Boeing Weighs Cutting or Halting 737 Max Production(wsj.com)
wsj.com
Boeing Weighs Cutting or Halting 737 Max Production
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-weighs-cutting-or-halting-737-max-production-11576448990
223 comments
An interesting part of the history of the 737 is that when it launched it originally had a serious rudder design flaw that contributed to several fatal crashes where a lot of folks lost their lives:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues
However, Boeing did fix the problem, and the 737 went on to be one of the best selling airplanes in history.
This MCAS issue is eerily similar in that it has also resulted in two fatal crashes. But if history is any guide, the problems will be fixed, and the memory of MCAS and MAX issues will likely fade from the public as well.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues
However, Boeing did fix the problem, and the 737 went on to be one of the best selling airplanes in history.
This MCAS issue is eerily similar in that it has also resulted in two fatal crashes. But if history is any guide, the problems will be fixed, and the memory of MCAS and MAX issues will likely fade from the public as well.
A part of me joins you in this pessimistic view, but the other side of me recognizes that the rudder issues took place in 1991 and most likely the vast majority of the public was never made aware of those issues. I had never heard of it, though that doesn't mean much as a statistical sample.
I know a lot of people are now aware of this particular design flaw and I would put money on it being more generally known now then then.
I know a lot of people are now aware of this particular design flaw and I would put money on it being more generally known now then then.
You can’t really compare the two.
The 80s and 90s were loaded with severe accidents where the NTSB was really giving the taxpayers their money’s worth since there would be a major accident almost every month and the agency had to create a new division to handle all the cases.
Most weren’t design issues like the MCAS and the 91’ rudder issue but faulty 3rd party parts, poor maintenance, unknown stresses on aging fleets, pilot issues, and on and on.
We are in an unprecedented age of aviation safety and the MCAS issue is a huge blow to that record, thus you’re hearing about it in this level because it is fresh in the news. Accidents were common place back then, so common that I’d wager the 91 crash wasn’t on peoples radars since they just accepted that aircraft crash frequently and to be honest the general public doesn’t know what a rudder is in the first place.
The 80s and 90s were loaded with severe accidents where the NTSB was really giving the taxpayers their money’s worth since there would be a major accident almost every month and the agency had to create a new division to handle all the cases.
Most weren’t design issues like the MCAS and the 91’ rudder issue but faulty 3rd party parts, poor maintenance, unknown stresses on aging fleets, pilot issues, and on and on.
We are in an unprecedented age of aviation safety and the MCAS issue is a huge blow to that record, thus you’re hearing about it in this level because it is fresh in the news. Accidents were common place back then, so common that I’d wager the 91 crash wasn’t on peoples radars since they just accepted that aircraft crash frequently and to be honest the general public doesn’t know what a rudder is in the first place.
In 1991, the number of deaths in air crashes was also nearly 5x the number of deaths in 2017. A plane crashing in 1991 was, for better or worse, just news.
But today, a plane crashing due to an engineering failure is rare enough that it makes headlines that people don't forget easily
But today, a plane crashing due to an engineering failure is rare enough that it makes headlines that people don't forget easily
> A plane crashing in 1991 was, for better or worse, just news.
IDK, the Lockerbie and TWA crashes were all over the news for what seemed like years
IDK, the Lockerbie and TWA crashes were all over the news for what seemed like years
They weren't "just" plane crashes. Most of the follow up surrounded the terrorism and hunt for the bombers...
I also believe most people hadn't heard of it. For one, news gets around much faster and easier nowadays with the advent of the internet. Anecdotally, it appears as if anyone who flies would've had the right exposure to Western media to hear about it.
The Boeing of those days was a different company than Boeing today, and the public knows it. That Boeing was driven by engineers with safety as their highest priority. Today's Boeing is driven by suits with profit as their highest priority. This Boeing has lost the public's trust. Even if they fix MCAS, how do we know there aren't other safety corners cut in the design just waiting to kill somebody?
Not only Boeing lost public trust but presumably the FAA as well. At least outside US this may have even more severe implications.
Boeing better not loses one more plane due to design issues.
Boeing better not loses one more plane due to design issues.
The "suits" didn't just take over last year. The complaint is at least as old as their move to Chicago in 2001. That would at least put the 787 in the same class of "suit-designed" aircraft.
And yet, air travel today is far safer than it has ever been, the 737 non-withstanding. Considering air travel has increased by almost an order of magnitude since the heydays of engineering-run Boeing in the 60s, and fatalities have decreased by a similar factor, air travel today is about 70x safer than it was in the past.
Based on this data, any nostalgic theories of how safety today is being ruined by <x> are really hard to defend.
And yet, air travel today is far safer than it has ever been, the 737 non-withstanding. Considering air travel has increased by almost an order of magnitude since the heydays of engineering-run Boeing in the 60s, and fatalities have decreased by a similar factor, air travel today is about 70x safer than it was in the past.
Based on this data, any nostalgic theories of how safety today is being ruined by <x> are really hard to defend.
> That would at least put the 787 in the same class of "suit-designed" aircraft.
The 787 is a suit-designed aircraft. Composite materials are not ready for prime time. They are a gamble that Boeing suits have made against passenger lives. If the bet pays out, the planes save a miniscule amount of fuel compared to planes made of traditional materials. If the bet does not pay out, people die.
Only a few months ago, we discovered more 737 problems. These were unrelated to MCAS. Instead, they affected the part that holds the wing to the fuselage:
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/09/29/boeing...
The 787 is a suit-designed aircraft. Composite materials are not ready for prime time. They are a gamble that Boeing suits have made against passenger lives. If the bet pays out, the planes save a miniscule amount of fuel compared to planes made of traditional materials. If the bet does not pay out, people die.
Only a few months ago, we discovered more 737 problems. These were unrelated to MCAS. Instead, they affected the part that holds the wing to the fuselage:
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/09/29/boeing...
people still die more driving to the airport than in a plane crash.
The fact that people smoke, drive while texting, drive drunk, don't exercise and so on, show that they don't really care about not dying. They just like to complain when dying is caused by somebody else.
The fact that people smoke, drive while texting, drive drunk, don't exercise and so on, show that they don't really care about not dying. They just like to complain when dying is caused by somebody else.
> They just like to complain when dying is caused by somebody else.
Which is completely legitimate.
Which is completely legitimate.
Should we have an eligibility criteria for people who can be allowed to complain?
Strongly disagree there. The material is perfectly fine, in part due to massive safety margins.
Composites have been in use in crewed aerospace vehicles for ~55 years (or arguably >80 years).
Composite aircraft were developed in the early 1960s, although first use of composites goes back to the 1930s, and even the Space Shuttle developed in the 1970s made extensive use of composites... not just carbon fiber and kevlar, but also materials considered cutting edge today, like metal-matrix boron fiber and carbon-carbon.
The materials are perfectly ready, if you're willing to pay the cost of testing, analysis, and margin. It took just ~35 years to go from Wright Brothers and their wooden aircraft to all-aluminum pressurized airliners (and yeah, there were folks who were skeptical of aluminum at that time as well).
Given at least 50 years in extensive use, I can't see how waiting longer will help[0]. The alternative is permanent stasis.
[0]More analysis or more margin or more testing is an argument I could buy into, but not being "too early for prime time."
Composites have been in use in crewed aerospace vehicles for ~55 years (or arguably >80 years).
Composite aircraft were developed in the early 1960s, although first use of composites goes back to the 1930s, and even the Space Shuttle developed in the 1970s made extensive use of composites... not just carbon fiber and kevlar, but also materials considered cutting edge today, like metal-matrix boron fiber and carbon-carbon.
The materials are perfectly ready, if you're willing to pay the cost of testing, analysis, and margin. It took just ~35 years to go from Wright Brothers and their wooden aircraft to all-aluminum pressurized airliners (and yeah, there were folks who were skeptical of aluminum at that time as well).
Given at least 50 years in extensive use, I can't see how waiting longer will help[0]. The alternative is permanent stasis.
[0]More analysis or more margin or more testing is an argument I could buy into, but not being "too early for prime time."
"Composite materials are not ready for prime time."
Wow, I didn't know the 787 was built with that in mind. Seriously, my dad has worked at Beechcraft since the 80s and he remembers when they tried that nonsense with the Starship. It's like no one remembers why the idea was scrapped beyond the initial costs (composites have to have aluminum weave to allow lightning strikes and static discharge dissipate through the wings otherwise it'll blow off said wing).
Wow, I didn't know the 787 was built with that in mind. Seriously, my dad has worked at Beechcraft since the 80s and he remembers when they tried that nonsense with the Starship. It's like no one remembers why the idea was scrapped beyond the initial costs (composites have to have aluminum weave to allow lightning strikes and static discharge dissipate through the wings otherwise it'll blow off said wing).
The data we have is the 737 MAX itself that stands out in the backdrop of ever increasing safety. That happened. The 787 possibly being a safe plane is irrelevant and doesn’t change that.
> And yet, air travel today is far safer than it has ever been, the 737 non-withstanding.
Boeing doesn’t get to take credit for all the advances in air safety in the past 40 years.
> And yet, air travel today is far safer than it has ever been, the 737 non-withstanding.
Boeing doesn’t get to take credit for all the advances in air safety in the past 40 years.
> Boeing doesn’t get to take credit for all the advances in air safety in the past 40 years.
No, but they can certainly take credit for some of those advances.
No, but they can certainly take credit for some of those advances.
The 1990s of those initial failures also predated the information heavy internet hyper analysis and outrage machines
It's the messenger's fault. Of course!
What arguments do you have that show that lots and lots of articles about about Boeings culture change are all wrong or insignificant (not a contributor to the Max's issues)?
I'm also not sure why you think a heuristic that uses amount of outrage as an inverse measure of the validity of an issue is a useful one. I would assume the connection is either non-existent or very weak, meaning you cannot infer anything useful about an issue from how much it is being discussed in the media and in public forums.
What arguments do you have that show that lots and lots of articles about about Boeings culture change are all wrong or insignificant (not a contributor to the Max's issues)?
I'm also not sure why you think a heuristic that uses amount of outrage as an inverse measure of the validity of an issue is a useful one. I would assume the connection is either non-existent or very weak, meaning you cannot infer anything useful about an issue from how much it is being discussed in the media and in public forums.
Given what we know now, after the outrage took out of the closet a lot of information previously obscured and out of the limelight, about Boeing's issues in production and design and the regulatory capture of the FAA: do you still think this whole backlash against the 737 MAX is purely the internet hyper analysis and outrage machine?
Nope, that wasn't my point obviously. Just highlighting it was a different time for media and analysis.
I'm not so sure about that. Besides what was already mentioned about news getting around much faster in 2019 vs 1991, the problems with the Max are harder to fix.
