying "some sort" because you don't need to control the airspace of a whole country in order to defend against tanks, you just need some "clean" space for your artillery do do its thing while stationed 20-30 km or more behind the front while being helped by a few drones.
As recent events in Syria (by "recent" I mean January-February of this year) have shown drone-guided artillery strikes are almost the perfect deterrent against tanks or any form of technicals on the ground, to be honest. There were even videos of Russian strikes hitting two guys on a motorcycle. Don't see tanks having any chance against that combo (i.e. artillery + drones), unless helped by air-support. There are countless examples on Twitter, this is one of them, involving the Turkish Army [1].
[1] https://twitter.com/warsmonitoring/status/123333691043478323...
As recent events in Syria (by "recent" I mean January-February of this year) have shown drone-guided artillery strikes are almost the perfect deterrent against tanks or any form of technicals on the ground, to be honest. There were even videos of Russian strikes hitting two guys on a motorcycle. Don't see tanks having any chance against that combo (i.e. artillery + drones), unless helped by air-support. There are countless examples on Twitter, this is one of them, involving the Turkish Army [1].
[1] https://twitter.com/warsmonitoring/status/123333691043478323...
The future of infantry/tank warfare is here it's just not distributed evenly.
Abu Tow (nom de guerre) is racking up kills in Syria, and from the videos I've seen none of those tanks are sporting APS.
Abu Tow (nom de guerre) is racking up kills in Syria, and from the videos I've seen none of those tanks are sporting APS.
The systems tanks use for identifying and defending against incoming shells are also able to identify the origin of those shells. Artillery is more vulnerable to counter battery fire than ever?
There are systems like Archer that fire and move long before the shell lands, but its still ratcheting up?
There are systems like Archer that fire and move long before the shell lands, but its still ratcheting up?
counter battery fire
The max effective range of a M1A2 is 3,500m. Max effective range of a Howitzer (155) is 18,000m.
You don't set up artillery where you'll be overrun by tanks.
People ITT talking about using the tank main gun as counter bat are confusing indirect fire with direct. Tanks cannot elevate the main gun like artillery (unless we're talking about mobile artillery).
When infantry kills tanks (not using air or fire support) usually requires near line of sight for targeting (TOW, Javelin). If you shoot and scoot you're still within the max effective range of the main gun (but hopefully outside max effective range for the coaxial). Therefore, if the APS gives the TC (tank commander) a POO (point of origin) he's going to swing the main gun around and blast them, as there's little cover you can find that will protect you from a tank round.
These TOW jockeys in Syria get such good kills on video because they're near max effective range for the TOW, in daylight (everything in the desert has roughly the same surface temp) challenging the sensors, shooting at old ass tanks. Count the flight time of the TOWs you see in those videos. Look where they're shooting from. Look what they're shooting at!
The max effective range of a M1A2 is 3,500m. Max effective range of a Howitzer (155) is 18,000m.
You don't set up artillery where you'll be overrun by tanks.
People ITT talking about using the tank main gun as counter bat are confusing indirect fire with direct. Tanks cannot elevate the main gun like artillery (unless we're talking about mobile artillery).
When infantry kills tanks (not using air or fire support) usually requires near line of sight for targeting (TOW, Javelin). If you shoot and scoot you're still within the max effective range of the main gun (but hopefully outside max effective range for the coaxial). Therefore, if the APS gives the TC (tank commander) a POO (point of origin) he's going to swing the main gun around and blast them, as there's little cover you can find that will protect you from a tank round.
These TOW jockeys in Syria get such good kills on video because they're near max effective range for the TOW, in daylight (everything in the desert has roughly the same surface temp) challenging the sensors, shooting at old ass tanks. Count the flight time of the TOWs you see in those videos. Look where they're shooting from. Look what they're shooting at!
By reading the technical details of the Krasnopol on its wiki page it looks like "moving before the shell lands" will do little when it comes to avoiding the incoming shell. At least that's what I can understand from this fragment on that page:
> The system functions as follows. The observer determines the target location (e.g. map coordinates or bearing and distance from their own position), ensures that their laser target designator can 'mark' the target and requests or orders a fire mission against the target using Krasnopol. A gun is then aimed at the target location and a guided shell is fired. The firing unit uses their 1A35K command device to send a signal via a communications link confirming the firing of the projectile to the 1A35I observation post device with the observer. The laser target designator is then used to illuminate the target and the in-flight projectile detects the radiant laser energy reflected by the target and the navigation system steers the shell towards the point of greatest incident energy—the designated target with top attack pattern. The iris of the optical seeker head is protected by a cap which is ejected by a mechanical timer upon firing.
Low visibility conditions are of course a deterrent against this type of attack.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krasnopol_(weapon_system)
> The system functions as follows. The observer determines the target location (e.g. map coordinates or bearing and distance from their own position), ensures that their laser target designator can 'mark' the target and requests or orders a fire mission against the target using Krasnopol. A gun is then aimed at the target location and a guided shell is fired. The firing unit uses their 1A35K command device to send a signal via a communications link confirming the firing of the projectile to the 1A35I observation post device with the observer. The laser target designator is then used to illuminate the target and the in-flight projectile detects the radiant laser energy reflected by the target and the navigation system steers the shell towards the point of greatest incident energy—the designated target with top attack pattern. The iris of the optical seeker head is protected by a cap which is ejected by a mechanical timer upon firing.
Low visibility conditions are of course a deterrent against this type of attack.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krasnopol_(weapon_system)
I think GP's "fire and move long before the shell lands" meant the gun moves, to avoid counter-battery fire (based on the shell's trajectory). Which is an orthogonal problem to the target moving.
Yeah, I got it that the gun moves, but this part:
> The laser target designator is then used to illuminate the target and the in-flight projectile detects the radiant laser energy reflected by the target and the navigation system steers the shell towards the point of greatest incident energy—the designated target with top attack pattern
I think means that the shell basically hits where the drone-laser points at any one moment, not where the drone-laser was pointing when the shell was first fired. Which means that if the target moves then the laser can still remain focused on it for the shell to hit said target, even if the target is moving.
> The laser target designator is then used to illuminate the target and the in-flight projectile detects the radiant laser energy reflected by the target and the navigation system steers the shell towards the point of greatest incident energy—the designated target with top attack pattern
I think means that the shell basically hits where the drone-laser points at any one moment, not where the drone-laser was pointing when the shell was first fired. Which means that if the target moves then the laser can still remain focused on it for the shell to hit said target, even if the target is moving.
The point is you can trace back the shell trajectory to its source and counterfire on that source location, unless the gun had already moved. I don't see how what you quoted changed that. Are you saying that because the trajectory is more dynamic that it's harder to trace back to its source, even if it's still there?
Usually tracing the origin of an artillery shot is relatively straight forward if you know one slice of the trajectory because it's a ballistic trajectory. If a counter-battery radar can track a shell before it becomes "guided" then it can determine the point it was fired from. And since tracking the origin of a shot might also use optical and acoustic detection that pinpoints the gun firing real time, fire and move makes total sense even with guided shells.
