Thomas Nagel: Thoughts Are Real (2013)(newyorker.com)
newyorker.com
Thomas Nagel: Thoughts Are Real (2013)
https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/thomas-nagel-thoughts-are-real
60 comments
Far and away the most interesting theory on this topic for me is from Hoffman. I recent read his fascinating book The Case Against Reality - mind blown pretty much sums up my experience of the book. In short he advocates that consciousness is fundamental and that what we experience as the material world...people, objects, atoms is the product of our consciousness and not the other way around. Space time he argues is not fundamental.
Blowing minds is a cheap trick, cult leaders do it, politicans do it. These books are exciting, it's like finding out that Harry Potter is real, but it's all intellectually lazy. There are more plot holes than plot in these books.
Never trust entirely anything about consciousness or physics that's not boring and downright indecipherable to the layman.
Never trust entirely anything about consciousness or physics that's not boring and downright indecipherable to the layman.
I agree about not trusting entirely anything about consciousness. I said Hoffman's theory was fascinating, not that I bought it entirely as there are too many unanswered questions. But for me it was a paradigm shift in terms of how one could look at what we call reality. Hoffman is a serious scientist a professor emeritus at UC Irvine with impressive credentials in neuroscience and cognitive psychology.
I'll say this colloquially and rhetorically (as I have little real interest in what the probably contorted answer might be), but I wonder how it can possibly account for the vast early period of time since the big bang when there was no consciousness.
Or was consciousness-created reality all made up on the spot on the birth of the first conscience?
And how has it been kept consistent through the life of all different consciences?
I think the simple fact that, for example, separated tribes of people have lived for millennium within a physically identical world is kinda a dead give-away that reality lives independently of consciousness.
Or was consciousness-created reality all made up on the spot on the birth of the first conscience?
And how has it been kept consistent through the life of all different consciences?
I think the simple fact that, for example, separated tribes of people have lived for millennium within a physically identical world is kinda a dead give-away that reality lives independently of consciousness.
Based on Hoffman's theory the reason there is consistency in how the world is viewed and experienced across tribes is because we are born with similar gear - something akin to a built in VR headset. Hoffman gives several examples in the book of objects we create on the fly that are not really there - we call them visual illusions - based on our unconscious visual intelligence logic rules.
So, hum, multiple consciousnesses create the same reality because our bodies, which are part of reality, are similar? Sounds to me this implies reality came first, but I'm just a simple man, not a book-writing philosopher.
... and the good old "visual illusions therefore 'anything'". About the level of argument sophistication I expected.
... and the good old "visual illusions therefore 'anything'". About the level of argument sophistication I expected.
It doesn't seem so surprising to me that there doesn't exist a compelling theory for something without a good definition: what is "consciousness"?
Your subjective first person experiences. The what it's like for you to perceive, imagine, remember, dream. The reds, sounds, tastes, smells and feels of your experiences. There are precise philosophical terms for the above. Qualia and phenomenal are two such terms.
Science keeps advancing steadily on understanding consciousness, but you won't find any of it on Youtube or from these popular science or philosophy writers and speakers.
You find it on Researchgate and such, start from a paper and chase down the citations.
You find it on Researchgate and such, start from a paper and chase down the citations.
> Science keeps advancing steadily on understanding consciousness
The perfect place to prove that is by putting a few citations in your comment. Better to show than tell.
The perfect place to prove that is by putting a few citations in your comment. Better to show than tell.
If you are looking for information about current research into consciousness, there is a book, The Hidden Spring by Mark Solms.
He gave a talk organised by The Royal Institution that talked about case studies that explore where consciousness comes from.
I hope this is helpful.
https://youtu.be/CmuYrnOVmfk
He gave a talk organised by The Royal Institution that talked about case studies that explore where consciousness comes from.
I hope this is helpful.
https://youtu.be/CmuYrnOVmfk
I don't have a paper that has it all, I recommend reading as many as you can and find interesting just to get a picture.
You may start here, follow the citations and their references.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221703137_Thermodyn...
You may start here, follow the citations and their references.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221703137_Thermodyn...
Problem is, a lot of papers won't be very good. Do you have some recommendation?
> In other words, even if it were possible to map out the exact pattern of brain waves that give rise to a person’s momentary complex of awareness, that mapping would only explain the physical correlate of these experiences, but it wouldn’t be them.
This is where Nagel is wrong. Mental activities don't map directly to brain functions, but this doesn't at all mean that they are not part of the physical world.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/mental-phenomena-dont-map-int...
Computers have mental activities too, simple ones, but we are not tapping into a different realm to make that happen.
