Publication of Hiroshima in the New Yorker (1997)(herseyhiroshima.com)
herseyhiroshima.com
Publication of Hiroshima in the New Yorker (1997)
http://www.herseyhiroshima.com/hiro.php
70 comments
(And a follow up about 40 years later: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1985/07/15/hiroshima-the-... )
And a small update from last week on how they discovered some rare "white band" copies of the original magazine at a high school named for Hersey: https://www.newyorker.com/books/double-take/a-rare-discovery...
"The white band had originally been added as a bit of an afterthought. The editors knew that Hersey’s report was shocking, and they quickly realized that the cover they’d chosen for the issue—a vibrant, bucolic scene of children and families frolicking in a park—might not give readers enough warning about the devastating nature of its contents. (New Yorker covers rarely have a connection with the contents of an issue, but, in this particular case, the dissonance was marked.) “My God, how would a guy feel, buying the magazine intending to sit in a barber’s chair and read it!” one editor was said to have thought, during a meeting at the time. So the white band was hastily added to about forty thousand newsstand copies in New York. (It was not included in the national run.) Very few copies of the edition with the original band exist today, which is why, as Blume noted, it’s considered one of the “white whales” of the antiquarian-magazine world."
"The white band had originally been added as a bit of an afterthought. The editors knew that Hersey’s report was shocking, and they quickly realized that the cover they’d chosen for the issue—a vibrant, bucolic scene of children and families frolicking in a park—might not give readers enough warning about the devastating nature of its contents. (New Yorker covers rarely have a connection with the contents of an issue, but, in this particular case, the dissonance was marked.) “My God, how would a guy feel, buying the magazine intending to sit in a barber’s chair and read it!” one editor was said to have thought, during a meeting at the time. So the white band was hastily added to about forty thousand newsstand copies in New York. (It was not included in the national run.) Very few copies of the edition with the original band exist today, which is why, as Blume noted, it’s considered one of the “white whales” of the antiquarian-magazine world."
To be fair, I don't think that link existed when Steve wrote this 24 years ago; the New Yorker set up a web site in November 01998, and the WABAC machine's first snapshots of that link are from 02014: https://web.archive.org/web/20140723205106/http://www.newyor...
Steve's a good person; I'm sure he would have linked to the article he was citing if he could.
Steve's a good person; I'm sure he would have linked to the article he was citing if he could.
No judgement, I mentioned I didn't spot a link to preemptively excuse myself in case it was redundant
More recently, the New Yorker published "The Plague Year" [1] in Jan 2021. IIRC, this was the first time since the Hiroshima issue that they dedicated almost the entire magazine to a single article. I quite liked it, and it was even on the HN front page [2].
[1] https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/01/04/the-plague-yea... [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25616014
[1] https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/01/04/the-plague-yea... [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25616014
he turned that into a book also:
https://www.amazon.com/Plague-Year-America-Time-Covid-ebook/...
https://www.amazon.com/Plague-Year-America-Time-Covid-ebook/...
There's a guy named Joseph Grew, a former US ambassador to japan before WW2 who tried to stop the bombings. Basically he put forth the argument that Japan would be willing to surrender as long as the emperor could keep his title/powers/etc. Truman removed this provision at the last minute, and surprise the surrender was not accepted. In the end we proceeded to use the nukes, and then let the emperor keep his title anyway.
It's interesting that I never heard of him until watching a documentary about this while in Japan.
It's interesting that I never heard of him until watching a documentary about this while in Japan.
I read the Bantam books version of Hiroshima before traveling to Japan and visiting the city. It gives one perspective on what happened there and the reality of the atomic bomb.
> Navy Admiral William F. Halsey, Third Fleet commander, was quoted in the press as saying that the Japanese had been on the verge of surrunder before the atom bombs were dropped in the summer of 1945 and that the "atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment..."
I suspect that the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were as much to impress Stalin as for any other purpose.
At the time of the bombings, there were literally millions of battle-hardened Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. They were also commanded by very able generals (see Zhukov).
If Stalin wanted them to, they could have easily rolled west, and the American and British armies would have been no match for the Soviet Red Army.
However, the USA had the bomb. I think Hiroshima and Nagasaki were at least in part about demonstrating the awesome power of the atomic bomb to Stalin and forestalling any temptation he might have to continue west.
I suspect that the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were as much to impress Stalin as for any other purpose.
At the time of the bombings, there were literally millions of battle-hardened Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. They were also commanded by very able generals (see Zhukov).
If Stalin wanted them to, they could have easily rolled west, and the American and British armies would have been no match for the Soviet Red Army.
However, the USA had the bomb. I think Hiroshima and Nagasaki were at least in part about demonstrating the awesome power of the atomic bomb to Stalin and forestalling any temptation he might have to continue west.
How does one conclude the Japanese were "on the verge of surrender" when it took not one, but two atomic bombs before they capitulated? And it took six days after the second bomb before they officially surrendered. That doesn't sound like "on the verge of surrender" to me.
This is an old argument. Read "Japan's Longest Day", from 1965, which is a detailed reconstruction of what went on before the Japanese surrender, from interviews with some of the people involved. Nobody was in overall charge. The Army barely spoke to the Navy.
Planning meetings consisted of the heads of the Army and Navy making statements.
The emperor's role was primarily ceremonial.
The civilian government had little or no control over the military. (For why, see [1]). The surrender was a near thing, with one faction almost succeeding in prevent the Emperor from broadcasting a surrender message.
The US side of that story is presented in "Thank God for the Atomic Bomb", by Paul Fussell. (1981) Fussell is a well-known essayist. He was in the Army during WWII, and he was in a unit scheduled for the invasion of Japan if the atomic bomb didn't work.
Look up "Operation Olympic". The first phase, the invasion of Kyushu, was scheduled for November 1, 1945, less than three months after the atomic bombing. This wasn't just planned; the equipment and soldiers were already in Okinawa and Saipan, the staging areas, and that invasion was going to happen if the atomic bomb didn't force a surrender. The operation was at least 3x the size of D-day and over a 500km sea approach. A million dead were expected on the Allied side. Far more on the Japanese side, because the defense was mostly infantry without enough heavy weapons, armor, or ammo.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_15_Incident
[2] https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/hf/iakh/HIS1300MET/v12/unde...
