The Problem of Colour(blog.oup.com)
blog.oup.com
The Problem of Colour
https://blog.oup.com/2017/12/problem-of-colour/
78 comments
Dispositional properties are just as difficult metaphysically than any other type of property.
What's an example of an object property that is philosophically or metaphysically straightforward?
I'm not sure about straightforward but, as an example, temperature seems simpler than colour.
Not so fast. By the time you rope in the notions of absolute zero, entropy, and Maxwell's demon, you could kick up enough dust to keep a whole stable of grad students busy.
These debates are less about a clear and present problem, than a mode of inquiry asking to look again at something "familiar" in a different way.
These debates are less about a clear and present problem, than a mode of inquiry asking to look again at something "familiar" in a different way.
Partly I'm playing devil's advocate here, as I'm sure there is a good answer... Can you give me an example of a useful, positive contribution that metaphysics and/or philosophy (I confess I don't know what the distinction is between them) have contributed to these topics?
For example, ancient Greek philosophers made many speculations about the nature of atoms, and in some ways their guesses were correct, but I don't think that speculation was especially fruitful. But their advances in geometry and number theory were tremendously productive.
For example, ancient Greek philosophers made many speculations about the nature of atoms, and in some ways their guesses were correct, but I don't think that speculation was especially fruitful. But their advances in geometry and number theory were tremendously productive.
> For example, ancient Greek philosophers made many speculations about the nature of atoms, and in some ways their guesses were correct, but I don't think that speculation was especially fruitful.
In terms of finding the actual answer (at least to the extent that we know the answer), it probably wasn't; but, in terms of suggesting that the question was one that had an answer, I think it was enormously fruitful. Leon Lederman's wonderful book "The God particle" persuasively (if perhaps slightly tongue-in-cheek?) argues a very direct intellectual through-line from the Greek analyses to (then-)current particle physics.
(Having said this, my personal feeling is that philosophy has done its part by expanding the scope of scientific inquiry, but probably doesn't have much to add to modern-day scientific discourse; but, then again, I am a scientist, and so am pre-disposed to believe in the primacy and importance of my discipline.)
In terms of finding the actual answer (at least to the extent that we know the answer), it probably wasn't; but, in terms of suggesting that the question was one that had an answer, I think it was enormously fruitful. Leon Lederman's wonderful book "The God particle" persuasively (if perhaps slightly tongue-in-cheek?) argues a very direct intellectual through-line from the Greek analyses to (then-)current particle physics.
(Having said this, my personal feeling is that philosophy has done its part by expanding the scope of scientific inquiry, but probably doesn't have much to add to modern-day scientific discourse; but, then again, I am a scientist, and so am pre-disposed to believe in the primacy and importance of my discipline.)
> I'm not sure about straightforward but, as an example, temperature seems simpler than colour.
At least physically, this seems wrong to me. Temperature is an emergent property of systems—there is no such thing as the temperature of an isolated particle—whereas (as spectral analysis shows) even individual atoms have colour.
At least physically, this seems wrong to me. Temperature is an emergent property of systems—there is no such thing as the temperature of an isolated particle—whereas (as spectral analysis shows) even individual atoms have colour.
2% of the population perceive a 4th primary color.
Do you know what it looks like?
Can you imagine what it looks like?
Can Maxwell's equations predict what it looks like?I think what's needed to help us imagine that is art and literature, not philosophy.
Biologists hypothesize that Mantis shrimps perceive 12 primary colors. Do you expect a sea creature the size of my fist to share art and literature about its inner experience?
A biologist can explain the workings of the mantis's vision system, an artist can imagine what it might be like to be experience it. What does the philosopher contribute? (I'm not asserting there's no contribution, I'd just like someone to explain what it is.)
The scientist, artist, and philosopher have contributed jack squat. Actually, that's wrong. The scientist has contributed the appearance of knowledge where none exists. I.e. a delusion. The delusion is that modern science understands color. It indeed understands optics, but not color.
The Problem of Color is a subset of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Both are uncharted territory. Maybe one day we'll have a half-decent theory of color. When that day comes, it will probably bud-off and begin a field of study distinct from "philosophy proper". Just like math and science budded-off. In the meantime, the only thing we can do is imagine and philosophize. Because we don't understand how to even investigate the problem, let alone solve it. We're still at the stage analogous to when the Ancient Greeks were debating whether matter is continuous or discrete. "Nobody knows for sure, but matter sure feels continuous to me."
The least we can do is demarcate our ignorance. Which is why blogposts like this exist. So when you (essentially) say "Our current theory of optics sounds perfectly satisfactory", you are defending the delusion the blogpost meant to correct. My two previous comments aren't meant to contribute a theory of color, but to make obvious that optics and color are not the same thing.
The Problem of Color is a subset of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Both are uncharted territory. Maybe one day we'll have a half-decent theory of color. When that day comes, it will probably bud-off and begin a field of study distinct from "philosophy proper". Just like math and science budded-off. In the meantime, the only thing we can do is imagine and philosophize. Because we don't understand how to even investigate the problem, let alone solve it. We're still at the stage analogous to when the Ancient Greeks were debating whether matter is continuous or discrete. "Nobody knows for sure, but matter sure feels continuous to me."
The least we can do is demarcate our ignorance. Which is why blogposts like this exist. So when you (essentially) say "Our current theory of optics sounds perfectly satisfactory", you are defending the delusion the blogpost meant to correct. My two previous comments aren't meant to contribute a theory of color, but to make obvious that optics and color are not the same thing.
The Problem of Color is a subset of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.
That's a good summary of what the article seems to be saying. But I still don't understand the reasoning behind that claim.
I mean, from the article:
But can this really be right? Focus on a colour in your immediate environment and ask yourself whether that could really be only a figment of your mind, or at best radically different from the way it appears.
Yes, obviously? What's the problem?
Somewhat analogously, there's a whole world of scent and pheromones that most animals perceive strongly, but we barely perceive at all. An entire sense that we don't even realise we're missing! I think that's fascinating, but it doesn't lead me to question the nature of reality in any deep philosophical way. Should it?
That's a good summary of what the article seems to be saying. But I still don't understand the reasoning behind that claim.