Would be cool though, because both computers and brains are constrained by that pesky thermodynamics. Scratch that. They are defined by it. In fact you don't even need computers or brains for lifelike behavior. Any system responding to a stochastic driving signal can be interpreted as computing. Making a predictive model of the environment equals to using available energy efficiently.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/how-life-and-death-spring-fro...
https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.3271
This is where Nagel is wrong. Mental activities don't map directly to brain functions, but this doesn't at all mean that they are not part of the physical world.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/mental-phenomena-dont-map-int...
Computers have mental activities too, simple ones, but we are not tapping into a different realm to make that happen.
Would be cool though, because both computers and brains are constrained by that pesky thermodynamics. Scratch that. They are defined by it. In fact you don't even need computers or brains for lifelike behavior. Any system responding to a stochastic driving signal can be interpreted as computing. Making a predictive model of the environment equals to using available energy efficiently.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/how-life-and-death-spring-fro...
https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.3271
As far as I can tell, neither you nor that article are responding to the sentence you quoted.
The argument made in that sentence is something like: if we come up with a description of how a bunch of photons interact with an eye to trigger a series of chemical reactions that lights up a bunch of neurons in a way that is proven to represent some mental image then, per Nagel, even if we achieved this, our explanation of sight would be missing something. The thing it would be missing is the subjective experience of seeing, something most of us are familiar with.
Nagel isn't saying that this subjective experience is something other than physical or material. He's saying that the brand of materialism currently in vogue cannot account for this subjective experience and so needs to be revised.
The argument made in that sentence is something like: if we come up with a description of how a bunch of photons interact with an eye to trigger a series of chemical reactions that lights up a bunch of neurons in a way that is proven to represent some mental image then, per Nagel, even if we achieved this, our explanation of sight would be missing something. The thing it would be missing is the subjective experience of seeing, something most of us are familiar with.
Nagel isn't saying that this subjective experience is something other than physical or material. He's saying that the brand of materialism currently in vogue cannot account for this subjective experience and so needs to be revised.
Subjective experiences seem mystical to us, because how could physics could cause something like this. One way to understand it is that we as experiencing subjects are made of nodes that can make things up and we have no choice but to believe them. Our nodes happen to produce useful, reliable things for us (except maybe when we are dreaming or on drugs) but the nature of the things they produce is different than what we believe, and have no choice but to believe. Like when we experience fear we are basically acting like we do driven by these signals, but it's all theatre. Useful theatre might I add, but it's just signals and how we interpret them. Vision is also just signals, there is just a lot of processing at the nodes so we get increasingly useful signals. We don't get a bunch of pixels, we get shapes, or better yet faces, intentions, predictions, stories.
The different parts of us do their jobs and a coherent picture is created. The most coherent picture is the first person view, but it is a fabrication. It's like a news report. The perceived self is a part of a stitched together story, not a central agent. The whole brain is the agent, however we only remember the story. The story is what ends up as a memory. The perceived self exist because I is an important context needed later for prediction, like the dimensions of your body and a lot more in a social environment. But your perceived self is not the actual you, just as your perceived world is not the actual world.
The general idea is that the signals from the nodes are processed and fed to the hippocampus to create an episodic memory engram, which reactivates the nodes that contributed the signals. This is when subjective experience happens, after all the work is done. Granted the next time the nodes can rely on what happened before, so we are not philosophical zombies, we don't passively experience it all, but the central agent is only a useful theatre, we are multitudes under the veneer.
The different parts of us do their jobs and a coherent picture is created. The most coherent picture is the first person view, but it is a fabrication. It's like a news report. The perceived self is a part of a stitched together story, not a central agent. The whole brain is the agent, however we only remember the story. The story is what ends up as a memory. The perceived self exist because I is an important context needed later for prediction, like the dimensions of your body and a lot more in a social environment. But your perceived self is not the actual you, just as your perceived world is not the actual world.
The general idea is that the signals from the nodes are processed and fed to the hippocampus to create an episodic memory engram, which reactivates the nodes that contributed the signals. This is when subjective experience happens, after all the work is done. Granted the next time the nodes can rely on what happened before, so we are not philosophical zombies, we don't passively experience it all, but the central agent is only a useful theatre, we are multitudes under the veneer.
What I find most interesting about your comment is the words "something most of us are familiar with", because it implies that consciousness is a two-way communication. It affects the physical world: If it didn't, then you wouldn't be typing those words. This is important if true, because it means you could absolutely scientifically prove its existence by measuring it.
I'm not taking any sides here, but just making a point.
I'm not taking any sides here, but just making a point.
> Computers have mental activities too, simple ones
That's begging the question as to whether awareness arises out of the physical world. You're assuming mental activities arise out of computations occurring in the physical world, when whether or not this is the case is in fact the question.
That's begging the question as to whether awareness arises out of the physical world. You're assuming mental activities arise out of computations occurring in the physical world, when whether or not this is the case is in fact the question.