The US side of that story is presented in "Thank God for the Atomic Bomb", by Paul Fussell. (1981) Fussell is a well-known essayist. He was in the Army during WWII, and he was in a unit scheduled for the invasion of Japan if the atomic bomb didn't work.
Look up "Operation Olympic". The first phase, the invasion of Kyushu, was scheduled for November 1, 1945, less than three months after the atomic bombing. This wasn't just planned; the equipment and soldiers were already in Okinawa and Saipan, the staging areas, and that invasion was going to happen if the atomic bomb didn't force a surrender. The operation was at least 3x the size of D-day and over a 500km sea approach. A million dead were expected on the Allied side. Far more on the Japanese side, because the defense was mostly infantry without enough heavy weapons, armor, or ammo.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_15_Incident
[2] https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/hf/iakh/HIS1300MET/v12/unde...
why did you get downvoted? it seems a plausible theory that's at least worth discussing / is a reasonable contribution to this thread.
Because it's been debunked over and over and over. It's just not supported by historical evidence, even by Japanese historians interviewing surviving Japanese officials. Somebody else has recommended in this thread but I will as well: "Japan's Longest Day" makes for fascinating reading.
The reality is that there was a peace faction in the Japanese government who did want to surrender but the ultranationalistic Japanese military was quite firmly in control and was very much _not_ interested in surrendering, even at the cost of millions of Japanese military and civilian casualties involved in continuing the war. (It's worth remembering that the Allied aerial firebombing campaigns had already devastated every other major city in Japan and caused far more civilian casualties than both atomic bombs did; both the Japanese and Allied militaries accepted this as part of the toll of war.) The aim (and preference of all factions) would have been a peace treaty that let Japan keep its ill-gotten gains in Asia. It took an unprecedented direct order from the Emperor to initiate the surrender, over the objections of the military. Even the high level overview provided by the Wikipedia article has excerpts like "[On August 9,] The cabinet meeting adjourned at 17:30 with no consensus. A second meeting lasting from 18:00 to 22:00 also ended with no consensus. ... The cabinet debated, but again no consensus emerged." and "As August 14 dawned, Suzuki, Kido, and the Emperor realized the day would end with either an acceptance of the American terms or a military coup." that directly contradict the idea that Japan was eager to surrender.
And beyond that, at the last minute, a coup attempt was made by fanatics willing to defy even the Emperor in an attempt to prevent the surrender proclamation from being broadcast (the Kyuujou incident).
Does any of this sound like a Japan that was eager to surrender? No, and that's why war historians generally deride this theory, quotes from Halsey, Eisenhower, etc. notwithstanding. Even just reading the Wikipedia article would make this clear: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan
The reality is that there was a peace faction in the Japanese government who did want to surrender but the ultranationalistic Japanese military was quite firmly in control and was very much _not_ interested in surrendering, even at the cost of millions of Japanese military and civilian casualties involved in continuing the war. (It's worth remembering that the Allied aerial firebombing campaigns had already devastated every other major city in Japan and caused far more civilian casualties than both atomic bombs did; both the Japanese and Allied militaries accepted this as part of the toll of war.) The aim (and preference of all factions) would have been a peace treaty that let Japan keep its ill-gotten gains in Asia. It took an unprecedented direct order from the Emperor to initiate the surrender, over the objections of the military. Even the high level overview provided by the Wikipedia article has excerpts like "[On August 9,] The cabinet meeting adjourned at 17:30 with no consensus. A second meeting lasting from 18:00 to 22:00 also ended with no consensus. ... The cabinet debated, but again no consensus emerged." and "As August 14 dawned, Suzuki, Kido, and the Emperor realized the day would end with either an acceptance of the American terms or a military coup." that directly contradict the idea that Japan was eager to surrender.
And beyond that, at the last minute, a coup attempt was made by fanatics willing to defy even the Emperor in an attempt to prevent the surrender proclamation from being broadcast (the Kyuujou incident).
Does any of this sound like a Japan that was eager to surrender? No, and that's why war historians generally deride this theory, quotes from Halsey, Eisenhower, etc. notwithstanding. Even just reading the Wikipedia article would make this clear: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan
Because anyone who knows the actual history, knows that's bullshit and OP could have just looked up the facts instead of making up something.
Japan was going to fight to the last man/woman/child. They were going to have seniors and children fight with sticks. The Pacific theater was already one of the bloodiest battle fronts in the war and the US was battle weary and didn't want to expend another 500,000 Americans to invade Japan. They dropped nukes to avoid another extended and unbelievably bloody conflict.
Go listen to the Hardcore History podcasts "Supernova in the East" and it'll make it much more clear.
Japan was going to fight to the last man/woman/child. They were going to have seniors and children fight with sticks. The Pacific theater was already one of the bloodiest battle fronts in the war and the US was battle weary and didn't want to expend another 500,000 Americans to invade Japan. They dropped nukes to avoid another extended and unbelievably bloody conflict.
Go listen to the Hardcore History podcasts "Supernova in the East" and it'll make it much more clear.
I don't think it's bullshit. I think Navy Admiral William F. Halsey did say those things.
"The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before."[1]
Those are the facts... GP made nothing up.
OTOH - the Cold War should be ample evidence of the West's distrust of Stalin and USSR generally. I think it's entirely plausible the motivation to drop the bomb included Soviet deterrence.
[1] http://www.doug-long.com/ga1.htm
"The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before."[1]
Those are the facts... GP made nothing up.
OTOH - the Cold War should be ample evidence of the West's distrust of Stalin and USSR generally. I think it's entirely plausible the motivation to drop the bomb included Soviet deterrence.
[1] http://www.doug-long.com/ga1.htm
I made a post about this above, but the difference between a negotiated peace and an unconditional surrender is rather crucial. The Japanese were willing to seek the former but found the latter politically unacceptable until sufficient pressure was applied.
> [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out,
He may have said that, but after reading books on Oppenheimer and other scientists at the Manhatten Project, I don't believe it is accurate
He may have said that, but after reading books on Oppenheimer and other scientists at the Manhatten Project, I don't believe it is accurate
The quote exists but doesn’t mean it’s correct.
you are right, I am convinced, this was obviously the best action the Americans could have done. Why is it so hard for people to get that?
I suspect (as some have indicated), this is a very centric version of the history, but that does not mean it is incorrect.
