Why the fuel-switch story does not explain the AI171 crash(frontline.thehindu.com)
frontline.thehindu.com
Why the fuel-switch story does not explain the AI171 crash
https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/ai-171-crash-boeing-787-electrical-failure-core-network/article70407491.ece
4 comments
Probably not an attack. The plane had a history of issues leading up to the crash. I think the saying "never attribute to malice what is attributable to incompetence" applies here.
The point of the article is to exonerate the pilots and expose a broader issue of honesty and transparency from Boeing and regulators that is covering up a systematic defect in Boeing aircraft design. The shared electrical bus renders other redundancies ineffective. The fact that the RAT has recently deployed 37 times uncommanded means another electrical failure at takeoff is a matter of time.
When you ask "why" 5 five times, it's never an individual. That's a big part of safety culture. Otherwise people cover their rears and don't divulge information that would save lives.
Aside: Isn't it wild that due to a software bug, Boeing directs airlines to reboot their 787-8s every 51 days?
The point of the article is to exonerate the pilots and expose a broader issue of honesty and transparency from Boeing and regulators that is covering up a systematic defect in Boeing aircraft design. The shared electrical bus renders other redundancies ineffective. The fact that the RAT has recently deployed 37 times uncommanded means another electrical failure at takeoff is a matter of time.
When you ask "why" 5 five times, it's never an individual. That's a big part of safety culture. Otherwise people cover their rears and don't divulge information that would save lives.
Aside: Isn't it wild that due to a software bug, Boeing directs airlines to reboot their 787-8s every 51 days?
Summary: Since we cannot possibly accept the actions of the pilot in the context of our worldview, we must find some alternative, no matter how improbable.
Causing a large commercial airliner to crash by remotely cutting off fuel to engines would be quite a feat. Would exploit be most manageable at departure? Location is almost fixed. Plane control is most vulnerable immediately at take-off. What, if any, vital control domains are transitioned outboard vs onboard at takeoff? Etc...
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This article is at least nuanced, but reads more like muck-raking and rehabilitation than systemic analysis.
Regarding the article's language: the focus on "single point of failure" reads like weasel words regarding the "core network": A "point" of failure is extremely context sensitive. To the occupants of the vehicle, the plane itself is a single point of failure.