“Peak Civilization”: The Fall of the Roman Empire (2009)(europe.theoildrum.com)
europe.theoildrum.com
“Peak Civilization”: The Fall of the Roman Empire (2009)
http://europe.theoildrum.com/node/5528
92 comments
Wow, that's an uncanny parallel to complexity in software development.
One way to reduce this is to try and enforce that structure is to be dependent on whatever is currently being done, so that any bureaucracies that are created are explicitly shut down at the end of a given task, with a meta-bureaucracy that just has the job of spinning off structures and winding them up, like job management in an OS.
Perhaps this is a good reason for a stronger social safety net.
In other words, while on the one hand it is important to eliminate jobs that produce zero or negative value, or even ones that offer value lower than their total economic costs (which includes opportunity costs--ie children who learn more effectively by another teacher, or on their own), on the other hand it is very difficult to tell people they should be losing their job. One way to fix that is perhaps to entitle everyone to basic needs.
In other words, while on the one hand it is important to eliminate jobs that produce zero or negative value, or even ones that offer value lower than their total economic costs (which includes opportunity costs--ie children who learn more effectively by another teacher, or on their own), on the other hand it is very difficult to tell people they should be losing their job. One way to fix that is perhaps to entitle everyone to basic needs.
Reminds me of the spaghetti legal code in the US
Last time Rome popped up as a topic on hackernews, someone mentioned "The history of Rome" podcast. It's absolutely fantastic. I mention it so that perhaps someone else can enjoy this masterpiece as much as I have.
Thanks for the recommendation. Also "Historia Civilis" [1] is a great YouTube channel on ancient Rome, with a particular focus on its military campaigns.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCv_vLHiWVBh_FR9vbeuiY-A
[1] https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCv_vLHiWVBh_FR9vbeuiY-A
Also the book The Storm Before The Storm, written by the author of that podcast (Mike Duncan), which about the end of the Roman republic (not the empire).
http://thestormbeforethestorm.com/
http://thestormbeforethestorm.com/
I can definitely second that. History of Rome on Spotify is one of my favorite things to listen to
I should also mention the Tides of History and The Fall of Rome Podcast. Both are excellent, and narrated by a newly minted phd in the field.
Rome popped up in the GDPR discussion some 30min after your wrote your text :-) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16606629#16609355
Yes, and it also mentions the gini coefficient. This popped up in the History of Rome podcast I was listening to last night. Never heard it before, need to read up on it :-)
Also the followup podcast "The History of Byzantium" if you couldn't get enough of late antiquity and the middle ages!
James C. Scott (in "Against the Grain: a deep history of the earliest states [2017]) has a bit of perspective on "collapse":
"Why deplore “collapse,” when the situation it depicts is most often the disaggregation of a complex, fragile, and typically oppressive state into smaller, decentralized fragments? One simple and not entirely superficial reason why collapse is deplored is that it deprives all those scholars and professionals whose mission it has been to document ancient civilizations of the raw materials they require. There are fewer important digs for archaeologists, fewer records and texts for historians, and fewer trinkets—large and small—to fill museum exhibits... Yet there is a strong case to be made that such “vacant” periods represented a bolt for freedom by many state subjects and an improvement in human welfare.
What I wish to challenge here is a rarely examined prejudice that sees population aggregation at the apex of state centers as triumphs of civilization on the one hand, and decentralization into smaller political units on the other, as a breakdown or failure of political order. We should, I believe, aim to “normalize” collapse and see it rather as often inaugurating a periodic and possibly even salutary reformulation of political order."
"Why deplore “collapse,” when the situation it depicts is most often the disaggregation of a complex, fragile, and typically oppressive state into smaller, decentralized fragments? One simple and not entirely superficial reason why collapse is deplored is that it deprives all those scholars and professionals whose mission it has been to document ancient civilizations of the raw materials they require. There are fewer important digs for archaeologists, fewer records and texts for historians, and fewer trinkets—large and small—to fill museum exhibits... Yet there is a strong case to be made that such “vacant” periods represented a bolt for freedom by many state subjects and an improvement in human welfare.
What I wish to challenge here is a rarely examined prejudice that sees population aggregation at the apex of state centers as triumphs of civilization on the one hand, and decentralization into smaller political units on the other, as a breakdown or failure of political order. We should, I believe, aim to “normalize” collapse and see it rather as often inaugurating a periodic and possibly even salutary reformulation of political order."
It stands to reason that Rome's collapse would have been straight away better for everyone, if it had involved a direct devolution of power to local administration; but that is not what happened. There was a long period of conflict and privation that accompanied it, as all the lights went out on the old administration while people were still running power for the new.
To a limited degree, the collapse of the British Empire, gentle though it was, illustrates the same problem: it's not that the new order is worse than the old, but rather that the process of getting there is so disordered and bad.
To a limited degree, the collapse of the British Empire, gentle though it was, illustrates the same problem: it's not that the new order is worse than the old, but rather that the process of getting there is so disordered and bad.
>an improvement in human welfare
Was this generally the outcome of the Roman Empire's collapse? Intuitively, I would expect breakdowns in law and order and the collapse of complex supply chain systems (particularly food delivery) to result in mass human suffering, at least in the short term.
Was this generally the outcome of the Roman Empire's collapse? Intuitively, I would expect breakdowns in law and order and the collapse of complex supply chain systems (particularly food delivery) to result in mass human suffering, at least in the short term.
Not to mention infrastructure like public baths and sewers.
For whom, and according to what value system?
The histories I've read of the early middle ages corroborate much of your intuition. Trade collapsed; many luxury goods became impossible to obtain at any price; illiteracy rose; population declined and many citizens died from famine and plague.
But there's often a trade-off between freedom and convenience, then and now. The Roman empire was built upon large-scale slavery and wealth inequality. If you were a member of the elite, then yes, the collapse was terrible; you lost access to all the privileges of the empire. If you were a slave, you probably ended up somewhat better off, becoming either a peasant or a bandit. Not being able to obtain pottery or steel doesn't matter much if you couldn't afford it to begin with, and dying at 40 from starvation is an improvement on dying at 25 in the arena.