I mean, from the article:
But can this really be right? Focus on a colour in your immediate environment and ask yourself whether that could really be only a figment of your mind, or at best radically different from the way it appears.
Yes, obviously? What's the problem?
Somewhat analogously, there's a whole world of scent and pheromones that most animals perceive strongly, but we barely perceive at all. An entire sense that we don't even realise we're missing! I think that's fascinating, but it doesn't lead me to question the nature of reality in any deep philosophical way. Should it?
Philosophy divides the mystery of consciousness into two problems. The Soft Problem is "how does the brain compute things?". The Hard Problem is "how does qualia exist?".
The Soft Problem is easy to imagine. Neuroscience will solve it eventually. We may not understand it yet, but we can make a lot of computer analogies and educated guesses. After all, computers are already Philosophical Zombies (someone who passes the Turing Test, yet in no way experiences qualia).
> but it doesn't lead me to question the nature of reality in any deep philosophical way. Should it?
Here's the contention the professionals are currently debating. The Hard Problem challenges our notions of Physicalism (as opposed to say, Dualism). "But souls are dumb, Science says so!".
Extrapolate into the future. Even after Neuroscience solves the brain's circuitry, qualia will remain just as mysterious as ever. E.g. suppose we discover that the hippocampus demultiplexes memories to different parts of the brain. Suppose we learn how to directly manipulate memory. Not only can we fix amnesia, but we can implant false memories. "Hooray, we've solved the Soft Problem!". But we still have no leads on the Hard Problem. A hippocampus doesn't distinguish a Homunculus from a P-Zombie.
Physicalism has been so successful in the sciences, everyone takes its accuracy for granted. I myself consider Physicalism true. But Physicalism is not adequate to explain the Hard Problem. This doesn't mean we have to go back to souls. But it does mean we need to (at least) "spice up" Physicalism, or maybe choose another line of attack, etc if we're ever to crack the Hard Problem.
The Soft Problem is easy to imagine. Neuroscience will solve it eventually. We may not understand it yet, but we can make a lot of computer analogies and educated guesses. After all, computers are already Philosophical Zombies (someone who passes the Turing Test, yet in no way experiences qualia).
> but it doesn't lead me to question the nature of reality in any deep philosophical way. Should it?
Here's the contention the professionals are currently debating. The Hard Problem challenges our notions of Physicalism (as opposed to say, Dualism). "But souls are dumb, Science says so!".
Extrapolate into the future. Even after Neuroscience solves the brain's circuitry, qualia will remain just as mysterious as ever. E.g. suppose we discover that the hippocampus demultiplexes memories to different parts of the brain. Suppose we learn how to directly manipulate memory. Not only can we fix amnesia, but we can implant false memories. "Hooray, we've solved the Soft Problem!". But we still have no leads on the Hard Problem. A hippocampus doesn't distinguish a Homunculus from a P-Zombie.
Physicalism has been so successful in the sciences, everyone takes its accuracy for granted. I myself consider Physicalism true. But Physicalism is not adequate to explain the Hard Problem. This doesn't mean we have to go back to souls. But it does mean we need to (at least) "spice up" Physicalism, or maybe choose another line of attack, etc if we're ever to crack the Hard Problem.
It seems to me that philosophy has made zero progress on the hard problem, other than naming it. Is there any concrete progress, any useful result you can point me at?
Neuroscience and computer science obviously haven't solved it either, but they have at least made some progress in understanding parts of the brain's structure, and gradually reproducing what we thought were uniquely human abilities with mindless computer programs. This suggests that "qualia" may not really be needed to explain consciousness (or at any rate thought); just as Darwin's theories showed why "god" isn't strictly needed to explain the diversity of animal species.
I agree there's still the niggling issue of "but why do I seem to experience stuff? Surely I'm not a mindless automaton!" There's also the problem of "but why does the universe exist in the first place?" But I don't believe philosophers have any particular insight or knowledge to bring to the first problem, any more than theologians have any real inside knowledge of the latter.
Neuroscience and computer science obviously haven't solved it either, but they have at least made some progress in understanding parts of the brain's structure, and gradually reproducing what we thought were uniquely human abilities with mindless computer programs. This suggests that "qualia" may not really be needed to explain consciousness (or at any rate thought); just as Darwin's theories showed why "god" isn't strictly needed to explain the diversity of animal species.
I agree there's still the niggling issue of "but why do I seem to experience stuff? Surely I'm not a mindless automaton!" There's also the problem of "but why does the universe exist in the first place?" But I don't believe philosophers have any particular insight or knowledge to bring to the first problem, any more than theologians have any real inside knowledge of the latter.
Made me think of unrelated but interesting color-related article about gamma correction seen last year on HN : https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12552094
I'm surprised that the article doesn't mention purple, a color that isn't part of the visible spectrum. It's a mixture of blue and red.
I think yellow is also interesting, because it so beautifully exhibits the ambiguity of colors; it does exist in the spectrum as a pure color, but in RGB model it only exists as red-green.
But purple and violet are truly fascinating, the way they help construct a circular color wheel when there is nothing circular about color spectrum.
But purple and violet are truly fascinating, the way they help construct a circular color wheel when there is nothing circular about color spectrum.
The rgb color model is not to be used in science or philosophy, it's useful in computer science because monitors are RGB.
Take a look at the LAB color model. It's defined with three axes; lightness, green–red and blue–yellow.
Yellow has no special meaning in this model.
Take a look at the LAB color model. It's defined with three axes; lightness, green–red and blue–yellow.
Yellow has no special meaning in this model.
The RGB color model has its origin in physiology, to match the three types of color receptors in our eyes.
(The LAB color model also originates from physiological considerations, but on the neurological level, i.e. at least one step after the color receptors.)
(The LAB color model also originates from physiological considerations, but on the neurological level, i.e. at least one step after the color receptors.)
Unfair. We also lack cones for yellow and cyan.
(Except for the tetrachromatic 2%, who experience a 4th primary color where "yellow" ought to be.)
(Except for the tetrachromatic 2%, who experience a 4th primary color where "yellow" ought to be.)
The difference is that the minimal situation needed for magenta/purple is objectively different from the minimal situation needed for yellow. (Assuming reality exists, etc.)