If and when we upload a mind to a computer and/or create true AI, this question will be settled for all practical purposes.
Why? Because the person in the computer, being a faithful simulation of a human mind (or some AI analogue), will say they feel exactly the same mental things as real humans, down to the most minor detail. You then see they are just software, and say it's impossible to prove they feel the subjective experience they claim to feel.
Then they say you're just a dude and it's impossible for you to prove you feel this subjective experience you claim to feel.
There's no way out. If it's possible _at all_ to have self-aware software, they will have exactly the same claim to consciousness as yourself. Which is: I can't show my mental state to anyone and you need to take my word for granted.
Why? Because the person in the computer, being a faithful simulation of a human mind (or some AI analogue), will say they feel exactly the same mental things as real humans, down to the most minor detail. You then see they are just software, and say it's impossible to prove they feel the subjective experience they claim to feel.
Then they say you're just a dude and it's impossible for you to prove you feel this subjective experience you claim to feel.
There's no way out. If it's possible _at all_ to have self-aware software, they will have exactly the same claim to consciousness as yourself. Which is: I can't show my mental state to anyone and you need to take my word for granted.
It's true that it's impossible for an outside observer to tell whether a claim to consciousness, by a faithful simulation of a human mind, is genuine. That may mean that the question cannot be settled. It doesn't actually settle the question though.
It does settle the question whether a human mind is any different than a software wrt consciousness. The only question that remains is are all things pretending to be conscious actually are?
How can it be settled when no one and nothing can show it's mental state to others?
The mental activities are the computations, it doesn't matter what you call it. It's the same predictive model of the environment thing, which is thermodynamics.
Of course we think that humans are special, but a gerbil, a cauliflower plant, even a metal spring does this. Granted a cauliflower can do much more than a spring, but then a gerbil can do more than a cauliflower.
https://nautil.us/issue/104/harmony/plants-feel-pain-and-mig...
Of course we think that humans are special, but a gerbil, a cauliflower plant, even a metal spring does this. Granted a cauliflower can do much more than a spring, but then a gerbil can do more than a cauliflower.
https://nautil.us/issue/104/harmony/plants-feel-pain-and-mig...
The core argument sounds kind of duff
>Since neither physics nor Darwinian biology—the concept of evolution—can account for the emergence of a mental world from a physical one, Nagel contends that the mental side of existence must somehow have been present in creation from the very start.
I mean Tesla cars can form a neural network model of the world around them. I don't think you have to go beyond physics to explain this stuff.
>Since neither physics nor Darwinian biology—the concept of evolution—can account for the emergence of a mental world from a physical one, Nagel contends that the mental side of existence must somehow have been present in creation from the very start.
I mean Tesla cars can form a neural network model of the world around them. I don't think you have to go beyond physics to explain this stuff.
Not for a model, but consciousness is a different 'matter'.
First you postulate that it's a different matter, then you wonder where is the science that explains it's existence.
Ever considered there might be nothing more to it than what we already know? This is basically the notion of emergence.
Is the emergence weak or strong? If it's weak, then subjectivity can be reduced to neurons firing or whatever. What does that look like? If it's strong, then you spooky emergence, which means something entirely new — something not entailed by prior physics coming into existence. That would be non-reductive physicalism, but I'm not sure how it's different than property dualism that David Chalmers would endorse.
You assume that our artificial neural networks du jour are enough of a start to get to AGI.
I doubt it.
I doubt it.
Not really. I'm assuming the artificial neural networks in Teslas have some awareness of their surroundings - where the road goes and so on, and that biological neural networks work in a somewhat similar way but are much more complicated.
ANN's aren't, but the human brain in vivo certainly is
Again this god-of-the-gaps drivel (or dualism-of-the-gaps, since the proponent is atheistic) that claims that since we don't know how a mind arises from the physical brain it must mean that it doesn't.
The extreme complexity of this theory of the world is of course irrelevant to the kind of people whose end goal is to put art on the same footing as science not only in abstract value (which it surely does) but as an actual method for knowing the world (which is preposterous).
To be clear, if we accept the existence of a non-physical mental realm, we have the monstrous problem of explaining how these two interact, as there are numerous correlations between the two.
The extreme complexity of this theory of the world is of course irrelevant to the kind of people whose end goal is to put art on the same footing as science not only in abstract value (which it surely does) but as an actual method for knowing the world (which is preposterous).
To be clear, if we accept the existence of a non-physical mental realm, we have the monstrous problem of explaining how these two interact, as there are numerous correlations between the two.
> To be clear, if we accept the existence of a non-physical mental realm, we have the monstrous problem of explaining how these two interact, as there are numerous correlations between the two.
I suspect a lot of the most interesting investigations of the next few hundred years will be in sorting out whether this is the case, and if so, how it all works.
