The French armed forces are planning for high-intensity war(economist.com)
economist.com
The French armed forces are planning for high-intensity war
https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/03/28/the-french-armed-forces-are-planning-for-high-intensity-war
174 comments
I am reading Brzeninski's The Grand Chessboard this week. It is a 24yo book with some very interesting stuff.
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> have a strong "US good/China scary & evil" tint
The US is imperfect and perhaps worse than (post-colonial) Europe in many respects, but does anyone seriously think that a Chinese global hegemony would be better? I understand that this is controversial and I'm not trying to agitate, but I am curious about who holds this position and why?
The US is imperfect and perhaps worse than (post-colonial) Europe in many respects, but does anyone seriously think that a Chinese global hegemony would be better? I understand that this is controversial and I'm not trying to agitate, but I am curious about who holds this position and why?
Well that's part of the point, China is obsessed with territorial unity, not expansionist policies, where the overlap is limited specifically to where we already know: other places that China already calls China. The American perspective is that everyone is secretly trying to expand - like America did. Chinese hegemony could happen in other areas, like how it already has resulted in movies being changed to accommodate Chinese audiences, or having leverage over many private sectors who want access to their market, and with a currency based hegemony that could increase. But the other person's point about books being too "US good/China scary & evil" is exactly about the very limiting false dichotomies that you latched directly on to.
> China is obsessed with territorial unity, not expansionist policies
Obviously false. From Tibet to the recent massive South China Sea annexation and Taiwan, all of it is hyper expansionist. It doesn't matter if they lie and claim otherwise, it's plainly a lie. They're seeking territorial expansion.
Nobody in their right mind believes the waters off the coast of south Vietnam belongs to China, except China. That's not about territorial unity, it's about hegemony in Asia and expanding their territory through military force. They're in conquering mode.
The territy they took when they conquered Tibet is twice the size of France. The South China Sea territory they're attempting to take now - which does not belong to them - is at least the size of Tibet or larger.
That's conquering on a scale not seen since immediately after WW2 with the Soviet Union's land grab in Eastern Europe.
Obviously false. From Tibet to the recent massive South China Sea annexation and Taiwan, all of it is hyper expansionist. It doesn't matter if they lie and claim otherwise, it's plainly a lie. They're seeking territorial expansion.
Nobody in their right mind believes the waters off the coast of south Vietnam belongs to China, except China. That's not about territorial unity, it's about hegemony in Asia and expanding their territory through military force. They're in conquering mode.
The territy they took when they conquered Tibet is twice the size of France. The South China Sea territory they're attempting to take now - which does not belong to them - is at least the size of Tibet or larger.
That's conquering on a scale not seen since immediately after WW2 with the Soviet Union's land grab in Eastern Europe.
The Chinese propaganda says they're just defending their territory, but as far as I can tell it's just expansionism in disguise. That is to say, they've been taking areas that even China considered to be part of (say) India, rewriting the past so that they're not only part of China but always have been, and sending in troops to claim them. In many ways their claim to the South China Sea is like this too.
yes, I'm watching them to see the incongruence. But primarily, the Chinese constitution calls for upholding territorial unity, and this undermines every other right granted in the constitution, and this is the nature of most of their punishments domestically, demands from foreigners (like when actors and celebrities end up saying boilerplate comments about Chinese sovereignty and unity, and it barely makes any sense to the English audience about why they would say that), and it is also congruent with their actions.
Now, is the limitation of my perspective that they can rationalize anything with this? Or that the unanimous People's Congress can update the constitution if any other roadblock is in their way? Sure. I just don't see that predilection.
There are plenty of disputed land borders around the edges of China. But I just don't see things beyond that and the South China Sea.
I was surprised to see the treatment of their state of Inner Mongolia, and to me this is a separate form of discrimination in favor of Han Chinese (or something more nuanced). My line in the sand - for the expansionist opinion - would be taking pieces of Mongolia. Or way into states of India and bordering nations. Or way past Xinjiang.
Now, is the limitation of my perspective that they can rationalize anything with this? Or that the unanimous People's Congress can update the constitution if any other roadblock is in their way? Sure. I just don't see that predilection.
There are plenty of disputed land borders around the edges of China. But I just don't see things beyond that and the South China Sea.
I was surprised to see the treatment of their state of Inner Mongolia, and to me this is a separate form of discrimination in favor of Han Chinese (or something more nuanced). My line in the sand - for the expansionist opinion - would be taking pieces of Mongolia. Or way into states of India and bordering nations. Or way past Xinjiang.
What makes people uncomfortable is that the US is a democracy, and the leaders are chosen by the population. China's military and social power is wielded by a very small group of elites in the CCP, which makes it hard to trust. The nature of US policy has been shaped over the centuries in the open, whereas China's policies and doctrines are sometimes changed overnight.
> What makes people uncomfortable is that the US is a democracy, and the leaders are chosen by the population.
Well, sort of. They're almost always from very wealthy families with very particular educational, social, and occupational histories, on both sides. We get to choose from within the group that makes it to through the candidate vetting processes controlled by the parties.
> China's military and social power is wielded by a very small group of elites in the CCP, which makes it hard to trust.
Again, it's pretty similar. The rich and their children have time and money to build the connections that can get them into positions of institutional power.
> The nature of US policy has been shaped over the centuries in the open, whereas China's policies and doctrines are sometimes changed overnight.
Policy changes in China get voted on too. They might seem like an orchestrated rubber stamp to us -- and they might actually be!
But similarly in the US, executive orders, agency decisions, and supreme court orders can happen swiftly and have similarly profound impacts on the people and the system. See for example Citizen's United, or the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine by the FCC. Did any normal people vote for those things? They kind of just... happened, and their impacts are huge.
I'm not trying to say I would rather live in China or under its system, rather that our perceptions of the differences between the systems are influenced heavily by our context and our naturally western-oriented media diet, and they may in reality be smaller than we feel.
To put it very cynically, our system currently works by allowing average people to feel like we have control over it, while China's doesn't use that tool so much. In truth, average people don't have any real control over either system under normal circumstances.
Well, sort of. They're almost always from very wealthy families with very particular educational, social, and occupational histories, on both sides. We get to choose from within the group that makes it to through the candidate vetting processes controlled by the parties.
> China's military and social power is wielded by a very small group of elites in the CCP, which makes it hard to trust.
Again, it's pretty similar. The rich and their children have time and money to build the connections that can get them into positions of institutional power.
> The nature of US policy has been shaped over the centuries in the open, whereas China's policies and doctrines are sometimes changed overnight.
Policy changes in China get voted on too. They might seem like an orchestrated rubber stamp to us -- and they might actually be!
But similarly in the US, executive orders, agency decisions, and supreme court orders can happen swiftly and have similarly profound impacts on the people and the system. See for example Citizen's United, or the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine by the FCC. Did any normal people vote for those things? They kind of just... happened, and their impacts are huge.
I'm not trying to say I would rather live in China or under its system, rather that our perceptions of the differences between the systems are influenced heavily by our context and our naturally western-oriented media diet, and they may in reality be smaller than we feel.
To put it very cynically, our system currently works by allowing average people to feel like we have control over it, while China's doesn't use that tool so much. In truth, average people don't have any real control over either system under normal circumstances.
> Again, it's pretty similar.
I don't see how... Yes, the US has a classist bias and certainly some mild corruption. That still seems a world apart from a single party system that routinely flouts its own constitution.
Also, executive orders and legislation are bound by the constitution in theory and practice. While they may result in abrupt changes from time-to-time, they are limited in scope. That seems materially different to me than a single party system that can pass, overturn, or utterly ignore whatever legislation it likes overnight.