While you could try to engineer a more efficiently yellowness-detector, engineering a better magentaness-detector would be a qualitatively different kind of biological machine.
While you could try to engineer a more efficiently yellowness-detector, engineering a better magentaness-detector would be a qualitatively different kind of biological machine.
Nature has already engineered a dedicated yellow-detector. And it qualitatively differs from what us normies think of as "yellow". Pseudo-yellow is bimodal in the same way that purple is bimodal, while true-yellow is monomodal.
Suppose humans experienced 12 primary colors. Is a combination of the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 12th "on the spectrum" any more than an exclusive combination of the 2nd and 3rd?
Suppose humans experienced 12 primary colors. Is a combination of the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 12th "on the spectrum" any more than an exclusive combination of the 2nd and 3rd?
You're looking in the wrong direction, you can always add a trivial trace of some additional wavelength and have no measurable effect on what people experience. That remains true no matter how many finite sensors you imagine they have. That part is simply not interesting.
What's interesting is differences in the MINIMAL set of physical things that need to be detected to get the experience.
The objective truth is that if I hand you a machine that generates just single wavelengths of photons, you can cause "Normies" to say "yellow" but you can't do the same for "magenta".
That asymmetry remains even when you talk about adding more sensors. You can frequency-shift an R/G/B cone to get a new kind that "peak-triggers when normal people say yellow" but you cannot do the same to create one which "peak-triggers when normal people say magenta". You would need to create a fundamentally different kind of sensor.
What's interesting is differences in the MINIMAL set of physical things that need to be detected to get the experience.
The objective truth is that if I hand you a machine that generates just single wavelengths of photons, you can cause "Normies" to say "yellow" but you can't do the same for "magenta".
That asymmetry remains even when you talk about adding more sensors. You can frequency-shift an R/G/B cone to get a new kind that "peak-triggers when normal people say yellow" but you cannot do the same to create one which "peak-triggers when normal people say magenta". You would need to create a fundamentally different kind of sensor.
You're assuming that yellow is permanently bound to a single particular wavelength. What if it's possible to rebind yellow to a different wavelength? What if it's possible to rebind purple to a single wavelength (rather than dual wavelength)? Color doesn't happen in the eyes, it happens in the brain.
Mirimir wouldn't feel surprised about the absence of purple if they understood color in the context of phenomenology (rather than engineering), which is the spirit in which the post was made.
I understand the difference you are pointing to. It's not a novel or interesting position, it's the default position. If you insist on binding colors to wavelengths, you probably didn't get anything out of the blogpost.
Mirimir wouldn't feel surprised about the absence of purple if they understood color in the context of phenomenology (rather than engineering), which is the spirit in which the post was made.
I understand the difference you are pointing to. It's not a novel or interesting position, it's the default position. If you insist on binding colors to wavelengths, you probably didn't get anything out of the blogpost.
And what does this have to do with colors being spectral? If you look at the cie chromaticity diagram you can see that yellow and cyan have wavelength corresponding to them while purple does not.
You probably think I'm being pedantic. But the point of the article is to conceptually distinguish color from wavelength. If we're going to distiniguish them, we might as go all the way. There's no reason to bind yellow (and cyan) to a single wavelength, while magenta gets special status. All three are secondary colors and all three are composites.
This is important because privileging magenta does not generalize to higher-dimensional color-spaces, and therefore impedes to our understanding of phenomenology.
This is important because privileging magenta does not generalize to higher-dimensional color-spaces, and therefore impedes to our understanding of phenomenology.
The RGB model that is currently used (sRGB) is just an emulation of CRT-displays, it is not how human vision works. There is not actually much conceptual difference between red and yellow.
The model is irrelevant to my point. E.g. Lab and Cieluv may become obsolete if it turns out that we can remap "the bindings between color and wavelength" in our brains as easily as "the bindings between color and wavelength" in our vision libraries. The fact that purple doesn't associate to a wavelength should be a clue that binding the two at all is a mistake, not a clue that purple is exceptional.
Yellow, cyan, and magenta don't correspond to particular wavelengths. They each correspond to a combination of two particular, adjacent wavelengths.
E.g. a "yellow" wavelength is only as bright as its decomposition into red and green. The fact that red & blue aren't adjacent is a red herring.
E.g. a "yellow" wavelength is only as bright as its decomposition into red and green. The fact that red & blue aren't adjacent is a red herring.
Yellow is about 575nm, while cyan is 490nm if this diagram is correct: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:PlanckianLocus.png
Is that a hostile parody of philosophy?
> Focus on a colour in your immediate environment and ask yourself whether that could really be only a figment of your mind, or at best radically different from the way it appears.
That question, which seems to be the bottom line on color before moving to the even more problematic broadening of the issue in the conclusion, is quite lazy; the answer is self-evident yes, and that's true even for traits that the article notes fundamentally do apply to objects (like shape), as anyone who has ever looked through a distorting lens or mirror (or had a visual hallucination) can readily attest.
He “problem”, such as it is, of color is not that a color one perceives might be different from the actual color of the object, but that color is not a property of objects at all, but instead an artifact of compressing information carried by the wavelengths of light impacting the eye to a smaller-dimensonal space, and that even the wavelengths of light that will be received is not purely a trait of the object perceived, but an effect of the combination of several of its traits with features of the environment. But, of courses this isn't a problem for anything out a particular preference for the nature of reality, it's just a well-established fact. At some point our model of reality must be adapted to known facts rather than merely reflecting what we'd prefer to believe.
The ultimate conclusion of the piece goes even further off the rails.
> Moreover, colour is arguably only the thin end of the wedge. One of the reasons why colours are philosophically interesting is that they provide an illustration of general problems that arise in thinking about the “manifest image” of the world, or the world as it appears to us as conscious subjects. It is not just colours that are under threat. Similar problems arise for aesthetic properties like beauty
That beauty is not an inherent property of objects but a subjective response of the observer has been indisputable and widely recognized for much longer than the same is true for color, so that’s a ludicrous thing to point to when claiming color is the thin edge of the wedge.