But at 30Km range even a classic shell becomes hard to precisely track. A guided shell just makes it worse. At long range a counter shot would basically be a blind shot because the target area is large enough to be considered unacceptable.
But at 30Km range even a classic shell becomes hard to precisely track. A guided shell just makes it worse. At long range a counter shot would basically be a blind shot because the target area is large enough to be considered unacceptable.
I missed that.
Then it's an artillery vs artillery battle, and the side with the best artillery wins (ignoring for the moment airspace superiority), which only adds to the point that tanks are mostly obsolete, they're not part of the conversation at all. I do agree that tanks do look cool and that they create more jobs and help preserve more technical know-how in times of peace, but out on today's fronts it looks like they're not as needed as before.
Then it's an artillery vs artillery battle, and the side with the best artillery wins (ignoring for the moment airspace superiority), which only adds to the point that tanks are mostly obsolete, they're not part of the conversation at all. I do agree that tanks do look cool and that they create more jobs and help preserve more technical know-how in times of peace, but out on today's fronts it looks like they're not as needed as before.
No you have still missed the point.
The counter-battery fire uses radar to calculate where incoming shells are fired from and shoots at that point.
But now the original artillery tries to move away from that point before the counter fire hits it.
That counter fire isn't laser guided.
The counter-battery fire uses radar to calculate where incoming shells are fired from and shoots at that point.
But now the original artillery tries to move away from that point before the counter fire hits it.
That counter fire isn't laser guided.
Then... presumably... the counter fire is tracked and counter-counter-fire is fired based on calculations about where the counter-fire is coming from.
Is the counter-fire mobile as well? Has it moved from its original point of counter-fire?
If not, there's only a couple rounds of this before counter-fire ends.
Is the counter-fire mobile as well? Has it moved from its original point of counter-fire?
If not, there's only a couple rounds of this before counter-fire ends.
Unless the counter-fire has longer range, because it's a missile, rather than an artillery round.
Or the counter-fire is protected by a C-RAM system like Phalanx, Iron Dome, MANTIS, or Porcupine/DRACO.
Every counter has a counter. It's turtles all the way down.
Or the counter-fire is protected by a C-RAM system like Phalanx, Iron Dome, MANTIS, or Porcupine/DRACO.
Every counter has a counter. It's turtles all the way down.
"The systems", would be highly unlikely to work at longer range. Small peturbations to down-ward arc trajectories are what make artillery pinpoint accurate (essentially GPS-guided shells or even better). You can't "Back project" a long-range guided munition, and even if you could, how would you map it to topology?
A defense system in nullification phase needs to know really one thing: Bearing. Once it knows the direction to the incoming munitions, it fills the air along that direction with metal as quickly as possible. Some distance information is important for timing and relative velocity is important for acquisition of targets.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trophy_(countermeasure)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phalanx_CIWS
Now, I speak from relative ignorance of a whole bunch of possible technologies that actually could back-project and actively sense shooters. I'd welcome an education on that. I base my assumptions on the "payload" model that most military aquistions take, in which you can't necessarily do the integrated sensing, computation, and real-time display that would be required to back-project an incoming shell or rocket onto local topology to provide an actionable estimate of the firer's location. I'm less skeptical of close-in / nonballistic, especially given TFA's claims, and very skeptical of longer-range / ballistic attacks.
On this, I'm fascinated by the smart-munitions arms race described in the future pistol duels from Count to a Trillion, where a series of countermeasures, decoys, and guided munitions would be pre-loaded in an attempt to outsmart your opponent.
A defense system in nullification phase needs to know really one thing: Bearing. Once it knows the direction to the incoming munitions, it fills the air along that direction with metal as quickly as possible. Some distance information is important for timing and relative velocity is important for acquisition of targets.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trophy_(countermeasure)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phalanx_CIWS
Now, I speak from relative ignorance of a whole bunch of possible technologies that actually could back-project and actively sense shooters. I'd welcome an education on that. I base my assumptions on the "payload" model that most military aquistions take, in which you can't necessarily do the integrated sensing, computation, and real-time display that would be required to back-project an incoming shell or rocket onto local topology to provide an actionable estimate of the firer's location. I'm less skeptical of close-in / nonballistic, especially given TFA's claims, and very skeptical of longer-range / ballistic attacks.
On this, I'm fascinated by the smart-munitions arms race described in the future pistol duels from Count to a Trillion, where a series of countermeasures, decoys, and guided munitions would be pre-loaded in an attempt to outsmart your opponent.
Looks like the Syrian Army was caught with its pants down, the vehicles staying still in the open. They didn't expect the Turks at all. And they were right next to the border. It is possible to minimise such damage by moving often and using cover and camouflage.
Unlike planes, tanks can work just fine in the dark or in bad weather. Smoke screens can be deployed to conceal movement.
Artillery and planes need good spotting too, which means that targeting a moving and unpredictable target is hard.
During the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia the Serbs effectively hid most of their armour in forests and churches, so it is possible even to hide from even the most high-tech adversary.
Unlike planes, tanks can work just fine in the dark or in bad weather. Smoke screens can be deployed to conceal movement.
Artillery and planes need good spotting too, which means that targeting a moving and unpredictable target is hard.
During the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia the Serbs effectively hid most of their armour in forests and churches, so it is possible even to hide from even the most high-tech adversary.
I think the entire Turkey vs Syria situation is a misunderstanding of the tactical situation. Shooting down the drones would have been fairly easy, but Syria wasn't able to sortie its fighters because Turkey had F-16s on their side of the border that would fire off an AMRAAM as soon as a Syrian jet took off. The obvious counter would be anti air, but the issue is that Russia was unwilling to engage Turkish jets on Turkish territory on behalf of Syria (for obvious reasons). The real reason that Syria's tanks were destroyed is because Syria was unable to counter Turkish F-16s, not because of drones.
planes may not have worked well in the dark during WW2 (excluding night fighters), but that hasn't been true in decades thanks to thermal imaging and night-vision advances.
A lot of wars these days are asymmetric. It's very rare to have fully equipped armies+navies+airforce on both sides. Usually people do the math upfront and one side concludes it probably is better to not get destroyed completely.
In most wars in recent history you have one side with lots of relatively high tech weaponry going against guerrilla forces fighting with relatively unsophisticated stuff but hiding among civilians, thus making the use of all that high tech weaponry a bit controversial. E.g. Syria is a good example of that.
WW II was probably the last conflict where all sides basically removed the gloves and fought with everything they had where everything on both sides included some very scary options. I live in what got rebuilt after WW II destroyed Berlin. There wasn't much left here. Other cities got it worse.
Tanks still have a role because in most conflicts, the other side would lack the means to defend against them. But they'd be relatively useless against someone with rockets & an airforce. But they are awesome for dominating a chaotic battlefield without that. Basically, in the Gulf wars, the US took out the iraqi airforce in no time and after that basically tanks rolled in pretty much without opposition. I don't think any US tanks were lost at all. Much of the conventional troops ended up surrendering.