It's a fundamentally unstable airframe. The engines are too big and too far forward. They can't fix that without a major redesign of the fuselage to lengthen the landing gear. At which point it may better to simply design and build a whole new airplane.
It's a fundamentally unstable airframe. The engines are too big and too far forward. They can't fix that without a major redesign of the fuselage to lengthen the landing gear. At which point it may better to simply design and build a whole new airplane.
> It's a fundamentally unstable airframe.
The 737 MAX is not a 'fundamentally unstable airframe', though there are points in the flight envelope where it is close to becoming unstable. The definition of an unstable aircraft is when the center of pressure is forward of the center of gravity, a condition which never occurs in the 747 MAX flight envelope, though it comes perilously close to it in some edge cases.
As you correctly identify the engines being 'too big and too far forward' is a factor here, but the most important part of it is the extra lift created by the engine bodies, not the power of the engines themselves.
The 737 MAX is not a 'fundamentally unstable airframe', though there are points in the flight envelope where it is close to becoming unstable. The definition of an unstable aircraft is when the center of pressure is forward of the center of gravity, a condition which never occurs in the 747 MAX flight envelope, though it comes perilously close to it in some edge cases.
As you correctly identify the engines being 'too big and too far forward' is a factor here, but the most important part of it is the extra lift created by the engine bodies, not the power of the engines themselves.
Let's just say that Boeing pushed a 50 year old design to places to which it never was supposed to pushed to.
Full blown panic about Airbus' offerings had a lot to do with this faithful decision.
The first crash was a combination of greed, bad design decisions, rush to market and all that in combination with an FAA that was in Boeing's pocket.
The fact that they didn't immediately pulled the plane after the Lion Air crash and the second crash was nothing less than corporate mass murder for profit.
Full blown panic about Airbus' offerings had a lot to do with this faithful decision.
The first crash was a combination of greed, bad design decisions, rush to market and all that in combination with an FAA that was in Boeing's pocket.
The fact that they didn't immediately pulled the plane after the Lion Air crash and the second crash was nothing less than corporate mass murder for profit.
I was under the impression the Max vs a clean room design was actually pushed by airlines, rather than by Boeing it’s self. They wanted a new form scratch design, much like the 787.
Now not to remove responsibility from them, ultimately they buckled under pressure and did the deed.
Now not to remove responsibility from them, ultimately they buckled under pressure and did the deed.
That's exactly what happened, Boeing wanted to re-design the 737 with a new type certificate and all that, but the airlines pushed for a re-engined 737.
In the end the 737 MAX is largely a good design, just with one big fuckup.
There's also a certain irony that Boeing would have been able to push out a software update before the Ethiopian crash if the government was not shut down for a month over Dec 2018-Jan 2019.
In the end the 737 MAX is largely a good design, just with one big fuckup.
There's also a certain irony that Boeing would have been able to push out a software update before the Ethiopian crash if the government was not shut down for a month over Dec 2018-Jan 2019.
They had a software update to correct a bunch of issues with MCAS in the pipe, but it was delayed by the government shutdown.
If there had been no government shutdown, the Ethiopian Airlines crash might not have happened.
If there had been no government shutdown, the Ethiopian Airlines crash might not have happened.
You keep pushing the blame on the government shutdown.
Boeing could itself grounded the airplanes without government intervention but corporate greed won.
Other governments are to blame ibdeed for relying on FAA certification instead of doing their own. I guess that won't happen again.
Boeing could itself grounded the airplanes without government intervention but corporate greed won.
Other governments are to blame ibdeed for relying on FAA certification instead of doing their own. I guess that won't happen again.
> You keep pushing the blame on the government shutdown.
I've actually only mentioned it in two or maybe three comments over the last year.
Your operating from the benefit of hindsight. All the information about the Lion Air crash is out now, you can look at it and decide it should have been grounded. At the time it was not very clear what had happened and why and if it was issues with the pilots or the aircraft or both. Boeing had more information than the public, but not as much as came to light after the Ethiopian Airlines crash.
Also, Boeing does not actually have the authority to ground aircraft they make, they have to push the FAA to do it. The FAA will want to have a good reason, because if the FAA does something that needlessly costs the airline industry lots of money, people at the FAA loose their jobs.
So, its pretty much fuckups all around.
I've actually only mentioned it in two or maybe three comments over the last year.
Your operating from the benefit of hindsight. All the information about the Lion Air crash is out now, you can look at it and decide it should have been grounded. At the time it was not very clear what had happened and why and if it was issues with the pilots or the aircraft or both. Boeing had more information than the public, but not as much as came to light after the Ethiopian Airlines crash.
Also, Boeing does not actually have the authority to ground aircraft they make, they have to push the FAA to do it. The FAA will want to have a good reason, because if the FAA does something that needlessly costs the airline industry lots of money, people at the FAA loose their jobs.
So, its pretty much fuckups all around.
> decide it should have been grounded
It should haven't been flown in the first place, as it breaks the rule of having a full-authority control system dependent on a single non-redundant sensor.
Boeing got approval for a limited-authority control system, and then modified it to be full-authority without redoing the paperwork. They KNOWINGLY LIED on the type certification documentation. If they wouldn't have lied the aircraft wouldn't have gotten of the ground in the first place.
> Boeing does not actually have the authority to ground aircraft
They do, it's called an Airworthiness Directive and a manufacturer can ask for it and FAA will comply. Even if the FAA is un-operative due to a US government shutdown, they could've notified EASA, CAA, etc. to prevent a knowingly-faulty plane from flying. They CHOSE to cover it.
> the FAA does something that needlessly costs the airline industry lots of money
Try to balance corporate greed vs safety, and it won't end well because lives of people some place far away don't have monetary value to FAA. Safety MUST be paramount in all aspects, trumping profit, because otherwise people will die.
It should haven't been flown in the first place, as it breaks the rule of having a full-authority control system dependent on a single non-redundant sensor.
Boeing got approval for a limited-authority control system, and then modified it to be full-authority without redoing the paperwork. They KNOWINGLY LIED on the type certification documentation. If they wouldn't have lied the aircraft wouldn't have gotten of the ground in the first place.
> Boeing does not actually have the authority to ground aircraft
They do, it's called an Airworthiness Directive and a manufacturer can ask for it and FAA will comply. Even if the FAA is un-operative due to a US government shutdown, they could've notified EASA, CAA, etc. to prevent a knowingly-faulty plane from flying. They CHOSE to cover it.
> the FAA does something that needlessly costs the airline industry lots of money
Try to balance corporate greed vs safety, and it won't end well because lives of people some place far away don't have monetary value to FAA. Safety MUST be paramount in all aspects, trumping profit, because otherwise people will die.
Yes, from everything that I've researched about this (not working in this industry anymore), MCAS was to adjust the feel of the controls when at the edge of the flight envelope. The plane, during normal flight, would behave very similarly to existing 737s.
What I read that shocked me was that Boeing was relying on a single angle of attack sensor at a time, with software rules that should have never flown. Such as: not tossing out obviously impossible angle of attack readings, doubling down on nose-down stall corrections, and not limiting MCAS to an input that ensured pilot controllability if the electric trim had to be disabled. (this may not have been possible, actually, in certain flight regimes)
The system pushed the plane into a regime where, from everything I have read, the aerodynamic forces were strong enough that manual pilot trimming (via a physical wheel near the control column) was not possible for a normal human, especially while the pilots were experiencing negative G's from such a strong nose-down trim. The flight log information I could find showed a very difficult cockpit situation. Enabling electric trim (and MCAS) shoved the nose downward, but also allowed some level of trim correction by the pilots that they could not achieve with the trim wheel. Stick forces were also enormous on the elevator, having to pull back over 50lbs if my memory serves.
Imagine yanking back with all your might while fiddling with secondary controls that also required enormous force to move, while the plane is forcing you up and out of your seat, against the seatbelt. This is where any cockpit communication issues between the two pilots would be severely complicating.
That Boeing released this with such flaws, and the FAA accepted it, seems quite damning to Boeing and the FAA. This is something that I can imagine technical leadership and management at Boeing would know about and should have caught and stopped much earlier in the process.
What I read that shocked me was that Boeing was relying on a single angle of attack sensor at a time, with software rules that should have never flown. Such as: not tossing out obviously impossible angle of attack readings, doubling down on nose-down stall corrections, and not limiting MCAS to an input that ensured pilot controllability if the electric trim had to be disabled. (this may not have been possible, actually, in certain flight regimes)
The system pushed the plane into a regime where, from everything I have read, the aerodynamic forces were strong enough that manual pilot trimming (via a physical wheel near the control column) was not possible for a normal human, especially while the pilots were experiencing negative G's from such a strong nose-down trim. The flight log information I could find showed a very difficult cockpit situation. Enabling electric trim (and MCAS) shoved the nose downward, but also allowed some level of trim correction by the pilots that they could not achieve with the trim wheel. Stick forces were also enormous on the elevator, having to pull back over 50lbs if my memory serves.
Imagine yanking back with all your might while fiddling with secondary controls that also required enormous force to move, while the plane is forcing you up and out of your seat, against the seatbelt. This is where any cockpit communication issues between the two pilots would be severely complicating.
That Boeing released this with such flaws, and the FAA accepted it, seems quite damning to Boeing and the FAA. This is something that I can imagine technical leadership and management at Boeing would know about and should have caught and stopped much earlier in the process.
They should have never made the Max. They need to make a new plane from the ground up. The 737 is ancient.
Yeah, the stories about how the new requirements didn't fit the limitations of the 737 design, and how they had to make it unbalanced and correct that inherent instability in software, throws up a bunch of red flags. At some point, you need to accept that the original design doesn't work anymore for the current requirements and redesign the whole thing from scratch. Or at least more thoroughly than the quick & dirty fix they used here.
The 737 MAX does not have "inherent instability."
The position of the engines causes the plane to pitch up more significantly when power is added. This is not necessarily bad, but it's different enough from the 737 NG that it would have required retraining pilots. MCAS was designed to remove the need for retraining, by using software to make the MAX act like the NG.
If everyone would have simply accepted that pilots needed to be retrained for the 737 MAX, MCAS wouldn't have been developed and those planes wouldn't have crashed.
The position of the engines causes the plane to pitch up more significantly when power is added. This is not necessarily bad, but it's different enough from the 737 NG that it would have required retraining pilots. MCAS was designed to remove the need for retraining, by using software to make the MAX act like the NG.
If everyone would have simply accepted that pilots needed to be retrained for the 737 MAX, MCAS wouldn't have been developed and those planes wouldn't have crashed.
You’re right in the first point, but wrong on the second and then maybe right again on the third. There’s a specific federal law concerning the pitch force curve stability (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/25.173) that the Max violated, meaning it was not going to be able to be certified as a 737 or as a new, clean sheet airplane, with the demonstrated stick force curve.