The histories I've read of the early middle ages corroborate much of your intuition. Trade collapsed; many luxury goods became impossible to obtain at any price; illiteracy rose; population declined and many citizens died from famine and plague.
But there's often a trade-off between freedom and convenience, then and now. The Roman empire was built upon large-scale slavery and wealth inequality. If you were a member of the elite, then yes, the collapse was terrible; you lost access to all the privileges of the empire. If you were a slave, you probably ended up somewhat better off, becoming either a peasant or a bandit. Not being able to obtain pottery or steel doesn't matter much if you couldn't afford it to begin with, and dying at 40 from starvation is an improvement on dying at 25 in the arena.
> If you were a slave, you probably ended up somewhat better off
Slavery continued to exist in Western Europe after the fall of Roman empire until at least year 1000 AD.
In other former parts of Roman Empire such as Northern Africa slavery continued to flourish almost until the 19th century.
Slavery continued to exist in Western Europe after the fall of Roman empire until at least year 1000 AD.
In other former parts of Roman Empire such as Northern Africa slavery continued to flourish almost until the 19th century.
The number of people in slavery would have still decreased. The fact that it continued to exist is immaterial to the point being made.
> The number of people in slavery would have still decreased
On what basis are you making this assumption? "The fall of Rome" was not an anti-slavery uprising. It was gradual disappearance of the central authority (and all its benefits such as roads, law and order etc).
About 10% of England's population entered in the Domesday Book (1086) were slaves. Compare that with the Roman Empire where slave population (including Rome and all provinces) are estimated at 10-15% of the total.
On what basis are you making this assumption? "The fall of Rome" was not an anti-slavery uprising. It was gradual disappearance of the central authority (and all its benefits such as roads, law and order etc).
About 10% of England's population entered in the Domesday Book (1086) were slaves. Compare that with the Roman Empire where slave population (including Rome and all provinces) are estimated at 10-15% of the total.
The biggest buyer of slaves going down would decimate the market, no? I would imagine it would have played exactly like abolition of slavery in Britain or US. There was still slavery across the world, but the number of people that suffered from it went down.
What if you were a peasant? Did your life get worse?
Probably somewhat better, in the sense that your imperial overlords became spectacularly ineffective at taxing you.
Except the local abbot would happily take 1/10 of the fruits of your labor, the landlord even more, and you stood no chance seeking better fortunes away because roads were in disrepair, infested by robbers and patrolled by mercenaries tasked to kill any fugitive...
But you died of famine and disease more often - population went way down. It became harder to trade even the most basic foodstuff, since simple roads to the closest market became unsafe. Eventually feudalism happened and a lot of simple peasants were literally enslaved to the land.
I seem to recall one essay I read (long ago back in college and which a modicum of google-fu fails to locate) that argued that average caloric intake went sharply up in the territories of the Western Roman Empire in the decades after it's collapse.
The barbarian hordes wandering through weren't tourists. They were taking the food that you needed in order to not starve. And if you tried to stop them, they killed you.
Now, you could (in the abstract) say that a better, more just, and more responsive society emerged. But for those who went through it, there were a bunch of new ways to die.
Now, you could (in the abstract) say that a better, more just, and more responsive society emerged. But for those who went through it, there were a bunch of new ways to die.
James C. Scott is a good illustration of 'no skin in the game' syndrome among intellectuals.
It would be very persuasive to see him personally bolting for freedom between warring warlords in present-day Libya, or improving his welfare in lawless mafia-ruled cities of ex-Soviet Union in the 1990s.
But no such chance, so his views may be safely ignored.
It would be very persuasive to see him personally bolting for freedom between warring warlords in present-day Libya, or improving his welfare in lawless mafia-ruled cities of ex-Soviet Union in the 1990s.
But no such chance, so his views may be safely ignored.
Size and complexity shouldn't be confused. Often large size necessitates simpler policies and procedures.
I happen to be rereading Gibbon right now. He doesn't focus in on complexity, he contradicts it - pinpointing Constantine's crude-but-effective solution to constant rebellions and civil wars as the cause of the slow collapse: namely stationing perhaps two-thirds of Rome's military permanently in the cities with independent commands (the "palantines".) This prevented the regular barbarian-fighting armies (the "Borderers") and their commanders from rebelling successfully because they were now a relatively small military minority that would have to fight city after city - even in their own area - just to usurp power locally. But, with one hand tied behind its back, Rome's fall was inevitable from that point on. This "prepared the ruin of the Empire" in Gibbon's words. (But it was, arguably necessary, rebellion and civil war were incredibly frequent before that decision was taken.)
Size (and inequality) had undermined solidarity across the empire, not complexity. Diversity isn't exactly complexity. Keeping large groups together is hard, and the traditional pagan religion had lost most of its force well before Christianity came along; soldiers were no longer too afraid of the Gods to break a solemn oath in order to join a local rebellion under their particular commander. Most people's religion, particularly in the upper classes, had become much simpler - they really didn't have any.
It's possible to see this inexorable tendency toward rebellion as a result of Augustus' previous simplification long before; when drafting soldiers became too complex and unpopular, he ended conscription. This set up the situation in which soldiers became more loyal to their commanders, and themselves, than to the official emperor in Rome.
Looking at other societies, from other books, local chiefs and individuals slowly learned how to undercut central authority, in particular, slowly starving the center of revenues. Deviousness and a growing culture of tax-cheating and avoidance. It ain't that hard to keep things together if you have the money.
I happen to be rereading Gibbon right now. He doesn't focus in on complexity, he contradicts it - pinpointing Constantine's crude-but-effective solution to constant rebellions and civil wars as the cause of the slow collapse: namely stationing perhaps two-thirds of Rome's military permanently in the cities with independent commands (the "palantines".) This prevented the regular barbarian-fighting armies (the "Borderers") and their commanders from rebelling successfully because they were now a relatively small military minority that would have to fight city after city - even in their own area - just to usurp power locally. But, with one hand tied behind its back, Rome's fall was inevitable from that point on. This "prepared the ruin of the Empire" in Gibbon's words. (But it was, arguably necessary, rebellion and civil war were incredibly frequent before that decision was taken.)