Because there is a lot of evidence that it wasn’t the case and that we knew it wasn’t the case.
The most damning evidence against it being necessary is that the Japanese were actively trying to get the Soviets to help them negotiate peace in the weeks leading up to the bombing. The soviets played them, and didn’t carry the message since they were secretly in the process of staging an invasion against Japan in Manchuria, an event that the Japanese knew would be fatal to their war. It’s worth noting that Hirohito did not order the surrender of Japan after hearing of Hiroshima, but after hearing of the Soviet declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria, which happened a few hours before Nagasaki.
Much of the reluctance to surrender was around guaranteeing that Hirohito could remain. A concession that we granted in the end.
Also keep in mind that the nuclear attacks weren’t even the most destructive aerial attacks that the US possessed. The firebombing of Tokyo did more damage to a wider area and killed more people. In fact, Hiroshima was the 6th most destructive bombing raid as far as land area destroyed goes. American forces wiped dozens of cities off the map using conventional attacks before Hiroshima.
Before August 6 the Japanese politicians were more than aware that the war was lost, and that surrender was necessary. There is a lot of the historical record that shows this.
There is also a lot of records that the bombing was as much a demonstration of power to Stalin as anything else.
Many of the justifications that we see know don’t appear in the written record until after 1945. You are welcome to do the research.
Most serious historians of the time acknowledge that the bombings might have shortened the war, but the effect was minimal. On the order of a few days or weeks at best.
Most of this is not disputed fact. The interpretation is certainly debatable, but we hide the complexity of the situation by perpetuating the story that it was either nuclear bombings or an invasion that would have killed millions.
More info with citations: https://www.thenation.com/article/world/why-the-us-really-bo...
The most damning evidence against it being necessary is that the Japanese were actively trying to get the Soviets to help them negotiate peace in the weeks leading up to the bombing. The soviets played them, and didn’t carry the message since they were secretly in the process of staging an invasion against Japan in Manchuria, an event that the Japanese knew would be fatal to their war. It’s worth noting that Hirohito did not order the surrender of Japan after hearing of Hiroshima, but after hearing of the Soviet declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria, which happened a few hours before Nagasaki.
Much of the reluctance to surrender was around guaranteeing that Hirohito could remain. A concession that we granted in the end.
Also keep in mind that the nuclear attacks weren’t even the most destructive aerial attacks that the US possessed. The firebombing of Tokyo did more damage to a wider area and killed more people. In fact, Hiroshima was the 6th most destructive bombing raid as far as land area destroyed goes. American forces wiped dozens of cities off the map using conventional attacks before Hiroshima.
Before August 6 the Japanese politicians were more than aware that the war was lost, and that surrender was necessary. There is a lot of the historical record that shows this.
There is also a lot of records that the bombing was as much a demonstration of power to Stalin as anything else.
Many of the justifications that we see know don’t appear in the written record until after 1945. You are welcome to do the research.
Most serious historians of the time acknowledge that the bombings might have shortened the war, but the effect was minimal. On the order of a few days or weeks at best.
Most of this is not disputed fact. The interpretation is certainly debatable, but we hide the complexity of the situation by perpetuating the story that it was either nuclear bombings or an invasion that would have killed millions.
More info with citations: https://www.thenation.com/article/world/why-the-us-really-bo...
This is a pretty extreme failure of me to remember Poe's law, im very sorry. I just thought the reasons people find it hard to believe are extremely obvious, considering the almost existential death and destruction these bombs caused. Like, I truly can't imagine defending it in whatever way.
that said, I do really appreciate this history, and while I firmly believe that we dont even need of these reasons to assert the moral human failure of the act, knowing them makes it even more disgusting.
that said, I do really appreciate this history, and while I firmly believe that we dont even need of these reasons to assert the moral human failure of the act, knowing them makes it even more disgusting.
Haha. Sorry about that one!
The interesting part is that there are a lot of people in this comment section that are 100% convinced that the nuclear option was the only one. Your extreme take is a pretty standard one in the US…
The interesting part is that there are a lot of people in this comment section that are 100% convinced that the nuclear option was the only one. Your extreme take is a pretty standard one in the US…
If some of the key figures involved can disagree with that assessment, why can't others?
> Japan was going to fight to the last man/woman/child.
This is not history, this is a hypothetical.
> They were going to have seniors and children fight with sticks.
I suspect this would have been ineffective.
This is not history, this is a hypothetical.
> They were going to have seniors and children fight with sticks.
I suspect this would have been ineffective.
The Japanese were not known for surrendering. There were mass suicides because they refused to be taken alive:
https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/japanese-mass-suicide...
https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/japanese-mass-suicide...
It's not ineffective in all situations. A single soldier, isolated from his group, fighting 10 seniors or children simultaneously, is not going to do well. Plenty of people are killed in the Middle-East from rock throwing.
It's not an implausible hypothesis that an invasion of Japan would have been a larger, and proportionally bloodier, version of the takings of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, two very bloody battles.
Right, but at no point were those the only options (even according to key military figures).
The firebombs the Japanese flew across the Pacific, setting fires in the Pacific Northwest of the US, were largely built by children.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fu-Go_balloon_bomb
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fu-Go_balloon_bomb
The problem is that there exist first-hand and second-hand (i.e. MAGIC intercepts) primary sources for decisions from both sides in the summer of 1945 (https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/) and they don't really support the theory. (It's possible you could find some reasoning to support the "impress the Soviets" part, but to make that the primary motive would be to ignore the majority.)
Also, keep in mind that Halsey had a bit of a problem with Nimitz and much of the Navy, particularly over the matter of two typhoons and Leyte Gulf, so he may not be entirely unbiased.
Also, keep in mind that Halsey had a bit of a problem with Nimitz and much of the Navy, particularly over the matter of two typhoons and Leyte Gulf, so he may not be entirely unbiased.
There are very few defensible historical positions that seem to rile up unreasonable criticism more than saying the use of atomic weapons on Japan might not have been justified, usually in the form of uneducated meme responses such as "they would never have surrendered" and "it's easy to say that now."
Given that we have evidence that many of those who were there at the time disagreed with the decision and that Japan had already been trying to work towards peace through back-channels, these responses seem to point to a deep need to feel like the United States didn't unjustifiably kill over 100k civilians.