In most wars in recent history you have one side with lots of relatively high tech weaponry going against guerrilla forces fighting with relatively unsophisticated stuff but hiding among civilians, thus making the use of all that high tech weaponry a bit controversial. E.g. Syria is a good example of that.
WW II was probably the last conflict where all sides basically removed the gloves and fought with everything they had where everything on both sides included some very scary options. I live in what got rebuilt after WW II destroyed Berlin. There wasn't much left here. Other cities got it worse.
Tanks still have a role because in most conflicts, the other side would lack the means to defend against them. But they'd be relatively useless against someone with rockets & an airforce. But they are awesome for dominating a chaotic battlefield without that. Basically, in the Gulf wars, the US took out the iraqi airforce in no time and after that basically tanks rolled in pretty much without opposition. I don't think any US tanks were lost at all. Much of the conventional troops ended up surrendering.
>WW II was probably the last conflict where all sides basically removed the gloves and fought with everything they had where everything on both sides included some very scary options.
I think that would actually be the Iran-Iraq War: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_War
Tank combat, air combat involving a wide range of aircraft, bombing raids, ballistic missile strikes, naval combat, trench warfare and chemical weapon use all took place during the war from 1980 to 1988.
I think that would actually be the Iran-Iraq War: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_War
Tank combat, air combat involving a wide range of aircraft, bombing raids, ballistic missile strikes, naval combat, trench warfare and chemical weapon use all took place during the war from 1980 to 1988.
Yes, you are correct; I forgot about how brutal that conflict was.
Only known case of a helicopter killing a jet in that war iirc!
> in the Gulf wars, the US took out the iraqi airforce in no time and after that basically tanks rolled in pretty much without opposition
I acknowledge the hedge of "pretty much" and use this moment to commemorate the Battle of 73 Easting, Toujours Pret.
"G Troop lost one M3 Bradley to Iraqi IFV fire and one soldier, Sergeant Nels A. Moller, the gunner of the Bradley, was killed. The Bradley's TOW launcher was inoperative, and the 25mm Bushmaster Cannon had jammed. While the crew was attempting to get the cannon back in action, an Iraqi BMP-1 which was thought to be disabled with a tank shell punched through its armor, fired and hit the vehicle's turret with 73 mm cannon fire. Moller died instantly and the remainder of the crew evacuated the damaged vehicle."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_73_Easting
I acknowledge the hedge of "pretty much" and use this moment to commemorate the Battle of 73 Easting, Toujours Pret.
"G Troop lost one M3 Bradley to Iraqi IFV fire and one soldier, Sergeant Nels A. Moller, the gunner of the Bradley, was killed. The Bradley's TOW launcher was inoperative, and the 25mm Bushmaster Cannon had jammed. While the crew was attempting to get the cannon back in action, an Iraqi BMP-1 which was thought to be disabled with a tank shell punched through its armor, fired and hit the vehicle's turret with 73 mm cannon fire. Moller died instantly and the remainder of the crew evacuated the damaged vehicle."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_73_Easting
A Bradley is not a tank.
Also, the real story is that a squad of Apaches in the air was ambushed and destroyed early in the Iraq war from ground fire. Half crashed and half made it back, but with too much damage to fly again.
Also, the real story is that a squad of Apaches in the air was ambushed and destroyed early in the Iraq war from ground fire. Half crashed and half made it back, but with too much damage to fly again.
The Bradley, as I've read, is a hallmark of the deficiencies of DOD committee planning. Well, until the F-35.
There's a dated but entertaining dramatization of this failure from the movie Pentagon Wars: https://youtu.be/aXQ2lO3ieBA.
I ve seen some write ups and basically the Allies go caught out by the Iraqis and almost got completely overrun.
As Wellington said ” It has been a damned serious business. It has been a damned nice thing – the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life.”
As Wellington said ” It has been a damned serious business. It has been a damned nice thing – the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life.”
No, a loss of a single APC is a miraculously low number for just any armour on armour battle imaginable.
Even a WWII era armoured force would've been able to inflict higher losses than Iraqi army of the Gulf War period.
Even a WWII era armoured force would've been able to inflict higher losses than Iraqi army of the Gulf War period.
> No, a loss of a single APC is a miraculously low number for just any armour on armour battle imaginable.
This is true
> Even a WWII era armoured force would've been able to inflict higher losses than Iraqi army of the Gulf War period.
This isn't. The gun on the T55 tank used by the Iraqis couldn't penetrate the armour of a M1 Abrams. No WWII tank was anywhere near as well gunned as a T55.
The Iraqi army in Gulf War 1 was actually pretty good. They were well armed and experienced (they'd fought the Iran/Iraq war). Airpower was the big difference though.
This is true
> Even a WWII era armoured force would've been able to inflict higher losses than Iraqi army of the Gulf War period.
This isn't. The gun on the T55 tank used by the Iraqis couldn't penetrate the armour of a M1 Abrams. No WWII tank was anywhere near as well gunned as a T55.
The Iraqi army in Gulf War 1 was actually pretty good. They were well armed and experienced (they'd fought the Iran/Iraq war). Airpower was the big difference though.
> They were well armed and experienced
1. Quite the opposite. Look for the accounts of some of tank battalions being sent to the field without food, ammo, and fuel, and only being deployed at the very last moment in a hurry. I am not talking about their reserves here, but their main force.
They also had new officers up to a colonel rank simply having no real military training.
Both of these has been quite usual for the Iraqi army. I has been the case since Iran-Iraq war.
2. Saddam was regularly purging his own armed forces.
Though, I heard that he gave amnesty to officers he purged a day before the invasion, and ordered them back into ranks, but you can imagine how that panic move went.
3. Saddam was sitting still for nearly a year, while US was building up more, and more forces in Saudi Arabia. His officers knew they will loose, and they saw Saddam being paralysed with fear all that time, and getting crazier by the day.
That greatly demoralised his few remaining competent officers, some of whom cashed out his treasury, and flew to places like London.
> The gun on the T55 tank used by the Iraqis couldn't penetrate the armour of a M1 Abrams.
Certainly, nothing at the time could've penetrated M1 front armour, but skirts and side armour even of the latest tanks are vulnerable to WW2 era weapons.
It would've been a universally correct decision for a tank force commander to push for flanking attacks, envelopments, and close up skirmishes, rather than allowing a superior force engage them in a frontal attack from outside of their return fire range.
Iraqi army did few lacklustre offensive attempts, with January 29 attack by their 5th Iraqi mechanised being the most serious one, but still botched. From then on, their morale collapsed, and it was a turkey shoot.
I was saying that if US were to attack a force with WW2 era level of preparedness, experience, and tactics, they could've taken more losses.
1. Quite the opposite. Look for the accounts of some of tank battalions being sent to the field without food, ammo, and fuel, and only being deployed at the very last moment in a hurry. I am not talking about their reserves here, but their main force.
They also had new officers up to a colonel rank simply having no real military training.
Both of these has been quite usual for the Iraqi army. I has been the case since Iran-Iraq war.