I don't see how... Yes, the US has a classist bias and certainly some mild corruption. That still seems a world apart from a single party system that routinely flouts its own constitution.
Also, executive orders and legislation are bound by the constitution in theory and practice. While they may result in abrupt changes from time-to-time, they are limited in scope. That seems materially different to me than a single party system that can pass, overturn, or utterly ignore whatever legislation it likes overnight.
Agreed. Let me know when China's equivalent of the Supreme Court rules that something Xi is doing is unconstitutional, and makes it stick.
Everything is politics, including Supreme Court rulings. Gay marriage wasn't a constitutional right until politics demanded it.
In China it's the Politburo rather than a Supreme Court but the leader must also engage with politics and get buy-in for changes.
In China it's the Politburo rather than a Supreme Court but the leader must also engage with politics and get buy-in for changes.
Hear, hear! In Anglo-Saxon England, the King too needed support from his lords. Clearly all of these systems are all exactly identical and there has been no progress in the intervening millennium.
The King needed a varying amount of support from lords, one church or another and a developing parliament depending on when in time it was.
And at every step along that journey, it was proclaimed as the best possible way of doing things, ordained by god, etc etc. Not just politics, we actually have the ideal system here.
And at every step along that journey, it was proclaimed as the best possible way of doing things, ordained by god, etc etc. Not just politics, we actually have the ideal system here.
To be clear, my response was satire. You suggested that the Supreme Court was functionally the same as the CCP politburo on the basis that there is some non-zero amount of politicking in either case. I pointed out that the same was true of Anglo-Saxon England to expose the ridiculousness of the equivalence, but you're ignoring that point and making a new point, utterly unrelated to the previous one (in fairness I would also abandon that position)? Something to the effect of, "Because some Americans and Anglo-Saxons thought their systems were the bees-knees, they must be equally terrible"? Am I getting this right?
Let me come at it this way. You're hyping up our court system and constitution, freedom, all of that.
Yet we imprison Americans at a much higher rate than Chinese imprison their own. And that's before I even get into how we treat foreigners.
So how much are all those great rhetorical adjectives worth when the rubber hits the road?
Yet we imprison Americans at a much higher rate than Chinese imprison their own. And that's before I even get into how we treat foreigners.
So how much are all those great rhetorical adjectives worth when the rubber hits the road?
(sorry, this got long)
A single party system sounds very scary, because how can you vote them out? But... that's just not how China's system works. I'm not an expert on China at all, and I don't mean to claim to be. I'm just an internet dweeb, but I'd still like to try to explain what I mean:
Within a party like China's, there isn't just bland homogenous unity. There are factions, with histories and ideological alignments and family connections, aspirations, and so on. Xi Jinping's ascendance was part of a long political game that came along with specific groups, ideas, and policies to the forefront of Chinese political power for a period, and it was supported by the prevailing milieu within the party, and could not have happened without them.
Over time, that milieu changes, and so do the party's goals, priorities, and actions. That happens as the course of external events and affairs, internal politics, economics, public sentiment, fortunes, etc. all unfold to shape it. Jinping has acted to maintain his power and continue his own work and vision, which appears to still be supported by the political powers that surround him. Changing their Constitution (to allow further terms) is a legal action, and they followed a process to do so. It would have required significant political capital to see that process through. It was hardly flouted, even if we balk at the result.
Fundamentally, what is done by the Chinese government is always simply work to preserve and extend: China's sovereign power, the well-being of its people, and the wealth of its ruling class. This is basically true of all nation states.
In America, it is difficult to change the Constitution. Maybe more difficult than in China; constitutions have different levels of significance in different places. But there is similarly a process for it that has been executed many times.
If someone really needs to, they can try to accrue and expend the required political capital to get an amendment done. There's been talk that the Koch brothers and some associated folks have been working on that for years[1]. In the meantime, Presidents, at the behest of whomever they are politically beholden to, work hard to get Judges in place to interpret laws however they may need, and those interpretations vary wildly.
Meanwhile, the two parties in America change as their cultural milieu forged by similarly shifting economic, political, etc. forces unfolds. They consistently line their own and their friends' pockets, start wars, create secret courts, surveil people, and so on.
So how different is having Just Two Parties who take turns depending on a very big vote, but that think in and act in many fundamentally similar ways... from Just One Party with an ever-changing internal makeup, whose leadership takes turns depending on a smaller vote? Ultimately, the American government still and always works to extend America's sovereign power, the well-being of its people, and the wealth of its ruling class.
To repeat myself a little from another post, I'm personally much happier living in a Western-style democracy than a Chinese-style system, where we at least maintain the illusion of real popular control. But the changes we can really effect as individuals, and the power we really have, in either system, are quite limited. While different tools are employed, the aims, the justifications, and the results are broadly similar in the end.
Perhaps you think the United States differs fundamentally in that it can't or won't use violence or underhanded political tactics against its own citizens, to keep the dissidents it really fears down? Read about Sandra Bland, Fred Hampton, or Martin Luther King. There are many, many examples here -- the mask of just benevolence slips off pretty easily.
What I'm ultimately saying is that, if the United States government needed to, it could and likely would use the same tactics the Chinese government does. It already does from time to time in limited contexts.
We, the people, get to choose as long as it's between Harvard and Yale, and if we got really dangerous and started to forcefully demand, say... anything really different? The string of unfortunate coincidences would come out first, and if we somehow kept our momentum up past that, well, then the gloves would come off for a while, until we quieted down.
We feel good about our worldview precisely because we are able to imagine that those gloves cannot come off, or that they wouldn't ever unless it was really justified, and then we'd be on the right side of it, right? But in reality they don't serve 'justice'. They serve the extension of America's sovereign power, the "well-being" of its people, and the wealth of its ruling class.
All that to say, I still feel like it is pretty similar.
1 - https://www.salon.com/2018/08/10/the-biggest-threat-to-our-d... (I just gogoled 'koch constitutional amendment' here, there may be better sources)
(edit: I corrected Fred Hampton's name from my typo'd Thompson.)
A single party system sounds very scary, because how can you vote them out? But... that's just not how China's system works. I'm not an expert on China at all, and I don't mean to claim to be. I'm just an internet dweeb, but I'd still like to try to explain what I mean:
Within a party like China's, there isn't just bland homogenous unity. There are factions, with histories and ideological alignments and family connections, aspirations, and so on. Xi Jinping's ascendance was part of a long political game that came along with specific groups, ideas, and policies to the forefront of Chinese political power for a period, and it was supported by the prevailing milieu within the party, and could not have happened without them.
Over time, that milieu changes, and so do the party's goals, priorities, and actions. That happens as the course of external events and affairs, internal politics, economics, public sentiment, fortunes, etc. all unfold to shape it. Jinping has acted to maintain his power and continue his own work and vision, which appears to still be supported by the political powers that surround him. Changing their Constitution (to allow further terms) is a legal action, and they followed a process to do so. It would have required significant political capital to see that process through. It was hardly flouted, even if we balk at the result.
Fundamentally, what is done by the Chinese government is always simply work to preserve and extend: China's sovereign power, the well-being of its people, and the wealth of its ruling class. This is basically true of all nation states.
In America, it is difficult to change the Constitution. Maybe more difficult than in China; constitutions have different levels of significance in different places. But there is similarly a process for it that has been executed many times.
If someone really needs to, they can try to accrue and expend the required political capital to get an amendment done. There's been talk that the Koch brothers and some associated folks have been working on that for years[1]. In the meantime, Presidents, at the behest of whomever they are politically beholden to, work hard to get Judges in place to interpret laws however they may need, and those interpretations vary wildly.