There is little question that the bombings were a better strategic choice than Operation Downfall, which would likely have killed more on both sides, but to paint this as the only alternative is a false dilemma. There is even debate among (prominent, non-revisionist) historians and political scientists as to whether the bombings were the primary reason for the surrender -- contemporary letters from within Japan indicate that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria may have actually been the primary factor (though the bombings certainly played some part, and were a larger factor in arguments made by some particular officials).
Given that we have evidence that many of those who were there at the time disagreed with the decision and that Japan had already been trying to work towards peace through back-channels, these responses seem to point to a deep need to feel like the United States didn't unjustifiably kill over 100k civilians.
There is little question that the bombings were a better strategic choice than Operation Downfall, which would likely have killed more on both sides, but to paint this as the only alternative is a false dilemma. There is even debate among (prominent, non-revisionist) historians and political scientists as to whether the bombings were the primary reason for the surrender -- contemporary letters from within Japan indicate that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria may have actually been the primary factor (though the bombings certainly played some part, and were a larger factor in arguments made by some particular officials).
I would argue the opposite; criticism of the use of atomic weapons on Japan tends to ramp up during periods of increasing skepticism toward American power (e.g., now). Unfortunately, that criticism is rarely rooted in credible historical argument. I wouldn't say you're arguing from a "uneducated meme response," but I would say that the position that you're taking is the symptom of a post-Vietnam/Watergate narrative regarding CIA conspiracies, the legitimacy of war, and the trustworthiness of American authority. It is, however, not a terribly useful way to approach the context of 1945.
While it is possible to find negative quotes from various individuals, such as the aforementioned Halsey, the question is really whether the people involved in the decision were making it in 'good faith' (i.e. out of the perceived necessity of ending the war on rational terms, and not diplomatic stick-shaking or the need to show off one's latest toys). Overwhelmingly, the primary sources argue that they were, and that the most salient concern was ensuring an unconditional surrender to avoid the mistakes made after the last war, in which the sociopolitical structures that enabled militarism were left intact. The "peace" that Japan was offering would have left its extremely dysfunctional political structures intact, and so was considered unacceptable.
The number of dead, and manner of their death, must also be seen in the context of the time. It doesn't really matter what we believe about the morality of targeting civilians in 2021; by 1945, that particular Rubicon had been crossed years before, and not just by the Allies. The Japanese Army committed atrocities on such a scale as to poison attitudes about the country to this very day; there is a good reason that people in China or the Philippines may roll their eyes when reading about poor Sadako and her thousand paper cranes (a story popularized by a 1977 Canadian novel).
I write this not to minimize any healthy sense of horror or responsibility, but to point out that "it's easy to say that now" is not merely a meme, but in this case responsible historical practice.
While it is possible to find negative quotes from various individuals, such as the aforementioned Halsey, the question is really whether the people involved in the decision were making it in 'good faith' (i.e. out of the perceived necessity of ending the war on rational terms, and not diplomatic stick-shaking or the need to show off one's latest toys). Overwhelmingly, the primary sources argue that they were, and that the most salient concern was ensuring an unconditional surrender to avoid the mistakes made after the last war, in which the sociopolitical structures that enabled militarism were left intact. The "peace" that Japan was offering would have left its extremely dysfunctional political structures intact, and so was considered unacceptable.
The number of dead, and manner of their death, must also be seen in the context of the time. It doesn't really matter what we believe about the morality of targeting civilians in 2021; by 1945, that particular Rubicon had been crossed years before, and not just by the Allies. The Japanese Army committed atrocities on such a scale as to poison attitudes about the country to this very day; there is a good reason that people in China or the Philippines may roll their eyes when reading about poor Sadako and her thousand paper cranes (a story popularized by a 1977 Canadian novel).
I write this not to minimize any healthy sense of horror or responsibility, but to point out that "it's easy to say that now" is not merely a meme, but in this case responsible historical practice.
I think there is maybe a middle ground.
It is entirely possible that the decision to drop the bomb was made in good faith, but that the Japanese were already committed to surrender. The fog of war is very real (as this month has reminded us).
In context, the Hiroshima bombing wasn't the most deadly or the most destructive bombing of the war. The Tokyo firebombing takes that honor. Given that the US Army was in the habit of wiping cities off the map at will BEFORE Hiroshima, I wonder how much of an influence the bomb really could have had in 3 days...
The other side of it is that American history really undervalues the soviet contribution to the war. The US conventional story fully ignores that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was cited by Japanese leadership as one of the reasons for full acceptance of the Potsdam declaration.
I don't disagree with what you are saying, but the conventional narrative that nuking two cities was the ONLY way to end the war really seems like an oversimplification of a very complex situation.
As you mention "total war" was already fully accepted, but I wish that that the complexity of the full situation was taught
It is entirely possible that the decision to drop the bomb was made in good faith, but that the Japanese were already committed to surrender. The fog of war is very real (as this month has reminded us).
In context, the Hiroshima bombing wasn't the most deadly or the most destructive bombing of the war. The Tokyo firebombing takes that honor. Given that the US Army was in the habit of wiping cities off the map at will BEFORE Hiroshima, I wonder how much of an influence the bomb really could have had in 3 days...
The other side of it is that American history really undervalues the soviet contribution to the war. The US conventional story fully ignores that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was cited by Japanese leadership as one of the reasons for full acceptance of the Potsdam declaration.
I don't disagree with what you are saying, but the conventional narrative that nuking two cities was the ONLY way to end the war really seems like an oversimplification of a very complex situation.
As you mention "total war" was already fully accepted, but I wish that that the complexity of the full situation was taught
My sticking point with that would be the point about the Japanese having "committed to surrender" prior to the bombs being dropped, which can't really be argued convincingly. The dysfunctional Japanese military hierarchy had trouble committing to anything short of aggressive militarism, which was a major reason for the war being launched in the first place, then continued despite the obvious hopelessness of the Japanese position. Even after the Emperor had officially ordered surrender (via a radio address, in which he explicitly mentioned the influence of the atomic bombs), a group of Japanese officers attempted to depose him in a coup—and this was far from an unprecedented event in a political environment that often punished any public position short of fanatical hawkishness with assassination.