2. Saddam was regularly purging his own armed forces.
Though, I heard that he gave amnesty to officers he purged a day before the invasion, and ordered them back into ranks, but you can imagine how that panic move went.
3. Saddam was sitting still for nearly a year, while US was building up more, and more forces in Saudi Arabia. His officers knew they will loose, and they saw Saddam being paralysed with fear all that time, and getting crazier by the day.
That greatly demoralised his few remaining competent officers, some of whom cashed out his treasury, and flew to places like London.
> The gun on the T55 tank used by the Iraqis couldn't penetrate the armour of a M1 Abrams.
Certainly, nothing at the time could've penetrated M1 front armour, but skirts and side armour even of the latest tanks are vulnerable to WW2 era weapons.
It would've been a universally correct decision for a tank force commander to push for flanking attacks, envelopments, and close up skirmishes, rather than allowing a superior force engage them in a frontal attack from outside of their return fire range.
Iraqi army did few lacklustre offensive attempts, with January 29 attack by their 5th Iraqi mechanised being the most serious one, but still botched. From then on, their morale collapsed, and it was a turkey shoot.
I was saying that if US were to attack a force with WW2 era level of preparedness, experience, and tactics, they could've taken more losses.
if US were to attack a force with WW2 era level of preparedness, experience, and tactics, they could've taken more losses.
It would have still been difficult for the Iraqis to do much. The Iraqi T-72 tanks (the best they had) didn't include night vision systems. Also the M1 could engage far outside of T-72 effective range.
Preparedness and tactics go a long way. But the equipment disparity was overwhelming.
It would have still been difficult for the Iraqis to do much. The Iraqi T-72 tanks (the best they had) didn't include night vision systems. Also the M1 could engage far outside of T-72 effective range.
Preparedness and tactics go a long way. But the equipment disparity was overwhelming.
Drones will change the equation I think for small state actors. You just need minimally capable drones to win economic exchanges (I lose 1000 $1000 drones to destroy your $25,000,000 plane/tank, I win).
The US will probably develop some countermeasures, but so much of the military complex is invested in impressive looking tanks/aircraft/ships and will have substantial political inertia.
The surface Navy is practically obsolete. They are deploying laser point defense that allegedly doesn't suck, but that won't stop a fleet of 1000 drone subs that just need one or two torpedos to hit, or a barrage of antiship missles.
If the US doesn't sell, other NATO countries and Russia/China will.
Radio jamming won't stop laser mesh network communication. They can lie in wait in bushes and activate right under forces.
At least if modern warfare (conventional) devolves into starcraft-esque massive drone vs drone flotilla conflicts, it might cut down on human troop life loss, and maybe even "collateral damage".
But that never seems to happen.
The US will probably develop some countermeasures, but so much of the military complex is invested in impressive looking tanks/aircraft/ships and will have substantial political inertia.
The surface Navy is practically obsolete. They are deploying laser point defense that allegedly doesn't suck, but that won't stop a fleet of 1000 drone subs that just need one or two torpedos to hit, or a barrage of antiship missles.
If the US doesn't sell, other NATO countries and Russia/China will.
Radio jamming won't stop laser mesh network communication. They can lie in wait in bushes and activate right under forces.
At least if modern warfare (conventional) devolves into starcraft-esque massive drone vs drone flotilla conflicts, it might cut down on human troop life loss, and maybe even "collateral damage".
But that never seems to happen.
Agree that we should have a serious discussion about our navy. Really have doubts about the utility, other than being huge (symbolic) symbols of power. But perhaps due to their size they will be able to mount significant countermeasures.
>>Basically, in the Gulf wars, the US took out the iraqi airforce in no time and after that basically tanks rolled in pretty much without opposition. I don't think any US tanks were lost at all. Much of the conventional troops ended up surrendering.
Smart men. No doubt US psy-opps played a part, they must've understood weeks ahead and talked among themselves that it is over, and no worth dying for Saddam (who is not even in our tribe :)) . No doubt top Generals were probably contacted offered X and Y if they surrendered. Giving a General a suitcase of cash is much cheaper than the bullets spent, without adding equipment and lives lost.
Smart men. No doubt US psy-opps played a part, they must've understood weeks ahead and talked among themselves that it is over, and no worth dying for Saddam (who is not even in our tribe :)) . No doubt top Generals were probably contacted offered X and Y if they surrendered. Giving a General a suitcase of cash is much cheaper than the bullets spent, without adding equipment and lives lost.
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Ethiopia vs Eritrea, or some of the other African wars come to mind as peer-vs-peer competitions.
Maybe India vs China in the 60s.
Maybe India vs China in the 60s.
Re: drone + artillery, do you have a link to more details? That accuracy look pretty crazy for first shot hits. I was under the impression that 10s of meters was state of the art for indirect fire. Is the drone acting as FO for very high precision artillery fire with GLONAS/GPS guidance? Or is it actively targeting (laser etc) for terminal guidance of the shells?
> Or is it actively targeting (laser etc) for terminal guidance of the shells?
Seems like that is the case, yes, at least from what I could read on the wiki page I linked in a comment above [1]
> drone + artillery, do you have a link to more details?
Not necessarily what you asked for but this targeted Google search [2] (which is in fact a /r/syriancivilwar search) can give you an idea of what the Russian implementation of this technology can do (I didn't catch the name of the Turkish/NATO implementation of it on the other side).
Looking at this tweet [3] from 2 days ago it seems that the technology has evolved quite rapidly, that poster is linking to a tweet from late 2017 when the Russians were still in the early test phase of it all. [4]
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krasnopol_(weapon_system)
[2] https://www.google.com/search?ei=DcV4XoXYLrGhmwXRoZ_oBg&q=Kr...
[3] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1241088031974662149
[4] https://twitter.com/warsmonitoring/status/931856689309110272
Seems like that is the case, yes, at least from what I could read on the wiki page I linked in a comment above [1]
> drone + artillery, do you have a link to more details?
Not necessarily what you asked for but this targeted Google search [2] (which is in fact a /r/syriancivilwar search) can give you an idea of what the Russian implementation of this technology can do (I didn't catch the name of the Turkish/NATO implementation of it on the other side).
Looking at this tweet [3] from 2 days ago it seems that the technology has evolved quite rapidly, that poster is linking to a tweet from late 2017 when the Russians were still in the early test phase of it all. [4]
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krasnopol_(weapon_system)
[2] https://www.google.com/search?ei=DcV4XoXYLrGhmwXRoZ_oBg&q=Kr...
[3] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1241088031974662149
[4] https://twitter.com/warsmonitoring/status/931856689309110272
> I was under the impression that 10s of meters was state of the art for indirect fire.
GLMRS [0] - 'the 70km sniper' - is a precision indirect fire weapon.
[0] https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/uk-complex-weapons/guided-mul...
GLMRS [0] - 'the 70km sniper' - is a precision indirect fire weapon.
[0] https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/uk-complex-weapons/guided-mul...
It is a combination of all: firing computers, GPS and high-res terrain maps allows artillery to shoot more accurately, drones to do corrections, there are a number of guided (and extremely expensive) artillery shells with various guidance systems.