Meanwhile, the two parties in America change as their cultural milieu forged by similarly shifting economic, political, etc. forces unfolds. They consistently line their own and their friends' pockets, start wars, create secret courts, surveil people, and so on.
So how different is having Just Two Parties who take turns depending on a very big vote, but that think in and act in many fundamentally similar ways... from Just One Party with an ever-changing internal makeup, whose leadership takes turns depending on a smaller vote? Ultimately, the American government still and always works to extend America's sovereign power, the well-being of its people, and the wealth of its ruling class.
To repeat myself a little from another post, I'm personally much happier living in a Western-style democracy than a Chinese-style system, where we at least maintain the illusion of real popular control. But the changes we can really effect as individuals, and the power we really have, in either system, are quite limited. While different tools are employed, the aims, the justifications, and the results are broadly similar in the end.
Perhaps you think the United States differs fundamentally in that it can't or won't use violence or underhanded political tactics against its own citizens, to keep the dissidents it really fears down? Read about Sandra Bland, Fred Hampton, or Martin Luther King. There are many, many examples here -- the mask of just benevolence slips off pretty easily.
What I'm ultimately saying is that, if the United States government needed to, it could and likely would use the same tactics the Chinese government does. It already does from time to time in limited contexts.
We, the people, get to choose as long as it's between Harvard and Yale, and if we got really dangerous and started to forcefully demand, say... anything really different? The string of unfortunate coincidences would come out first, and if we somehow kept our momentum up past that, well, then the gloves would come off for a while, until we quieted down.
We feel good about our worldview precisely because we are able to imagine that those gloves cannot come off, or that they wouldn't ever unless it was really justified, and then we'd be on the right side of it, right? But in reality they don't serve 'justice'. They serve the extension of America's sovereign power, the "well-being" of its people, and the wealth of its ruling class.
All that to say, I still feel like it is pretty similar.
1 - https://www.salon.com/2018/08/10/the-biggest-threat-to-our-d... (I just gogoled 'koch constitutional amendment' here, there may be better sources)
(edit: I corrected Fred Hampton's name from my typo'd Thompson.)
I don't know how you can confidently compare (post-war) China and the U.S. this way. No doubt the U.S. has some degree of corruption, but surely we can recognize that corruption isn't a binary and indeed China is in a different corruption ballpark than the U.S. Similarly, you listed a handful of names of citizens who were killed by the U.S. government and indeed these are tragedies, but how long do you reckon the complete list is, and how does it compare to China's? So if you're only here to argue that the U.S. is imperfect, I don't think anyone here disagrees--no one has argued that the U.S. is perfect in this thread, and indeed I began it with an admission of U.S. imperfection. But I don't see how anyone can contend that the gap between these countries is small.
>To put it very cynically, our system currently works by allowing average people to feel like we have control over it, while China's doesn't use that tool so much. In truth, average people don't have any real control over either system under normal circumstances.
I think we do. Voting for Donald Trump or Joe Biden was entirely in the average person's control, and the outcome is that Joe Biden won. Simple.
Take, for example, the President. Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, Ronald Reagan - none of them came from wealthy families. If the most powerful man in the country is chosen entirely by the people, I'd say average people do have control over the system.
I think we do. Voting for Donald Trump or Joe Biden was entirely in the average person's control, and the outcome is that Joe Biden won. Simple.
Take, for example, the President. Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, Ronald Reagan - none of them came from wealthy families. If the most powerful man in the country is chosen entirely by the people, I'd say average people do have control over the system.
Hmm, USA isn't governed by a relatively small group of elites? You have elections where the presidency can either go to a slightly right-wing candidate or a much more-right-wing candidate. Until January the president's family were all employed in political positions, weren't they? How's that for a small group of elites?? You've got major political and financial dynasties that seem pretty good at preserving power and keeping it in a small group.
>The nature of US policy has been shaped over the centuries in the open, //
That really doesn't seem to be true. Do you teach in schools about all the democracies that those in power have chosen to meddle with? Is it in election manifestos? Like "if elected we will depose the democratically elected leaders of country X in order to impose a dictator who is covertly in our employ".
>China's policies and doctrines are sometimes changed overnight //
Exactly like presidential edicts? How much of the population voted to leave the Paris Agreement on climate change, for example?
I'm not saying China ain't bad, their leadership clearly aren't great either.
>The nature of US policy has been shaped over the centuries in the open, //
That really doesn't seem to be true. Do you teach in schools about all the democracies that those in power have chosen to meddle with? Is it in election manifestos? Like "if elected we will depose the democratically elected leaders of country X in order to impose a dictator who is covertly in our employ".
>China's policies and doctrines are sometimes changed overnight //
Exactly like presidential edicts? How much of the population voted to leave the Paris Agreement on climate change, for example?
I'm not saying China ain't bad, their leadership clearly aren't great either.
Ignoring the silly Overton window flamebait and the conflation of legislation and executive order, if we can't understand the difference between a de jure single-party system and a two party system with mild corruption, then we're lost.
> if we can't understand the difference between a de jure single-party system and a two party system with mild corruption, then we're lost.
Lost in translation. "Single party system" is a fancy way of saying "totalitarian dictatorship." "Two party system with mild corruption" is a fancy way of saying "modern plutocracy."
I agree that modern plutocracy is better than totalitarian dictatorship. It's not great but it could be worse.
Lost in translation. "Single party system" is a fancy way of saying "totalitarian dictatorship." "Two party system with mild corruption" is a fancy way of saying "modern plutocracy."
I agree that modern plutocracy is better than totalitarian dictatorship. It's not great but it could be worse.
The CCP is 100 million people, FYI.
This thread is great, OP asks for less reductionist good vs evil viewpoints and gets 20 replies saying 'no its actually that'.
This thread is great, OP asks for less reductionist good vs evil viewpoints and gets 20 replies saying 'no its actually that'.
> The CCP is 100 million people, FYI.
Are you trying to say that all 100 million of them have meaningful influence on CCP policy? Like some sort of great big Athenian democracy?
Are you trying to say that all 100 million of them have meaningful influence on CCP policy? Like some sort of great big Athenian democracy?
How much meaningful influence do you have on American policy?
There are lots of facets and levels of politics -- being a CCP member kind of necessitates being engaged in some way, probably at the local level for the vast majority of them.
There are lots of facets and levels of politics -- being a CCP member kind of necessitates being engaged in some way, probably at the local level for the vast majority of them.
> How much meaningful influence do you have on American policy?
Very little, that's why we refer to the actions of the American government rather than the actions American people.
Very little, that's why we refer to the actions of the American government rather than the actions American people.
This thread started with a heartfelt plea from 9th grade civics about how America is an Accountable Democracy, though.
It turns out that "corruption" (or choose your metric) isn't a binary proposition, so the argument, "but the US has corruption too!" kind of misses the point.
I think I'm not quite following--it seems clear to me that China has been interested in expanding its influence for the last 20+ years in much the same way that post-war America was interested in expansion (albeit post-war America had the credible-at-the-time excuse that it was expanding its influence to prevent the spread of communism for the good of the whole world).
Expansionist as in borders, no, as in marketshare of foreign capital and resources? Undoubtedly.
> China is obsessed with territorial unity, not expansionist policies ...
You say as if it makes China better, but I see strong parallels with Nazi Germany's Lebensraum, or Imperial Japan's "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". Nationalist sentiments can paint a surprising amount of aggression as "defending what's naturally ours."
You say as if it makes China better, but I see strong parallels with Nazi Germany's Lebensraum, or Imperial Japan's "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". Nationalist sentiments can paint a surprising amount of aggression as "defending what's naturally ours."