Now, if you’re going to make a clean sheet design and allow a new type rating, you can change the landing gear and wing design to achieve enough room to set the engines farther back and change the airfoil around them to design a plane that meets 25.173. Boeing already has such a plane: the 757.
Now, if you’re going to make a clean sheet design and allow a new type rating, you can change the landing gear and wing design to achieve enough room to set the engines farther back and change the airfoil around them to design a plane that meets 25.173. Boeing already has such a plane: the 757.
Boeing wanted a whole new design, the airlines pushed for a re-engined 737.
Who at Boeing made the final decision? Was there a debate?
Boeing, like many successful businesses these days, is a customer focused company. So ultimately the customers made that decision.
You don't spend billions of dollars developing a product that wont sell... unless your Airbus with the A380.
You don't spend billions of dollars developing a product that wont sell... unless your Airbus with the A380.
Why does everything have to be new?
It basically is a new plane but fitted in the box of the old which did not fit and was 'altered' by a software system to behave like it fitted in the box.
The difference between them is that the rudder flaw could be fixed; once the problem was identified it was a trivial fix. They replaced a single part the size of a soda can.
The 737 Max can't be fixed. The engine location unbalances the plane. Full stop. Huge changes to the entire plane must be made to fix that. Software fixes are bandaids and any time the software either fails to activate when it should, or activates when it should not, people die. Unless you think software is 100% infallible, this plane is going to be much less safe than it could have been, forever, unfixably.
The 737 Max can't be fixed. The engine location unbalances the plane. Full stop. Huge changes to the entire plane must be made to fix that. Software fixes are bandaids and any time the software either fails to activate when it should, or activates when it should not, people die. Unless you think software is 100% infallible, this plane is going to be much less safe than it could have been, forever, unfixably.
You may refuse to fly on 737 Max, but how do you feel about 737-8200? Boeing will likely not use the "Max" name when the plan is put back into service. See: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48995509
That might very well have the opposite effect of the one intended. By making it harder to identify the MAX version of the 737 people might end up refusing to fly in 737's altogether.
I fly SWA frequently, and not a flight went by without overhearing some person asking if this is a MAX8, and a number of people not realizing the MAX8 is a submodel of the 737 series.
What happens if that 737-8200 crashes? It doesn't even need to be due to a fault of the plane, people will simply not trust the FAA and Boeing's explanation.
It may bring down the Boeing entirely, together with the operators who use Boeing aircraft. "If it's Boeing I am not going" can turn into a real thing, drastically reducing the occupancy of the flights. These businesses operate on thin margins, not being able to fill the aeroplanes may give rather short runways before their collapse.
It may bring down the Boeing entirely, together with the operators who use Boeing aircraft. "If it's Boeing I am not going" can turn into a real thing, drastically reducing the occupancy of the flights. These businesses operate on thin margins, not being able to fill the aeroplanes may give rather short runways before their collapse.
People are not stupid. They will know the new name of the MAX whatever it will be.
Devil's advocate:
Common, successful marketing: If a brand is poisoned, distance yourself from the name & rebrand. At its extreme, it is used alongside phoenix company tactics.
It works, although a (likely minority) customer portion will keep their finger on the pulse.
Common, successful marketing: If a brand is poisoned, distance yourself from the name & rebrand. At its extreme, it is used alongside phoenix company tactics.
It works, although a (likely minority) customer portion will keep their finger on the pulse.
The engines are visibly different. They are huge.
Do you think the majority of consumers pay any attention to the size of the engine when boarding a flight?
I’m sure a majority of people who step off a plane can’t say whether the plane was made by Boeing.
This also means that once Boeing gets the 737-8200 (or whatever) approved for flight, it will be unnoticed for customers who won’t ever notice the difference between it and an 800 or an A320.
This also means that once Boeing gets the 737-8200 (or whatever) approved for flight, it will be unnoticed for customers who won’t ever notice the difference between it and an 800 or an A320.
> Do you think the majority of consumers pay any attention to the size of the engine when boarding a flight?
I am not an industry insider but my understanding is the vast majority of the flying public simply does not matter. We are flying on the cheapest possible ticket. The people who do matter imo are those who are flying on a corporate account or better yet those who control a corporate account. If wealthy people refuse to fly on this death trap, I think airlines will listen.
I am not an industry insider but my understanding is the vast majority of the flying public simply does not matter. We are flying on the cheapest possible ticket. The people who do matter imo are those who are flying on a corporate account or better yet those who control a corporate account. If wealthy people refuse to fly on this death trap, I think airlines will listen.
They’d have to go out of their way to even see it. The gate may or may not have windows into the tarmac and the jet bridge goes all the way to the door usually.
I'm hoping for 737 Pro Max
There have been plenty of design flaws in commercial jetliners and in most cases, reputation is recovered. But there hasn't been design flaw quite like this one.
but none quite like this one.
but none quite like this one.
Especially one that the FAA tried to pooh pooh as long as it could. It was amazing to watch the goodwill and trust accumulated over decades crumble to nothing in a few hours as the European countries one by one banned the airline from their airspace but did not ground them. It was the EASA telling the FAA to do the right thing. They didn't and then finally the EASA did ground the plane. I really can't remember any other time when the EASA and the FAA disagreed especially this big.
https://www.thejournal.ie/us-ireland-boeing-4538567-Mar2019/
https://www.thejournal.ie/us-ireland-boeing-4538567-Mar2019/
My perception is different.
It was appropriate, I think, for the FAA not to ground the fleet after the first crash. It was also arguably appropriate for the FAA not to ground the fleet immediately after the second crash, but then after some time when it became apparent that the failure mode was sufficiently similar (as they did).
However, what has emerged since then certainly damaged the reputation of the FAA. But it was not a matter of a few hours, it was a matter of careful investigation and evaluation over months.
It was appropriate, I think, for the FAA not to ground the fleet after the first crash. It was also arguably appropriate for the FAA not to ground the fleet immediately after the second crash, but then after some time when it became apparent that the failure mode was sufficiently similar (as they did).
However, what has emerged since then certainly damaged the reputation of the FAA. But it was not a matter of a few hours, it was a matter of careful investigation and evaluation over months.
Except there are reports some pilots had already raised concerns about the safety of the MAX, even before both of these crashes.
If true, that would indicate these pilot reports were not given the full scrutiny that they deserved.
If true, that would indicate these pilot reports were not given the full scrutiny that they deserved.
Well, as you said yourself, the FAA itself calculated the chance of a MAX crash to be significant higher than other models.
Sure, those things take time, but a more decisive action should have been taken sooner.
It might not justify a full ground but at least it should have justified a very strongly worded Advisory Notice to pilots (not sure of the specific nomenclature for this document) also the AOA disagree light should have been made default ASAP.
So no, FAA has a lot to blame here.
Sure, those things take time, but a more decisive action should have been taken sooner.
It might not justify a full ground but at least it should have justified a very strongly worded Advisory Notice to pilots (not sure of the specific nomenclature for this document) also the AOA disagree light should have been made default ASAP.
So no, FAA has a lot to blame here.
It's been reported that an FAA analysis after the first crash concluded that - without modification - MCAS was expected to cause an additional 15 crashes over the service life of the 737 MAX. It seems that when the second aircraft crashed Boeing was already working on a new version of MCAS, but they and the FAA decided to keep this quiet and keep the aircraft flying. I think that this decision accepted rather a lot of risk to life, compared to what I would expect from civil aviation.
"Peter Defazio, the chairman of the House Transportation Committee, said an FAA analysis following the Lion Air accident but before the Ethiopian Airlines crash concluded there would be 15 fatal MAX accidents if there was no fix to MCAS. DeFazio asked Dickson why wasn’t airplane grounded then? He did not have an answer."
https://leehamnews.com/2019/12/11/faa-no-max-certification-u... (I think the first report was in the WSJ, but that's behind a paywall)
"Peter Defazio, the chairman of the House Transportation Committee, said an FAA analysis following the Lion Air accident but before the Ethiopian Airlines crash concluded there would be 15 fatal MAX accidents if there was no fix to MCAS. DeFazio asked Dickson why wasn’t airplane grounded then? He did not have an answer."
https://leehamnews.com/2019/12/11/faa-no-max-certification-u... (I think the first report was in the WSJ, but that's behind a paywall)
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markdown(2)
It was the Chinese Authorities who moved first and the we-outsource-our-job-to-Boeing FAA last.
China has recently produced some competing planes and has more of an authoritarian hold on the industry. About 20% of the Max stock was across a few of Chinese airlines which wasn’t a huge number.
The last one also happened in SEA and had some initial duelling finger pointing so it worked well as a PR gambit to be the first to block it.
Especially in the middle of a trade war involving product quality issues and Boeing is the closest thing to a US state run aircraft manufacturer. It’s always been a beacon of American protectionism well before the recent administration.
So basically there was a ton of political will potentially involved here.
The last one also happened in SEA and had some initial duelling finger pointing so it worked well as a PR gambit to be the first to block it.
Especially in the middle of a trade war involving product quality issues and Boeing is the closest thing to a US state run aircraft manufacturer. It’s always been a beacon of American protectionism well before the recent administration.
So basically there was a ton of political will potentially involved here.
> But there hasn't been design flaw quite like this one.
The DC-10 cargo door issue is probably the closest thing. Took two accidents, 346 fatalities and a House of Representatives investigation to get the flawed design fixed: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10#Cargo_...
The DC-10 cargo door issue is probably the closest thing. Took two accidents, 346 fatalities and a House of Representatives investigation to get the flawed design fixed: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10#Cargo_...
Also the DeHaviland Comet ... first passenger jetliner, but due to poorly understood metal fatigue science had several high-profile explosive disintegrations during flight and along with the lives of those on board, the hopes of the UK being a major aviation player looked bleak until Airbus.
Notably that was another case that was widely seen as the FAA treating an American company especially gently.
Like a lot of tragedies, it's really hard to tell how much the side effects of something like this are attributed to the mistake itself and how much can be explained through modern communication networks (social media) amplifying everything.
Is the Boeing mistake really that bad, or is it because this is the first such aviation design mistake to happen in our post-2010 everyone-is-online world? Remember that the tails on 737s used to just...fall off back in the '90s.
For the record, I don't think the 737 MAX should have ever been cleared to fly with the current version of MCAS. But I can't help but believe that there had to be some boneheaded designs in the past that cost hundreds of lives that we just don't think about today.
In any case, I hope Boeing has learned from this and revised its engineering processes to go back to its previous prestigious roots. I also hope against hope that we will finally see some executives go to prison for approving this.
Is the Boeing mistake really that bad, or is it because this is the first such aviation design mistake to happen in our post-2010 everyone-is-online world? Remember that the tails on 737s used to just...fall off back in the '90s.