I suspect a lot of the most interesting investigations of the next few hundred years will be in sorting out whether this is the case, and if so, how it all works.
Mapping out the human mind, understanding andaybe even simulating it on a computer will surely be one of the most fascinating directions of study over the next few hundred years, agreed.
However, I am not aware of a single argument for dualism beyond 'we don't yet know how it works' or 'I can imagine a p-zombie/qualia therefore it must exist and it disproves that the mind is something like computation'.
However, I am not aware of a single argument for dualism beyond 'we don't yet know how it works' or 'I can imagine a p-zombie/qualia therefore it must exist and it disproves that the mind is something like computation'.
Good thing you have solved metaphysics then, care to share your work?
While there are massive amounts of work left to actually describe the mechanisms and understand the specifics, I think computation presents an extremely convincing account of how the mind can arise from the body. Metaphysics of course has many other aspects beyond mind/body dualism, and many of those are well outside the realm of what can be scientifically probed.
But the origins of the mind in the body and brain are not beyond scientific exploration, and we have been making progress towards them - only baby steps so far, but already too much to keep believing in anything like dualism. In fact, mind/body dualism has not been taken seriously in any scientific circles for at least a hundred years, but it persists in certain philosophical circles, with silly thought experiments such as 'p-zombies'.
But the origins of the mind in the body and brain are not beyond scientific exploration, and we have been making progress towards them - only baby steps so far, but already too much to keep believing in anything like dualism. In fact, mind/body dualism has not been taken seriously in any scientific circles for at least a hundred years, but it persists in certain philosophical circles, with silly thought experiments such as 'p-zombies'.
You do understand that the problem isn't in the origin, but type? It doesn't matter if the mind is generated by the body, the issue is if it is reducible to it. This pertains more to ontology as in what is reality and what is is than any particularities of the empirical mechanisms of cognition and neuroscience, substance dualism has nothing to do with science and people who understand the problem know that.
So everything real real or imagined exists. Equally? But to equate objects that physically exist with those that do not is fantasy, and fabricates extensions to the physical universe that exist only in Nagel's mind. Imagination does not equate to belief much less physical existence.
The reductio absurdum of Nagel's theorem is this: existence of everything in the universe is given existence by human imagination. So if all humans were to die off, everything that remains would, what, disappear?
That isn't metaphysics. It's anthropocentric solipsism.
The reductio absurdum of Nagel's theorem is this: existence of everything in the universe is given existence by human imagination. So if all humans were to die off, everything that remains would, what, disappear?
That isn't metaphysics. It's anthropocentric solipsism.
No we can't just all die off and the universe would disappear, we'd just keep merging and unifying together into one - we together are really just all one entity, separated into seemingly infinite smaller consciousnesses, including humans, animals, plants, rocks, but also higher otherworldly things we have no idea about. As far as it goes, Humans are really just a tiny part in all of this. It's this one, god-mind if you will, that fabricates our universe, but for us individual humans it is as real as it gets. There's really nothing too special about us, and we are better off taking things as real. In a way you can say evolution is both true and it's not, but for all we know following the things that are tried and proven is the more practical thing to do, right? Like, when it comes to Pokemon for example, I just looked up that Pikachu evolve to Raichu. But wait does he really? Or isn't that just bunch of fabrication too? Well for all intends and purposes that's how it works right?
Ok, so the first half of your comment is something we could have a discussion about, but then...
> In a way you can say evolution is both true and it's not
Why?
> for all we know following the things that are tried and proven is the more practical thing to do, right?
What?
> Like, when it comes to Pokemon for example, I just looked up that Pikachu evolve to Raichu. But wait does he really? Or isn't that just bunch of fabrication too? Well for all intends and purposes that's how it works right?
?????
> In a way you can say evolution is both true and it's not
Why?
> for all we know following the things that are tried and proven is the more practical thing to do, right?
What?
> Like, when it comes to Pokemon for example, I just looked up that Pikachu evolve to Raichu. But wait does he really? Or isn't that just bunch of fabrication too? Well for all intends and purposes that's how it works right?
?????
It's maybe not the best metaphor, and I don't want to imply that life is a video game of sorts either. What I'm trying to get at, is in the world of Pokemon, creatures follow certain rules, which in that context are truly real. We know Pikachu evolves into Raichu. But we also know that it's all fiction and none of it is real. Now Pokemon was created by a team of people, but imaging it was made just by a single guy. He/She locked himself into a room for a few years and worked on it. Created all the Pokemons, all the environments, everything inside that world. Now this guy's/girl's mind basically IS the Pokemon universe. Pikachu, and all the other Pokemon are small tiny separated parts of his mind.