Worth mentioning that the Russian Krasnopol does not use GLONASS (and I guess not high-res terrain maps either), which makes it less expensive compared to its NATO equivalents. From this page [1]:
> A single Krasnopol shell costs around $35 000. That's significantly less that the cost of a single US GPS-guided Excalibur. Although the Excalibur has nearly twice the range and is more reliable.
Couldn't quickly find the cost for a single Excalibur shell, maybe someone else can fill in the information.
[1] http://www.military-today.com/artillery/krasnopol.htm
> A single Krasnopol shell costs around $35 000. That's significantly less that the cost of a single US GPS-guided Excalibur. Although the Excalibur has nearly twice the range and is more reliable.
Couldn't quickly find the cost for a single Excalibur shell, maybe someone else can fill in the information.
[1] http://www.military-today.com/artillery/krasnopol.htm
Artillery must be guided to do that correct?
The link isn't loading, but: recently I was reading about the Mongol Empire (started circa ±1200) and how their military tactics were extremely innovative for the time, specifically for their method of operating as separate, independent units across vast distances. Apparently, this method of warfare was ignored for hundreds of years and only came into use again when mechanized transports (like tanks) became widely adopted. The Soviets developed this into "Deep Battle" which was extensively used on the Eastern Front during WW2.
Deep Battle doctrine bore a heavy resemblance to Mongol strategic methods, substituting tanks, motorized troop carriers, artillery, and airplanes for Mongol horse archers, lancers, and field artillery. The Red Army even went so far as to copy Subutai's use of smokescreens on the battlefield to cover troop movements.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subutai#Legacy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_operation
Deep Battle doctrine bore a heavy resemblance to Mongol strategic methods, substituting tanks, motorized troop carriers, artillery, and airplanes for Mongol horse archers, lancers, and field artillery. The Red Army even went so far as to copy Subutai's use of smokescreens on the battlefield to cover troop movements.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subutai#Legacy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_operation
Also:
> Though unknown to the west for many centuries, Subutai's exploits were first featured by the British military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart in his book Great Captains Unveiled after World War I. Liddell Hart used the example of the Mongols under Genghis and Subutai to demonstrate how a new mechanized army could ideally fight using the principles of mobility, dispersion, surprise, and indirect means. Though he gained little support in Britain, Liddell Hart's books were read in Germany, whose armies during the initial 1940–41 invasions of France and Russia bore an astonishing similarity to the campaigns of Subutai, 700 years earlier. In particular, Erwin Rommel and George Patton were avid students of Mongol campaigns
> Though unknown to the west for many centuries, Subutai's exploits were first featured by the British military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart in his book Great Captains Unveiled after World War I. Liddell Hart used the example of the Mongols under Genghis and Subutai to demonstrate how a new mechanized army could ideally fight using the principles of mobility, dispersion, surprise, and indirect means. Though he gained little support in Britain, Liddell Hart's books were read in Germany, whose armies during the initial 1940–41 invasions of France and Russia bore an astonishing similarity to the campaigns of Subutai, 700 years earlier. In particular, Erwin Rommel and George Patton were avid students of Mongol campaigns
Not sure that the statement about him getting little support in Britain is correct. The British Army was fully mechanized in 1939, even infantry regiments had plenty of Universal Carriers [1] to help move supplies around. The German Army was still using horses in 1945.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Carrier
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Carrier
Everyone was using horses in 1945. Only the US, who got into the war late, and who had a massive industrial base, showed up heavily motorized.
The Brits ended up motorized mostly because of 1) the US supplying them, and 2) they left many of their horses on the continent when they pulled back from Dunkirk. The US sent tons of jeeps to the USSR too.
The Brits ended up motorized mostly because of 1) the US supplying them, and 2) they left many of their horses on the continent when they pulled back from Dunkirk. The US sent tons of jeeps to the USSR too.
The British Army wasn't using horses in 1940 so didn't leave them at Dunkirk.
Why would an innovation like this go ignored for so incredibly long?
It requires significant mobility and logistics to achieve: every Mongol had horses and could live off the land, but armies between them and WWII relied on infantry and artillery who required long logistical trains. It wasn't until mechanization that the Mongol's strategies could be replicated.
The wonderfully-titled (and wonderfully written) Collection of Unmitigated Pedantry covered some of the unique and hard to copy advantages specific to the Mongols. As you point out, logistics has as much to do with it as fighting tactics.
They're covered here in part 4 of a longer series, just scroll down a bit. https://acoup.blog/2020/02/28/collections-the-fremen-mirage-...
They're covered here in part 4 of a longer series, just scroll down a bit. https://acoup.blog/2020/02/28/collections-the-fremen-mirage-...
Yep, I was reading his "Gondor heavy infantry kit review" last night, and almost quoted it in my last comment as to why the Mongols could produce such an effective fighting force and subsequent societies couldn't: "every army is a battlefield instantiation of the society that created it."
Are tanks the new battleship? It seems to me that the heavily armored, heavily armed, slow vehicles are no longer a match for the fast-paced and dynamic modern warfare. They are sitting ducks for attack helicopters, jets and well-coordinated infantry teams.
Interesting read by the way. It's crazy to see what sort of smart inventions are created in this arms race between David and Goliath.
Interesting read by the way. It's crazy to see what sort of smart inventions are created in this arms race between David and Goliath.
Helicopters are a bit fragile and don't forget that tanks will engage at 1k plus yards.
Using tanks for COIN and FIBU is quite different
Using tanks for COIN and FIBU is quite different
> tanks will engage at 1k plus yards
More like 3 km. They've had kills out to 4 km.
More like 3 km. They've had kills out to 4 km.
COIN = counter-insurgency?
FIBU = ?
FIBU = ?
FIBUA = Fighting In Built-up Areas
Apparently that's the official British Army term. The unofficial term is FISH, which stands for Fighting In Someone's House.
Should also be called a war crime.
Opps I should have said - its also known as Fish And Chips in the UK.
Fighting In Someone's House, and Causing Havoc In Public Spaces.
Fighting In Someone's House, and Causing Havoc In Public Spaces.
Fighting In Built Up areas?
APS has given tanks a new lease on life. Not sure whether it would work against aerial threats/projectiles though.
A case has been made for lightly armoured vehicles (like the Jackal) to be fitted sith TOWs and Javelins.
It would run circles around any MBT, easier to maintain, and cheaper.
Not that I would want to sit in an urban ambush, but as a tank killer, why not?
It would run circles around any MBT, easier to maintain, and cheaper.
Not that I would want to sit in an urban ambush, but as a tank killer, why not?
You're thinking of infantry fighting vehicles. During the first Gulf War M2 Bradleys destroyed more Iraqi tanks than Coalition tanks did.
> It would run circles around any MBT, easier to maintain, and cheaper.
That's the idea, but in practice lightly armored IFVs were too vulnerable to guerrilla warfare tactics or technicals, so they have mostly evolved to be more like tanks or in some cases literally based on tank chassis.