Size (and inequality) had undermined solidarity across the empire, not complexity. Diversity isn't exactly complexity. Keeping large groups together is hard, and the traditional pagan religion had lost most of its force well before Christianity came along; soldiers were no longer too afraid of the Gods to break a solemn oath in order to join a local rebellion under their particular commander. Most people's religion, particularly in the upper classes, had become much simpler - they really didn't have any.
It's possible to see this inexorable tendency toward rebellion as a result of Augustus' previous simplification long before; when drafting soldiers became too complex and unpopular, he ended conscription. This set up the situation in which soldiers became more loyal to their commanders, and themselves, than to the official emperor in Rome.
Looking at other societies, from other books, local chiefs and individuals slowly learned how to undercut central authority, in particular, slowly starving the center of revenues. Deviousness and a growing culture of tax-cheating and avoidance. It ain't that hard to keep things together if you have the money.
I'm a bit less happy with my answer, on reflection. I'm using "complexity" to mean something close to Kolmogarov Complexity, which I still think is reasonable. But we may need more categories to have a sensible discussion.
I now begin to think we should perhaps distinguish between size, complexity of design, the number of moving parts, and I might also add redundancy (since it trades off with many of the above.) These can all vary independently. There's a sense in which redundancy (or fail-safe system design) can add parts but reduce overall design complexity, or at least management complexity/too many bad decisions that are too easy to make or implement. So maybe the latter is an additional meaning of complexity that should be considered. "Control Complexity." For example, an aircraft with no dihedral is simpler, but far harder to manage, to keep level.
Note re the above that the number of moving parts (and size) in a physical system doesn't nec reflect Kolmogarov Complexity since the Turing machine simulating that system can loop.
I now begin to think we should perhaps distinguish between size, complexity of design, the number of moving parts, and I might also add redundancy (since it trades off with many of the above.) These can all vary independently. There's a sense in which redundancy (or fail-safe system design) can add parts but reduce overall design complexity, or at least management complexity/too many bad decisions that are too easy to make or implement. So maybe the latter is an additional meaning of complexity that should be considered. "Control Complexity." For example, an aircraft with no dihedral is simpler, but far harder to manage, to keep level.
Note re the above that the number of moving parts (and size) in a physical system doesn't nec reflect Kolmogarov Complexity since the Turing machine simulating that system can loop.
Please don't read Gibbon to learn anything about Rome unless it's what 18th century British scholars think of it. He is important for the historiography of the field but wrong about a lot of things, especially anything about religion and the Byzantine Empire.
It would be shocking if we hadn't learned more about the subject, since, but the vast majority of source material we now have was available to Gibbon and well-digested by him. It's perfectly evident reading Gibbon that he couldn't be straightforward about religion at that time.
"a degree of professional esteem which remains as strong today as it was then", from:
"In the early 20th century, biographer Sir Leslie Stephen ["Gibbon, Edward (1737–1794)," Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 7, (Oxford, 1921), p. 1134.] summarized The History's reputation as a work of unmatched erudition, a degree of professional esteem which remains as strong today as it was then:
The criticisms upon his book...are nearly unanimous. In accuracy, thoroughness, lucidity, and comprehensive grasp of a vast subject, the History is unsurpassable. It is the one English history which may be regarded as definitive. ...Whatever its shortcomings, the book is artistically imposing as well as historically unimpeachable as a vast panorama of a great period."
"a degree of professional esteem which remains as strong today as it was then", from:
"In the early 20th century, biographer Sir Leslie Stephen ["Gibbon, Edward (1737–1794)," Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 7, (Oxford, 1921), p. 1134.] summarized The History's reputation as a work of unmatched erudition, a degree of professional esteem which remains as strong today as it was then:
The criticisms upon his book...are nearly unanimous. In accuracy, thoroughness, lucidity, and comprehensive grasp of a vast subject, the History is unsurpassable. It is the one English history which may be regarded as definitive. ...Whatever its shortcomings, the book is artistically imposing as well as historically unimpeachable as a vast panorama of a great period."
The complexity that is being referred to is social and administrative complexity, the huge military upkeep being a side effect of that.
A simple policy can still reflect a highly complex, expensive form of social organization. It's rather hard to argue that stationing massive garrisons throughout an empire is not a massive exercise in social complexity and organization.
> Diversity isn't exactly complexity. Keeping large groups together is hard,
It's difficult to argue that late Imperial Rome, with its multiple levels of bureaucracies, military and civilian, a nascent Church, along with large standing garrisons wasn't far more socially and economically complex than the societies of the invading barbarians.
And all that complexity went exactly towards 'keeping large groups together' without the benefit of a unified ethnicity or other identity.
But note that in earlier times, Rome's technological and social complexity was able to pay for itself and then some: it was able to field and man large military organizations, and the complexity brought in a profit by conquest and war booty.
In other words, size was a logical end result to earlier complexity: in order to keep the system running, Rome had to continue to grow.
Unfortunately, Rome ran out of rich easily-conquered lands and its inefficient (and complex) economy could not make the economic transition (unlike the Eastern Empire, which had richer and more densely populated lands).
Your example of stationing two-thirds of a massive standing army just to keep order is an example of just how inefficient the late Western Imperial economy must have been, and why it fell against barbarian groups that had much simpler, flatter social hierarchies based on ethnic kinship and trust.
A simple policy can still reflect a highly complex, expensive form of social organization. It's rather hard to argue that stationing massive garrisons throughout an empire is not a massive exercise in social complexity and organization.
> Diversity isn't exactly complexity. Keeping large groups together is hard,
It's difficult to argue that late Imperial Rome, with its multiple levels of bureaucracies, military and civilian, a nascent Church, along with large standing garrisons wasn't far more socially and economically complex than the societies of the invading barbarians.
And all that complexity went exactly towards 'keeping large groups together' without the benefit of a unified ethnicity or other identity.
But note that in earlier times, Rome's technological and social complexity was able to pay for itself and then some: it was able to field and man large military organizations, and the complexity brought in a profit by conquest and war booty.
In other words, size was a logical end result to earlier complexity: in order to keep the system running, Rome had to continue to grow.
Unfortunately, Rome ran out of rich easily-conquered lands and its inefficient (and complex) economy could not make the economic transition (unlike the Eastern Empire, which had richer and more densely populated lands).