Similarly for us humans, each of us is tiny tiny infinite small part of the whole thing, and the "whole thing" is what creates the universe. In that sense it's not really real, but for us, from our perspective as individuals, it is real. Or as real as it's going to get, for now. We know our world behaves in predictable ways, we can analyze, measure, know of the laws of physics, and we'd be foolish not to abide by its rules. Like they say that train coming down the tracks is very real and you wouldn't want to step in front of it.
But at the same time you'd be foolish to fixate completely onto material world. I believe there are some things science will never be able to answer, consciousness is one of them. I mean it's something you have to decide for yourself, think about it, whatever it is you want to believe in. No one give you the ultimate truth here. The thing is though, all things considered, consciousness not arising from our physical reality, is the approach to take if you want to learn more about this stuff.
Similarly for us humans, each of us is tiny tiny infinite small part of the whole thing, and the "whole thing" is what creates the universe. In that sense it's not really real, but for us, from our perspective as individuals, it is real. Or as real as it's going to get, for now. We know our world behaves in predictable ways, we can analyze, measure, know of the laws of physics, and we'd be foolish not to abide by its rules. Like they say that train coming down the tracks is very real and you wouldn't want to step in front of it.
But at the same time you'd be foolish to fixate completely onto material world. I believe there are some things science will never be able to answer, consciousness is one of them. I mean it's something you have to decide for yourself, think about it, whatever it is you want to believe in. No one give you the ultimate truth here. The thing is though, all things considered, consciousness not arising from our physical reality, is the approach to take if you want to learn more about this stuff.
Reviews of Nagel's book by actual philosophers:
https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/mind-and-cosmos-why-the-material...
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/do-you-only-have-b...
https://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/remarkable-facts
https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/mind-and-cosmos-why-the-material...
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/do-you-only-have-b...
https://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/remarkable-facts
From The Nation's review:
> In support of his skepticism [about the soundness of scientific explanations of nature], Nagel writes: “The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in our possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more credible now than it was in Aristotle’s day.” This seems to us perhaps the most startling sentence in all of Mind and Cosmos.
Nagel doesn't seem to give science credit where credit is due.
I find Daniel Dennett a much more interesting read because he actually wrestles with the philosophical implications of the scientific revolution, rather than rejecting scientific naturalism basically because it doesn't "feel right".
From Dennett's work I recommend Darwin's Dangerous Idea, especially the discussion of "cranes" and "skyhooks". Dennett says that, according to evolutionary theory, the complex structure of the world is built from the bottom up by a sequence of cranes (upon cranes upon cranes...) rather than being dropped from the mysterious, omnipotent heavens by "skyhooks".
> In support of his skepticism [about the soundness of scientific explanations of nature], Nagel writes: “The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in our possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more credible now than it was in Aristotle’s day.” This seems to us perhaps the most startling sentence in all of Mind and Cosmos.
Nagel doesn't seem to give science credit where credit is due.
I find Daniel Dennett a much more interesting read because he actually wrestles with the philosophical implications of the scientific revolution, rather than rejecting scientific naturalism basically because it doesn't "feel right".
From Dennett's work I recommend Darwin's Dangerous Idea, especially the discussion of "cranes" and "skyhooks". Dennett says that, according to evolutionary theory, the complex structure of the world is built from the bottom up by a sequence of cranes (upon cranes upon cranes...) rather than being dropped from the mysterious, omnipotent heavens by "skyhooks".
Speaking as a meditation guy, reality comes down to sensation.
I mean, this stream of sensations : Sights, sounds, tastes, feelings - and yes, thoughts.
No, thought does not get a special role here. Except in that we consider it to be special. And we use it to map, narrate and explain everything. We really like "meaning".
We use thoughts like this. We associate this thought with that sight (ex "that looks like a horse"), or this thought with that smell (ex "smells like cookies"), or this thought with this other thought (ex "it logically follows..."). I mean we assign meaning. We map stuff.
But no, thought is not inherently special. It's just one more grape on the perceptual vine.
And all those perceptual/sensational/experience-things are all equally real, as far as I can tell.
I mean, this stream of sensations : Sights, sounds, tastes, feelings - and yes, thoughts.
No, thought does not get a special role here. Except in that we consider it to be special. And we use it to map, narrate and explain everything. We really like "meaning".
We use thoughts like this. We associate this thought with that sight (ex "that looks like a horse"), or this thought with that smell (ex "smells like cookies"), or this thought with this other thought (ex "it logically follows..."). I mean we assign meaning. We map stuff.
But no, thought is not inherently special. It's just one more grape on the perceptual vine.
And all those perceptual/sensational/experience-things are all equally real, as far as I can tell.
Well, the "mapping" you're referring to is itself fairly special; it's a reflection of intentionality, the fact that thoughts can be "about" something else in our minds. This is one of many key insights about phenomenology - the very 'stuff' that meditators experiment with as part of their practices! Some fascinating insights to be gained by blending all of those traditions.