To argue that the atomic bombs were not decisive requires ignoring a lot of primary source evidence—including the declaration of surrender read by the Emperor to the Japanese people—in favor of mostly conspiratorial innuendo that is only convincing to those already inclined to be skeptical of contemporary American power structures. Beyond that, the argument seems to assume an omniscience on the part of Allied leaders. What was known at the time was that Japanese soldiers were often fighting to the last man, holding hopeless positions for the purpose of causing as many casualties to the enemy as possible, and that because of this American political will to continue the war was wavering, putting the goal of victory by unconditional surrender in doubt. In that context it was deemed necessary to end the war as quickly as possible.
I don't think that anyone would argue that dropping the atomic bombs was the only way to end the war. Alternatives were considered—but it was thought that those alternatives would result in an unsatisfactory postwar settlement, and simply repeat mistakes made in the aftermath of the last great war. In short, if the last years of the war were conducted with great brutality, it was because they were intended to be decisive.
(I don't disagree with you that a lot of popular Western histories undervalue contributions by the Soviet Union, but that largely applies to the war against Germany and its European allies, not the war in the Pacific. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria, for example, was probably a contributing factor to the collapse of support for the war, but far from a decisive one.)
To argue that the atomic bombs were not decisive requires ignoring a lot of primary source evidence—including the declaration of surrender read by the Emperor to the Japanese people—in favor of mostly conspiratorial innuendo that is only convincing to those already inclined to be skeptical of contemporary American power structures. Beyond that, the argument seems to assume an omniscience on the part of Allied leaders. What was known at the time was that Japanese soldiers were often fighting to the last man, holding hopeless positions for the purpose of causing as many casualties to the enemy as possible, and that because of this American political will to continue the war was wavering, putting the goal of victory by unconditional surrender in doubt. In that context it was deemed necessary to end the war as quickly as possible.
I don't think that anyone would argue that dropping the atomic bombs was the only way to end the war. Alternatives were considered—but it was thought that those alternatives would result in an unsatisfactory postwar settlement, and simply repeat mistakes made in the aftermath of the last great war. In short, if the last years of the war were conducted with great brutality, it was because they were intended to be decisive.
(I don't disagree with you that a lot of popular Western histories undervalue contributions by the Soviet Union, but that largely applies to the war against Germany and its European allies, not the war in the Pacific. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria, for example, was probably a contributing factor to the collapse of support for the war, but far from a decisive one.)
If arguing that the atomic bombs were not decisive is conspiratorial, then a lot of respected, mainstream subject matter experts are conspiracy theorists.
EDIT: For some reason I can't reply to the child comment, so I'll address it here. I'm not talking about pundits. I'm talking about historians and political scientists, arguing compellingly from evidence. This case is drastically overstated, and mainstream, pro-military sources have been on both sides of the debate since the beginning (including the US Strategic Bombing Survey, which affirmed the usefulness of most other US bombing plans, and yet found that "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."). The anti-bomb side also includes such obscure (/s) academic figures as Robert Pape, Gar Alperovitz, and Stephen Peter Rosen (certainly no anti-war/anti-government figure), as well as military contemporaries such as Douglas MacArthur, Chester Nimitz, William Leahy, William Halsey, Curtis LeMay, and Dwight Eisenhower.
The suggestion that this position is fringe or conspiracy-esque is simply not tenable.
EDIT: For some reason I can't reply to the child comment, so I'll address it here. I'm not talking about pundits. I'm talking about historians and political scientists, arguing compellingly from evidence. This case is drastically overstated, and mainstream, pro-military sources have been on both sides of the debate since the beginning (including the US Strategic Bombing Survey, which affirmed the usefulness of most other US bombing plans, and yet found that "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."). The anti-bomb side also includes such obscure (/s) academic figures as Robert Pape, Gar Alperovitz, and Stephen Peter Rosen (certainly no anti-war/anti-government figure), as well as military contemporaries such as Douglas MacArthur, Chester Nimitz, William Leahy, William Halsey, Curtis LeMay, and Dwight Eisenhower.
The suggestion that this position is fringe or conspiracy-esque is simply not tenable.
I'll put it this way: in popular culture, the controversy over the use of atomic weapons by America goes beyond purely what can be proved, and has instead become a proxy war for other contemporary political issues. (This is not a new phenomenon, and the history of Hiroshima discourse is a fascinating subject in itself.) You will no doubt find some 'mainstream' pundits—even NY Times op-ed authors—willing to carry water for the notion that the use of the atomic bomb was unnecessary, and furthermore known to be unnecessary by the principals at the time.
The evidence, however, does not support it.
EDIT: To respond to your edit, statements of opinion made by American military figures after the war are not considered convincing. A lot of our war scholarship used to be based on statements made by participants after the war, but we have become increasingly skeptical of this approach, for good reason. For example, our narrative about the German invasion of the Soviet Union used to be largely based on the postwar testimonies of Nazi generals. However new examination of primary sources—i.e. records, receipts, transcripts of meetings (some of which were previously buried in Soviet archives)—have shown that their testimonies were often extremely inaccurate, misleading, self-serving, or else calculated to produce a political effect in a Cold War context.
For the same reason, what figures like Halsey—and particularly Douglas MacArthur, an unreliable narrator worthy of "Pale Fire"—have to say about whether the atomic bombs were decisive should provoke skepticism at best. And this is not just because they were political figures and seasoned inter-service warriors, jockeying for position in a postwar hierarchy, but because they weren't there. The best way to determine whether the bomb was decisive is to examine primary sources, both in the American and Japanese context, some of which have been posted elsewhere in this thread.
By examining those sources you cannot really make the case that the bomb was not decisive, nor can you claim that the decision to use the bomb was primarily motivated by factors other than the urgent need to end the war quickly. While some people may indeed make that argument, they are relying on questionable postwar statements of opinion, with no convincing evidence to support them.
The evidence, however, does not support it.
EDIT: To respond to your edit, statements of opinion made by American military figures after the war are not considered convincing. A lot of our war scholarship used to be based on statements made by participants after the war, but we have become increasingly skeptical of this approach, for good reason. For example, our narrative about the German invasion of the Soviet Union used to be largely based on the postwar testimonies of Nazi generals. However new examination of primary sources—i.e. records, receipts, transcripts of meetings (some of which were previously buried in Soviet archives)—have shown that their testimonies were often extremely inaccurate, misleading, self-serving, or else calculated to produce a political effect in a Cold War context.