> for moral properties like right and wrong
Well, yes, this is the philosophically most interesting one, and it's worthy of discussion, but this piece doesn't even begin to be that discussion, or even indirectly illuminate the issue.
> —even for what philosophers have traditionally called “primary qualities” like shape and size.
Well, sure, somethingnsimilar applies there, though the problem there is somewhat different, and connects to the more fundamental problem that the objects to which we apply traits aren't fundamental entities, but arbitrary and subjective divisions of the underlying reality.
> Focus on a colour in your immediate environment and ask yourself whether that could really be only a figment of your mind, or at best radically different from the way it appears.
That question, which seems to be the bottom line on color before moving to the even more problematic broadening of the issue in the conclusion, is quite lazy; the answer is self-evident yes, and that's true even for traits that the article notes fundamentally do apply to objects (like shape), as anyone who has ever looked through a distorting lens or mirror (or had a visual hallucination) can readily attest.
He “problem”, such as it is, of color is not that a color one perceives might be different from the actual color of the object, but that color is not a property of objects at all, but instead an artifact of compressing information carried by the wavelengths of light impacting the eye to a smaller-dimensonal space, and that even the wavelengths of light that will be received is not purely a trait of the object perceived, but an effect of the combination of several of its traits with features of the environment. But, of courses this isn't a problem for anything out a particular preference for the nature of reality, it's just a well-established fact. At some point our model of reality must be adapted to known facts rather than merely reflecting what we'd prefer to believe.
The ultimate conclusion of the piece goes even further off the rails.
> Moreover, colour is arguably only the thin end of the wedge. One of the reasons why colours are philosophically interesting is that they provide an illustration of general problems that arise in thinking about the “manifest image” of the world, or the world as it appears to us as conscious subjects. It is not just colours that are under threat. Similar problems arise for aesthetic properties like beauty
That beauty is not an inherent property of objects but a subjective response of the observer has been indisputable and widely recognized for much longer than the same is true for color, so that’s a ludicrous thing to point to when claiming color is the thin edge of the wedge.
> for moral properties like right and wrong
Well, yes, this is the philosophically most interesting one, and it's worthy of discussion, but this piece doesn't even begin to be that discussion, or even indirectly illuminate the issue.
> —even for what philosophers have traditionally called “primary qualities” like shape and size.
Well, sure, somethingnsimilar applies there, though the problem there is somewhat different, and connects to the more fundamental problem that the objects to which we apply traits aren't fundamental entities, but arbitrary and subjective divisions of the underlying reality.
Since nobody else has yet, https://xkcd.com/1882/
> Focus on a colour in your immediate environment and ask yourself whether that could really be only a figment of your mind.
Yes, of course that could really be the case. It's a bit of a downer that this article ends with an argument from incredulity.
Yes, of course that could really be the case. It's a bit of a downer that this article ends with an argument from incredulity.
Basically all of perceived reality is a simulation created by your mind from very incomplete information.
Nobody perceives reality as it actually is. It’s all just vibrations in various fields, and any macroscopic interpretation above that is your imagination, from your own personal identity to the colors you see.
Nobody perceives reality as it actually is. It’s all just vibrations in various fields, and any macroscopic interpretation above that is your imagination, from your own personal identity to the colors you see.
Colour is a pigment of your imagination...
That's a very facile response to the article (sadly, the article doesn't go into any depth on the subject). One could just as well ask the same about any property that we perceive in the senses and later apprehend through the intellect.
EDIT: I did find this review, but I haven't read it[0].
[0] http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/a-naive-realist-theory-of-colour/
EDIT: I did find this review, but I haven't read it[0].
[0] http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/a-naive-realist-theory-of-colour/
> One could just as well ask the same about any property that we perceive in the senses and later apprehend through the intellect.
Indeed, and I have this nagging feeling that there might be something to it. It goes along with the suspicion that neither what I perceive through my senses nor what I apprehend through my intellect are as coherent as they feel, but perhaps that's just me.
Indeed, and I have this nagging feeling that there might be something to it. It goes along with the suspicion that neither what I perceive through my senses nor what I apprehend through my intellect are as coherent as they feel, but perhaps that's just me.
I've been going through this for a couple years now on just about any issue I go deep on. It is unsettling and points toward meaningless (even against relative meaning derived from each other), which is even more unsettling.
>Nobody perceives reality as it actually is.
A couple of comments: This sentence has a misleading form. It sounds like "Nobody here has a hat", denying something quite unproblematically possible. But would would it mean to perceive reality 'as it actually is'? The phrase seems confused. Like people who worry about life being meaningless, there's a category error being made somewhere.
And the phrase 'reality as it actually is' is but a modern version of the Kantian 'reality as-it-is-in-itself', (of which nothing could be known or said). Some of the problems coming from such language (i.e. most of Idealism and relativism in their various forms) and their history have been entertainingly explored by the philosophers Musgrave[0] and Stove[1].
e.g. "We can eat oysters only insofar as they are brought under the physiological and chemical conditions which are the presuppositions of the possibility of being eaten. Therefore, we cannot eat oysters as they are in themselves."
or "We have eyes, therefore we can't see."
[0] Alan Musgrave, Idealism and Antirealism http://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/I...
[1] Stove's Discovery of the Worst Argument in the World http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.html
A couple of comments: This sentence has a misleading form. It sounds like "Nobody here has a hat", denying something quite unproblematically possible. But would would it mean to perceive reality 'as it actually is'? The phrase seems confused. Like people who worry about life being meaningless, there's a category error being made somewhere.
And the phrase 'reality as it actually is' is but a modern version of the Kantian 'reality as-it-is-in-itself', (of which nothing could be known or said). Some of the problems coming from such language (i.e. most of Idealism and relativism in their various forms) and their history have been entertainingly explored by the philosophers Musgrave[0] and Stove[1].
e.g. "We can eat oysters only insofar as they are brought under the physiological and chemical conditions which are the presuppositions of the possibility of being eaten. Therefore, we cannot eat oysters as they are in themselves."
or "We have eyes, therefore we can't see."
[0] Alan Musgrave, Idealism and Antirealism http://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/I...
[1] Stove's Discovery of the Worst Argument in the World http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.html
> But would would it mean to perceive reality 'as it actually is'?