I honestly don't understand the need some people seem to have to reach for an extra-physical domain for the mind to exist in. It seems to me quite obvious that the human nervous system is necessary and sufficient to create subjective experience in humans.
We don't have such doubts about any other organ. For instance if someone's pancreas is damaged or needs to be removed, we accept readily that this person will no longer be able to produce insulin by themselves anymore. We don't search for some alternate metaphysical explanation for blood sugar regulation.
It's similarly easy to observe A/B tests vis a vis the brain's role in consciousness.
We don't have such doubts about any other organ. For instance if someone's pancreas is damaged or needs to be removed, we accept readily that this person will no longer be able to produce insulin by themselves anymore. We don't search for some alternate metaphysical explanation for blood sugar regulation.
It's similarly easy to observe A/B tests vis a vis the brain's role in consciousness.
> ...the need some people seem to have to reach for an extra-physical domain for the mind to exist in.
It's because subjective experience (SE) cannot even be defined in physical terms. Or any terms, really. Instead of any definition of SE, all that's on offer are ostensions that will direct a reader's attention to his own SE if he's having it. Such as:
Descartes: SE is what you're absolutely certain must exist, even if everything else is an illusion.
Nagel: SE is "what it's like to be _____".
Nagel again (same paper, but not quoted enough): It [SE] is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. [italics mine]
It's because subjective experience (SE) cannot even be defined in physical terms. Or any terms, really. Instead of any definition of SE, all that's on offer are ostensions that will direct a reader's attention to his own SE if he's having it. Such as:
Descartes: SE is what you're absolutely certain must exist, even if everything else is an illusion.
Nagel: SE is "what it's like to be _____".
Nagel again (same paper, but not quoted enough): It [SE] is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. [italics mine]
> It's because subjective experience (SE) cannot even be defined in physical terms. Or any terms, really.
What makes you think that it's undefinable, rather than that we're just not capable of defining it?
For instance, as human beings we cannot ever really understand systems like the weather, or the economy. We can understand some of the component forces involved, but there are too many things interacting for us really to wrap our minds around how the whole thing moves.
Similarly, we now have a proof for the 4 color problem, but it had to be provided by a computer, because the number of cases involved in the proof was not really within the grasp of the human mind.
As humans, we can basically hold 7-10 things in our mind at one time. So in order to "solve" something, we need to be able to break it down into a maximum of 7-10 component parts at any one time. What if it's the case that the physical origin of subjective experience is perfectly obvious, but it would require a consciousness with the capacity to consider 1000 independent neural processes at the same time to see the solution?
> It [SE] is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence.
I don't really get this one. How is it that the empirical explanation of subjective experience is compatible with its absence?
What makes you think that it's undefinable, rather than that we're just not capable of defining it?
For instance, as human beings we cannot ever really understand systems like the weather, or the economy. We can understand some of the component forces involved, but there are too many things interacting for us really to wrap our minds around how the whole thing moves.
Similarly, we now have a proof for the 4 color problem, but it had to be provided by a computer, because the number of cases involved in the proof was not really within the grasp of the human mind.
As humans, we can basically hold 7-10 things in our mind at one time. So in order to "solve" something, we need to be able to break it down into a maximum of 7-10 component parts at any one time. What if it's the case that the physical origin of subjective experience is perfectly obvious, but it would require a consciousness with the capacity to consider 1000 independent neural processes at the same time to see the solution?
> It [SE] is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence.
I don't really get this one. How is it that the empirical explanation of subjective experience is compatible with its absence?
Thanks for replying, skohan! Since this item has moved far off the front page, I'm guessing that just about nobody else will be seeing whatever else we write here. If you wish, you can email me at [email protected] .
Descartes described the clearest identifying property of SE: it's absolutely certain to exist. Since absolute certainty lies outside the scope of science: science can't define what SE is, it can only describe what SE does.
Science doesn't rule out the philosophical hypothesis known as "illusionism" (advocated by Keith Frankish), that SE is a delusion.
If you, skohan, have SE and have correctly identified it: its nonexistence will be inconceivable to you. Are you there yet?
Descartes described the clearest identifying property of SE: it's absolutely certain to exist. Since absolute certainty lies outside the scope of science: science can't define what SE is, it can only describe what SE does.
Science doesn't rule out the philosophical hypothesis known as "illusionism" (advocated by Keith Frankish), that SE is a delusion.
If you, skohan, have SE and have correctly identified it: its nonexistence will be inconceivable to you. Are you there yet?
I concur that it is unjustified to believe an extra-physical domain is necessary for the mind to exist. However where I differ is your believe that it is "obviously" not necessary.