For the same reason, what figures like Halsey—and particularly Douglas MacArthur, an unreliable narrator worthy of "Pale Fire"—have to say about whether the atomic bombs were decisive should provoke skepticism at best. And this is not just because they were political figures and seasoned inter-service warriors, jockeying for position in a postwar hierarchy, but because they weren't there. The best way to determine whether the bomb was decisive is to examine primary sources, both in the American and Japanese context, some of which have been posted elsewhere in this thread.
By examining those sources you cannot really make the case that the bomb was not decisive, nor can you claim that the decision to use the bomb was primarily motivated by factors other than the urgent need to end the war quickly. While some people may indeed make that argument, they are relying on questionable postwar statements of opinion, with no convincing evidence to support them.
More importantly than their presence in Eastern Europe, said battle-hardened troops had advanced into Manchuria and Korea. History would have looked quite different indeed if they had proceeded to invade Japan.
Reds did invade northern Japanese islands and still occupy them today.
Yalta agreement carved out areas south of this for the U.S.
Yalta agreement carved out areas south of this for the U.S.
They had no experience in successful landing assault operations.
And besides, all big cities in Manchuria and Korea were captured only after Japanese surrender.
And besides, all big cities in Manchuria and Korea were captured only after Japanese surrender.
When I went to high school in Canada, this analysis was more or less the standard treatment of the subject. I'm surprised you're getting downvoted.
The history does not credibly support this analysis. For Halsey to say that the Japanese were on "the verge of surrender" is somewhat misleading; while the Japanese may have been willing to seek a negotiated end to the conflict, they were certainly not willing to surrender unconditionally, and in fact were throwing away an appalling number of lives in India, New Guinea, and islands all across the Pacific to prove this. An unconditional surrender was seen as necessary because the Western Allies believed that they needed a free hand in the postwar period to drastically restructure the political systems of the Axis countries and prevent future militarism. If you look at the example of the interwar period (in which negotiated truces had repeatedly failed in the face of determined militarism) and then note the result of the postwar period for both the Japanese and German economies, it would be very hard to argue that the Allies were wrong.
The conditions the Japanese Supreme War Council (made up of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of the Navy, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs; the only higher authority was the Emperor) were willing to accept were:
1. The Emperor continued unmolested as the head of state,
2. Japan was responsible for its own disarmament,
3. There would be no occupation, and
4. Japan would conduct its own war crime trials.
1. The Emperor continued unmolested as the head of state,
2. Japan was responsible for its own disarmament,
3. There would be no occupation, and
4. Japan would conduct its own war crime trials.
This was not possible, the Allies had all agreed on unconditional surrender so no separate peace could be carved out.
Yes—and beyond the important question of separate peace, those conditions were seen as too onerous given the perceived need to transform Japan's political and social institutions after the war. Beyond this was the political requirement to address widespread and well-known atrocities committed by the Japanese Army, as well as the failure of voluntary arms control treaties in the interwar period.
In the end, of course, the Allies did decide to leave the Emperor in place as nominal head of state—but had not decided to do so before the Japanese capitulated, and certainly did not want to commit themselves to that course.
In the end, of course, the Allies did decide to leave the Emperor in place as nominal head of state—but had not decided to do so before the Japanese capitulated, and certainly did not want to commit themselves to that course.
Exactly. And the Allies included the Soviets, who were thus rather cold to aiding a negotiated surrender.
"the American and British armies would have been no match for the Soviet Red Army".
U.S. , Britain, Canada and France had millions of battle hardened troops, too ... and air and sea supremacy.
U.S. , Britain, Canada and France had millions of battle hardened troops, too ... and air and sea supremacy.
I see people touting the amazing prowess of the American and British armies in WWII a lot, and I have to wonder if those people are mystified about how Stalin ended up with half of Europe. How do they fit it into their worldview?
About a third of the total casualties of World War II were in Operation Barbarossa, 25 million out of 75 million, about 14% of the Soviet population, mostly within a few months in 01941. The battle hardened troops of the US and even France could mostly go back home to their families, barring Jody; the Soviet troops had, in many cases, had their families killed or starved to death by the Germans. And, when it came to land combat, the Soviets were enormously outproducing not only Germany, though not the US; in 01944, the last full year of war, they produced some 17000 tanks, and nearly 20000 in 01943. (The US numbers were 37000 in 01944 and 27000 in 01943.)
However, Russian tanks had a significant advantage over US tanks for combat in Europe: they were in Europe. And so were the farms that fed their crews.
So, I'm not sure if they "would have been no match for the Soviet Red Army", but I'm sure glad they didn't have to find out.
About a third of the total casualties of World War II were in Operation Barbarossa, 25 million out of 75 million, about 14% of the Soviet population, mostly within a few months in 01941. The battle hardened troops of the US and even France could mostly go back home to their families, barring Jody; the Soviet troops had, in many cases, had their families killed or starved to death by the Germans. And, when it came to land combat, the Soviets were enormously outproducing not only Germany, though not the US; in 01944, the last full year of war, they produced some 17000 tanks, and nearly 20000 in 01943. (The US numbers were 37000 in 01944 and 27000 in 01943.)
However, Russian tanks had a significant advantage over US tanks for combat in Europe: they were in Europe. And so were the farms that fed their crews.
So, I'm not sure if they "would have been no match for the Soviet Red Army", but I'm sure glad they didn't have to find out.
I think the wide availability of US and British war stories, tales, and legends, relative to those of other countries, is probably due to them being in English. I'm sure every side has their stories of cunning tricks they pulled, daring midnight raids, undercover operations, ingenious hardware, extreme training, victory against all odds, and everything else. But we hear our stories from our grandparents, books, and the English internet. It's less common to look across to the other sides and learn about how they saw things.
That's one of the reasons this article is very important.
That's one of the reasons this article is very important.
Not only this, but a significant number of the resistance movements against the Nazi occupation or Fascist governance in France, Italy, etc were organized by Communists or sympathetic to them. The Communist Parties maintained popularity for decades after WWII partially as a result of the role they played in resisting the Nazis, organizing resistance, etc.
Remember that the rest of western Europe and North America stood by and let Franco overrun Spain while the communist movement (small c and big-C) actively tried to fight him.