It would mean that direct perception is the case. We directly perceive the objects out there in the world as they are, not a representation of some sort in our heads.
> We have eyes, therefore we can't see.
It's more like, we have eyes that provide our brains with information to color in the world in response to visible light reflecting off objects.
But that doesn't answer the question about whether the world is actually colored. What if we had a different kind of eyes, or our visual cortex processed the information differently?
Is only the visible light colored, or do radio waves have colors, or is the color on the surface of objects themselves?
It would mean that direct perception is the case. We directly perceive the objects out there in the world as they are, not a representation of some sort in our heads.
> We have eyes, therefore we can't see.
It's more like, we have eyes that provide our brains with information to color in the world in response to visible light reflecting off objects.
But that doesn't answer the question about whether the world is actually colored. What if we had a different kind of eyes, or our visual cortex processed the information differently?
Is only the visible light colored, or do radio waves have colors, or is the color on the surface of objects themselves?
>We directly perceive the objects out there in the world as they are, not a representation of some sort in our heads.
My point was that this is a grammatical sentence, but like a christian talking of eternal life, the impossibility and unimaginability of the thing is ignored.
That bit about the eyes was a TL;DR and teaser for the linked (very funny) papers, which doesn't mean much without them I guess. It's a spoof/reductio of a kind of argument which has often been used in philosophy, Stove's Gem. Yes sorry, not answering questions. I seem to spend more time questioning questions. They often conceal and smuggle in false assumptions.
My point was that this is a grammatical sentence, but like a christian talking of eternal life, the impossibility and unimaginability of the thing is ignored.
That bit about the eyes was a TL;DR and teaser for the linked (very funny) papers, which doesn't mean much without them I guess. It's a spoof/reductio of a kind of argument which has often been used in philosophy, Stove's Gem. Yes sorry, not answering questions. I seem to spend more time questioning questions. They often conceal and smuggle in false assumptions.
How do you reconcile your statements that, on the one hand, we directly perceive the objects out there in the world as they are, while on the other, we have eyes that provide our brains with information to color in the world in response to visible light reflecting off objects, but that doesn't answer the question about whether the world is actually colored? If being colored in a certain way doesn't mean having a certain spectral absorbance, what does it mean?
The comet-like image near the top of the page is actually a cropped and rotated image of a painting by Hilma af Klint, who is a remarkable early abstract artist.
I'm not personally outraged by the casual manipulation and instrumentalisation of that painting by some graphic designer -- it is in the public domain -- but it seems like a very unprincipled and ignorant thing to do. The title of the painting is "Altar Painting, No. 1".
I'm not personally outraged by the casual manipulation and instrumentalisation of that painting by some graphic designer -- it is in the public domain -- but it seems like a very unprincipled and ignorant thing to do. The title of the painting is "Altar Painting, No. 1".
There is an acknowledgment at the bottom:
> Featured image credit: Altarpiece, No. 1, Group X, Altarpieces by Hilma af Klint. Public domain via Wikimedia Commons.
> Featured image credit: Altarpiece, No. 1, Group X, Altarpieces by Hilma af Klint. Public domain via Wikimedia Commons.
I don't know what this book argues specifically, but the problem of color is very much a special case of the problem of qualia. If one takes a presumptuous and shallow view of science, one might be inclined to accept Galileo's characterization of color. However, that's just an accident of history and not the result of having comprehended some essential scientific fact concerning color. The invention and subsequent consignment of qualia (here, color) to conscious experience is the consequence not of scientific discovery, but of a metaphysics -- and a deeply flawed metaphysics at that -- that has been lurking in our thinking since Galileo and Descartes. That metaphysics proposes that the world is composed of two kinds of substances, namely, the material res extensa (things extended in space) and the immaterial res cogitans (for all intents and purposes, minds). What can not be attributed to res extensa (e.g., color) is attributed to minds, so really, when physicists talk about color, they are not speaking of color in conformity with the common understanding of color, but in terms of a redefinition of color.
The problem of qualia comes into play most especially when a materialist metaphysical position is accepted of the kind where the immaterial res cogitans is denied. The materialist is then faced with the task of explaining how all of that which was attributed to minds (e.g., color) -- and indeed minds themselves -- is really something that can be attributed to res extensa. The kicker is, of course, that you can't, at least not without radically reforming how you understand matter. It is by definition impossible to locate color in matter given a Cartesian understanding of matter. Many physicists, in their more philosophical moments, tacitly accept a metaphysical position of that kind.
What's important is that the modern understanding of color, one that attributes it to consciousness rather than things, is not a scientific position. It is a metaphysical position and a very problematic one that is running its course as philosophers and scientists try helplessly and in vain to explain things like consciousness and the objects of consciousness.
The problem of qualia comes into play most especially when a materialist metaphysical position is accepted of the kind where the immaterial res cogitans is denied. The materialist is then faced with the task of explaining how all of that which was attributed to minds (e.g., color) -- and indeed minds themselves -- is really something that can be attributed to res extensa. The kicker is, of course, that you can't, at least not without radically reforming how you understand matter. It is by definition impossible to locate color in matter given a Cartesian understanding of matter. Many physicists, in their more philosophical moments, tacitly accept a metaphysical position of that kind.
What's important is that the modern understanding of color, one that attributes it to consciousness rather than things, is not a scientific position. It is a metaphysical position and a very problematic one that is running its course as philosophers and scientists try helplessly and in vain to explain things like consciousness and the objects of consciousness.
I'm not sure I understand your point? If I feel confused, that's a real physical thing. Sure we say emotions are in my mind but my mind is part of my whole body which is a physical thing we can touch and dissect (if not yet fully understand).
Similarly my understanding and perception of the colours I see comes from a real physical body that has accumulated a lot of sensory input and experiences and uses that to interpret new sensory input.
I can't explain to you how I experience the colour blue but I don't need to grapple with metaphysics to explain, in principle, why I might experience it that way.
Similarly my understanding and perception of the colours I see comes from a real physical body that has accumulated a lot of sensory input and experiences and uses that to interpret new sensory input.
I can't explain to you how I experience the colour blue but I don't need to grapple with metaphysics to explain, in principle, why I might experience it that way.