Your example of stationing two-thirds of a massive standing army just to keep order is an example of just how inefficient the late Western Imperial economy must have been, and why it fell against barbarian groups that had much simpler, flatter social hierarchies based on ethnic kinship and trust.
The Barbarian societies were often more complex, being less well-integrated and uniform than Roman society; Rome was far more interested in integrating conquered populations. Trust didn't work well for the Persians or Mongolians (at the leadership level.) I don't know a society that solved that one from my reading, highly religious and superstitious societies in which the ruling families were Gods, such as the Egyptians came closer to a solution. Simplicity of a kind.
Much conflation of size and complexity, here, once again. And you seem to merely elide my points. The size of the Roman army allowed a remarkable degree of standardization in the tools of war, and training. That's not complexity. Roman society hadn't gotten poorer; but it had gotten less cohesive, fewer were ready to sacrifice for the whole.
Size automatically required large amounts of social complexity in the days of Rome, especially if you measure complexity in the actual cost it took to hold Rome together.
I'll remind you that the contemporaneous Chinese Han dynasty also evolved into a large militarized, centralized bureaucratic state despite the wide differences in geography and developmental path, and faced very similar problems of replacing conscripts with professional soldiers and then keeping them loyal. What forced them to have similar organization was their sheer size and the organizational pressures this caused.
I'll remind you that the contemporaneous Chinese Han dynasty also evolved into a large militarized, centralized bureaucratic state despite the wide differences in geography and developmental path, and faced very similar problems of replacing conscripts with professional soldiers and then keeping them loyal. What forced them to have similar organization was their sheer size and the organizational pressures this caused.
But I started with a profound example of the reverse. Cost is size, not complexity. There were considerable savings due to scale in Rome, including assembly lines for manufacturing amphora, etc.
Re China you give another example of size creating simplicity and standardization. In contrast to your first paragraph.
Re China you give another example of size creating simplicity and standardization. In contrast to your first paragraph.
> Cost is size, not complexity.
You're narrowly defining 'complexity' as only 'complexity of procedure' and completely ignoring social complexity and specialization.
How about you justify why only the single measure of 'complexity' is sufficient for our discussion?
A few direct responses to your example:
1. Standardization may save costs overall, but they represent a form of social complexity (you now have specialized bureaucrats and administrators to determine standards and communicate with troops, weapons must move a long way to supply every legion, training is now done in a centralized fashion)
2. This social complexity adds fragility to the system—if your army depends on having standardized gear to function properly, and barbarians capture your centralized workshops, then all of a sudden you lose the ability to equip the troops effectively; barbarians don't have that problem
3. It's not even clear that standardization saves overall costs here; it may save administrative cost at the Imperial level (it's easier to manage and train troops if they are interchangeable) but incur large hidden costs at the local level; in other words standardization may be an externalization of administrative problems onto the provinces. A direct example would be: if you force all the troops to use standard gear, they might fight worse than if they used weapons that were specialized for dealing with local enemies; also now your troops have a huge delay in being equipped from a central armory, and may end up pay out of their own pockets for local wares just to survive.
Anyone who has sat through multiple re-orgs at a large corporation will understand that what is 'simple' for the administrator (let's make the org chart simple and clear!) may actually cause tons of hidden additional complexity at the bottom layers, so that total complexity has risen even though things look 'simpler' at one particular level.
You're narrowly defining 'complexity' as only 'complexity of procedure' and completely ignoring social complexity and specialization.
How about you justify why only the single measure of 'complexity' is sufficient for our discussion?
A few direct responses to your example:
1. Standardization may save costs overall, but they represent a form of social complexity (you now have specialized bureaucrats and administrators to determine standards and communicate with troops, weapons must move a long way to supply every legion, training is now done in a centralized fashion)
2. This social complexity adds fragility to the system—if your army depends on having standardized gear to function properly, and barbarians capture your centralized workshops, then all of a sudden you lose the ability to equip the troops effectively; barbarians don't have that problem
3. It's not even clear that standardization saves overall costs here; it may save administrative cost at the Imperial level (it's easier to manage and train troops if they are interchangeable) but incur large hidden costs at the local level; in other words standardization may be an externalization of administrative problems onto the provinces. A direct example would be: if you force all the troops to use standard gear, they might fight worse than if they used weapons that were specialized for dealing with local enemies; also now your troops have a huge delay in being equipped from a central armory, and may end up pay out of their own pockets for local wares just to survive.
Anyone who has sat through multiple re-orgs at a large corporation will understand that what is 'simple' for the administrator (let's make the org chart simple and clear!) may actually cause tons of hidden additional complexity at the bottom layers, so that total complexity has risen even though things look 'simpler' at one particular level.
Lots of strenuous agreeing with me (vs the article) here, if you actually read what I've said, along with hypothetical tangents that may be worth thinking about but don't belong in a reply to me. Much of this I've addressed, see complex for the pilot, simpler plane. Many distinctions can be made, but less-organized societies have no shortage of complexity and variety (the armies the Romans met in Gaul had enormous variety in equipage, and thanks to little training, all too much variety in the responses of soldiers in battle.) The (Western) Romans didn't go down due to complexity, and Gibbon can't be cited for that claim, as was done. The standardization of Roman shields allowed them to pack together and shield soldiers better, their uniformity was not a "liability".
It's a liability if the costs of the costs of the standardization exceed the real returns, a point which you have 'strenuously' ignored while pretending to push the burden proof back to me.
Sure, in a vacuum anything can be seen as 'complexity', but if you actual measure the costs of doing complicated things in late Roman times then it's clear why their system fell apart while the Germans' largely didn't, despite the Romans having more territory and population to start with, and the key is to see that the late Roman system was horribly inefficient, even after taking standardization into account.
I've made a detailed case for my views. Where's yours?
Otherwise you will never come to any real conclusions, since every society will look more complex from a particular perspective, so none can be fruitfully compared to another. Or you would end up with ridiculous conclusions like modern society is simpler than hunter gatherer societies, because we have uniform driving laws and a global data routing protocol while they don't.