There is a reason this is a philosophical question, and not purely a matter of science. The reason consciousness is special is because we viscerally experience it in a way that is undeniably more significant than any discrete physical observation (such as your example of insulin production). Of course that doesn't prove anything one way or the other, but to unilaterally declare that consciousness is purely a result of mechanical and chemical biological processes is quite a leap and not something that is easily falsifiable.
For empiricists and other logically-minded folks the idea that reality begins and ends with the physical world can be comforting—after all, that would mean that everything could likely eventually be explained through physical observation and continued rigorous application of the scientific method. However this line of thinking also relies on faith just as religion does: the faith that our perception of reality is representative of the whole of reality and that there is no facet beyond the reach of a cleverly designed experiment.
I am of the opinion that it is hubris to declare one way or another. It's easily conceivable to me that the reality we see and experience is but a reflection of a deeper reality which our meat-sack senses and ideas can not penetrate, but that nevertheless exists and interacts with us.
There is a reason this is a philosophical question, and not purely a matter of science. The reason consciousness is special is because we viscerally experience it in a way that is undeniably more significant than any discrete physical observation (such as your example of insulin production). Of course that doesn't prove anything one way or the other, but to unilaterally declare that consciousness is purely a result of mechanical and chemical biological processes is quite a leap and not something that is easily falsifiable.
For empiricists and other logically-minded folks the idea that reality begins and ends with the physical world can be comforting—after all, that would mean that everything could likely eventually be explained through physical observation and continued rigorous application of the scientific method. However this line of thinking also relies on faith just as religion does: the faith that our perception of reality is representative of the whole of reality and that there is no facet beyond the reach of a cleverly designed experiment.
I am of the opinion that it is hubris to declare one way or another. It's easily conceivable to me that the reality we see and experience is but a reflection of a deeper reality which our meat-sack senses and ideas can not penetrate, but that nevertheless exists and interacts with us.
The definition of "physical world" is simply a network of cause-effect relations. Since conciousness enters into cause-effect relations with stuff we all acknowledge as "physical" (such as machinery, and indeed our own biology) this shows that whatever we subjectively experience as "conciousness" is itself physical. The fact that we don't know how that physics works under the hood (it's probably nothing close to ordinary mechanics and chemistry!) doesn't mean it's not part of the physical world. It's not "deeper" than physics, it's just more physics.
I agree. That's why words like "supernatural" or "extra-physical" are misleading, as those are just semantic labels relative to the nature of our current understanding.
However that definition is tautological and is distinct from the idea that consciousness arises from neurons firing, which is what most physicalists are taking as the cause of consciousness.
However that definition is tautological and is distinct from the idea that consciousness arises from neurons firing, which is what most physicalists are taking as the cause of consciousness.
If it's not arising from neurons firing, what is it arising from?
So you are correct that it can probably never be proven that empiricism is really enough to explain reality, but in my opinion it's a very good place to start. Science has a very successful track record of claiming explanations from the clutches of mysticism, and our understanding of the world has basically never moved in the other direction.
But I don't even think you have to resort to that level of "faith" in physical reality to be fairly confident that the brain is sufficient to explain the mind:
1. The human mind is always co-located with a reasonably well-functioning brain, and has never existed anywhere else.
2. Disrupting the physical/chemical function of the brain dependably and predictably disrupts the function of the mind.
3. We can even sub-locate component functions of what we would consider the mind to sub-regions or processes of the brain.
4. The structure and function of the brain seems to be sufficiently complex to give rise to such a complex phenomenon.
If we saw that fact pattern in any other domain, we wouldn't feel the need to look farther for alternate explanations.
But I don't even think you have to resort to that level of "faith" in physical reality to be fairly confident that the brain is sufficient to explain the mind:
1. The human mind is always co-located with a reasonably well-functioning brain, and has never existed anywhere else.
2. Disrupting the physical/chemical function of the brain dependably and predictably disrupts the function of the mind.
3. We can even sub-locate component functions of what we would consider the mind to sub-regions or processes of the brain.
4. The structure and function of the brain seems to be sufficiently complex to give rise to such a complex phenomenon.
If we saw that fact pattern in any other domain, we wouldn't feel the need to look farther for alternate explanations.
Well now you're using dog whistles like "mysticism" when I'm talking about philosophy. Regardless of the explanatory power of science, there are always questions that go beyond its sphere.
The key question here is "what gives rise to the experience of consciousness?". Everything you described is about the mechanics of cognition, but it does not explain the qualia of consciousness, or why we are not p-zombies. This is a very hard problem to chip away at from a scientific perspective.
Do you believe that if we were capable if making a replica of a brain that performed all the same functions in silicon, and had the same computational capacity that it would be conscious? Why or why not?
The key question here is "what gives rise to the experience of consciousness?". Everything you described is about the mechanics of cognition, but it does not explain the qualia of consciousness, or why we are not p-zombies. This is a very hard problem to chip away at from a scientific perspective.