> It would run circles around any MBT, easier to maintain, and cheaper.
That's the idea, but in practice lightly armored IFVs were too vulnerable to guerrilla warfare tactics or technicals, so they have mostly evolved to be more like tanks or in some cases literally based on tank chassis.
I mean even lighter than IFVs. Literally something like a Jackal (MWMIK).
War is Boring, The War Nerd or some other outlet expanded upon this idea a few years back. Based on long range desert patrols used by the Brits in WW2, later in Oman, and then in the Gulf Wars. Only works in mostly symmetrical theatres and in specific environments. Hunting Desert Foxes for example.
> too vulnerable to guerrilla warfare tactics or technicals
Yes. Probably not for clearing a Baghdad street. Of course, some genius will apply the same tactics to Urban areas. Because it's cheap and readily available. And see his soldiers shredded. A bit like the Land Rover Snatch.
War is Boring, The War Nerd or some other outlet expanded upon this idea a few years back. Based on long range desert patrols used by the Brits in WW2, later in Oman, and then in the Gulf Wars. Only works in mostly symmetrical theatres and in specific environments. Hunting Desert Foxes for example.
> too vulnerable to guerrilla warfare tactics or technicals
Yes. Probably not for clearing a Baghdad street. Of course, some genius will apply the same tactics to Urban areas. Because it's cheap and readily available. And see his soldiers shredded. A bit like the Land Rover Snatch.
Related - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXQ2lO3ieBA
(literally a story about how a light personnel carrier became a pseudo-MBT)
(literally a story about how a light personnel carrier became a pseudo-MBT)
A M1A2 main battle tank can travel at 40mph or 30mph offroad. If you know where one is and then lose track it can be 600 miles away from where you thought it was within 24 hours. If you saw the tank in Paris it could show up as far away as Prague or Madrid the next day.
They aren't that slow.
They aren't that slow.
1000km (600m) is a long way to go in a metal box. And you’d need to carry fuel, spare parts, and ammo. Tanks are vulnerable without infantry, so better have them there too. Tracks are very inefficient (and can tear up roads), so it’s better to load them on to trains or lorries.
It’s not just a tank. It’s all the logistics that go in to supporting one.
It’s not just a tank. It’s all the logistics that go in to supporting one.
One of SOE's achievements around D-Day was introducing abrasive materials into the axle bearings of the trank transporters for the SS Das Reich division - they were stationed in the south of France and had to try to make their own way there rather than using transporters - which fortunately didn't go well.
An entire division of experienced and well equipped troops pretty much neutralised with some gritty powder in the right places....
An entire division of experienced and well equipped troops pretty much neutralised with some gritty powder in the right places....
A tank is not just the individual tank like it was in ww1 - its the complete weapon system plus its supporting arms
Um I suspect that's the official speed the actual speed would be classified I know people who where passed by chieftains on Salisbury plain going >50mph in the 70's
With the M1A2 engine governor removed, speeds of around 60 mph (97 km/h) are possible on an improved surface; however, damage to the drivetrain (especially to the tracks) and an increased risk of injuries to the crew can occur at speeds above 45 mph (72 km/h).
But what is the MTBF? What is the chance that a unit can keep all of its tanks running without stopping for 600 miles?
Yes and no. I'd argue that just because there are good counters to a particular weapon system doesn't necessarily mean the system is obsolete: jets aren't made obsolete by SAMs for example. It will change the dynamic, though. The US seems to bank on achieving air superiority, so the vast majority of helicopters or jets would be intercepted. The other option, favored by Soviet doctrine, is to have lots of short range air defense vehicles deployed alongside the tanks. As for infantry teams or ATGM-equipped vehicles, there are options. You've got active protection systems, which could develop all the way to some sort of mini-CIWS. But there's also a question of targeting. Sure, those ATGMs can engage tanks at 8+km, but you need to find and target the tank first. I think you'll start to see a cat-and-mouse game: vehicle stealth, better optics and sensors, active radar, ISR teams and drones, anti-UAV weapons, etc. I think tanks will still play a major role, but that role may shift and they will likely need to work in tandem with other vehicles.
Actually, on that note I think in the next decade we'll see work on developing unmanned tanks, which I personally think will be a major game changer. A large portion of the internal volume of a tank is for the crew. Remove the crew and you can significantly reduce the volume of the tank, reducing the surface area, so you can provide the same amount of protection with much less armor by weight. You can get an unmanned vehicle with the same armor and firepower of a main battle tank with half the weight and significantly reduced size. There would be some trade offs (an unmanned system will necessarily have worse situational awareness, so the tank would probably need to operate alongside infantry teams or a manned vehicle) but I think that will help keep tanks on the battlefield for decades to come
Actually, on that note I think in the next decade we'll see work on developing unmanned tanks, which I personally think will be a major game changer. A large portion of the internal volume of a tank is for the crew. Remove the crew and you can significantly reduce the volume of the tank, reducing the surface area, so you can provide the same amount of protection with much less armor by weight. You can get an unmanned vehicle with the same armor and firepower of a main battle tank with half the weight and significantly reduced size. There would be some trade offs (an unmanned system will necessarily have worse situational awareness, so the tank would probably need to operate alongside infantry teams or a manned vehicle) but I think that will help keep tanks on the battlefield for decades to come
>unmanned tanks
The Russian T14 Armata[1] is a strong nod in that direction. The turret is unmanned and fully automatic; the crew of 3 is hosted in a well protected capsule in the front hull.
This ensures both low top weight & visibility, just as well as improved survivability for the crew.
--
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-14_Armata
The Russian T14 Armata[1] is a strong nod in that direction. The turret is unmanned and fully automatic; the crew of 3 is hosted in a well protected capsule in the front hull.
This ensures both low top weight & visibility, just as well as improved survivability for the crew.
--
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-14_Armata
Very true, Soviet (and now Russian) doctrine has long prioritized a lower weight and size. The Soviets were (I believe) the first to use an automatic loader for the gun to reduce the crew size from 4 to 3, and thus reduce the tank's size and weight. Soviet tanks are consistently in the 45 ton range as a result, while Western tanks tend to be over 60 tons, and tend to lack autoloaders (a notable exception is the French Leclerc). Soviet doctrine called for tanks to be smaller to present a smaller target, and provide better operational mobility. For example, there were many bridges in Warsaw pact countries designed so that a T-72 tank could cross, but a heavier Western tank would cause the bridge to collapse. Western doctrine, on the other hand, tends to eschew the idea of an autoloader for a variety of reasons. Historically, the problems with an autoloader are reduced survivability (having all the tank rounds together in a carousel or conveyor system means if the tank is penetrated all the rounds could cook off and kill everyone) and I believe earlier autoloaders offered worse performance than a skilled human loaders. Autoloaders have since improved in performance and survivability, but the other reason Western doctrine has discouraged the idea of using an autoloader is the reduced situational awareness from losing a crew member. Whenever the loader isn't actually loading, they are an extra pair of eyes that can be looking for targets or potential threats. There's a decent explanation of all this here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0x-8NheU1E
I think that will be the biggest challenge with unmanned armored vehicles, the reduced situational awareness. You can put all the cameras you want on the tops of the tank, a remote operator will have to deal with the limited bandwidth (can't have full 60fps 4K resolution in 360 degrees simultaneously on a satellite link) and increased latency. At first this can be helped by using it as a fire support vehicle for infantry, where the infantry can be their eyes and ears. Eventually there can be enhanced automation to help reduce the workload of remote operators (not automatically firing, but having the system continuously scan around it and tracking the movement of all visible people and vehicles so the operator doesn't have to) and fusing that data with that of other tanks and even UAVs overhead.