> Well that's part of the point, China is obsessed with territorial unity, not expansionist policies
They are not directly militarily expansionist but are very economically influential by bankrolling the new silk road and lots of developments in Africa.
> The American perspective is that everyone is secretly trying to expand
A huge & growing society seeks resources - which requires expansion; it would be more surprising if they did not given their capabilities and size.
They are not directly militarily expansionist but are very economically influential by bankrolling the new silk road and lots of developments in Africa.
> The American perspective is that everyone is secretly trying to expand
A huge & growing society seeks resources - which requires expansion; it would be more surprising if they did not given their capabilities and size.
> China is obsessed with territorial unity, not expansionist policies
I don’t think the evidence supports that - they’re literally creating new islands to gain more territorial water, for instance. They contest their borders with India and Japan regularly. Their international economic and development policies serve to expand their global influence.
I don’t think the evidence supports that - they’re literally creating new islands to gain more territorial water, for instance. They contest their borders with India and Japan regularly. Their international economic and development policies serve to expand their global influence.
I don't see the comment as thinking it's better, but more that it's a very likely possibility of a shifting balance of power.
It's fine that you're asking for insight into some specific point of view, but do you feel that comparing Chinese hegemony to US's pertains to what the person said?
Yes, maybe I misinterpreted, but I understood his grievance to be that many books focus too much on preserving US influence relative to Chinese influence. Apologies if I misunderstood.
I think she was looking for a non-biased overview.
> does anyone seriously think that a Chinese global hegemony would be better
I welcome Chinese non judgemental policy especially internal matter.
I welcome Chinese non judgemental policy especially internal matter.
It is the non-interference in internal affairs policy. China is having it to criticize the US gunboat approach. It is not a policy that will be used forever. See how Haiti was criticized by China for its internal affairs just a few weeks ago.
It would be good for many small developing countries that don't seek for global hegemony. For those developing countries, China's rise proves that there is an alternative route for modernization. Of course, for the west, that itself is THE single biggest threat from China.
Why should we think that China would be better for small developing countries than the West? Or that the West's interests are in keeping small developing countries poor? Specifically, I would think Western countries with capitalist economies would want wealthy trading partners, and indeed give hundreds of billions of dollars in aid per year (ignoring private investment altogether).
Sure, happy to provide the contra. Not everything I write below is something I necessarily believe to be true, but it should be generally representative of the beliefs from the opposite position.
China as a nation and as a group of people have rarely (if ever) been aggressive outside their own borders. Any time where China exerted force or pressure outside its own country is justified as being purely defensive in nature. Internally, this is seen as largely being a cultural difference between Chinese philosophy/practice and the rest of the world.
In contemporary times, this practice of non-aggression translates to China's global policy. "One belt, one road" -- one of the primary globalization initiatives of China -- is built around Chinese support of critical national and trade infrastructure of developing countries. The idea is to build up trade partners and diplomatic allies through cooperation and capital infusions. Examples include building international trade ports, providing billions in medical aid, donating technology infrastructure, building millions of km of roadways, and investing in local enterprises. Fundamentally, China is focusing on countries left by the wayside by Western regimes (Africa, parts of Southeast Asia, South America, parts of the Middle East) but China is a good partner to many European countries. This is a dramatic departure from European colonialism and American exceptionalism where military might and economic threats were the standard negotiating tactics.
This, the Chinese allege, is fundamentally why a Chinese global hegemony is better than previous historical attempts. The Chinese do not significantly interfere with other nation's business unless it is as an ally of support or unless it's a defensive reaction to outside aggression. This allows other nations and peoples of the world to live their own lives while taking advantage of the market efficiencies, technology, and capital resources that China can provide.
China as a nation and as a group of people have rarely (if ever) been aggressive outside their own borders. Any time where China exerted force or pressure outside its own country is justified as being purely defensive in nature. Internally, this is seen as largely being a cultural difference between Chinese philosophy/practice and the rest of the world.
In contemporary times, this practice of non-aggression translates to China's global policy. "One belt, one road" -- one of the primary globalization initiatives of China -- is built around Chinese support of critical national and trade infrastructure of developing countries. The idea is to build up trade partners and diplomatic allies through cooperation and capital infusions. Examples include building international trade ports, providing billions in medical aid, donating technology infrastructure, building millions of km of roadways, and investing in local enterprises. Fundamentally, China is focusing on countries left by the wayside by Western regimes (Africa, parts of Southeast Asia, South America, parts of the Middle East) but China is a good partner to many European countries. This is a dramatic departure from European colonialism and American exceptionalism where military might and economic threats were the standard negotiating tactics.
This, the Chinese allege, is fundamentally why a Chinese global hegemony is better than previous historical attempts. The Chinese do not significantly interfere with other nation's business unless it is as an ally of support or unless it's a defensive reaction to outside aggression. This allows other nations and peoples of the world to live their own lives while taking advantage of the market efficiencies, technology, and capital resources that China can provide.
Reminds me a bit of the old line, “Rome conquered the world in self defense”.
The idea that “we acted outside our borders in defense”, is a line as old as empire itself (and in no way unique). One need only look at the changing borders of China over time to see that their interests extend exactly as far as the geography and external kinetic force allow it to.
Another line of thinking they’ll teach you in China is that the people of Tibet were enslaved by a ruling class, and their annexation was actually a liberation for the good of the local population. Maybe they’re right, and maybe five people in Tibet agreed before they started shoving families of Han Chinese into the region en masse, but justification of expansionist policies is a different discussion than whether their policies are or are not expansionist.
The idea that “we acted outside our borders in defense”, is a line as old as empire itself (and in no way unique). One need only look at the changing borders of China over time to see that their interests extend exactly as far as the geography and external kinetic force allow it to.
Another line of thinking they’ll teach you in China is that the people of Tibet were enslaved by a ruling class, and their annexation was actually a liberation for the good of the local population. Maybe they’re right, and maybe five people in Tibet agreed before they started shoving families of Han Chinese into the region en masse, but justification of expansionist policies is a different discussion than whether their policies are or are not expansionist.
Oh certainly -- like I said, there are plenty of pieces of propaganda I disagree with WRT the Chinese govt and its justifications for actions.
As to the OP's unasked question as to if the world would prefer living under Chinese supremacy vs American supremacy I think the difference is where in the world one currently lives. Generally speaking, I assume that North Americans, Brits, and small parts of Asia (Japan, Taiwan, Philippines) likely prefer American hegemony. OTOH, pretty much everywhere else in the world likely prefers a Chinese hegemony.
As to the OP's unasked question as to if the world would prefer living under Chinese supremacy vs American supremacy I think the difference is where in the world one currently lives. Generally speaking, I assume that North Americans, Brits, and small parts of Asia (Japan, Taiwan, Philippines) likely prefer American hegemony. OTOH, pretty much everywhere else in the world likely prefers a Chinese hegemony.
How about no hegemony? Are we allowed that as an option. USA seems only to be fighting China, so it can replace/keep itself in place as bully of the World meddling and causing untold harm for very perverse ends. We need actual democracy, if we can make it work, proportional representation seems a bare minimum to work towards if we want to seek greater global cooperation (which we must to combat global climate change). Instead we have opposition of other countries only so the powerful of our own countries can step in and reap the benefit, rather than to actually take moral high-ground, or seek better outcomes for our respective countries. Take Brexit, how can purposeful interruption of trade and restriction of movement possibly bring QoL improvements to the populous, it can't, it was all a cynical plan to benefit the elite. Maybe it will act as a wake up call.