Do you believe that if we were capable if making a replica of a brain that performed all the same functions in silicon, and had the same computational capacity that it would be conscious? Why or why not?
> it does not explain the qualia of consciousness, or why we are not p-zombies. This is a very hard problem to chip away at from a scientific perspective.
Why do you think so? What makes you think subjective experience is not just another type of brain function, like smell, taste or value judgement?
> Do you believe that if we were capable if making a replica of a brain that performed all the same functions in silicon, and had the same computational capacity that it would be conscious? Why or why not?
Yes I do believe so. I believe that consciousness is a function of our nervous system, so if you could make a perfect copy, put it into the same state, and gave it all the same inputs and outputs, it would be conscious.
However I think we're very far from that. the functions of the brain depend on complex and diverse sub-cellular processes which current models don't scratch the surface of replicating with any kind of fidelity, so I think it will be quite some time before we can test this hypothesis.
To pose a similar question to you, if you don't think a perfect replica of the brain would give rise to consciousness, what do you think would be missing?
Why do you think so? What makes you think subjective experience is not just another type of brain function, like smell, taste or value judgement?
> Do you believe that if we were capable if making a replica of a brain that performed all the same functions in silicon, and had the same computational capacity that it would be conscious? Why or why not?
Yes I do believe so. I believe that consciousness is a function of our nervous system, so if you could make a perfect copy, put it into the same state, and gave it all the same inputs and outputs, it would be conscious.
However I think we're very far from that. the functions of the brain depend on complex and diverse sub-cellular processes which current models don't scratch the surface of replicating with any kind of fidelity, so I think it will be quite some time before we can test this hypothesis.
To pose a similar question to you, if you don't think a perfect replica of the brain would give rise to consciousness, what do you think would be missing?
> Why do you think so? What makes you think subjective experience is not just another type of brain function, like smell, taste or value judgement?
The key here being "not just". The reason is because there is no conceptual identity between subjective states and brain functions. They're entirely different things. This doesn't mean brain states aren't involved. It means a reduction or identity can't be stated as the solution without explaining how the subjective comes from it.
This is basically the modern version of John Locke's secondary qualities of perception (color, taste, etc) not being the primary qualities of objects (number, extension, etc). Neurons have objective qualities identified in science. But how they have secondary qualities is the big mystery.
The key here being "not just". The reason is because there is no conceptual identity between subjective states and brain functions. They're entirely different things. This doesn't mean brain states aren't involved. It means a reduction or identity can't be stated as the solution without explaining how the subjective comes from it.
This is basically the modern version of John Locke's secondary qualities of perception (color, taste, etc) not being the primary qualities of objects (number, extension, etc). Neurons have objective qualities identified in science. But how they have secondary qualities is the big mystery.
We also have never seen evidence for elementary particles outside of humongous particle accelerators, so the former must clearly be a mere artifact of the latter. Physicists are no strangers to the "clutches of mysticism" when it comes to issues of foundational ontology!
That's a severely strained comparison. We have only seen elementary particles at CERN etc. because we designed those systems to create the extreme situations which we predicted should be able to make elementary particles measurable, based on mathematics derived from empirical evidence. The fact that observable reality lines up so well with predictions in that case is a huge credit to empiricism, and a physical explanation for the universe.
If we had a CERN for the science of mind, it would be building an artificial brain and using it to replicate consciousness.
If we had a CERN for the science of mind, it would be building an artificial brain and using it to replicate consciousness.
You may have run across Thomas Nagel via his What is it like to be a bat?
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=nagle+%22to+be+a+bat%22&t=fpas&ia=...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_It_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%...
> Nagel famously asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."[2] This assertion has achieved special status in consciousness studies as "the standard 'what it's like' locution."[3] Daniel Dennett, while sharply disagreeing on some points, acknowledged Nagel's paper as "the most widely cited and influential thought experiment about consciousness."
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=nagle+%22to+be+a+bat%22&t=fpas&ia=...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_It_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%...
> Nagel famously asserts that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."[2] This assertion has achieved special status in consciousness studies as "the standard 'what it's like' locution."[3] Daniel Dennett, while sharply disagreeing on some points, acknowledged Nagel's paper as "the most widely cited and influential thought experiment about consciousness."
It's fascinating just how vast the gap is. There is seemingly no theory of consciousness that has any testable hypotheses. It's quite engaging to hear some of our most public intellectuals talk about what to make of that.
Imagination is pretty much the only thing that fills that void today.
Some of my favorite speakers on the topic have been Dennett, Hoffman, Tononi and Penrose.
Just look at some of the contributors on the playlist below! And they know almost as little as I do. It's a fun and mindbending topic.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fh7rCV0zi1Q&list=RDCMUCl9StM...