I think that will be the biggest challenge with unmanned armored vehicles, the reduced situational awareness. You can put all the cameras you want on the tops of the tank, a remote operator will have to deal with the limited bandwidth (can't have full 60fps 4K resolution in 360 degrees simultaneously on a satellite link) and increased latency. At first this can be helped by using it as a fire support vehicle for infantry, where the infantry can be their eyes and ears. Eventually there can be enhanced automation to help reduce the workload of remote operators (not automatically firing, but having the system continuously scan around it and tracking the movement of all visible people and vehicles so the operator doesn't have to) and fusing that data with that of other tanks and even UAVs overhead.
Swedish S tank had an autoloader, which came out a few years before the first T-72.
True, though I believe the T-64 preceded even the S-tank, and I believe the T-64 was the first production tank to have an autoloader. As an aside for those you aren't familiar with the Strv 103 (also called the S tank) it's a particularly interesting tank: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stridsvagn_103 . It is the only main battle tank to have no turret!
Ah, I had forgotten about the T-64 since it was never exported. Looks like it entered service with the GSFG in 1976 after development started in 1967. So the Strv 103 preceded it by just a few years. For the Soviets, the T-64 was quite an expensive tank.
Keith Laumer did some interesting takes on this in his Bolo stories.
A well trained tank crew in a modern tank that is part of a layered defense or offense is going to be a useful tool for a very long time.
Remove any one of those components, and tanks are sitting ducks.
Remove any one of those components, and tanks are sitting ducks.
Am I the only one that is absolutely disgusted by violence, yet absolutely loves reading articles such as this?
I'm so with you. I hate the function these are designed for, but it's so satisfying seeing such deeply-functional engineering. Like some kind of weird problem-solving porn.
If you get excited by this topic, I suggest you give War Thunder a try.
The game has horrible UX, but:
1. The game does the best (?) job I've seen of any game at simulating a wide variety of historical vehicles, shells, and armor.
2. The game has a low barrier to entry: no fast twitch reactions, and slow gameplay.
3. It has a fairly fun meta to improve within.
4. The community loosely associated around it can be both fun and informative: PhlyDaily, The Chieftain's Hatch, RedEffect, Potential History, and Lindybeige
The game has horrible UX, but:
1. The game does the best (?) job I've seen of any game at simulating a wide variety of historical vehicles, shells, and armor.
2. The game has a low barrier to entry: no fast twitch reactions, and slow gameplay.
3. It has a fairly fun meta to improve within.
4. The community loosely associated around it can be both fun and informative: PhlyDaily, The Chieftain's Hatch, RedEffect, Potential History, and Lindybeige
Its easy to imagine smarter missiles that have multiple independent warheads and contain jammers and attempt to fly around to approach from vulnerable angles etc.
Its also easier to imagine infantry falling back on indirect fire, where they identify targets for artillery and aircraft.
RPGs etc made cheaply-equipped soldiers able to take on expensive tanks. But now extremely expensive tanks are becoming immune to them, and the next step for soldiers is also expensive.
Its also easier to imagine infantry falling back on indirect fire, where they identify targets for artillery and aircraft.
RPGs etc made cheaply-equipped soldiers able to take on expensive tanks. But now extremely expensive tanks are becoming immune to them, and the next step for soldiers is also expensive.
In ww2 the tactical doctrine for German troops was to engage with three PanzerFaust teams two missiles would be fired initially with the most experienced team held back.
And Russian response in Berlin 1945 was simply take as many spring beds from German homes as available and weld them to the armour. Crude but totaly effective against PanzerFaust.
Similar approaches were / are used to protect against RPGs in Iraq. Literally just welding metal slats to the front to cause them to go off before hitting armor.
The goal of slat armour isn't to detonate the RPG, as the jet from the shaped charge will easily penetrate even with the extra ~50cm of space. In WW2 some US tank crews tried to protect their tanks by piling sandbags on them, but the extra spacing actually made Panzerfausts more effective as the armour piercing jet had more space to fully form before hitting metal.
The goal with the slats is to catch and mangle the incoming warhead, so that it either fails to detonate, or doesn't form the penetrating jet.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q7BupgOgXd4
The goal with the slats is to catch and mangle the incoming warhead, so that it either fails to detonate, or doesn't form the penetrating jet.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q7BupgOgXd4
I recently read an excellent account of what things were like as a British tank commander in 1994 & 1945 from Normandy onwards - "grim" doesn't do it justice. Imagine as a 19 year old commander of 4 tank platoon being told that your life expectancy was two weeks!
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/30145506-tank-action
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/30145506-tank-action
I saw an interesting talk about Soviet WW2 tanks [1] and one of the things it said was the Soviets had done research and determined that a tank survives an average of 14 hours in combat, and in its entire life only needed an engine and transmission able to drive 1500 km
[1] https://youtu.be/N6xLMUifbxQ?t=2321
[1] https://youtu.be/N6xLMUifbxQ?t=2321
How about fooling the APS into firing at duds until its munitions are depleted and then shooting a rocket? Like a series of high caliber, slower moving projectiles made out of something super radar reflective at reflective angles?
While you're standing around, firing blanks at the tank, how do you expect the tank will react to you?
It will, ah, be highly incentivised to shoot back. And it won't be shooting at you with blanks.
Pretty much all the tactics listed in TFA seem to be desperation moves.
It will, ah, be highly incentivised to shoot back. And it won't be shooting at you with blanks.
Pretty much all the tactics listed in TFA seem to be desperation moves.
Hmmm... basically just setting off blasting caps and model rockets with enough uumph to trip the artillery radars.
https://web.archive.org/web/20200323100053/https://mwi.usma....
And some amazing videos of the Trophy APS system mentioned in the article doing their thing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6aA9HsmLHBQ
And some amazing videos of the Trophy APS system mentioned in the article doing their thing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6aA9HsmLHBQ
Trophy is amazing, but it has it's limitations. It limits friendly infantry from getting close, and still get saturated and in need of recharge.
War is nasty, although the rate of invention during world war was impressive. Rocket technology really improved as everyone was trying to figure out how to make better missiles. Same with jet engines and submarines. Computation, Cryptography also got major upgrades.
When things get scarce, the only natural solution is to fight it out. Natural selection is very mean and nasty.
When things get scarce, the only natural solution is to fight it out. Natural selection is very mean and nasty.