Suppose I have a coffee machine. I can weigh it, clean it, measure titration. But is the machine edible? No, because the machine isn't coffee per se.
Similarly, suppose scientists discover a neural-structure (or chemical-interaction, etc) responsible for blueness. I can dissect it, electrocute it, soak it in LSD. But will the scientists experience blueness? No, because the structure isn't qualia per se.
The prevailing ideology is that by studying the mechanical nature of coffee machines, we'll ipso facto understand the biochemistry of the beverage. danielam is arguing that this ideology is probably wrong. This is why the Problem of Qualia is a problem.
Similarly, suppose scientists discover a neural-structure (or chemical-interaction, etc) responsible for blueness. I can dissect it, electrocute it, soak it in LSD. But will the scientists experience blueness? No, because the structure isn't qualia per se.
The prevailing ideology is that by studying the mechanical nature of coffee machines, we'll ipso facto understand the biochemistry of the beverage. danielam is arguing that this ideology is probably wrong. This is why the Problem of Qualia is a problem.
A couple points. First, I did not claim that the experience of things or even consciousness require appeals to anything immaterial or non-physical. I merely said that a Cartesian materialism as a metaphysical position cannot explain these things, and this appears to be the way that many contemporary philosophers and physicists _in_their_philosophical_moments_ understand matter. Modern physics actually departs quite a bit from that kind of materialism. This is not a question first and foremost about the experience of color but the nature of color. Cartesians reduce color to an experience and locate that experience in an immaterial mind. Materialism, without reforming the account of matter inherited by Descartes, does away with the material mind and is now left with a desiccated account of reality that cannot even _in_principle_ account for color understood as experience. The solution is not to return to Cartesian dualism but to embrace a different metaphysics that can account for things like color, not as experiences, but as real properties of the world. After that, it is possible to talk about what it means to perceive color. (Indeed, a fatal flaw of modern philosophy is that it prioritizes epistemology over metaphysics, but that’s a topic for another day.)
Second -- and this is not the main thrust of what I said, but it is in response to what you wrote -- you are begging the question when you presume that everything can be accounted for physics. Consider the concept of Triangularity. In the world, we have concrete, triangular things that instantiate Triangularity. We perceive them through our senses. One triangle may be an isosceles triangle, another might be equilateral, still another may be a right triangle. Of these, each may be large, small, drawn with thick lines or quickly sketched on the board with a piece of chalk. However, none of these triangular things are themselves Triangularity or else only one triangle could exist. Furthermore, none of these concrete instances are perfect instantiations of Triangularity. The lines composing them are never fully straight. They are only approximations, and yet we still know what Triangularity is, its properties (like the angles summing to 180 degrees), and so on. It exists in our minds, and in the mind it exists, by necessity, completely apart from any particular, concrete instantiations of it (we may have images of triangles in mind, but the images themselves are not Triangularity itself, something all these images share). It follows that because Triangularity isn’t concrete or particular, there exists in the mind something that isn’t concrete or particular, but universal. But because physical things are necessarily instantiations of universals and not universals themselves, then we have in our minds something non-physical.
Second -- and this is not the main thrust of what I said, but it is in response to what you wrote -- you are begging the question when you presume that everything can be accounted for physics. Consider the concept of Triangularity. In the world, we have concrete, triangular things that instantiate Triangularity. We perceive them through our senses. One triangle may be an isosceles triangle, another might be equilateral, still another may be a right triangle. Of these, each may be large, small, drawn with thick lines or quickly sketched on the board with a piece of chalk. However, none of these triangular things are themselves Triangularity or else only one triangle could exist. Furthermore, none of these concrete instances are perfect instantiations of Triangularity. The lines composing them are never fully straight. They are only approximations, and yet we still know what Triangularity is, its properties (like the angles summing to 180 degrees), and so on. It exists in our minds, and in the mind it exists, by necessity, completely apart from any particular, concrete instantiations of it (we may have images of triangles in mind, but the images themselves are not Triangularity itself, something all these images share). It follows that because Triangularity isn’t concrete or particular, there exists in the mind something that isn’t concrete or particular, but universal. But because physical things are necessarily instantiations of universals and not universals themselves, then we have in our minds something non-physical.
Something that helped me understand why this problem is significant: the things you mention as giving an account of color perception are only accounting for a brain system which evolves through states having structure which is isomorphic to fluctuations of colors in subjective experience[0]. However, the philosophical question isn't about whether you can create such a mapping, it's about reconciling the fact that if you look around your environment it's like something, and what it's like is importantly not a bunch of neurons. And yet when we look inside brains, we only find neurons. So if we want to say that the experience of colors can be explained physically as well, then there should be some physical place where e.g. redness is occurring rather than electro-chemical flux of neuron interaction.
[0] Another subtlety here is that the brain states having structure isomorphic to something in subjectivity doesn't necessarily make sense. It would on the assumption that everything is 'structural', but that's not an assumption everyone is willing to make. (You can find demonstrations that mathematics and the sciences can only deal in terms of structure, which is why for their practitioners it makes sense to ignore anything non-structural—but this is very different from a demonstration that everything actually is structural.) In that case, in order to create this mapping, we have to create another structure (for instance, a taxonomy of colors names and relationships between colors), and we can configure that structure in a way which is intended to reflect some moments of subjective experience. Now that structure could be potentially be found isomorphic to some evolving brain states, while to say that the subjective experience itself was isomorphic is likely nonsensical.
[0] Another subtlety here is that the brain states having structure isomorphic to something in subjectivity doesn't necessarily make sense. It would on the assumption that everything is 'structural', but that's not an assumption everyone is willing to make. (You can find demonstrations that mathematics and the sciences can only deal in terms of structure, which is why for their practitioners it makes sense to ignore anything non-structural—but this is very different from a demonstration that everything actually is structural.) In that case, in order to create this mapping, we have to create another structure (for instance, a taxonomy of colors names and relationships between colors), and we can configure that structure in a way which is intended to reflect some moments of subjective experience. Now that structure could be potentially be found isomorphic to some evolving brain states, while to say that the subjective experience itself was isomorphic is likely nonsensical.