Sure, in a vacuum anything can be seen as 'complexity', but if you actual measure the costs of doing complicated things in late Roman times then it's clear why their system fell apart while the Germans' largely didn't, despite the Romans having more territory and population to start with, and the key is to see that the late Roman system was horribly inefficient, even after taking standardization into account.
I've made a detailed case for my views. Where's yours?
Otherwise you will never come to any real conclusions, since every society will look more complex from a particular perspective, so none can be fruitfully compared to another. Or you would end up with ridiculous conclusions like modern society is simpler than hunter gatherer societies, because we have uniform driving laws and a global data routing protocol while they don't.
I'm not ignoring perverse standardization as a possibility, but c'mon there's no shortage of additional details that can be added, tangents, exceptions to exceptions, etc. But I'd be more interested if your points were specific historical instances and sourced, not hypotheticals (which we all acknowledge as logically possible.)
I've cited a source, and a specific historical instance, have you?
PS - the German "system" fell apart many times, populations swapped, etc. The area was always a problem, no one empire or monarchy there was a constant problem.
I've cited a source, and a specific historical instance, have you?
PS - the German "system" fell apart many times, populations swapped, etc. The area was always a problem, no one empire or monarchy there was a constant problem.
I think the crux of our disagreement here seems to be that you believe size is the main driver of Rome's failure and complexity should play no (causative) role.
I have a more nuanced position: size was certainly a strong causative factor, but it had an intricate relationship to social, military, other complexities in a strong feedback loop that took place over centuries.
In large, complex systems, it's never one factor that fully causes another, but a complex feedback occurs; sometimes the system tends towards homeostasis, while other times a feedback occurs that utterly transforms the system as a whole.
Let's just talk about Rome in particular. Rome's Empire has often been called the 'accidental' empire in the sense that the Roman Republic and the people did not seek out to create an empire from the get-go, but it sort of fell into their lap. How did this happen?
1. Rome was embroiled with constant conflicts with their neighbors starting with the Etruscans and Samnites and developed the military and social institutions (a certain form of complexity here) that let them eventually triumph
2. To defeat their enemies, Rome eventually built a massive war machine (complexity) and found out that conquest was very profitable (selling slaves back in Rome, pillaging and taxing the conquered territories—tons of social, economic, and military complexity, but here have the beginnings of size as well).
3. However, this 'pillaging economy' only worked as long as Rome was able to keep conquering weaker neighbors and taking its population as slaves. At any point in the process, Rome theoretically could have disbanded (or drastically reduced) the size of its legions and decided 'here is enough', but internal conflicts, the quest for glory, etc. kept the military adventurism, because it was profitable for the generals and troops that lead the conquest (a complex arrangement, leading to 'size')
4. Administering a vast empire was difficult, so simplifying reforms (which, as you say and I completely admit, may reduce complexity) like standardization of coinage, law, military equipment, etc. occurred in the late Empire. However this was still in the context of an overly bloated (size) and overly inefficient (complexity) Empire that was only held together by military force
So I think you're absolutely right if your thesis is that size -> complexity. However, in certain cases (like Rome's), complexity -> size as well, and the combination is key.
And the rise and fall of Rome over the centuries can be seen as a certain path one can take:
initial complexity (the highly profitable, 'accidental' Roman war machine) -> overly fast, unsustainable growth -> forced additional complexity due to size -> failure to reform (and simplify) quickly enough -> collapse
I have a more nuanced position: size was certainly a strong causative factor, but it had an intricate relationship to social, military, other complexities in a strong feedback loop that took place over centuries.
In large, complex systems, it's never one factor that fully causes another, but a complex feedback occurs; sometimes the system tends towards homeostasis, while other times a feedback occurs that utterly transforms the system as a whole.
Let's just talk about Rome in particular. Rome's Empire has often been called the 'accidental' empire in the sense that the Roman Republic and the people did not seek out to create an empire from the get-go, but it sort of fell into their lap. How did this happen?
1. Rome was embroiled with constant conflicts with their neighbors starting with the Etruscans and Samnites and developed the military and social institutions (a certain form of complexity here) that let them eventually triumph
2. To defeat their enemies, Rome eventually built a massive war machine (complexity) and found out that conquest was very profitable (selling slaves back in Rome, pillaging and taxing the conquered territories—tons of social, economic, and military complexity, but here have the beginnings of size as well).
3. However, this 'pillaging economy' only worked as long as Rome was able to keep conquering weaker neighbors and taking its population as slaves. At any point in the process, Rome theoretically could have disbanded (or drastically reduced) the size of its legions and decided 'here is enough', but internal conflicts, the quest for glory, etc. kept the military adventurism, because it was profitable for the generals and troops that lead the conquest (a complex arrangement, leading to 'size')
4. Administering a vast empire was difficult, so simplifying reforms (which, as you say and I completely admit, may reduce complexity) like standardization of coinage, law, military equipment, etc. occurred in the late Empire. However this was still in the context of an overly bloated (size) and overly inefficient (complexity) Empire that was only held together by military force
So I think you're absolutely right if your thesis is that size -> complexity. However, in certain cases (like Rome's), complexity -> size as well, and the combination is key.
And the rise and fall of Rome over the centuries can be seen as a certain path one can take:
initial complexity (the highly profitable, 'accidental' Roman war machine) -> overly fast, unsustainable growth -> forced additional complexity due to size -> failure to reform (and simplify) quickly enough -> collapse
The Classical Roman Empire had a surprisingly ineffective and inefficient administrative system, even at its height. It was strongly centralized, and the Empire, even by the second century, was simply too large to manage by one person. After the Crisis of the Third Century, Diocletian essentially solved the issue by installing multiple co-emperors to divvy up the work, although this did have massive issues (turns out that having two theoretically co-equal rulers in an absolute monarchy doesn't bode well for stability).
What essentially happened from the third century through the seventh century is that the internal instability caused more and more power to be (intentionally or not) devolved to more local elites. After Christianity became the state religion, the administrative backbone of Roman Europe became the Church and not the Empire itself, which also helped to hasten the devolution. At some point, the local rulers and population would realize that they're not getting anything from Rome and they owe nothing to Rome, so why call themselves Roman? The Western Roman Empire effectively dissolved itself into nothingness, and its passing went more or less unnoticed by contemporaneous observers.