I served in a light-infantry battalion, specifically in our heavy-weapons company. Most of the doctrine is available publicly. For a heavy weapons company, see Appendix D of https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN6672...
Going against tanks as an infantry unit is a tough spot. Tanks are significantly faster, more lethal, and harder to kill than any light-infantry unit. In a defense, light infantry uses engagement area development to attempt to even the odds. Engagement area development is similar to building a defense in depth. A quick summary:
0. Analyze the enemy composition and disposition to determine likely avenues of approach. After that, build your engagement areas on those approaches.
1. When the enemy is far away, attempt to disrupt or turn their movement into the engagement area. This is typically a combination of scouts, artillery, or obstacles to channel the enemy into the engagement area.
2. Once the enemy is in the engagement area, keep them there (fix) as long as possible. Use priority targets and sectors of fire to efficiently concentrate fires on the most valuable targets which almost certainly includes tanks.
3. Finally, you block the enemy with obstacles to move to secondary positions.
The author's first tactic of a trial shot of engaging at range is part of step 1. The goal is to force the enemy to change their movement, slow them down, or disable the active protection measures. This is a bit more difficult with a TOW missile than with a Javelin. Modern tanks will auto-rotate if you laser range find them directly. Since a tank round travels significantly faster than a TOW missile, a tank can kill you before the TOW missile reaches them. Since a TOW is guided by an operator via a wire, the missle with then miss.
The second tactic of multiple missiles would go in step 2. To avoid firing excessive missiles at targets, one technique is to "shard" the engagement area so subordinate units are responsible for parts of it.
The third tactic of using grenade launchers and mortars is questionable. We were taught that tanks are basically invulnerable to indirect fire (mortars and artillery). I don't think a 60mm mortar would have any significant effect on a tank unless you score a direct hit. The precision on indirect fire isn't good enough to directly hit a tank. Hoping to trigger the tank's active defense measure is a long shot. Also, if you're using a M320 grenade launcher with a max effective range of 320m against a tank, you're going to die soon unless you have some other significant advantage like urban terrain. The MK19 automatic grenade launcher is a much better weapon for trying to prematurely damage the tank's defense with a range of 1500m.
Going against tanks as an infantry unit is a tough spot. Tanks are significantly faster, more lethal, and harder to kill than any light-infantry unit. In a defense, light infantry uses engagement area development to attempt to even the odds. Engagement area development is similar to building a defense in depth. A quick summary:
0. Analyze the enemy composition and disposition to determine likely avenues of approach. After that, build your engagement areas on those approaches.
1. When the enemy is far away, attempt to disrupt or turn their movement into the engagement area. This is typically a combination of scouts, artillery, or obstacles to channel the enemy into the engagement area.
2. Once the enemy is in the engagement area, keep them there (fix) as long as possible. Use priority targets and sectors of fire to efficiently concentrate fires on the most valuable targets which almost certainly includes tanks.
3. Finally, you block the enemy with obstacles to move to secondary positions.
The author's first tactic of a trial shot of engaging at range is part of step 1. The goal is to force the enemy to change their movement, slow them down, or disable the active protection measures. This is a bit more difficult with a TOW missile than with a Javelin. Modern tanks will auto-rotate if you laser range find them directly. Since a tank round travels significantly faster than a TOW missile, a tank can kill you before the TOW missile reaches them. Since a TOW is guided by an operator via a wire, the missle with then miss.
The second tactic of multiple missiles would go in step 2. To avoid firing excessive missiles at targets, one technique is to "shard" the engagement area so subordinate units are responsible for parts of it.
The third tactic of using grenade launchers and mortars is questionable. We were taught that tanks are basically invulnerable to indirect fire (mortars and artillery). I don't think a 60mm mortar would have any significant effect on a tank unless you score a direct hit. The precision on indirect fire isn't good enough to directly hit a tank. Hoping to trigger the tank's active defense measure is a long shot. Also, if you're using a M320 grenade launcher with a max effective range of 320m against a tank, you're going to die soon unless you have some other significant advantage like urban terrain. The MK19 automatic grenade launcher is a much better weapon for trying to prematurely damage the tank's defense with a range of 1500m.
War is stupid.
Maybe so, but can you please stop posting unsubstantive comments here? We're trying for a different sort of forum.
https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html
https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html
sure let’s talk about how important military spending is while the global economy has come to a halt because of a virus and the advanced nations are crying for help.
Yeah, but can we quarantine war? People are dying out there, and we can't even get to people to stop going out to the bars! And you want to stop wars?
What does spending on military $600B/y get you? Capability of winning wars? America has not won a war since WW2. National security? Think about 9/11. Geopolitical influence? See the middle east mess. Economic wealth? Well if you invested a trillion per year in any sector of the economy you would have spurred economic activity of similar magnitude with the defense sector, that could actually have some benefits for the society, e.g. proper healthcare.
Military spending is what keeps US economy afloat; the rest is just peanuts by comparison.
It is government spending anyway. Even if they were throwing the same money to subsidize football or ballet dancing, the benefits for the economy would be almost identical.
Btw how many wars did the USA win due to its huge military spending? Oh yes, the number is exactly zero.
Btw how many wars did the USA win due to its huge military spending? Oh yes, the number is exactly zero.
Tanks are by definition not a defensive weapon. If they are not advancing onto an enemy strongpoint during war, they are being wasted.
USSR had a plan to move 20000 tanks and 80000 units of support armour into Europe all at once with a very idea that no low intensity aerial, mine warfare or guerrilla anti-tank campaign can stop it all before all airfields and commando bases are overwhelmed.
USSR had a plan to move 20000 tanks and 80000 units of support armour into Europe all at once with a very idea that no low intensity aerial, mine warfare or guerrilla anti-tank campaign can stop it all before all airfields and commando bases are overwhelmed.
That's why we had tactical nukes ready to go to try to counter that threat
Try nuking 100000 units of armour
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fulda_Gap
Not that hard to nuke the passage that they'd be forced to take for a land invasion. That was NATO planning in the 60s and 70s
Not that hard to nuke the passage that they'd be forced to take for a land invasion. That was NATO planning in the 60s and 70s
A one way trip - there was no planed way of retreating from that what I recall
Yes, that was the plan.
To force nato into the most costly trades possible, early on.
They wanted to force nato to field their heaviest military assets to the frontlines at the time when nuclear rockets will be flying left and right.
And they would attack over very wide fronts for the first few days, before they concentrate their forces, thus concealing their breakthrough trajectory until the most costly trades are done.
To force nato into the most costly trades possible, early on.
They wanted to force nato to field their heaviest military assets to the frontlines at the time when nuclear rockets will be flying left and right.
And they would attack over very wide fronts for the first few days, before they concentrate their forces, thus concealing their breakthrough trajectory until the most costly trades are done.
It's WW3, mang. If this is going down then chances are nukes are on the table too -- so go all in.
After the surrender, when the Serbs drove their undamaged tanks home, the "look how many you missed" attitude missed the point. They were undamaged because they had effectively suppressed, and hidden in underground car parks, etc.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_bombing_of_Yugoslavia