For the record, I don't think the 737 MAX should have ever been cleared to fly with the current version of MCAS. But I can't help but believe that there had to be some boneheaded designs in the past that cost hundreds of lives that we just don't think about today.
In any case, I hope Boeing has learned from this and revised its engineering processes to go back to its previous prestigious roots. I also hope against hope that we will finally see some executives go to prison for approving this.
A big difference is that from everything I hear about this issue, it sounds like this was not an honest mistake, but a mistake driven by a policy of cutting costs and corners everywhere.
They wanted this airframe to be able to do something it was never designed for. Instead of redesigning it from the ground up, which costs money both for development and for recertification, they tried to correct the problem in software.
They didn't want to have to retrain pilots, so they pretended nothing really changed, again through software.
And of course FAA testing is expensive, so instead the FAA blindly trusts Boeing.
So a plane that should have been more thoroughly redesigned, recertified, with pilots retrained, got none of those things in order to save costs, and the FAA just blindly trusts Boeing that it's okay. Boeing clearly betrayed that trust.
It's not just a single honest mistake, it's a policy that drove everything towards this mistake. I think that's why a lot of people are so upset.
They wanted this airframe to be able to do something it was never designed for. Instead of redesigning it from the ground up, which costs money both for development and for recertification, they tried to correct the problem in software.
They didn't want to have to retrain pilots, so they pretended nothing really changed, again through software.
And of course FAA testing is expensive, so instead the FAA blindly trusts Boeing.
So a plane that should have been more thoroughly redesigned, recertified, with pilots retrained, got none of those things in order to save costs, and the FAA just blindly trusts Boeing that it's okay. Boeing clearly betrayed that trust.
It's not just a single honest mistake, it's a policy that drove everything towards this mistake. I think that's why a lot of people are so upset.
Yes, it's really that bad. Not because of the flaw itself, but the culture that drove the flaw into the outside world.
There have been plenty of others in the past that do not detract from the magnitude of this one.
There have been plenty of others in the past that do not detract from the magnitude of this one.
It’s hard to be statistically sure given the small number of existing examples, but taken on face value, no recent large airliner has anything like this level of deaths per flight.
Yes it is that bad. No it is not because of social media. Airline crashes have always been a huge deal. That's why airplanes are so safe
The 737NG problems in the 90s were rudders deflecting suddenly and irrecoverably, tails did not fall off. Two crashes and a number of incidents before the problem was identified. Boeing also tried to squash that investigation, they actually swiped the servo from the first crashed plane so it could not be properly analyzed.
Then the 737NG went on to have the best safety record of any plane ever. So while the MAX problem is pretty bad, and social media vastly complicates the PR angle, there is precedent for recovering from this. Certainly with as many MAXs as have been built there is enormous incentive to get it fixed. It's not realistic to expect them to scrap the planes.
Then the 737NG went on to have the best safety record of any plane ever. So while the MAX problem is pretty bad, and social media vastly complicates the PR angle, there is precedent for recovering from this. Certainly with as many MAXs as have been built there is enormous incentive to get it fixed. It's not realistic to expect them to scrap the planes.
Scrapping will not happen, yes. But I have a feeling the max might become the first southern hemisphere exclusive.
briandear(2)
There’s also clearly a serious design flaw in FAA regulations and how the certification process works. Like most rules, I’m sure they meant well when it was implemented but as the regulations/process has iterated it’s created a perverse incentive where Boeing wasn’t optimizing for safety in order to pass the safety certification.
Boeing bears a lot of responsibility but taking Boeing to task without taking a look at the system in which it operates seems short-sighted.
Boeing bears a lot of responsibility but taking Boeing to task without taking a look at the system in which it operates seems short-sighted.
Has software had its materials science moment? The pioneering DeHavilland Comet failed due to unexpected stress fractures. The aviation industry changed markedly because of it with years of testing preceding the introduction of any new material or process. Boeing took the lead, DeHavilland never recovered.
My cynical view is that little will change in this era.
My cynical view is that little will change in this era.
More like MBAs moment maybe? This issue doesn't seem to have anything to do with the difficulties or shortcomings of computer science but product management.
I am no fan of MBAs but in this case I am talking about what I perceive as cultural difference between hardware and software engineering. I come from the experimental/hardware world and I believe there isn't the incremental patch and release mindset for deliverable items. The testing cycles for mission critical hardware is rather brutal.
The MBA piece of it is why I'm cynical. "Ho-ho-hold on one second. This installation has a substantial dollar value attached to it." --- C.J. Burke "Aliens"
The MBA piece of it is why I'm cynical. "Ho-ho-hold on one second. This installation has a substantial dollar value attached to it." --- C.J. Burke "Aliens"
But that isn't the situation, it's really not.
The context is airbus has an advanced and fuel-economic model that was eating Boeing market share. Boeing decided to produce one more version of the 737 model - it fit the category and as a fuel-efficinet "drop-in replacement", it was very competitive but was rather aerodynamically unstable. So Boeing added a software system to compensate but didn't tell anyone, didn't make it dependent on redundant sensors and basically produced a plane where, once the facts were all out, it became obvious it could never fly again - not because it could never be made safe but because making safe would involve admitting how flagrantly you initially skirted safety. No one flies on the "once this was utterly unsafe but now we've fixed it" plane if they really have fixed it.
Everything about the plane was super advanced but cheap-as-could-be, including the software. But by that token, none of this seems the fault of "software culture", indeed, there's been no implication that the software was at fault in the crashes, just the total shitshow design package, which was indeed the fault of finance and management pushing this approach through.
The context is airbus has an advanced and fuel-economic model that was eating Boeing market share. Boeing decided to produce one more version of the 737 model - it fit the category and as a fuel-efficinet "drop-in replacement", it was very competitive but was rather aerodynamically unstable. So Boeing added a software system to compensate but didn't tell anyone, didn't make it dependent on redundant sensors and basically produced a plane where, once the facts were all out, it became obvious it could never fly again - not because it could never be made safe but because making safe would involve admitting how flagrantly you initially skirted safety. No one flies on the "once this was utterly unsafe but now we've fixed it" plane if they really have fixed it.
Everything about the plane was super advanced but cheap-as-could-be, including the software. But by that token, none of this seems the fault of "software culture", indeed, there's been no implication that the software was at fault in the crashes, just the total shitshow design package, which was indeed the fault of finance and management pushing this approach through.
I think this is a systems engineering problem that may have been due to siloed hardware and software engineering teams. The hardware engineers knew they were making something inherently unstable that the software would have to compensate for. The software engineers believed they had working AoA hardware.
MCAS is a band-aid trying to fix the inherent stability of the 737 max. Add in the fact that a single faulty pitch sensor could bring down a plane and blam. Finally, fail to properly train pilots on how the system actually worked and how to override it and here we are today. Software is a part of it but overall I don't see it as a software issue.
I think it was a systems issue with the software a part of it. From what I read, the software system is archaic in a bad way since you have duplicate systems but not used for redundancy. Only one set is used at a time and which one is switched with every boot.
It had two pitch sensors but each is paired with a single computer. There was an optional add on to use both sensors in some way but this is unreliable as well since you don’t know which is right. It was when the plane was flying with the failed sensor (every other time since only one sensor failed) that they ran into the problem.
At least from my readings of how you are supposed to build robust systems from unreliable parts, this is a terrible way to design a system.
See https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-c... for info on the sensors.
Search for Jim Gray and fault tolerance on how to build reliable systems from unreliable parts. You need redundant parts with voting (which implies more than 2 sensors and more than 2 computers), error detection, etc... Supposedly the Space Shuttle computer systems were designed right although much of the rest of the Shuttle wasn’t designed right.
The Boeing way relied on the pilots to compensate for mechanical or software failure. Unfortunately, they seemed to willingly choose to not inform pilots of MCAS and there seemed to be failure scenarios where recovery is difficult.
Lastly, I think it is part of the job of a software engineer to push back on requirements and designs that don't work even if it is a failure in the system. Falling back to built as spec'd isn't worth of being called engineering.
It had two pitch sensors but each is paired with a single computer. There was an optional add on to use both sensors in some way but this is unreliable as well since you don’t know which is right. It was when the plane was flying with the failed sensor (every other time since only one sensor failed) that they ran into the problem.
At least from my readings of how you are supposed to build robust systems from unreliable parts, this is a terrible way to design a system.
See https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-c... for info on the sensors.
Search for Jim Gray and fault tolerance on how to build reliable systems from unreliable parts. You need redundant parts with voting (which implies more than 2 sensors and more than 2 computers), error detection, etc... Supposedly the Space Shuttle computer systems were designed right although much of the rest of the Shuttle wasn’t designed right.
The Boeing way relied on the pilots to compensate for mechanical or software failure. Unfortunately, they seemed to willingly choose to not inform pilots of MCAS and there seemed to be failure scenarios where recovery is difficult.
Lastly, I think it is part of the job of a software engineer to push back on requirements and designs that don't work even if it is a failure in the system. Falling back to built as spec'd isn't worth of being called engineering.
Not really, this was not a software issue. As much as I dislike many current software engineering practices they seem to be 100% innocent here.
As far as we know the MCAS behaved exactly according to specifications. All of its flaws seem to be intentional (e.g. only using one AoA sensor, not being easy for the pilots to disable, not being explained to the pilots).
As far as we know the MCAS behaved exactly according to specifications. All of its flaws seem to be intentional (e.g. only using one AoA sensor, not being easy for the pilots to disable, not being explained to the pilots).
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The A330 in the crash of AF 447 certainly had a design flaw like that. Due to that flaw, they entered a high altitude stall and crashed into the ocean.
On AF447 all three of the airspeed probes iced up for 40 seconds, prompting the flight computers to disconnect autopilot and autothrottle and clearly announce to the crew that air data was unreliable and that the normal protection against stalling was suspended. The pilots immediately understood the problem, however for various reasons made a series of bad decisions which resulted in the crash. Tragically there was no need for the pilots to take any urgent action - by design the plane continued in stable flight when the air data was lost.
On the 737MAX crashes the single angle of attack indicator being used as input to the MCAS malfunctioned and in response the system set about repeatedly forcing the plane into a dive with no clear indication of why this was happening. Compounding this was the utter lack of training on the MCAS system, which wasn't even mentioned in the pilot manual or IPad-based training that was also used by US airlines.
There's a world of difference between these accidents.
On the 737MAX crashes the single angle of attack indicator being used as input to the MCAS malfunctioned and in response the system set about repeatedly forcing the plane into a dive with no clear indication of why this was happening. Compounding this was the utter lack of training on the MCAS system, which wasn't even mentioned in the pilot manual or IPad-based training that was also used by US airlines.
There's a world of difference between these accidents.
Same thing for me in a megacorp. Group manager said “no requirement to travel on a 737 Max” without higher approval... he said he’d just eat the cancellation fees from his own budget.