Portraying this gradual process as a concrete "fall" is somewhat problematic. There is a striking continuity on many levels. Even the polities end up being fairly stable: the Frankish kingdom eventually ended up inheriting the Western Roman Empire de facto and arguably de jure following the crowning of Charlemagne as Holy Roman Empire, while the Eastern Roman Empire became the Byzantine Empire. In both cases, the administrative systems had been transformed dramatically from the traditional Roman model. That's not to say that there wasn't a severe shock, but the biggest shock would have been the loss of North Africa (the key granary supplying Rome) that created a vicious cycle of economic decline. The actual date commonly given for the fall (476) was more or less contemporaneously ignored by everybody as yet another change in the local ruler.
What essentially happened from the third century through the seventh century is that the internal instability caused more and more power to be (intentionally or not) devolved to more local elites. After Christianity became the state religion, the administrative backbone of Roman Europe became the Church and not the Empire itself, which also helped to hasten the devolution. At some point, the local rulers and population would realize that they're not getting anything from Rome and they owe nothing to Rome, so why call themselves Roman? The Western Roman Empire effectively dissolved itself into nothingness, and its passing went more or less unnoticed by contemporaneous observers.
Portraying this gradual process as a concrete "fall" is somewhat problematic. There is a striking continuity on many levels. Even the polities end up being fairly stable: the Frankish kingdom eventually ended up inheriting the Western Roman Empire de facto and arguably de jure following the crowning of Charlemagne as Holy Roman Empire, while the Eastern Roman Empire became the Byzantine Empire. In both cases, the administrative systems had been transformed dramatically from the traditional Roman model. That's not to say that there wasn't a severe shock, but the biggest shock would have been the loss of North Africa (the key granary supplying Rome) that created a vicious cycle of economic decline. The actual date commonly given for the fall (476) was more or less contemporaneously ignored by everybody as yet another change in the local ruler.
While my only source is the Fall of Rome podcast that others on this thread are raving about, one key point he makes is that whether or not it was a 'Fall' depends a lot on where you lived. Yes, there was lots of continuity in Aquitane and Gaul, but if you lived in much of Northern Africa, (what is now) northern France, or Britain, you saw a significant decline in your standard of living. Britain even stopped using currency altogether.
IANA historian, but do read contemporary scholarly history. Chris Wickham whom everyone seems to respect thinks that population in most regions of the Western Empire fell by 50% or more after 300 AD.
Setting aside arguments about what the "fall of an empire" means, a 50% decline in population is much more serious than administrative devolution. I'm sure that anyone in that period who could see a large enough span of time would have felt something major was lost.
Setting aside arguments about what the "fall of an empire" means, a 50% decline in population is much more serious than administrative devolution. I'm sure that anyone in that period who could see a large enough span of time would have felt something major was lost.
Great quote made back in 2009 "I can see the politicians of the time running on a platform that said, "Keep the barbarians out! More walls to defend the empire"."
Also "As things stands, we seem to be blithely following the same path that the Roman Empire followed. Our leaders are unable to understand complex systems and continue to implement solutions that worsen the problem. As the wise druid was trying to tell to Marcus Aurelius, building walls to keep the barbarians out was a loss of resources that was worse than useless. "
Also "As things stands, we seem to be blithely following the same path that the Roman Empire followed. Our leaders are unable to understand complex systems and continue to implement solutions that worsen the problem. As the wise druid was trying to tell to Marcus Aurelius, building walls to keep the barbarians out was a loss of resources that was worse than useless. "
Walls being useless in one situation at a given time and place does not mean they are always useless: for instance the great wall of China have been really useful to keep northern barbarians at bay for centuries.
And the walls surrounding Constantinople kept the eastern Roman empire going for an extra millennium after the western part fell.
Well, the reality is that letting the barbarians in actually did in significant part lead to Rome's downfall. They rampaged through the countryside and sacked Rome multiple times.
Rome was in a state of near perpetual warfare with the Germans for centuries. Eventually Rome became too weak to defend its northeastern borders and the Germans hollowed out what had become a rotten western empire.
Rome was in a state of near perpetual warfare with the Germans for centuries. Eventually Rome became too weak to defend its northeastern borders and the Germans hollowed out what had become a rotten western empire.
I don't know why you're being downvoted - the analogy to modern politics they are trying to push is hilariously bad. Are we really blaming the Romans for not supplicating the Goths and then getting massacred by them, leading to a 1000 year technological stagnation? Are we really trying to project Donald Trump onto Marcus Aurelius? You've got to be kidding me.
No, we're projecting Donald Trump onto a hypothetical Roman politician imagined in 2009 by Ugo Bardi the Oil Drum writer, due to the coincidental and quite obvious similarity of their "wall" platforms, including both the expense and the futility, as well as the fact that both are set in empires collapsing under their own weight. Is it so hard to see?
Are we really trying to project Donald Trump onto Marcus Aurelius?
This is a post from 2009. Any analogies to Trump are being done by you.
This is a post from 2009. Any analogies to Trump are being done by you.
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Interestingly, the Gothic rebellions that lead to the sacking of Rome twice in the 400s AD was a direct result of the Romans abandoning their traditional policy of integration, dispersion, and resettlement in favor of abusing and exploiting the desperate Goths. Given a choice by the Romans of starving to death or selling their children into slavery, the Goths chose 'none of the above' and went on a rampage that led to the position as a coherent military power within the borders of the Empire but not truly tied to it.
The degree to which the Romans relied on barbarians in later years for their own defense was quite significant -- and they rarely afforded barbarians full citizenship.
By the time Rome was sacked by barbarians, it was in terminal decline anyway.
This article focuses too much on economics. Surely these economic effects have happened and greatly contributed to Rome's demise. But were they a root cause or just a consequence of something else? I think that politics played some role in Rome's demise and that should've at least been mentioned to give a complete picture.
Some political systems are quite effective, some are not as much. Monarchys are typically less effective since the power transition is not merid-based. Roman empire wasn't quite a monarchy in the medieval sense, but judging by the amount of crises per century, it was pretty close. Wasn't that a factor to be taken into account? Wasn't that the bad emperors who screwed up Roman economy to the extent that even Marcus Aurelius couldn't fix it?