So there were in fact forces on the ground in many parts of Europe that would not have seen potential Red Army invasion forces as the same kind of invasion force as the Germans. At least for a period of time.
Remember that the rest of western Europe and North America stood by and let Franco overrun Spain while the communist movement (small c and big-C) actively tried to fight him.
So there were in fact forces on the ground in many parts of Europe that would not have seen potential Red Army invasion forces as the same kind of invasion force as the Germans. At least for a period of time.
"while the communist movement actively tried to fight".
They also allied with them : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pac...
Remember this stuff also : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_French_Communis...
They also allied with them : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pac...
Remember this stuff also : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_French_Communis...
> They also allied with them
As your own link states, this wasn't an alliance. Also if you read the "background" section of the article, you'll see that they very much saw Nazi Germany has a major threat and wanted to contains them early by allying France and Britain.
But France and particularly Britain instead prefered trying to appease Germany until the last minute with the results we know.
The non-agression pact might seem cynical from the west point of view, but if you put yourself in the soviet shoes for a second, it was a logical move.
As for your second link it's really not very assertive, most of the claims made early after the war were rebutted by historians later on.
As your own link states, this wasn't an alliance. Also if you read the "background" section of the article, you'll see that they very much saw Nazi Germany has a major threat and wanted to contains them early by allying France and Britain.
But France and particularly Britain instead prefered trying to appease Germany until the last minute with the results we know.
The non-agression pact might seem cynical from the west point of view, but if you put yourself in the soviet shoes for a second, it was a logical move.
As for your second link it's really not very assertive, most of the claims made early after the war were rebutted by historians later on.
It says it wasn't a "formal alliance". The Nazi-Soviet pact was alliance for practical purposes as seen with joint "victory parades" with the Wehrmacht and Red Army and expanded trading.
I'm not sure what specific "rebutted by historians" you're talking about. There were disclosures about Nazi-Soviet secret protocols in 1946 : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pac... though Soviet attempts to deny this were not credible: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pac...
I'm not sure what specific "rebutted by historians" you're talking about. There were disclosures about Nazi-Soviet secret protocols in 1946 : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pac... though Soviet attempts to deny this were not credible: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molotov%E2%80%93Ribbentrop_Pac...
> was alliance for practical purposes as seen with joint "victory parades"
Alliance would mean joint fighting, not joint parading. Yes they secretly divided Europe on a map, and agreed not to fight over it, that not an alliance.
> I'm not sure what specific "rebutted by historians" you're talking about
Your second link on the French communist party activities during 39-41. It's like you didn't even read what you linked as source:
> but later historians have downplayed the PCF's role in any such actions, stating that they were isolated cases
Alliance would mean joint fighting, not joint parading. Yes they secretly divided Europe on a map, and agreed not to fight over it, that not an alliance.
> I'm not sure what specific "rebutted by historians" you're talking about
Your second link on the French communist party activities during 39-41. It's like you didn't even read what you linked as source:
> but later historians have downplayed the PCF's role in any such actions, stating that they were isolated cases
The history is complicated. The Ribbentrop pact was within the Communist parties seen as necessary to bide time, since the USSR knew Germany was going to invade them. But I would agree, it's inexcusable in retrospect.
I am not an apologist for Stalinism, I am not saying any of this was a good thing. I am mostly accused of being a Trotskyist, or whatever.
But the role of the Communist movement in resisting Nazism in Europe is something not widely understood in the Anglo-American sphere. To the point where some on the right in the US have now started to conflate the two. Which is... nonsense.
Anglo-American post-war triumphalism is/was ridiculous. My father grew up in the rubble of the end of the war. There were no winners, it was tragedy all around.
I am not an apologist for Stalinism, I am not saying any of this was a good thing. I am mostly accused of being a Trotskyist, or whatever.
But the role of the Communist movement in resisting Nazism in Europe is something not widely understood in the Anglo-American sphere. To the point where some on the right in the US have now started to conflate the two. Which is... nonsense.
Anglo-American post-war triumphalism is/was ridiculous. My father grew up in the rubble of the end of the war. There were no winners, it was tragedy all around.
It's sort of ridiculous that this conversation has degraded into debating who to blame for World War II and what was or was not excusable.
Listen, all those people are fucking dead!
Hirohito was the last surviving World War II leader; he died in 01989, 33 years ago, at which point the other leaders had all been dead for decades.
There's nobody left to blame or punish!
The youngest WWII soldiers were born around 01930, which is 91 years ago; there are very few of them left alive either.
I have the unpleasant feeling that some people are commenting on this thread because they support one or another of the belligerents in that bloody slaughter, as if it were a sportsball game, rather than because they are interested in what is true and what is false. How could you go about debugging a program if you had to argue with advocates of one subroutine or another, intentionally feeding you unreliable information so you'll blame a different subroutine for the bug? How could you go about analyzing a chemical reaction if you had to argue with people who were fans of one or another chemical compound, and tried to argue that their favorite compound would be produced from any reaction, whether or not the necessary elements were present? This is an excellent example of what I mean when I liken HN to the intellectual equivalent of the impoverished slums where I used to volunteer.
The relevant point to the factual question being discussed is that the European Resistance was, as you say, led by people who supported Stalin, and they had largely been put in charge of their various countries under the occupation of the United Nations. At the point that we're talking about, in 01945, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had been dead for four years, and Europe was full of the tales of noble sacrifices and terrible suffering the Russians had experienced in order to resist the Nazis. So Stalin could reasonably anticipate a lot more popular support and a lot less government resistance for setting up Communist governments in them, should he push his military advantage further, than Hitler ever had for setting up Nazi governments.
Listen, all those people are fucking dead!
Hirohito was the last surviving World War II leader; he died in 01989, 33 years ago, at which point the other leaders had all been dead for decades.
There's nobody left to blame or punish!
The youngest WWII soldiers were born around 01930, which is 91 years ago; there are very few of them left alive either.
I have the unpleasant feeling that some people are commenting on this thread because they support one or another of the belligerents in that bloody slaughter, as if it were a sportsball game, rather than because they are interested in what is true and what is false. How could you go about debugging a program if you had to argue with advocates of one subroutine or another, intentionally feeding you unreliable information so you'll blame a different subroutine for the bug? How could you go about analyzing a chemical reaction if you had to argue with people who were fans of one or another chemical compound, and tried to argue that their favorite compound would be produced from any reaction, whether or not the necessary elements were present? This is an excellent example of what I mean when I liken HN to the intellectual equivalent of the impoverished slums where I used to volunteer.