Having looked carefully into what Boeing has been doing with the 737 Max, I have no intention of flying on one ever again, even if it gets rammed through FAA again.
Though I am absolutely certain that all the sleazy airlines (or perhaps Boeing) will soon begin a rebranding project, changing the name to something that people will not immediately recognize.
Though I am absolutely certain that all the sleazy airlines (or perhaps Boeing) will soon begin a rebranding project, changing the name to something that people will not immediately recognize.
Unless you boycott Boeing 737-max similar airplanes, you may fly with one without knowing it. The name is really badly burnt and the only plausible way out of it for Boeing is renaming it to something that doesn't ring the bell.
IIRC I read that they've already done that for the airplanes that are being delivered since the grounding.
IIRC I read that they've already done that for the airplanes that are being delivered since the grounding.
Simple solution: If it's Boeing, I 'aint going
As far as I can tell, no planes have been delivered since the grounding. The airlines aren't willing to take delivery of a flawed product. It would just cost them money to park them, and may even have legal consequences, such as shifting the burden of proof in any legal disputes that may still arise.
You are correct about delivery. Boeing has parking lots full of new Max that are ready for delivery.[1]
The OP is referring to several Max that had their paint changed to remove "737 MAX" and replace it with "737 8200" (see link to RyanAir example in sibling).[2]
1 - https://s4.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20190709&t=2...
2 - https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-...
The OP is referring to several Max that had their paint changed to remove "737 MAX" and replace it with "737 8200" (see link to RyanAir example in sibling).[2]
1 - https://s4.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20190709&t=2...
2 - https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-...
I drove by that parking lot this summer when visiting Seattle. And it's really a parking lot, like one used for employees and now it's stuffed to the borders with 737MAXs sealed up with tape and waiting for final updates.
It looks like about half the lot is striped for cars and the other half striped for plane storage. But, the planes are overflowing and filling most of both sections. There's also a large gate on the lot, with street controls (parking lot is across a busy street from the factory, it appears) so Boeing must regularly use part of it for planes.
IIRC the FAA wont allow Boeing to transfer ownership of the aircraft until the grounding is lifted.
The UK's sleaziest airline is way ahead of you
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-...
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-...
This is exactly why this is pretty bad for companies operating these flights. The alternatives are often within reach of the customers.
I believe that several carriers (for sure United and I think others) will let you change for free on a Max. The issue for you is going to be the impact to your time, which is likely more valuable than the change fee to begin with. On the standard consultant route of Monday morning/Thursday afternoon there are many times not alternative flights for hours (or possibly days) later -- especially if a Max gets "subbed in" at the last minute and you cannot plan ahead. The change fee will be inconsequential compared to you not showing up on a client site for a day or at all.
With the amount of planes already ordered and in the production pipeline, it will be near impossible to not fly with a 737 MAX within a few years, if you are a heavy flier. The alternative for a given route may be a train, bus, or another aircraft with a schedule that won't meet yours.
A bit tangential but I'm curious: if you fly that much, does your company compensate the CO2? From their statement about changing flights being no problem, it sounds like there would easily be budget for such a thing, but I have no idea if companies are starting to do this yet.
You'd hope so, but I know from traveling for a large multinational that it was up to the individual to pay for their own offsetting and I think most are the same. I tend to just try and video conference with people to alleviate the exhaustion of traveling (I live in New Zealand, going to a workshop in Europe is a 30-40 hour endeavor) and the carbon that flying generates.
I think what was ridiculously through this entire process was Boeing blaming someone else. That's pretty much been the issue right from when it surfaced. Initially it was the bad pilots, bad airlines, bad countries and lately it's been the bad software consultants.
However, it's been evident from the beginning this is a fundamental design flaw that Boeing was trying to, inappropriately, use software to make work. Something no software would be capable of doing because software could not make up for the lack of necessary information in the case of certain sensors failing.
However, it's been evident from the beginning this is a fundamental design flaw that Boeing was trying to, inappropriately, use software to make work. Something no software would be capable of doing because software could not make up for the lack of necessary information in the case of certain sensors failing.
Certain sensors? Plural?
They only checked ONE single sensor (which is a glitchy one at best) because their software infra didn’t support multiple checks. There should be three AoA sensors to check to see if one is faulty in flight (of course the grand old 737 only HAS two, so that’s yet another issue).
Instead they checked just one and come what may sent the plane to hell based on that one sensor read-out.
Instead they checked just one and come what may sent the plane to hell based on that one sensor read-out.
You only need two sensors to determine if one is faulty. You need three if you need the correct measurement. For this application, all that is required is a warning that the AoA sensors aren’t providing correct information.
That's true but it puts the aircraft at a greater risk of stalling, because MCAS is supposed to be a safety feature to prevent stalls.
Two sensors are sufficient to prevent false positives, but three or more are necessary to mitigate false negatives.
If the MAX is really so easy to stall that it needs a computer system to prevent stalls, then that system should be robust enough to survive a sensor out.
Two sensors are sufficient to prevent false positives, but three or more are necessary to mitigate false negatives.
If the MAX is really so easy to stall that it needs a computer system to prevent stalls, then that system should be robust enough to survive a sensor out.
There is no risk of stalling.
There was never any risk of stalling.
MCAS was added solely so that the 737 MAX 8 could share a type rating with the previous members of the 737 family. This is what allowed Airlines to put pilots on this plane without any significant new training.
Please stop perpetuating urban myths.
Here, listen to a guy who actually know what he's talking about describing the overall situation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btZXVPfh-pE
There was never any risk of stalling.
MCAS was added solely so that the 737 MAX 8 could share a type rating with the previous members of the 737 family. This is what allowed Airlines to put pilots on this plane without any significant new training.
Please stop perpetuating urban myths.
Here, listen to a guy who actually know what he's talking about describing the overall situation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btZXVPfh-pE
I don't think I'm perpetuating an urban myth. My understanding is that MCAS was necessary to correct a deficiency in the controls - that's the controls violated an FAA rule that the pitch up should not be superlinear relative to the control input (which clearly increases the risk of stall). And indeed after testing they had to increase the strength of MCAS because the tendency to pitch up was worse than previously anticipated.
The desire for a common type rating is an explanation for why the FAA rule was violated without MCAS.
The desire for a common type rating is an explanation for why the FAA rule was violated without MCAS.
This is incorrect. And this has been dispelled by multiple commercial pilots including Juan from the link above who is one of the most experienced pilots in the country.
The origin of this noise is sensationalist news coverage and misinterpretation of FAA rules. I expect a higher standard on HN than perpetuating myths. You guys are like the flat earthers of aviation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maneuvering_Characteristics_Au...
As Juan points out in either that or another video, the 767 has a stronger pitch-up characteristic and yet doesn't have MCAS and doesn't fall out of the sky from stalls.
Another myth and piece of sensationalist news bullshit is that Boeing made a safety feature that would have prevented the accidents optional. The safety feature in question was AOE Disagree Indicator. The reason it was optional is because AOA doesn't mean anything to civilian pilots and the option only made sense for airlines who hire ex-militaray pilots who can actually read the AOA indicator and make sense of it.
The origin of this noise is sensationalist news coverage and misinterpretation of FAA rules. I expect a higher standard on HN than perpetuating myths. You guys are like the flat earthers of aviation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maneuvering_Characteristics_Au...
As Juan points out in either that or another video, the 767 has a stronger pitch-up characteristic and yet doesn't have MCAS and doesn't fall out of the sky from stalls.
Another myth and piece of sensationalist news bullshit is that Boeing made a safety feature that would have prevented the accidents optional. The safety feature in question was AOE Disagree Indicator. The reason it was optional is because AOA doesn't mean anything to civilian pilots and the option only made sense for airlines who hire ex-militaray pilots who can actually read the AOA indicator and make sense of it.
From the Wikipedia article you linked: "The 737 MAX's larger CFM LEAP-1B engines are fitted further forward and higher up than in previous models. The aerodynamic effect of its nacelles contributes to the aircraft's tendency to pitch up at high angles of attack (AOA). The MCAS is intended to compensate in such cases, modeling the pitching behavior of previous models, and meet a certain certification requirement"
Note that last piece: "intended to [...] meet a certain certification requirement". So yes, part of the intention of MCAS is to meet the certification requirements. It's a bit downplayed in the text, but is very important nevertheless: the certification requirements MUST be met (MUST in the sense of the Internet RFCs). Modelling the behavior of previous models is a sufficient condition for that, and is what Boeing was trying to do anyways, but is not critical. Complying to the certification requirements is critical.
Note that last piece: "intended to [...] meet a certain certification requirement". So yes, part of the intention of MCAS is to meet the certification requirements. It's a bit downplayed in the text, but is very important nevertheless: the certification requirements MUST be met (MUST in the sense of the Internet RFCs). Modelling the behavior of previous models is a sufficient condition for that, and is what Boeing was trying to do anyways, but is not critical. Complying to the certification requirements is critical.
So the whole point of MCAS is to basically create an emulated flight envelope more similar to how previous generations 737s flew just to avoid a type rating re-certification?
People died because Boeing was playing with emulators in real life?
People died because Boeing was playing with emulators in real life?
The shared type rating was a huge draw for airlines. Without it, the 737 MAX 8 would not have been nearly as popular in orders as it was.
Boeing got very greedy and multiple failures have occurred along the way. MCAS on passenger planes is not unheard of, and has been implemented for various reasons before including shared type ratings. It was just never botched across the board this badly before.
The biggest failure as parent comment correctly notes, is MCAS was given significantly more control authority than originally planned after flight testing showed it was ineffective as per the original design. But this change in control authority didn't trigger a review process which would have reclassified it from non-critical to critical system.
Boeing got very greedy and multiple failures have occurred along the way. MCAS on passenger planes is not unheard of, and has been implemented for various reasons before including shared type ratings. It was just never botched across the board this badly before.
The biggest failure as parent comment correctly notes, is MCAS was given significantly more control authority than originally planned after flight testing showed it was ineffective as per the original design. But this change in control authority didn't trigger a review process which would have reclassified it from non-critical to critical system.
> The reason it was optional is because AOA doesn't mean anything to civilian pilots and the option only made sense for airlines who hire ex-militaray pilots who can actually read the AOA indicator and make sense of it.
Do you have a source for that because as far is I can see it is rubbish.
Military pilots are probably more familiar with AoA as early swept wing aircraft needed to be flown with careful attention to it. However several civilian accident investigations have suggested an AoA indicator as a potential mitigation. It's not exactly like reading tea leaves, if you keep the value below 15 or so degrees the wing is flying. Much above that it won't be.
They are also used to good effect by backcountry private pilots who need to extract maximum performance from their aircraft.
Do you have a source for that because as far is I can see it is rubbish.