> How about no hegemony? Are we allowed that as an option.
You can have two or more somewhat balanced powers jockeying for supremacy by way of cold or real wars, but this seems strictly worse for nearly everyone than a single imperfect, democratic superpower. I don't think there's a world in which nations don't compete for influence, at least not in the next century.
> USA seems only to be fighting China, so it can replace/keep itself in place as bully of the World meddling and causing untold harm for very perverse ends.
I don't see how anyone can look on 20th century history and conclude that a US hegemony is as bad as it gets.
> We need actual democracy, if we can make it work, proportional representation seems a bare minimum to work towards if we want to seek greater global cooperation (which we must to combat global climate change).
I don't see a global democracy coming to fruition in the next 100 years. It's an interesting idea, however.
You can have two or more somewhat balanced powers jockeying for supremacy by way of cold or real wars, but this seems strictly worse for nearly everyone than a single imperfect, democratic superpower. I don't think there's a world in which nations don't compete for influence, at least not in the next century.
> USA seems only to be fighting China, so it can replace/keep itself in place as bully of the World meddling and causing untold harm for very perverse ends.
I don't see how anyone can look on 20th century history and conclude that a US hegemony is as bad as it gets.
> We need actual democracy, if we can make it work, proportional representation seems a bare minimum to work towards if we want to seek greater global cooperation (which we must to combat global climate change).
I don't see a global democracy coming to fruition in the next 100 years. It's an interesting idea, however.
>look on 20th century history and conclude that a US hegemony is as bad as it gets. //
A USA hegemony under Sanders would be very interesting, under Trump's ilk ...
USA's power relies on threat of violence, can we really not do better than 'the best murderers win'?
I'm guessing you're from USA; when you say the best thing for everyone is a USA hegemony?
A USA hegemony under Sanders would be very interesting, under Trump's ilk ...
USA's power relies on threat of violence, can we really not do better than 'the best murderers win'?
I'm guessing you're from USA; when you say the best thing for everyone is a USA hegemony?
I'll try to make a good-faith response.
> does anyone seriously think that a Chinese global hegemony would be better
False equivalency; no one is arguing that. However, a multi-polar world is appealing. The US is certainly not always a good actor here either: the US has 50+ years of foreign interventions to point to that span the globe, particularly the middle east, latin america, and southeast asia. Less extreme: its ability to unilaterally cause pain for even allies (EU, Canada) through trade tariffs wasn't exactly welcomed.
It would be in Europe (and other regions') interest to be able to defend their own interests on equal footing with the US. Currently, they cannot do that (military and economic dependence). Having China offers leverage. I.e., the US will be incentivized to behave better if other countries can say "well if you push us too far, we'll work with China."
This is just my armchair analysis. I'm not invested enough to back this up with citations or anything so if that's what you're looking for feel free to ignore and argue with someone else who cares more.
> does anyone seriously think that a Chinese global hegemony would be better
False equivalency; no one is arguing that. However, a multi-polar world is appealing. The US is certainly not always a good actor here either: the US has 50+ years of foreign interventions to point to that span the globe, particularly the middle east, latin america, and southeast asia. Less extreme: its ability to unilaterally cause pain for even allies (EU, Canada) through trade tariffs wasn't exactly welcomed.
It would be in Europe (and other regions') interest to be able to defend their own interests on equal footing with the US. Currently, they cannot do that (military and economic dependence). Having China offers leverage. I.e., the US will be incentivized to behave better if other countries can say "well if you push us too far, we'll work with China."
This is just my armchair analysis. I'm not invested enough to back this up with citations or anything so if that's what you're looking for feel free to ignore and argue with someone else who cares more.
Multipolar (4+) power balances tend to be the least stable (see: WWI & WWII), due to temporarily alliances believing they possess superior force and making a first strike.
Afaik, tripolar tends to be the most stable, with a default-neutral third party, who may choose to side with either other major.
Bipolar comes in second.
Afaik, tripolar tends to be the most stable, with a default-neutral third party, who may choose to side with either other major.
Bipolar comes in second.
> "However, a multi-polar world is appealing."
A multi-polar world is one where a bunch of nation-states have a realistic shot at becoming the new global hegemon. The likely situation is something like what occurred in the 19th and early 20th century where all of the major powers were locked into a blisteringly expensive military and arms race. And when you have a military that stands on an equal footing with others, the temptation is there to use it to advance national interests and, as the old quote goes, "of course you realize this means war!"; the list of wars that occurred in the 19th century is surprisingly long. Absolutely nothing about that scenario is appealing.
A multi-polar world is one where a bunch of nation-states have a realistic shot at becoming the new global hegemon. The likely situation is something like what occurred in the 19th and early 20th century where all of the major powers were locked into a blisteringly expensive military and arms race. And when you have a military that stands on an equal footing with others, the temptation is there to use it to advance national interests and, as the old quote goes, "of course you realize this means war!"; the list of wars that occurred in the 19th century is surprisingly long. Absolutely nothing about that scenario is appealing.
> False equivalency; no one is arguing that.
Really? Can someone clarify what my earlier quoted passage was referencing then? I wasn't trying to straw-man the OP.
> However, a multi-polar world is appealing. The US is certainly not always a good actor here either: the US has 50+ years of foreign interventions to point to that span the globe, particularly the middle east, latin america, and southeast asia.
The Cold War (and most/all of those foreign-interventions that you object to) were products of a multi-polar world. I don't know that this is a good thing. I understand and empathize with the "competition is good" impulse, but I don't think it bears out in history.
> It would be in Europe (and other regions') interest to be able to defend their own interests on equal footing with the US. Currently, they cannot do that (military and economic dependence). Having China offers leverage. I.e., the US will be incentivized to behave better if other countries can say "well if you push us too far, we'll work with China."
I understand and empathize with this as well, as noted above.
Really? Can someone clarify what my earlier quoted passage was referencing then? I wasn't trying to straw-man the OP.
> However, a multi-polar world is appealing. The US is certainly not always a good actor here either: the US has 50+ years of foreign interventions to point to that span the globe, particularly the middle east, latin america, and southeast asia.
The Cold War (and most/all of those foreign-interventions that you object to) were products of a multi-polar world. I don't know that this is a good thing. I understand and empathize with the "competition is good" impulse, but I don't think it bears out in history.
> It would be in Europe (and other regions') interest to be able to defend their own interests on equal footing with the US. Currently, they cannot do that (military and economic dependence). Having China offers leverage. I.e., the US will be incentivized to behave better if other countries can say "well if you push us too far, we'll work with China."
I understand and empathize with this as well, as noted above.
>> False equivalency; no one is arguing that.
>Really? Can someone clarify what my earlier quoted passage was referencing then? I wasn't trying to straw-man the OP.
IIUC, OP's quote just means that a lot of existing books do try to make that argument, i.e., that the only outcome of the US losing its position is for China to take it, as opposed to a multi-polar world (and thus, it would be in the reader's best interest to support US hegemony).
IIUC, OP's quote just means that a lot of existing books do try to make that argument, i.e., that the only outcome of the US losing its position is for China to take it, as opposed to a multi-polar world (and thus, it would be in the reader's best interest to support US hegemony).
A multi-polar world might not be appealing for those who fall within China's pole but who are not China. Ditto non-Russia within Russia's pole.
I mean, as you point out, it's not always all that great for those within the US's pole, either. But to me, China and Russia seem to be more aggressive in asserting themselves in dominance over others.
I mean, as you point out, it's not always all that great for those within the US's pole, either. But to me, China and Russia seem to be more aggressive in asserting themselves in dominance over others.