> So if we want to say that the experience of colors can be explained physically as well, then there should be some physical place where e.g. redness is occurring rather than electro-chemical flux of neuron interaction.
I am reminded of an essay by Stephen Jay Gould, on the history of preformationism, and the debate over whether the homunculus resided in the sperm or the egg. The idea that a human could be represented by an ordering of simple chemicals was inconceivable at the time.
The idea that physicalism requires a specific physical locus for redness is no more sound than the idea that genetic theory requires human-ness to be located in a specific base on a DNA molecule. Emergent phenomena are real, common, and not, in general, particularly mysterious (though the mind certainly is, at least to me.)
More prosaically, maybe redness is actually localized, as a memory of a sensation. Is there anything more to redness than a comparison to prior sensations?
I am reminded of an essay by Stephen Jay Gould, on the history of preformationism, and the debate over whether the homunculus resided in the sperm or the egg. The idea that a human could be represented by an ordering of simple chemicals was inconceivable at the time.
The idea that physicalism requires a specific physical locus for redness is no more sound than the idea that genetic theory requires human-ness to be located in a specific base on a DNA molecule. Emergent phenomena are real, common, and not, in general, particularly mysterious (though the mind certainly is, at least to me.)
More prosaically, maybe redness is actually localized, as a memory of a sensation. Is there anything more to redness than a comparison to prior sensations?
> Emergent phenomena are real, common, and not, in general, particularly mysterious
I have no issue with emergent phenomena. It's just that whether the phenomenon is emergent or not is irrelevant to the question at hand.
For instance, let's say the brain 'system' responsible for color perception is distributed all throughout the human brain in such a way that it would be impossible to formulate any hierarchical conceptual structure which could account for it. It's just an emergent consequence of a ton of other complex stuff going on.
Okay, now if you recall my previous point about reconciling the experience of redness vs clusters of neurons—you can hopefully see that the above makes no difference to the problem. It's just a different mapping of a physical structure onto subjective experience, without accounting for the fundamental difference between the subjective experience and the physical structure.
(This answer is less thorough, but I did take my time with what I wrote previously. If you read it more closely I think you'll see the difference in what we're each talking about here.)
I have no issue with emergent phenomena. It's just that whether the phenomenon is emergent or not is irrelevant to the question at hand.
For instance, let's say the brain 'system' responsible for color perception is distributed all throughout the human brain in such a way that it would be impossible to formulate any hierarchical conceptual structure which could account for it. It's just an emergent consequence of a ton of other complex stuff going on.
Okay, now if you recall my previous point about reconciling the experience of redness vs clusters of neurons—you can hopefully see that the above makes no difference to the problem. It's just a different mapping of a physical structure onto subjective experience, without accounting for the fundamental difference between the subjective experience and the physical structure.
(This answer is less thorough, but I did take my time with what I wrote previously. If you read it more closely I think you'll see the difference in what we're each talking about here.)
Matter is a subjective experience. An atom is only an atom because it feels like something to be an atom. Qualia is the basis for all existence. The world is a feeling. No need for duality. Feeling is the a priori element.
A priori means derived from logic rather than perceptions and experience. Not "more fundamental".
Well according to wikipedia it means knowledge independent of experience not "dependent on logic". In this sense it is similar to saying that something is axiomatic. Besides I'm not at all sure there is a difference between knowledge gained from logic or from experience: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=xO3Gw0zlmWM
> Well according to wikipedia it means knowledge independent of experience not "dependent on logic".
wikipedia:
> Thus, the two kinds of knowledge, justification, or argument, may be glossed:
> A priori knowledge or justification is independent of experience, as with mathematics (3 + 2 = 5), tautologies ("All bachelors are unmarried"), and deduction from pure reason (e.g., ontological proofs).[3]
> A posteriori knowledge or justification depends on experience or empirical evidence, as with most aspects of science and personal knowledge.
There's nothing wrong or controversial about my definition. Non-Experiental Knowledge is Logical Knowledge by exhaustion. "Feeling" is exactly the kind of thing "a priori" was intended to exclude.
> In this sense it is similar to saying that something is axiomatic.
In no sense of the word, colloquial or academic, does "a priori" mean "axiomatic". They are different beasts.
> Besides I'm not at all sure there is a difference between knowledge gained from logic or from experience: <skims youtube video>
The video redefines the Problem of Infinite Regress as "Modus Morons". I've read What the Tortoise said to Achilles myself. Yes, the truth of modus ponens is arguably derived from induction. But that's a topic I'm not going to get into right now. At the very least, the terms are useful to label their disparate track-records.
If you want to dig further, your general position is called Idealism.
wikipedia:
> Thus, the two kinds of knowledge, justification, or argument, may be glossed:
> A priori knowledge or justification is independent of experience, as with mathematics (3 + 2 = 5), tautologies ("All bachelors are unmarried"), and deduction from pure reason (e.g., ontological proofs).[3]
> A posteriori knowledge or justification depends on experience or empirical evidence, as with most aspects of science and personal knowledge.
There's nothing wrong or controversial about my definition. Non-Experiental Knowledge is Logical Knowledge by exhaustion. "Feeling" is exactly the kind of thing "a priori" was intended to exclude.
> In this sense it is similar to saying that something is axiomatic.
In no sense of the word, colloquial or academic, does "a priori" mean "axiomatic". They are different beasts.
> Besides I'm not at all sure there is a difference between knowledge gained from logic or from experience: <skims youtube video>
The video redefines the Problem of Infinite Regress as "Modus Morons". I've read What the Tortoise said to Achilles myself. Yes, the truth of modus ponens is arguably derived from induction. But that's a topic I'm not going to get into right now. At the very least, the terms are useful to label their disparate track-records.
If you want to dig further, your general position is called Idealism.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=2ZHmCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA23&lpg...
You have an argumentative style which implies that you are more interested in winning than seeking the truth. As such I am dissinclined to take you too seriously.
You have an argumentative style which implies that you are more interested in winning than seeking the truth. As such I am dissinclined to take you too seriously.
Because this isn't about truth. This is about diction. You are using "a priori" in a non-standard way.
Also. Maybe meditate on the irony of citing wikipedia articles without reading them and then criticizing polemics.
But is the collective experience of matter a subjective experience?