The relevant point to the factual question being discussed is that the European Resistance was, as you say, led by people who supported Stalin, and they had largely been put in charge of their various countries under the occupation of the United Nations. At the point that we're talking about, in 01945, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had been dead for four years, and Europe was full of the tales of noble sacrifices and terrible suffering the Russians had experienced in order to resist the Nazis. So Stalin could reasonably anticipate a lot more popular support and a lot less government resistance for setting up Communist governments in them, should he push his military advantage further, than Hitler ever had for setting up Nazi governments.
Yes, but the actual alliance was in a secret codicil to the pact; the public face of the pact was just a truce between enemies. Both Hitler and Mussolini came to power largely on the strength of their opposition to Communism, which is why even a pact of neutrality was so scandalous to French Communists.
Yes, this is a good point: the Nazis got much of their public support from being opposed to socialism, and so the European resistance was largely run by Communists. People in the US mostly don't know this and tend to respond by shooting the messenger, which I guess is why your comment is downvoted like a dirty spammer.
"Russian tanks had a significant advantage over US tanks".
This is much debated by WWII historians. When the U.S. tanks finally did square off against the Soviet tanks, U.S. tanks won : https://www.quora.com/How-did-the-Sherman-tank-compare-to-th... . U.S. reliability and logistics made up for any discrepancies in the specifications.
I'm not sure who you're quoting when you say, "Russian tanks had a significant advantage over US tanks," but I don't have any reason to think your quote is true. In case you intend that as a paraphrase of what I was saying, let me correct that misreading. I was making no claims about the relative quality of the tanks; by all reports, Soviet tanks were vastly inferior to German tanks as well.
Rather, my primary tank-related claim was that the USSR was producing enormous quantities of war materiel, as exemplified by tanks; in 01943 they outproduced Germany almost 2:1 in quantity of tanks, and even in 01944 when Germany was catching up, they still outproduced them. The quality of that materiel was merely adequate, but it still would have represented a very significant military threat to the US's position in Europe, as it had to Germany's.
My second claim was that the USSR was in a better logistical situation with respect to Europe than the US was. I don't think that's controversial, since Moscow is in Europe, and so was most Soviet farmland and much Soviet arms production.
Rather, my primary tank-related claim was that the USSR was producing enormous quantities of war materiel, as exemplified by tanks; in 01943 they outproduced Germany almost 2:1 in quantity of tanks, and even in 01944 when Germany was catching up, they still outproduced them. The quality of that materiel was merely adequate, but it still would have represented a very significant military threat to the US's position in Europe, as it had to Germany's.
My second claim was that the USSR was in a better logistical situation with respect to Europe than the US was. I don't think that's controversial, since Moscow is in Europe, and so was most Soviet farmland and much Soviet arms production.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_Wor...
U.S. + British + France GDP was 7 times bigger than Russia at end of the war. Western allied air supremacy ( including a nuclear monopoly ) would have obliterated Soviet logistics.
The West had the upper hand and Stalin knew it.
U.S. + British + France GDP was 7 times bigger than Russia at end of the war. Western allied air supremacy ( including a nuclear monopoly ) would have obliterated Soviet logistics.
The West had the upper hand and Stalin knew it.
How, then, is it that an iron curtain fell across Europe?
I wonder if those GDP numbers capture everything relevant to military advantage. The USSR produced as many tanks in a year and a half as Britain did throughout the whole war, despite having the same GDP.
Certainly it is true that with the nuclear monopoly the US had the upper hand; what we're discussing here is what Stalin would have believed if the bomb had remained secret, or perhaps only been demonstrated on uninhabited Pacific atolls, so the nuclear monopoly would not have figured into his calculations, or been a more theoretical factor. Or, more precisely, what Truman believed Stalin would have believed.
I wonder if those GDP numbers capture everything relevant to military advantage. The USSR produced as many tanks in a year and a half as Britain did throughout the whole war, despite having the same GDP.
Certainly it is true that with the nuclear monopoly the US had the upper hand; what we're discussing here is what Stalin would have believed if the bomb had remained secret, or perhaps only been demonstrated on uninhabited Pacific atolls, so the nuclear monopoly would not have figured into his calculations, or been a more theoretical factor. Or, more precisely, what Truman believed Stalin would have believed.
Not having sea supremacy would mean the overseas countries wouldn’t stand a chance preventing the USSR from taking over Western Europe, but I don’t see how having it counts for much as a defense against a soviet occupation of Europe.
I also think, but can’t find hard numbers, that the USSR had more soldiers than the other allies combined (some strategists thought the allies would need the remains of the German army to help fight the Russians, if it were to come to that)
What they may not have had enough was technology. The USA provide them with lots of material (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease)
I think there is some truth in saying World War Two in Europe was won with American materiel and Russian blood.
That could have been their weak point. The western powers might have been able to hold of the larger USSR army by gaining air superiority. I’m not sure of that, though, as the time the USSR really needed US tech to survive was gone in 1945.
I also think, but can’t find hard numbers, that the USSR had more soldiers than the other allies combined (some strategists thought the allies would need the remains of the German army to help fight the Russians, if it were to come to that)
What they may not have had enough was technology. The USA provide them with lots of material (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease)
I think there is some truth in saying World War Two in Europe was won with American materiel and Russian blood.
That could have been their weak point. The western powers might have been able to hold of the larger USSR army by gaining air superiority. I’m not sure of that, though, as the time the USSR really needed US tech to survive was gone in 1945.
I'm not sure why you getting downvoted. The first one was little short of a war crime from what i can see. Blow up a mountain maybe, to demonstrate the unlimited power of the a-bomb, but why drop it on a populated city? But even if the first one can be justified (we only had 2 bombs and they were fanatical etc.) why the second bomb? At least give them a bit more time to think.
I think maybe this subject gets taught differently in America to the rest of the world.
I think maybe this subject gets taught differently in America to the rest of the world.
[deleted]
Anything new on this from 7 months ago?
Oh in fact there is, a new followup article on it rather than this relic
(From elsewhere in thread)
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28360294
(From elsewhere in thread)
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28360294
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1946/08/31/hiroshima