Military pilots are probably more familiar with AoA as early swept wing aircraft needed to be flown with careful attention to it. However several civilian accident investigations have suggested an AoA indicator as a potential mitigation. It's not exactly like reading tea leaves, if you keep the value below 15 or so degrees the wing is flying. Much above that it won't be.
They are also used to good effect by backcountry private pilots who need to extract maximum performance from their aircraft.
Commercial pilots are trained to work with airspeed and glideslope not AOA. I don't know what else to tell you. If you want to hear the same thing from an authority figure, the same youtube channel I linked earlier discusses this. Pick up a sample manual if you want to check something that's a basic fact in the industry.
I always wondered if it makes sense to base anything like this on AOA alone. The aircraft has a ground speed of several hundred knots, a sensible air speed, is at a normal attitude, in normal wind conditions, no wind sheer warnings and with normal engine function. In that situation AOA sensor failure is far more likely than a stall.
But if they aren't providing correct information then MCAS can't work and now your plane has different flying characteristics than the older 737s, which is all your pilots are trained on because the whole point of MCAS is to prevent requiring recertification.
It doesn't matter what group was materially at fault, internal or external. It says "Boeing" on the tin. It's Boeing's responsibility to ensure integrity of all supply inputs, hardware or software.
Disclosure: I was a Boeing employee in the early 90s, and wrote software to control test systems that exercised electronic subsystems. The subsystems were supplied by vendors, and in some cases some of the test hardware too.
Disclaimer: I know nothing.
Disclosure: I was a Boeing employee in the early 90s, and wrote software to control test systems that exercised electronic subsystems. The subsystems were supplied by vendors, and in some cases some of the test hardware too.
Disclaimer: I know nothing.
Also, I have read many comments on previous articles placing the blame on changes to the Boeing corporate culture. Not accepting responsibility is surely another sign of that fault.
Right after the first crash I was surprised on how much aggressive Boeing came out blaming the pilots.
It felt weird, usually these companies wait for a good initial investigation, take some pressure and then start spreading their message through more discreet channels.
It felt weird, usually these companies wait for a good initial investigation, take some pressure and then start spreading their message through more discreet channels.
I think as a corporate entity, they will never admit wrongdoing because they're terrified of lawsuits. As long as they never say "it was our fault", even if it was, I think that places (at least some of) the burden on the plaintiff in a wrongful death suit.
There’s a difference between not accepting responsibility and aggressively blaming everyone but themselves.
The former is understandable. The latter is far more worrying.
The former is understandable. The latter is far more worrying.
Boeing PR has been pushing these "oh no Boeing will have to halt production", with supposedly dire consequences for the whole US economy, for months. I have seen them at least 3 times now.
This is just another effort to pressure politicians and regulators to get the Max back in service.
It also shows yet again the sad state of media. This almost reads as a Boeing press release, lacking any reflection or substantial commentary.
This is just another effort to pressure politicians and regulators to get the Max back in service.
It also shows yet again the sad state of media. This almost reads as a Boeing press release, lacking any reflection or substantial commentary.
I have the same feeling. as we know, Boeing is the one of the two biggest plane maker, and there is no hardware issue 737 Max, just a software issue. anyway, the politicians have to show a pose that they are careful about the monitor process than before.
What do you mean by “no hardware issue”? The root cause is that the hardware is not a 737 but is pretending to be one!
Hardware can't pretend to be other hardware...
Isn't the issue a hardware issue that they tried to patch over with software?
I've also had the same feeling about all of the articles referring to this as a "software problem".
Regardless of how they're trying to address the issue, the whole idea of not installing redundant AoA sensors as the default base option was a manufacturing, engineering, and management problem in my book.
Regardless of how they're trying to address the issue, the whole idea of not installing redundant AoA sensors as the default base option was a manufacturing, engineering, and management problem in my book.
To protect their long-term reputation they should consider cutting the programme, taking the multi billion dollar loss and start anew with a narrowbody range that is actually from the 2000s not warmed up 1960s.
But that would ‘never fly’. So we will get a software-upgraded, mandatory “training” aircraft where pilots will have to be on full-alert every second of the flight, it will somewhere crash again and pilots faulted for being “trained but not paying enough attention” and there’s that.
But that would ‘never fly’. So we will get a software-upgraded, mandatory “training” aircraft where pilots will have to be on full-alert every second of the flight, it will somewhere crash again and pilots faulted for being “trained but not paying enough attention” and there’s that.
You're right, it would never fly, but probably not for the reason you think. A company like Boeing is good at writing off large losses, after all. However the problem is the customers. By the time they design and build an entirely new narrow body plane, the customers would have long since modernized their fleets with planes bought from other manufacturers like Airbus.
Any MAX production changes could carry significant implications for the U.S. economy. Boeing’s inability to deliver the aircraft during the prolonged grounding has already weighed on the nation’s trade deficit.
The quoted statement is highly speculative, but it's a good indication of why supposedly reputable news outlets and others in positions of societal authority seem to be hand-waving away the seriousness of the entire issue.
Planes have fallen out of the sky, and civilians were killed. These planes should never fly again, regardless of whatever random macro-economy professor says.
The quoted statement is highly speculative, but it's a good indication of why supposedly reputable news outlets and others in positions of societal authority seem to be hand-waving away the seriousness of the entire issue.
Planes have fallen out of the sky, and civilians were killed. These planes should never fly again, regardless of whatever random macro-economy professor says.
"What's a few lives when there's billions of profits at stake?"
That and a bunch of jobs. The Seattle area isn’t as exposed to Boeing cut backs as it used to be, but I guess it would still be felt.
Of course, they would have to replace this with something, either previous specced 737s, a new spec 737, or a new plane. While they are developing that market share will fly to Europe and possibly China.
Of course, they would have to replace this with something, either previous specced 737s, a new spec 737, or a new plane. While they are developing that market share will fly to Europe and possibly China.
WSJ also has some great reporting on the total contribution of the 737 MAX to US GDP: https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeings-737-max-is-too-big-to-f...
Not defending Boeing's behavior, just noting that the grounding of the MAX indeed materially affected GDP.
Not defending Boeing's behavior, just noting that the grounding of the MAX indeed materially affected GDP.
It apparently affected GNC more than it affected GDP.
As a consumer, there are a lot of things a company can fail at and still get me to give them another try by saying, "We fixed it, you totally won't get burned this time." Chipotle and salmonella outbreaks being one example.
It's a much harder sell when the product in question is an aircraft. If Chipotle is wrong, I get food poisoning. If Boeing is wrong, I get to learn what it feels like to be in a plane falling out of the sky.
Killing off the 737 Max seems awfully expensive.
For a more traditional business, I would guess that the failed product would be fixed, renamed, and then released as something brand new. I'm not sure if that's possible in the aerospace industry, but I'm curious to see what Boeing does here.
It's a much harder sell when the product in question is an aircraft. If Chipotle is wrong, I get food poisoning. If Boeing is wrong, I get to learn what it feels like to be in a plane falling out of the sky.
Killing off the 737 Max seems awfully expensive.
For a more traditional business, I would guess that the failed product would be fixed, renamed, and then released as something brand new. I'm not sure if that's possible in the aerospace industry, but I'm curious to see what Boeing does here.
On the other hand, food poisoning kills many more people than plane accidents. Despite that, I have heard a lot more from the media about fatalities from plane accidents than from food poisoning. And I suppose that's simply because fear sells.
In proportion to the exposition, badly stored eggs kill way less than the overall history of the Boeing 737-800Max. Cars also kill proportionally less.
Last time I looked at the numbers, riding a motorcycle on the city killed more. by a small margin.
Of course, that is extrapolating from the small number of flights and deaths that occurred. I don't think the sample is statistically significant enough to compare with cars... but the eggs are on a quite safe territory.
Of course, that is extrapolating from the small number of flights and deaths that occurred. I don't think the sample is statistically significant enough to compare with cars... but the eggs are on a quite safe territory.
If you get food poisoning, your chance of living is still pretty good. If your plane crashes, you might live, but your odds are much worse than if you get food poisoning.
Many more people eat meals each day, than fly in a plane.
Many more people eat meals each day, than fly in a plane.
Your odds of surviving a plane crash are also quite good, though I agree it's much more likely to kill you than food poisioning.
Are they? I'd be interested to see some stats.
What kind of plane crashes are there where you have a good chance of surviving? I'd have guessed the only ones where everyone survives are where they run off the runway at half speed and bump around a bit on an empty field of grass.
Surely if something happens in mid air and you're not able to make it back to a runway and actually land the plane your odds would be complete shite (<5%?)
What kind of plane crashes are there where you have a good chance of surviving? I'd have guessed the only ones where everyone survives are where they run off the runway at half speed and bump around a bit on an empty field of grass.
Surely if something happens in mid air and you're not able to make it back to a runway and actually land the plane your odds would be complete shite (<5%?)
Some old but still relevant stats: https://flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_oct01.pdf
"From 1983 through 2000, NTSB investigated 26 accidents involving fire, serious injury and either substantial aircraft damage or aircraft destruction. There were 2,739 occupants involved in these serious accidents; 1,524 (55.6 percent) of the occupants survived the accident, 716 (26.1 percent) of the occupants died from impact, 340 (12.4 percent) died from unknown causes, 12 131 (4.8 percent) died from fire/smoke, and 28 (1.0 percent) died from other causes."
"From 1983 through 2000, NTSB investigated 26 accidents involving fire, serious injury and either substantial aircraft damage or aircraft destruction. There were 2,739 occupants involved in these serious accidents; 1,524 (55.6 percent) of the occupants survived the accident, 716 (26.1 percent) of the occupants died from impact, 340 (12.4 percent) died from unknown causes, 12 131 (4.8 percent) died from fire/smoke, and 28 (1.0 percent) died from other causes."
Not if the plane crash is caused by runaway uncontrollable maximum deflection of the elevator trim as in the case of these MAX crashes.
Well it depends on the type of crash really. Landing gear failure has a fairly high survival rate for example, on the other hand MCAS-related crashes are pretty damn lethal compared to everything else.
Food poisoning is not very exciting. Anything involving large things falling from the sky and blowing up will get hugely more media coverage for the same number of deaths.
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I'd fly it if they fix the automatic gizmo that caused the crashes. Flying remains statistically pretty safe. I was thinking the other day on my flight to Siem Reap as they did the saftey demo they'd be better dropping the stuff about life vest of which the chances of being useful are roughly zero and giving some tips on not being involved in a vehicle accident after landing which is maybe 10,000x more likely.
Exactly that. You will see the MAX naming go away with many carriers, to be replaced with some generic numbering.
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Hopefully this is this beginning of the end to the entire 737 family. The MAX has revealed to me just how dated and obsolescent this aircraft is, in all its forms. It persists because it allows airlines to shamble on without investing in the changes necessary to adopt better designs. Perhaps they'll be forced to do so as the MAX and possibly the rest of the 737 family finally get phased out of first world passenger service, the latter if for no other reason as they are not competitive in their non-MAX form.