This including any kind of scientific hardware we use to measure it?
How many people believing otherwise would it take to change the experience of matter in general public, if it is subjective? (Because if it is subjective, it must be malleable.)
This including any kind of scientific hardware we use to measure it?
How many people believing otherwise would it take to change the experience of matter in general public, if it is subjective? (Because if it is subjective, it must be malleable.)
Well the whole universe believes that matter behaves the way it does. A few billion lumps of gooey brain tissue isnt going to change it. But cut that matter off from the experience of the rest of the universe and it's free to do anything it damn well pleases. Until you look at it again and then it becomes something that fits with what its supposed to be doing wrt the universe at this moment
If the issue at hand is the denial of physicality, then the issue of emergence is significant, because arguments that claim qualia cannot be physically localized can quickly be dismissed as naive. Much more significantly, if you are actually attempting to understand consciousness, then you are ill-equipped to do that if you are unaware of the nature of emergence.
If you insist that there is no difference, then it goes both ways. I think you are actually right in a way you did not intend: more sophisticated versions of the qualia argument are ultimately no better, as at some point, it always comes down to what you are prepared to believe - that there is a fundamental difference that cannot be bridged.
There was a time when humanity found it impossible to believe that life could arise from matter alone, yet dualism in this regard has effectively been abandoned, at least scientifically and philosophically. While this does not, of course, prove anything about the mind, it does show how arguments from the fundamental difference between matter and information-like things are really appeals to plausibility. As an observation that there is a gap in our understanding, that is fine; as a claim that the difference can never be resolved, they are just opinions.
And as I briefly speculated in my last paragraph, the physical basis for color as a quale might be surprisingly localized...
If you insist that there is no difference, then it goes both ways. I think you are actually right in a way you did not intend: more sophisticated versions of the qualia argument are ultimately no better, as at some point, it always comes down to what you are prepared to believe - that there is a fundamental difference that cannot be bridged.
There was a time when humanity found it impossible to believe that life could arise from matter alone, yet dualism in this regard has effectively been abandoned, at least scientifically and philosophically. While this does not, of course, prove anything about the mind, it does show how arguments from the fundamental difference between matter and information-like things are really appeals to plausibility. As an observation that there is a gap in our understanding, that is fine; as a claim that the difference can never be resolved, they are just opinions.
And as I briefly speculated in my last paragraph, the physical basis for color as a quale might be surprisingly localized...
The kicker is, of course, that you can't, at least not without radically reforming how you understand matter.
What reformation is required here? Given how simulated neural networks tend to end up with particular neurons representing concepts, it should not be surprising if one could find neurons in the brain for colors. The experience of color is the combined effect of activation of those neurons.
What reformation is required here? Given how simulated neural networks tend to end up with particular neurons representing concepts, it should not be surprising if one could find neurons in the brain for colors. The experience of color is the combined effect of activation of those neurons.
... therefore, neural networks consciously experience color. QED
The experience of color isn't a concept.
The problem of qualia comes into play most especially when a materialist metaphysical position is accepted of the kind where the immaterial res cogitans is denied. The materialist is then faced with the task of explaining how all of that which was attributed to minds (e.g., color) -- and indeed minds themselves -- is really something that can be attributed to res extensa.
This doesn't seem all that bad to me. I'm faced with the task of explaining lots of things that I don't understand for a variety of reasons. Sometimes I'm motivated to participate in the exploration, sometimes I'm willing to let it be delegated to others. This would seem to be true regardless of whether I think that the mind is material or immaterial. We may develop an elaborate theory of the immaterial mind, yet end up concluding that we still don't understand color.
I wouldn't trust myself to conduct research into the inner workings of an immaterial mind, without perhaps building up from a successful inquiry into simpler immaterial systems.
This doesn't seem all that bad to me. I'm faced with the task of explaining lots of things that I don't understand for a variety of reasons. Sometimes I'm motivated to participate in the exploration, sometimes I'm willing to let it be delegated to others. This would seem to be true regardless of whether I think that the mind is material or immaterial. We may develop an elaborate theory of the immaterial mind, yet end up concluding that we still don't understand color.
I wouldn't trust myself to conduct research into the inner workings of an immaterial mind, without perhaps building up from a successful inquiry into simpler immaterial systems.
It sounds like it's just an exploration of the history of color perception and philosophy of it. Scientists don't really have any problem; they all understand color is light emitted interacting with light reflected interacting with our light sensors (eyeballs). They're pretty good at measuring and recreating those elements.
My guess though is, to your point about qualia, while we've scientifically categorized animals, plants, and minerals food is fairly subjective but many preferences are shared between people. We've also developed a rough language around food (sweet, sour, umami), and food scientists have studied it and tried recreating characteristics.
My guess though is, to your point about qualia, while we've scientifically categorized animals, plants, and minerals food is fairly subjective but many preferences are shared between people. We've also developed a rough language around food (sweet, sour, umami), and food scientists have studied it and tried recreating characteristics.
Where does information fit into the Cartesian dichotomy?
I thought this was going to be an "sRGB vs P3, and fixing images for colour gamuts" article because that's also a goddam metaphysical rabbit hole can't seem to be solved ...
Recently I learned that there were only four colours in rainbows, in medieval times. Then Newton came along and decided there were 'as many colours in a rainbow as there are notes in an octave'. This gave us the spectrum we have today.
The choice of colors in some medieval rainbow depictions was interesting, too.
> For it is of four colours, and takes its appearance from all of the elements into itself. From the sky it draws the fiery colour, from the waters purple, from the air white, and from the earth it gathers black.
Source: https://forthewynnblog.wordpress.com/2017/11/20/how-many-col...
> For it is of four colours, and takes its appearance from all of the elements into itself. From the sky it draws the fiery colour, from the waters purple, from the air white, and from the earth it gathers black.
Source: https://forthewynnblog.wordpress.com/2017/11/20/how-many-col...
Explaining colour in terms of how objects reflect, refract or emit different wavelengths of light (and similarly for the rods and cones in our eyes) sounds perfectly satisfactory to me. What's the problem with that theory?
I really don't see the point of all the metaphysical stuff. It just doesn't tell you anything useful.