> I mean, as you point out, it's not always all that great for those within the US's pole, either. But to me, China and Russia seem to be more aggressive in asserting themselves in dominance over others.
Tell that to Latin America (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_involvement_in_r...) and the Middle East.
China uses economic leverage. Russia uses subterfuge. America uses those with an extra helping of bombs.
Tell that to Latin America (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_involvement_in_r...) and the Middle East.
China uses economic leverage. Russia uses subterfuge. America uses those with an extra helping of bombs.
"Cold War shenanigans are exactly why we need a multi-polar power balance" was not the argument I expected. :) I'm joking, but I think my reasoning is correct: the U.S. meddled in Latin America precisely because it was competing with the U.S.S.R. for hegemony in the region. This seems like evidence against (not for) a multi-polar power arrangement.
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China has been pretty open about their willingness to use military to conquer. Russia has militarily taken territory much more recently than the US has.
During the cold war the US and Russia made a mess of many many countries. It doesn't seem likely to be cleaned up any time soon. That's what a multi-polar world is like.
During the cold war the US and Russia made a mess of many many countries. It doesn't seem likely to be cleaned up any time soon. That's what a multi-polar world is like.
> It would be in Europe (and other regions') interest to be able to defend their own interests on equal footing with the US. Currently, they cannot do that (military and economic dependence). Having China offers leverage. I.e., the US will be incentivized to behave better if other countries can say "well if you push us too far, we'll work with China."
The only reason Europe has been able to fund their various subsidies, welfare programs, and safety nets, is because they've slashed their defense budgets by joining NATO and outsourcing defense to the US.
> This is just my armchair analysis. I'm not invested enough to back this up with citations or anything so if that's what you're looking for feel free to ignore and argue with someone else who cares more.
Then why post?
The only reason Europe has been able to fund their various subsidies, welfare programs, and safety nets, is because they've slashed their defense budgets by joining NATO and outsourcing defense to the US.
> This is just my armchair analysis. I'm not invested enough to back this up with citations or anything so if that's what you're looking for feel free to ignore and argue with someone else who cares more.
Then why post?
Some books I recently enjoyed, mostly focused on the infosec aspect but still somewhat on topic:
The Kill Chain, by Christian Brose
Active Measures, by Thomas Rid
Sandworm, by Andy Greenberg
Fatal System Error, by Joseph Mann
The Kill Chain, by Christian Brose
Active Measures, by Thomas Rid
Sandworm, by Andy Greenberg
Fatal System Error, by Joseph Mann
I would also love to find a book like that. But, I doubt that it exists -- probably the world was always like this, but, it seems like there is just too much going on, and too much context to try to grasp and consider.
One example of just one thing that's barely been reckoned with in mass public discourse, a tiny thing and an unfathomably huge thing, is the impact of national and corporate intelligence agencies on the world over the past 200 years, during the time when any nation could project force into pretty much any other via easy global travel.
Every major country has not just spies, but significant resources they can bring to bear in terms of psychological operations and embedded operatives across the political spectrum. Just one small example of this kind of thing is Operation Gladio[1], which had massive ramifications for the political landscape in Europe in the last 50 years, and there are countless things like this that we do and don't know anything about.
Just the USA has had a hand in so many bizarre and hugely important events, and then to think that Russia, China, Germany, Israel, France, the UK, and any number of other countries have operated in a similar fashion since WWI or earlier? Yikes!
And that doesn't even touch on the corporate side of it, with its roots going back to the gilded age or earlier, where unions and putdowns and murders and all kinds of nutty (but secret) behaviour was just... normal.
There's just so much we don't, and may never know, and even that stuff is just a tiny portion of the picture. The kind of open and secret economic games that get played, power and relationship dynamics between countries and their leaders, their wealthy families, the networks of people who meet through family and upbringing, grudges, debts, ideological choices and pragmatic ones -- it goes on and on and on. And then the technological changes!
But, I would really love to read that book if you find it.
1 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Gladio
One example of just one thing that's barely been reckoned with in mass public discourse, a tiny thing and an unfathomably huge thing, is the impact of national and corporate intelligence agencies on the world over the past 200 years, during the time when any nation could project force into pretty much any other via easy global travel.
Every major country has not just spies, but significant resources they can bring to bear in terms of psychological operations and embedded operatives across the political spectrum. Just one small example of this kind of thing is Operation Gladio[1], which had massive ramifications for the political landscape in Europe in the last 50 years, and there are countless things like this that we do and don't know anything about.
Just the USA has had a hand in so many bizarre and hugely important events, and then to think that Russia, China, Germany, Israel, France, the UK, and any number of other countries have operated in a similar fashion since WWI or earlier? Yikes!
And that doesn't even touch on the corporate side of it, with its roots going back to the gilded age or earlier, where unions and putdowns and murders and all kinds of nutty (but secret) behaviour was just... normal.
There's just so much we don't, and may never know, and even that stuff is just a tiny portion of the picture. The kind of open and secret economic games that get played, power and relationship dynamics between countries and their leaders, their wealthy families, the networks of people who meet through family and upbringing, grudges, debts, ideological choices and pragmatic ones -- it goes on and on and on. And then the technological changes!
But, I would really love to read that book if you find it.
1 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Gladio
The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. It's written by a retired British general. It covers how war changed during the industrial revolution, then with the creation of nuclear weapons. The main point of the book is that conventional warfare is all but obsolete, but high level commanders don't know how to conduct anything but conventional warfare, and that the media can win or lose a conflict based on the narrative it pushes.
In addition to just the difficulty posed by the breadth of what you're asking for, if there are also institutional or structural pressures which preclude such a work from existing?
On the academic side, I get the sense that there is so much pressure to specialize and deeply study narrow areas that a really broad work (global developments over decades) would not be well received. Within think tanks, a broad survey would likely still need to be concordant with an institutional agenda. And if really broad documents are being produced within state departments/foreign ministries or other parts of government, we would never see them?
On the academic side, I get the sense that there is so much pressure to specialize and deeply study narrow areas that a really broad work (global developments over decades) would not be well received. Within think tanks, a broad survey would likely still need to be concordant with an institutional agenda. And if really broad documents are being produced within state departments/foreign ministries or other parts of government, we would never see them?
I've read a bit of Peter Zeihan. It's hard to be a good judge of his accuracy - he can come across as a bit of a pompous - but he seems knowing and somewhat neutral.
When it comes to contemporary political events, there is too much incentive to push a specific agenda, and too little incentive to be neutral. So if you want a neutral opinion, you need to piece it together from multiple biased sources.
My personal feeling, as a first-generation immigrant, is that the West has eliminated the local incentives for traits associated with personal strength. Partly by moving jobs requiring problem-solving to cheaper countries. Partly by the corporate culture trying to refocus people's passion into areas where they wouldn't accumulate economic leverage (passion about hobbies, social issues and identity is OK, passion about the product that would make you one day start your own business is a no-no).
So we have a high concentration of strong ambitious people used to solving problems in countries like China (because the entire world literally pays them to do so). And we have a lot of softer people taking too many things for granted in the West, sitting on most of the world's wealth. This is a textbook recipe for a conflict.
My personal feeling, as a first-generation immigrant, is that the West has eliminated the local incentives for traits associated with personal strength. Partly by moving jobs requiring problem-solving to cheaper countries. Partly by the corporate culture trying to refocus people's passion into areas where they wouldn't accumulate economic leverage (passion about hobbies, social issues and identity is OK, passion about the product that would make you one day start your own business is a no-no).
So we have a high concentration of strong ambitious people used to solving problems in countries like China (because the entire world literally pays them to do so). And we have a lot of softer people taking too many things for granted in the West, sitting on most of the world's wealth. This is a textbook recipe for a conflict.