Early Roman republic was on the other hand an outlier in terms of its efficiency. Obviously that was military efficiency, but wasn't it tightly connected with political efficiency? It seems to me that early Roman republic managed to build a system that promoted people based on their merit and that somehow made the entire system an order of magnitude more efficient then their neighbours.
It seems to me that just the fact that we are looking at ancient Roman history is an example of availability bias. Hundreds or thousands of other city-states of that era weren't as militarily or politically effective and therefore lost to Rome and ceased to exist. This is another indicator of high efficiency of early Roman politics, and it kind of implies that as time went by the efficiency slowly or rapidly decreased.
Of course it's hard to argue about how effective is one political system compared to another. It's hard to even define precisely what is efficiency in this case. But I think we shouldn't only focus on economics just because it's easier to talk about. I am waiting for someone smarter than me to write a book about political reasons of why do societies collapse. Or is there such a book already out there?
Some political systems are quite effective, some are not as much. Monarchys are typically less effective since the power transition is not merid-based. Roman empire wasn't quite a monarchy in the medieval sense, but judging by the amount of crises per century, it was pretty close. Wasn't that a factor to be taken into account? Wasn't that the bad emperors who screwed up Roman economy to the extent that even Marcus Aurelius couldn't fix it?
Early Roman republic was on the other hand an outlier in terms of its efficiency. Obviously that was military efficiency, but wasn't it tightly connected with political efficiency? It seems to me that early Roman republic managed to build a system that promoted people based on their merit and that somehow made the entire system an order of magnitude more efficient then their neighbours.
It seems to me that just the fact that we are looking at ancient Roman history is an example of availability bias. Hundreds or thousands of other city-states of that era weren't as militarily or politically effective and therefore lost to Rome and ceased to exist. This is another indicator of high efficiency of early Roman politics, and it kind of implies that as time went by the efficiency slowly or rapidly decreased.
Of course it's hard to argue about how effective is one political system compared to another. It's hard to even define precisely what is efficiency in this case. But I think we shouldn't only focus on economics just because it's easier to talk about. I am waiting for someone smarter than me to write a book about political reasons of why do societies collapse. Or is there such a book already out there?
Fate of empires by John baggot glubb is the canonical treatment of this topic. It’s also really short and pithy and you can read it in an hour.
Since the article starts by citing the battle of the Teutoberger Forest (in the photo caption), I'll say this:
If you can read or understand German, and you don't know the 19th Century satirical song "Als die Roemer Frech Geworden", you're in for a treat.
Every recorded version seems to have a different choice of stanzas, but a comment to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_-z2Nmu4okI seems pretty comprehensive.
If you can read or understand German, and you don't know the 19th Century satirical song "Als die Roemer Frech Geworden", you're in for a treat.
Every recorded version seems to have a different choice of stanzas, but a comment to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_-z2Nmu4okI seems pretty comprehensive.
I wonder if in the long view we still live in the Roman empire.
Perhaps in Roman civilization. The alphabet of every European language, including English, was inherited from Latin, which was the language of the Roman Empire. This indicates that the Roman bureaucratic system, and along with it, its administrative principles, were adopted in whole by the states in Europe that succeeded the Roman empire.
More like a fan-fiction reboot.
The Roman empire lasted over a thousand years - but only in the east, in Constantinople.
The command structure of the empire lives on today in the Catholic church, but of course it's not a continuation.
The command structure of the empire lives on today in the Catholic church, but of course it's not a continuation.
When the Ottomans sacked Constantinople, didn't the intellectuals just move back to Rome and start the Renaissance?
Intellectually I'd say that history is pretty continuous. The greatest loss was not the "fall" of Rome, but the destruction of Mayan history during the Spanish conquest (they had developed writing separately - along with the Chinese, Phoenicians, and Arabs).
Intellectually I'd say that history is pretty continuous. The greatest loss was not the "fall" of Rome, but the destruction of Mayan history during the Spanish conquest (they had developed writing separately - along with the Chinese, Phoenicians, and Arabs).
Less the Ottomans sacking it than the Fourth Crusade doing that job. Constantinople was a pretty sad city in the 1440s; the Ottomans actually revived the city back into a major metropolis.
The USA is an Enlightenment creation, designed to learn from and avoid the failures of previous government systems; as such they owe more to the spirit of Ancient Athens than to that of Ancient Rome.
From what I have read, the thinkers of the American and French revolutions seemed to be influenced by Rome rather than Athens.
The US revolution is driven by the spirit of the agora and the polis, an alliance of such polities, and the idea that the people are the source of all state power; rather than the Roman Republic or Empire as a centralized entity with absolute dominion over the people.
I don't think it is accidental that John Adams and Thomas Jefferson read classics in the original Greek for pleasure. Also, while Cicero was a giant of the Roman Republic, he was a great admirer of Aristotle.
I don't think it is accidental that John Adams and Thomas Jefferson read classics in the original Greek for pleasure. Also, while Cicero was a giant of the Roman Republic, he was a great admirer of Aristotle.
The legal systems in continental Europe are directly descended from the Roman one: https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilL...
As a non-lawyer and non-European I don't know how significant that is.
As a non-lawyer and non-European I don't know how significant that is.
The notions of law and legality prominent in the west are derived from the Roman ones; and many other parts of the world adopted one of these common law or civil law system over the last two hundred years. Japan and China, for example, both adopted these legal systems in recent times.
There are many Roman legal institutions, however, that have been abandoned; and these are some of the most essential to Roman society. These include:
* The unity of political and military authority.
* The father's power of life and death over the members of his family.
* The deep interconnectedness of religious mystery and the state.
* The careful delineation of different kinds of citizens with different levels of rights, as a matter of statute.
There are many Roman legal institutions, however, that have been abandoned; and these are some of the most essential to Roman society. These include:
* The unity of political and military authority.
* The father's power of life and death over the members of his family.
* The deep interconnectedness of religious mystery and the state.
* The careful delineation of different kinds of citizens with different levels of rights, as a matter of statute.