The original 737 is a fine 60's design. It is long past time for the industry to break out the capital crowbar and pry some funds from the industry tuches to support some evolution. As the cost of that appears in ticket prices people will have to think harder before obligating themselves to bounce around the world. I care not.
The original 737 is a fine 60's design. It is long past time for the industry to break out the capital crowbar and pry some funds from the industry tuches to support some evolution. As the cost of that appears in ticket prices people will have to think harder before obligating themselves to bounce around the world. I care not.
Interestingly, the MAX is a completely new aircraft. If Boeing had just admitted that and certified it as such that would have had significant effect on the required training and certification costs but it would have at least recognized the truth. The 737MAX is much less of a 737 than the NG.
> Interestingly, the MAX is a completely new aircraft.
For some value of 'completely new.' The design isn't new. A new design would accommodate modern, large diameter high by-pass turbo fans without compromising pitch behavior. The 737 was designed to be powered by much smaller diameter low-bypass engines that prevailed in the 60's.
Also, the cockpit is deliberately designed not to require changes in training; the now ancient controls and instruments are significant contributors to the 737 MAX problems.
I used the term 'design' several times because I do indeed understand there is much new in the 737 MAX, but the fundamental design is obsolescent.
For some value of 'completely new.' The design isn't new. A new design would accommodate modern, large diameter high by-pass turbo fans without compromising pitch behavior. The 737 was designed to be powered by much smaller diameter low-bypass engines that prevailed in the 60's.
Also, the cockpit is deliberately designed not to require changes in training; the now ancient controls and instruments are significant contributors to the 737 MAX problems.
I used the term 'design' several times because I do indeed understand there is much new in the 737 MAX, but the fundamental design is obsolescent.
So, in aircraft circles the conventional wisdom goes something like this: change the engines->change the wing; Change the wing->it's a new aircraft.
The fact that it doesn't look like a new aircraft and that Boeing did what they could to make it look like a 737 has as much to do with the customer demands and the regulatory hoops they were trying to jump through without re-certifying it as a new aircraft.
Now, if they had done a complete redesign from the ground up without these restrictions then it would have no doubt been a better plane in many ways, but it would not have sold so fast in these numbers, which for Boeing was very important. So think of it as a 'new plane trying to masquerade as an old one' and you're pretty close to where it's at.
The fact that it doesn't look like a new aircraft and that Boeing did what they could to make it look like a 737 has as much to do with the customer demands and the regulatory hoops they were trying to jump through without re-certifying it as a new aircraft.
Now, if they had done a complete redesign from the ground up without these restrictions then it would have no doubt been a better plane in many ways, but it would not have sold so fast in these numbers, which for Boeing was very important. So think of it as a 'new plane trying to masquerade as an old one' and you're pretty close to where it's at.
> which for Boeing was very important
More important than maintaining its reputation for safe designs, apparently.
This is covered ground. They whys and wherefores of how Boeing ended up ruining its track record are well understood. My point -- my only point -- is that I hope the halt of 737 MAX they are now being made to contemplate ultimately carries over to the rest of the 737 family, and I've seen nothing that dissuades me from that hope.
I'll add that if the Boeing business model (and the airlines etc.) is not viable without forever reworking an obsolescent 50+ year old product then perhaps the thing that really needs rework is the business itself. Keeping dysfunctional bubbles inflated is the source of some of the greatest evils.
More important than maintaining its reputation for safe designs, apparently.
This is covered ground. They whys and wherefores of how Boeing ended up ruining its track record are well understood. My point -- my only point -- is that I hope the halt of 737 MAX they are now being made to contemplate ultimately carries over to the rest of the 737 family, and I've seen nothing that dissuades me from that hope.
I'll add that if the Boeing business model (and the airlines etc.) is not viable without forever reworking an obsolescent 50+ year old product then perhaps the thing that really needs rework is the business itself. Keeping dysfunctional bubbles inflated is the source of some of the greatest evils.
Airlines - and the airplane industry as a whole - are quite efficient and actually proof positive that we can do stuff at that level. Where this whole saga really went off the rails is in the regulatory domain, an FAA with teeth that would not be in bed with Boeing would have required major modifications or certification as a new aircraft, and the knowledge that they would not get a sweetheart deal would have kept Boeing honest.
The 'obsolescent 50+ year old product' ended up serving the market better than some much more recent designs. The whole reason the industry moves slowly is because they want to play it safe, if they end up not doing that than they might as well 'go ahead and break stuff' but I really hope that they will be able to regroup and do it right the next time around because Airbus needs the competition as much as Boeing does.
I'm pretty curious what would satisfy you in terms of a modern day business model for aircraft manufacturers and airlines, so if you would care to write out your thoughts I would definitely be grateful.
The 'obsolescent 50+ year old product' ended up serving the market better than some much more recent designs. The whole reason the industry moves slowly is because they want to play it safe, if they end up not doing that than they might as well 'go ahead and break stuff' but I really hope that they will be able to regroup and do it right the next time around because Airbus needs the competition as much as Boeing does.
I'm pretty curious what would satisfy you in terms of a modern day business model for aircraft manufacturers and airlines, so if you would care to write out your thoughts I would definitely be grateful.
> I'm pretty curious what would satisfy you in terms of a modern day business model for aircraft manufacturers and airlines, so if you would care to write out your thoughts I would definitely be grateful.
A little competition would go a long way. This market is wholley owned by two company oligopoly that employs the sons and daughters and sons-in-laws and daughters-in-laws of the senators and chairmen and vice-chairmen and acting-deputy-vice-chairpersons directly or indirectly through their boards and law firms and non-profit chairmanships and god knows what else, so the regulatory capture you mention is a metaphysical certitude. I know of two remaining solutions; a GULAG system or competition. The former is worse than the problem so I dream of the latter. War use to serve as a means to break these ice jams, but that's pretty much obviated today given nukes.
BTW, this view applies to far more than aircraft manufacturers and operators. Pretty much every damn 'problem' you can name in the modern world is a consequence of the same structural dysfunction.
That's the best I can afford to do with my time.
A little competition would go a long way. This market is wholley owned by two company oligopoly that employs the sons and daughters and sons-in-laws and daughters-in-laws of the senators and chairmen and vice-chairmen and acting-deputy-vice-chairpersons directly or indirectly through their boards and law firms and non-profit chairmanships and god knows what else, so the regulatory capture you mention is a metaphysical certitude. I know of two remaining solutions; a GULAG system or competition. The former is worse than the problem so I dream of the latter. War use to serve as a means to break these ice jams, but that's pretty much obviated today given nukes.
BTW, this view applies to far more than aircraft manufacturers and operators. Pretty much every damn 'problem' you can name in the modern world is a consequence of the same structural dysfunction.
That's the best I can afford to do with my time.
I think that even though the engines are bigger a lot of things are still really old. I read that starting the plane requires 7 steps, where in Airbus you press a button and the computer does it for you.
Also in Airbus the computer tells you what is wrong and in the 737-max you get an error code that you need to look up in a book. All to make sure pilots need as little additional training.
Also in Airbus the computer tells you what is wrong and in the 737-max you get an error code that you need to look up in a book. All to make sure pilots need as little additional training.
Also in Airbus the computer tells you what is wrong and in the 737-max you get an error code that you need to look up in a book. All to make sure pilots need as little additional training.
Of interest the P-8 Poseidon has EICAS but none of the other 737s do.
Of interest the P-8 Poseidon has EICAS but none of the other 737s do.
The problem is it's not quite enough of a new aircraft. If they'd fitted longer landing gear (along with all the changes that imples), they could have put the new larger engines under the wing, where they should have been in the first place, rather than stuck out in front of it, and then they wouldn't have needed MCAS.
I could imagine for many carriers the shorter landing gear is a feature of the design; I believe some using this airframe choose to disembark passengers direct to the tarmac using the system's ladders, rather than involve a flight of stairs or an articulated gangway, lessening airport fees.
Edit: not to lessen any of the other points you made - this absolutely should have gone through approval as a new model.
Edit: not to lessen any of the other points you made - this absolutely should have gone through approval as a new model.
The design predates broad availability of jetways at airports. The concept, in the 1960s, was that by being able to use stairs they'd be able to service many smaller airports. By the 1970s this was clearly the wrong choice -- smaller airports just installed jetways too. This was a design decision that didn't even last the decade, but was brought forward for the next 50 years because changes would mean a recertification. That is why the landing gear is short. There are essentially no operators who make use of the low height of the aircraft, and there hasn't been for longer than most of us have been alive.
I can't count the number of times that I've boarded 737's by stairways.
>(along with all the changes that imples)
You just put designing an entirely new airplane in a parenthetical. New landing gear means modifications to the wing. Modifying the wing isn't much less work than just designing a new one. By the time you've designed a brand new wing, you've 75% of the way to a new clean sheet design anyway.
You just put designing an entirely new airplane in a parenthetical. New landing gear means modifications to the wing. Modifying the wing isn't much less work than just designing a new one. By the time you've designed a brand new wing, you've 75% of the way to a new clean sheet design anyway.
I don't fly that often, but I know I'll keep track of whatever they call this plane in the future to make sure I never board such a plane.
If a company would book a ticket for me at one of these I would rather get fired or quit my job rather than board a MAX plane.
Never ever, am I going to travel with this model and I will be highly suspicious for future models they produce.
If a company would book a ticket for me at one of these I would rather get fired or quit my job rather than board a MAX plane.
Never ever, am I going to travel with this model and I will be highly suspicious for future models they produce.
There is nothing Boeing can do now to save the MAX short of firing the whole executive suite and the board. The longer they stall, the worse for the stockholders.
Boeing's problems are much much worse and complex than that.
Firing them all is a no-brainier, but they need to be replaced with competent ones willing to take the reigns of a slowly but surely nose diving plane on fire.
Unfortunately the cancer spread to lower levels of the company too, so it's no easy to turn this around and tragically politics and geopolitics it's what will "saved" them for now but I'm almost sure it's a pack with the devil and they'll pay dearly for it.
Firing them all is a no-brainier, but they need to be replaced with competent ones willing to take the reigns of a slowly but surely nose diving plane on fire.
Unfortunately the cancer spread to lower levels of the company too, so it's no easy to turn this around and tragically politics and geopolitics it's what will "saved" them for now but I'm almost sure it's a pack with the devil and they'll pay dearly for it.
To me, the first concrete step they could take to regain trust would be to admit the mistake, scrap the max program including produced planes, and double down on a totally redesigned successor.
Admitting the mistake and scrapping the Max program would likely mean the end of the company unless it got the mother of all bailouts from Uncle Sam.
Which it would.
Nikki Haley, former South Carolina governor and recent Ambassador, joined their Board recently.
