You are correct that the March 31 figures do not include the IPO proceeds. If you take a look at the Q1'19 supplemental deck that Lyft released with their earnings, you will find a cash reconciliation as if their IPO had occurred on the last day of the quarter.
Not even remotely - they made out better on this than other recent IPOs.
They are paying 35 - 40 euros or ~$45 million at the midpoint. If they float $1 billion in shares today, that means fees are 4.5% of the overall “offering”, or almost exactly what Dropbox paid.
Interesting, thanks - I did not have a chance to read through the full F-1 yet when I wrote the below, so apologies for the incorrect statement on my part regarding the stabilization agent and roadshow given the limited scope of engagement that bankers have on this listing.
Per a WSJ article in January, Spotify has retained investment bankers (reportedly paying them $30MM) to help ascertain interest from large institutional investors, tell the investment story, et cetera. Given that, I imagine that they will advise the company and its pre-IPO shareholders on an indicative price or price range.
Also, I would be hard pressed to imagine that they would not nominate a stabilization agent to help deal with the issues that you noted so that they manage price volatility in initial trading.
You have your definition for Enterprise Value flipped - it should be (Equity Value + Total Debt - Cash & Equivalents + Non Controlling Interest). If you are subtracting debt and adding cash, you are typically looking to get equity value from EV.
Your Box multiples look to be correct - looks like they trade at 6.1x on a trailing twelve month revenue basis, and ~5.0x on a next twelve months revenue basis.
Given that Dropbox has a $10BN valuation and a $600MM line of credit from the big banks, I would expect that their trailing revenue multiple is ~10.0x.
While $1.43 billion may be the GAAP tax rate they record, in practice they did not pay anywhere near that much.
For the 2016 reporting period, cash taxes paid was recorded at $412 million, not the $1.43 billion you noted above. Given that, their effective cash tax rate was 10.6%, not the 36.7% you quoted.
Very misleading article - per the company's latest 10-Q, they only have $4.8 billion in debt. On a net leverage basis, they are currently around 3.2x net debt / EBITDA which is down the fairway for most high yield public companies.
The remainder of their "debt" as the article lays it out is in Streaming Content Obligations and is not debt as you and I would think about it. Yes, it is contractually committed; however, unlike debt, they likely can default on their obligations and the only recourse would be a lawsuit for either damages or specific performance. (There is also no interest payment - as interest expense on $15.7 billion would be significant relative to their current debt burden.)
Compared to true debt instruments, which carry covenants that allow the debtholders to push the company into bankruptcy, the streaming content obligations very likely do not have any such ability to do so. (From what I can tell, the cross-default clauses in their debt instruments do not trigger in the event that they do not fulfill their streaming content obligations.)
In this case, none of the IPO proceeds went to existing shareholders. Based on the prospectus, it would appear that all insiders are subject to either a 120-day or 180-day lock-up post IPO.
This seems more like a liquidity raise to fund future growth that just happened to be timed incorrectly with respect to the Amazon / Whole Foods announcement.
RSUs =/= restricted stock; however, people tend to use the terms interchangeably. A RSU isn't a real share until it vests (at which point it becomes a common share), while restricted stock is a real share that has vesting requirements or some performance requirements (or both).
It will be on page 21 of the following document: https://investor.lyft.com/static-files/19f2bd14-9b3c-4b85-9f...