About the past point... are you that sure? I mean, USA Green Cards, Permanent Residency aren’t different kinds of citizenship?
Also there's a big and increasing class of people in the EU living outside their home country. They currently have no say in their country of residence for many years and if the EU breaks apart (ie Brexit), then millions more will be left with no political rights or the prospect of ever getting them.
Not really, the only thing you can't do with a green card is vote and citizenship is automatic (modulo paperwork) after five years. That, and you can get deported for a serious crime. But the status is naturally time limited.
The second class citizens of the US are illegal immigrants. It would be trivial to get rid of them by cracking down on their employers but that would increase labor costs for their employers so the government turns a blind eye unless forced.
The second class citizens of the US are illegal immigrants. It would be trivial to get rid of them by cracking down on their employers but that would increase labor costs for their employers so the government turns a blind eye unless forced.
They are de facto but de jure they are all almost exactly the same as full citizenship.
It's a difference in degree that makes for a difference in kind. There is no legal status of "slave" or "vassal" in most (any?) common or civil law countries.
It's a difference in degree that makes for a difference in kind. There is no legal status of "slave" or "vassal" in most (any?) common or civil law countries.
Can someone help me translate the quoted Latin? I'm a beginner.
>“In primis sciendum est quod imperium romanum circumlatrantium ubique nationum perstringat insania et omne latus limitum tecta naturalibus locis appetat dolosa barbaries."
I think generally if you look at the above sentence and know some Latin vocabulary you can see what is going on, but I'm having a hard time sorting out the structure given the subjunctives, passives, and participles.
>“In primis sciendum est quod imperium romanum circumlatrantium ubique nationum perstringat insania et omne latus limitum tecta naturalibus locis appetat dolosa barbaries."
I think generally if you look at the above sentence and know some Latin vocabulary you can see what is going on, but I'm having a hard time sorting out the structure given the subjunctives, passives, and participles.
"The Barbarians are at the gate."
Source: I took Latin for 8 years; had to read-and-translate live for three years from Virgil every other week at 8am in front of the class. Latin is usually more concise than English, except when it's medieval or kitchen Latin.
Source: I took Latin for 8 years; had to read-and-translate live for three years from Virgil every other week at 8am in front of the class. Latin is usually more concise than English, except when it's medieval or kitchen Latin.
There are only two verbs in this sentence that I can see: "appetat" which means "he/she/it attacks/grasps/strives for/approaches, and "perstringat" which is a subjunctive and means "he/she/it may graze/seize/reprove". I think perstringat refers to sciendum, but I am not what appetat refers to.
There is no verb that implies a plural third person, nor is there a word for "gate" here.
What I'm having trouble with is the second part. So the first part is something like, "in the beginning, the knowing may draw together what is the roman authority of the barking around, wherein the nation..." But still I'm not sure. Then in the second part we have what could be multiple nominatives and only one verb.
There is no verb that implies a plural third person, nor is there a word for "gate" here.
What I'm having trouble with is the second part. So the first part is something like, "in the beginning, the knowing may draw together what is the roman authority of the barking around, wherein the nation..." But still I'm not sure. Then in the second part we have what could be multiple nominatives and only one verb.
First it must be known that the empire is surrounded etc. etc. and each edge (of the empire) covered with natural features appeals to cunning barbarism.
I.e. they're at the gate.
I.e. they're at the gate.
There are more verbs in various forms. E.g. "sciendum est ..." means it should be known that ...
"tecta" is from "tegere".
"tecta" is from "tegere".
R.A. Lafferty brought this event to life in his fiction.
https://www.fantasticfiction.com/l/r-a-lafferty/fall-of-rome...
”Rome's demise was not a simple case of fierce barbarians sacking and subduing a decadent, crumbling city. The author has skillfully balanced the turmoil and illusions of a mighty, dying Empire against the vitality of the aggressive Huns, Vandals, and above all, the Goths. The result is one of the most perceptive and stimulating historical accounts ever written.
This is history told and read for sheer pleasure: exciting, splendid and complex. The Fall of Rome is a story of the men and women who made things happen, who were as awesome, poignant, and in some cases, as savage as the era itself.”
https://www.fantasticfiction.com/l/r-a-lafferty/fall-of-rome...
”Rome's demise was not a simple case of fierce barbarians sacking and subduing a decadent, crumbling city. The author has skillfully balanced the turmoil and illusions of a mighty, dying Empire against the vitality of the aggressive Huns, Vandals, and above all, the Goths. The result is one of the most perceptive and stimulating historical accounts ever written.
This is history told and read for sheer pleasure: exciting, splendid and complex. The Fall of Rome is a story of the men and women who made things happen, who were as awesome, poignant, and in some cases, as savage as the era itself.”
The fall of Rome is complicated because people like to match it up with their pet theory as to why our current empire will collapse real soon now.
But the Romans just ran out of things to steal. Taking foreign lands meant not just immediate booty but ongoing tribute and advantageous trade and promises of farmland for soldiers. That strategy could only go so far. Then when they lost their great early prize, Carthage, which supplied grain to Rome itself, the empire was finished. Local gangsters took over from the distant gangsters and so they had feudalism.
But the Romans just ran out of things to steal. Taking foreign lands meant not just immediate booty but ongoing tribute and advantageous trade and promises of farmland for soldiers. That strategy could only go so far. Then when they lost their great early prize, Carthage, which supplied grain to Rome itself, the empire was finished. Local gangsters took over from the distant gangsters and so they had feudalism.
The eastern Roman empire kept going for centuries despite losing Egypt and generally getting their ass kicked by the caliphates, though.
I miss the oil drum. It had good content and good commenters. Too bad they couldn't survive the rise of oil from shale.
I am not even sure it has actually fallen. It seems a lot we are still living in what it has morphed into.
Has it fallen ? Il thought its capital had moved to Washington...
> The answer to these crisis and challenges is to build up structures - say, bureaucratic or military - in response. Each time a crisis is faced and solved, society finds itself with an extra layer of complexity. Now, Tainter says, as complexity increases, the benefit of this extra complexity starts going down - he calls it "the marginal benefit of complexity". That is because complexity has a cost - it costs energy to maintain complex systems.