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-02-26-Boeing-Nominates-Nik...
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-02-26-Boeing-Nominates-Nik...
So much for Boeing, then.
could you explain how scrapping the max program could bankrupt entire company ?
The 737 and its variants pay the bills at Boeing. They don't have a replacement for the 737, and the sales from the rest of their planes would not be sufficient to keep the company afloat.
Is that really the case? I've long been under the impression that the military side is making at least as much as the civil side at Boeing.
Well, just to buyback the 400 existing airframes you'd be looking at $50 billion in cash, to start.
Boeing doesn't have $50B cash, or anything close to it.
Boeing doesn't have $50B cash, or anything close to it.
When I buy a chocolate bar for $1 and sell it for $1.10 I only gain 10c. If it turns out its rotten and I can't get my money back I will lose the $1 not the 10c.
There are 393 delivered to customers at this time and another 300 produced. The unit cost ranges from 100M to 130M. The cost of all units is aprox 80 billion dollars whereas their annual earnings are about 8 billion. They have aprox 9 billion in cash and cash equivalents. Scrapping all maxes would therefore require them to borrow 9-10 years worth of earnings. I predict they find a way to kill more people before cratering and being bailed out on all our dimes. We should just order them scrapped now and buy the pieces after the company becomes insolvent and skip the dead people but if this happened now we would probably end up with Jared Kushner running Boeing.
There are 393 delivered to customers at this time and another 300 produced. The unit cost ranges from 100M to 130M. The cost of all units is aprox 80 billion dollars whereas their annual earnings are about 8 billion. They have aprox 9 billion in cash and cash equivalents. Scrapping all maxes would therefore require them to borrow 9-10 years worth of earnings. I predict they find a way to kill more people before cratering and being bailed out on all our dimes. We should just order them scrapped now and buy the pieces after the company becomes insolvent and skip the dead people but if this happened now we would probably end up with Jared Kushner running Boeing.
It's interesting when you put it like that, because it's clear there is no incentive to ever do the right thing then.
You either come clean and bankrupt the company, or move forward and try to make the defective thing work asap, which is sort of what they did.
I'm not sure what the solution is, but clearly having the only incentive being the morality of those involved willing to risk their livelihood is not the solution.
You either come clean and bankrupt the company, or move forward and try to make the defective thing work asap, which is sort of what they did.
I'm not sure what the solution is, but clearly having the only incentive being the morality of those involved willing to risk their livelihood is not the solution.
This analysis seems to assume that the scrapped airframes are worth $0, which clearly isn't the case. Unfortunately I don't have anywhere near the expertise to produce a realistic value of their scrap value, but I would expect that large portions of the avionics and engine systems would retain significant value.
> if this happened now we would probably end up with Jared Kushner running Boeing.
I would not know of a quicker way to ensure that Boeing really would end as a company.
I would not know of a quicker way to ensure that Boeing really would end as a company.
> We should just order them scrapped now and buy the pieces after the company becomes insolvent and skip the dead people.
Maybe they made their own bed then... A major shake up would lead to restructuring within the aerospace industry and new competitors would spring up. The company would likely be majorly downsized but wouldn't go out of existence. Taxpayers shouldn't be liable just because they made a catastrophic miscalculation and built a fatally flawed aircraft.
Maybe they made their own bed then... A major shake up would lead to restructuring within the aerospace industry and new competitors would spring up. The company would likely be majorly downsized but wouldn't go out of existence. Taxpayers shouldn't be liable just because they made a catastrophic miscalculation and built a fatally flawed aircraft.
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Thanks to the duopoly in the market, right now, there is no replacement for the 737. Cancelling the MAX would create a plane gap of about 5000 planes. This alone has the potential to severely impact the safety of commercial aviation. Older planes get flown longer, even when they should be retired.
Also, creating a replacement would take at least 10 years. Any attempt to rush this has the risk of creating a much larger disaster than fixing MCAS. With MCAS, there is a defective software (which can and is being fixed) on a well-known and reliable airframe. With a new plane, you start from scratch in every aspect.
Yes, Boeing should start a successor of the 737 on full steam, but stopping the 737 doesn't sound like a good idea.
Also, creating a replacement would take at least 10 years. Any attempt to rush this has the risk of creating a much larger disaster than fixing MCAS. With MCAS, there is a defective software (which can and is being fixed) on a well-known and reliable airframe. With a new plane, you start from scratch in every aspect.
Yes, Boeing should start a successor of the 737 on full steam, but stopping the 737 doesn't sound like a good idea.
Thank you!
You're most welcome. I try to do this for every HN story I'm interested in that's behind a paywall: I figure if I want to read it in its entirety, there must be other kindred spirits. Interestingly enough, sometimes my unblocked links get downvoted. I file those under "No good deed goes unpunished."
I imagine it will be safe in the future, but doomed because of PR.
Maybe they could help their PR if they made it actually comfortable to fly in. I was avoiding it before the grounding because it sounds like a sardine can they want to use for 5 hour flights like LAX-DCA.
https://thepointsguy.com/news/cruel-and-unusual-aa-puts-pann...
Maybe they could help their PR if they made it actually comfortable to fly in. I was avoiding it before the grounding because it sounds like a sardine can they want to use for 5 hour flights like LAX-DCA.
https://thepointsguy.com/news/cruel-and-unusual-aa-puts-pann...
Doesn't Boeing basically deliver an empty tube to the airline? Boeing isn't picking the interior layout; the airline is.
They probably will have to Galt production.
But none of the executives are going to prison right? That's what should actually happen. They deliberately and systematically short-changed the engineering in order to make more money, to the point where hundreds of people died.
But none of the executives are going to prison right? That's what should actually happen. They deliberately and systematically short-changed the engineering in order to make more money, to the point where hundreds of people died.
Thankfully none of us on this forum are in charge at Boeing. We would certainly do the wrong thing in response to the MCAS debacle. An observation is that the overall environment is relatively healthy but we must never let the MCAS incident be repeated. Identify why MCAS was so poorly coded and how it passed QC and I think you’ve solved the most pressing issue.
It seems unlikely, at least to me, that Boeing will ever restart 737 Max production. The decision by Boeing executives to bet the company on this deeply flawed aircraft will have serious economic consequences for the employees, suppliers, and investors who trusted them.
For the rest of us, no big deal. Airbus will happily take up the slack.
For the rest of us, no big deal. Airbus will happily take up the slack.
They need to whine less and display some introspection instead.
Clearly Boeing has a company culture issue, not a 737 issue. Well both I suppose.
Clearly Boeing has a company culture issue, not a 737 issue. Well both I suppose.
Boeing executives willingly and knowingly put a plane in the skies that they knew pilots weren't properly trained to fly, and people died as a result.
There should 100% be a prison sentence for the decision makers that OK'd that move. That's negligence to the highest degree.
There should 100% be a prison sentence for the decision makers that OK'd that move. That's negligence to the highest degree.
Better than scrapping them all after they are built.
At this point it’s about the negative name recognition more than anything.
Don't they already have deals in place? Unless they could fulfill those orders with 737s at mightily discounted rates, I would think it would really be up to the customers at this point.
Does anyone have a guess how much of a plane could be saved just by recycling? Assuming they would bring it back to factory by air.
That’s an interesting question. I wonder if they could be “re-specced” as NG 700/800/900 by re-engining them with NG engines and provably disabling MCAS? Likely there would be big penalties to be paid to the airlines though.
"Unsafe despite software patch" - the modern day Corvair. I'll never fly on one of these, and neither should you. Boeing needs to get their act together...
The Corvair was actually made safe at the end of the first generation and throughout the second generation rear suspension. The snap understeer of the 1960-1963 models wasn't especially unsafe, especially in relation to numerous Porsche 911 models that were released during and after the Corvair.
GM's choice to recommend lower inflation pressures for the tires vs installing an anti-sway bar for the first gen cars with swing axle rear suspension (2nd gen was IRS) was rather stupid but it's nothing compared to the 737 MAX.
GM's choice to recommend lower inflation pressures for the tires vs installing an anti-sway bar for the first gen cars with swing axle rear suspension (2nd gen was IRS) was rather stupid but it's nothing compared to the 737 MAX.
The only way for that to happen is to purge the entire executive suite.
Will that happen? No, thus a new(ish) and now chronic distrust of the company and the decision that it makes.
Will that happen? No, thus a new(ish) and now chronic distrust of the company and the decision that it makes.
If it were merely the executives that made the fatal decisions regarding the 737 MAX then clearing out the top level of management may suffice, but it's fairly clear that it wasn't a C-level decision in this case.
Once you have a bad culture established in an organization it's very hard to turn that around absent a rather drastic purging of employees at multiple levels combined with a very pro-active new management that not only talks about the necessary new culture but also actively implements the incentives required to enforce such a culture.
Personally I've had to deal with cultural turn around efforts at companies in the past (albeit nowhere near the scale of Boeing) and over time I learned that the only reliable way to address such a situation is to purge with fire and bring in new people.
Once you have a bad culture established in an organization it's very hard to turn that around absent a rather drastic purging of employees at multiple levels combined with a very pro-active new management that not only talks about the necessary new culture but also actively implements the incentives required to enforce such a culture.
Personally I've had to deal with cultural turn around efforts at companies in the past (albeit nowhere near the scale of Boeing) and over time I learned that the only reliable way to address such a situation is to purge with fire and bring in new people.
interesting situation, like in ben horowitz new book, you have to have a shock culture to changed.
There was never really anything wrong with the Corvair.
Are we thinking of the same plane? The one with the square windows that caused stress fractures?
That was the de Havilland DH 106 Comet. He is talking about the Chevrolet Corviar, which was a car and the subject of Ralph Nader’s book Unsafe At Any Speed.
The Corvair was a GM automobile, made infamous by Ralph Nader's book "Unsafe at Any Speed."
You're thinking of the de Havilland Comet (or possibly the aircraft manufacturer Convair).
You're thinking of the de Havilland Comet (or possibly the aircraft manufacturer Convair).
Um... all those tuck-under accidents didn't happen? They weren't actually tuck under? They were tuck under, but that wasn't the fault of the car? What are you actually claiming here?
And, can you document it rather than just claim it?
And, can you document it rather than just claim it?
He's probably referring to the 1972 NHTSA report that basically says "well lots of other cars are just as unsafe, so it's fine".
Build the 797 ASAP.
It's not rocket science.
(sorry)
It's not rocket science.
(sorry)
There's been no further guidance so far on what we'll do when the 737 Max is back in service, but the message was clear: the safety and comfort of the employee is worth a $200 change fee, compared to being forced onto a plane that the employee feels is unsafe. I've never heard that mentioned for any other plane. As much as air travel has sucked this summer with cancelations and delays caused by the grounding of this plane, I don't foresee that model having much luck if/when it's put into full service.