I don't have any books to recommend, let alone 'neutral' sources, but two research 'areas' may help:
1) The USMC reading list. If you want an English language view of the current state of 'thought' from the leaders of any near-future conflicts, this list is it. It goes from poolee to the top brass. Maybe look for the more top level books and read from there. Though the underlying mindset is important and is from the lower rank books.
https://mca-marines.org/commandants-professional-reading-lis...
2) The wikipedia articles on the Nagorno-Karabakh war of October 2020 and their linked pages. Obviously there aren't any books out on this war yet, as it was so recent. But the underlying mechanics of the war are likely to be the ones we're seeing in the near future as both sides were somewhat evenly matched and had access to modern weaponry. "The war was marked by the deployment of drones, sensors, long-range heavy artillery[99] and missile strikes, as well as by state propaganda and the use of official social media accounts in online information warfare.[100]" I'd maybe put out a google alert for books about this conflict when they come out.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Nagorno-Karabakh_conflict
1) The USMC reading list. If you want an English language view of the current state of 'thought' from the leaders of any near-future conflicts, this list is it. It goes from poolee to the top brass. Maybe look for the more top level books and read from there. Though the underlying mindset is important and is from the lower rank books.
https://mca-marines.org/commandants-professional-reading-lis...
2) The wikipedia articles on the Nagorno-Karabakh war of October 2020 and their linked pages. Obviously there aren't any books out on this war yet, as it was so recent. But the underlying mechanics of the war are likely to be the ones we're seeing in the near future as both sides were somewhat evenly matched and had access to modern weaponry. "The war was marked by the deployment of drones, sensors, long-range heavy artillery[99] and missile strikes, as well as by state propaganda and the use of official social media accounts in online information warfare.[100]" I'd maybe put out a google alert for books about this conflict when they come out.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Nagorno-Karabakh_conflict
Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?
China’s Three Warfares(non-kinetic/pre-kinetic warfare): https://cryptome.org/2014/06/prc-three-wars.pdf
Professor Anne Marie Brady: https://twitter.com/Anne_MarieBrady
China’s Three Warfares(non-kinetic/pre-kinetic warfare): https://cryptome.org/2014/06/prc-three-wars.pdf
Professor Anne Marie Brady: https://twitter.com/Anne_MarieBrady
Geopolitics is all about oil.
This article suspiciously seems like saber rattling to me. Like it was placed in the Economist to send a message to someone.
It is good for global security that France has a strong military and is strengthening it. But it is only a small consideration. It is nonsense to talk about France embarking on a global "high-intensity, state-on-state conflict" and projecting land military power from Russia to Turkey, and "naval presence" in the Indo-Pacific, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Persian Gulf, without noting that this would mean far more powerful militaries than France being involved and would mean nukes flying and most human life on the planet being wiped out in short order.
In 2021, saying that France is preparing for a high-intensity war with Russia or Turkey is as absurd as saying that the State of Texas is preparing for a high-intensity war with North Korea or Mexico.
The only scenario where France would be engaged in a high-intensity war with Russia or Turkey is if World War III started. I believe that it is reasonable to say that a high-intensity war between the world powers would probably result in the end of human civilization within a few hours. The fact that 10,000 French soldiers are planning to do a 4 day military training exercise in 2023 is a tiny consideration in the larger scheme of any strategic plans that NATO and the EU have for a hypothetical WWIII.
What is most suspicious is that the article tries to equate such a world-ending event with on-going and hypothetical French military adventures in Africa. French military adventurism in Africa and the Middle East is not a high-intensity, state-on-state conflict.
It is good for global security that France has a strong military and is strengthening it. But it is only a small consideration. It is nonsense to talk about France embarking on a global "high-intensity, state-on-state conflict" and projecting land military power from Russia to Turkey, and "naval presence" in the Indo-Pacific, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Persian Gulf, without noting that this would mean far more powerful militaries than France being involved and would mean nukes flying and most human life on the planet being wiped out in short order.
In 2021, saying that France is preparing for a high-intensity war with Russia or Turkey is as absurd as saying that the State of Texas is preparing for a high-intensity war with North Korea or Mexico.
The only scenario where France would be engaged in a high-intensity war with Russia or Turkey is if World War III started. I believe that it is reasonable to say that a high-intensity war between the world powers would probably result in the end of human civilization within a few hours. The fact that 10,000 French soldiers are planning to do a 4 day military training exercise in 2023 is a tiny consideration in the larger scheme of any strategic plans that NATO and the EU have for a hypothetical WWIII.
What is most suspicious is that the article tries to equate such a world-ending event with on-going and hypothetical French military adventures in Africa. French military adventurism in Africa and the Middle East is not a high-intensity, state-on-state conflict.
> This article suspiciously seems like saber rattling to me. Like it was placed in the Economist to send a message to someone.
Who? Why?
> would mean nukes flying and most human life on the planet being wiped out in short or
We had 50 years of Cold War and MAD and plenty of large, gruesome wars and no one got nuked. France was involved with some of them, too, e.g. Vietnam.
The lesson of the Korean War is that even with nukes, intense conventional war is still possible, even likely.
> The only scenario where France would be engaged in a high-intensity war with Russia or Turkey is if World War III started
Not at all. If the French -- already reluctant members of NATO, with a history of trying to NOT be a member -- were to walk out of the alliance, why would that conflict lead to WW3? An multi-polar world with an independent Europe means that they can fight their own wars against Russia and Turkey -- they have in the past!
Who? Why?
> would mean nukes flying and most human life on the planet being wiped out in short or
We had 50 years of Cold War and MAD and plenty of large, gruesome wars and no one got nuked. France was involved with some of them, too, e.g. Vietnam.
The lesson of the Korean War is that even with nukes, intense conventional war is still possible, even likely.
> The only scenario where France would be engaged in a high-intensity war with Russia or Turkey is if World War III started
Not at all. If the French -- already reluctant members of NATO, with a history of trying to NOT be a member -- were to walk out of the alliance, why would that conflict lead to WW3? An multi-polar world with an independent Europe means that they can fight their own wars against Russia and Turkey -- they have in the past!
> Who? Why?
I don't know. There are many possibilities, known and unknown. If you're asking me to speculate, with the limited information I have, I would put my money on trying to scare some African military force that France is engaged in conflict with.
> The lesson of the Korean War is that even with nukes, intense conventional war is still possible
Korea and Vietnam were Cold War era wars between highly asymmetric opponents. They were proxy conflicts between global superpowers. The entire premise of a "Cold War" or "proxy war" is that it allows powerful opponents to avoid a high-intensity conflict where mutual destruction is assured. That is not state-on-state, high-intensity conflict. Just like French involvement in the proxy wars in Africa and the Middle East is not state-on-state, high-intensity conflict.
> An multi-polar world with an independent Europe means that they can fight their own wars against Russia and Turkey -- they have in the past!
Again, we are not in the past. We're not discussing war in the context of 19th century European military technology, we are discussing a future major global conflict. The last time Europe was at war with Russia and Turkey, it was exactly in the context of a world war.
A multipolar world (as opposed to a unipolar or bipolar world) is exactly the kind of situation where one would expect high-intensity, state-on-state conflict to develop into a World War. That's pretty much the store of WWI and WWII. The Cold War is the story of a bipolar world. Notice how Cold War is "cold," the opposite of "high-intensity."
I don't know. There are many possibilities, known and unknown. If you're asking me to speculate, with the limited information I have, I would put my money on trying to scare some African military force that France is engaged in conflict with.
> The lesson of the Korean War is that even with nukes, intense conventional war is still possible
Korea and Vietnam were Cold War era wars between highly asymmetric opponents. They were proxy conflicts between global superpowers. The entire premise of a "Cold War" or "proxy war" is that it allows powerful opponents to avoid a high-intensity conflict where mutual destruction is assured. That is not state-on-state, high-intensity conflict. Just like French involvement in the proxy wars in Africa and the Middle East is not state-on-state, high-intensity conflict.
> An multi-polar world with an independent Europe means that they can fight their own wars against Russia and Turkey -- they have in the past!
Again, we are not in the past. We're not discussing war in the context of 19th century European military technology, we are discussing a future major global conflict. The last time Europe was at war with Russia and Turkey, it was exactly in the context of a world war.
A multipolar world (as opposed to a unipolar or bipolar world) is exactly the kind of situation where one would expect high-intensity, state-on-state conflict to develop into a World War. That's pretty much the store of WWI and WWII. The Cold War is the story of a bipolar world. Notice how Cold War is "cold," the opposite of "high-intensity."
One of the contingencies driving the French planning is the potential waning or disengagement of some of those powers (one in particular), and the reason for it's preparation is to reduce the power gap with the others.
So, two competing hypotheses:
1) France knows something we don't know about the likelihood of them getting into a high-intensity war
2) France's military is worried about the civilian government cutting their budget until they are irrelevant, as happened in most of the rest of European NATO, and wants to look relevant
It's Greece-Turkey, as others have said. Turkey has burned through much of it's foreign reserves, tourism is fucked and we could see Erdogan whipping up nationalist sentiment in the face of major economic difficulties.
Longer term, as Putin slides out of the picture with his medical issues, Russia is an interesting candidate for instability. The Chinese might try to solidify their land grab in the east, but the bigger worry is Russia breaking apart and imploding.
Europe has zero capability for warfare in the Pacific, so that is irrelevant.
Longer term, as Putin slides out of the picture with his medical issues, Russia is an interesting candidate for instability. The Chinese might try to solidify their land grab in the east, but the bigger worry is Russia breaking apart and imploding.
Europe has zero capability for warfare in the Pacific, so that is irrelevant.
Turkey has already had varying involvement with warfar recently with engagements in Syria and Armenia-Azerbaijan. I would not be suprised to see them engage in further conflict.
Putin's medical issues are unconfirmed and even with them, he may not resign for another decade plus. I remember recently how western media had all but confirmed Kim Jong-Un was dead and it was being kept secrey.
> but also Turkey or a North African country.
What? Turkey is separated from France by half a dozen countries, all of which would severely object to Turkish forces passing through them, and other NATO states would also have severe objections to such a conflict. And no North African states have any significant amphibious capability - there is a sea between North Africa and France, you know.
What? Turkey is separated from France by half a dozen countries, all of which would severely object to Turkish forces passing through them, and other NATO states would also have severe objections to such a conflict. And no North African states have any significant amphibious capability - there is a sea between North Africa and France, you know.
Do you think if Turkey invaded a nearby country like Greece or Armenia, that France would do nothing?
Greece is a EU member state. The whole EU would react to such a thing - which is why Turkey would never do something that dumb.
Russia, ever the villain (and oft deserved) is also not dumb.
The most likely flashpoints for major conflict in my eyes are Pakistan - India, India - China, and China - Taiwan. It's a stretch to picture the French getting involved in any of those.
Major conflict in Europe just doesn't seem likely to me.
Russia, ever the villain (and oft deserved) is also not dumb.
The most likely flashpoints for major conflict in my eyes are Pakistan - India, India - China, and China - Taiwan. It's a stretch to picture the French getting involved in any of those.
Major conflict in Europe just doesn't seem likely to me.
> Greece is a EU member state. The whole EU would react to such a thing - which is why Turkey would never do something that dumb.
That's exactly because EU members would react that Turkey doesn't do it and preparing for this scenario is exactly how you prevent it.
That's exactly because EU members would react that Turkey doesn't do it and preparing for this scenario is exactly how you prevent it.
Unless you don't consider it major, I think you're missing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that just happened 6 months ago, with a huge ability to spiral out of control, cause a humanitarian crisis, which Turkey will definitely get involved in supporting Azerbaijan. There is now really bad blood between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and Armenians still live in Nagorno-Karabakh, currently only safeguarded by Russian troops. That situation is still a tinderbox until an actual resolution is achieved and generations have passed.
I wouldn't describe that as major (I wasn't aware of it) but it looks like a mess.
Turkey was already involved in recent hostilities. Armenia alleged Turkish troops and air support were involved in the fighting in December while Azerbaijan claims Turkish involvement was limited to "military advisors".
Major conflict is a relative term, but I'd call Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia major conflicts that happened in Europe within last ~20 years.
Those are not the kind of major WWII style conflicts discussed in the article.
I believe it did not escalate to a major conflict because UE carefully avoided it. Ukraine, in my profane view, was clearly a casus belli for UE, as this country, IIRC, was seriously considering joining the UE and UE members were not objecting (unlike for Turkey - some say this rejection was the cause of Erdogan).
>> Major conflict is a relative term, but I'd call Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia major conflicts that happened in Europe within last ~20 years.
> Those are not the kind of major WWII style conflicts discussed in the article.
WWII-style conflicts are an especially major type. They were so unusually major that the "world war" moniker was coined for them, because calling them a plain "war" just wouldn't do, and anything similarly unusually major would probably be cataclysmic at this point. I don't think that should be the threshold for calling something "major."
> Those are not the kind of major WWII style conflicts discussed in the article.
WWII-style conflicts are an especially major type. They were so unusually major that the "world war" moniker was coined for them, because calling them a plain "war" just wouldn't do, and anything similarly unusually major would probably be cataclysmic at this point. I don't think that should be the threshold for calling something "major."
Neither would I, but that's the context for this discussion. Major conflict between major powers as described in the article.
One can bike-shed endlessly about definitions, but let's keep it to the context.
One can bike-shed endlessly about definitions, but let's keep it to the context.
Either you're talking about a World War scale conflict or a regional conflict. "Major conflict in Europe" is by definition regional, because you've constrained it to Europe. If it doesn't involve Europe, it can't be a World War.
Just read the article man. I've no further interest in nitpicking over definitions. The article talks about preparing for war with other major powers, with WWII levels of casualties.
I'm not commenting on the article. I'm commenting on you saying that you can't imagine a major conflict in Europe.
> Either you're talking about a World War scale conflict or a regional conflict. "Major conflict in Europe" is by definition regional, because you've constrained it to Europe. If it doesn't involve Europe, it can't be a World War.
Looks like nit picking over definitions to me. I don't see a connection to me not imaging a war between major powers in Europe. Can you make the connection for me?
Looks like nit picking over definitions to me. I don't see a connection to me not imaging a war between major powers in Europe. Can you make the connection for me?
Don't get angry. You said that you can't imagine a major conflict in Europe. That's ignorant, because Europe has never been war-free for more than a few years at a time, so I pointed that out. If you meant to say that you can't imagine something akin to WW2 or something, then just say that. Maybe you were talking about Western Europe.
I am not sure Russia would not attempt to take the Baltics. They directly border Russia, has previously been a part of the Soviet Union, etc.
It would depend entirely on how Europe and the US reacts of course. If Europe stand united then Russia would stay out. If the US was willing to get involved then Russia would stay out.
Possibly France and Poland could stop Russia from taking the Baltics, but I don't think so.
I would have said Turkey wouldn't do anything, but with Erodogan I don't know any longer.
As for major conflicts in Europe, I have seen, stood on and crawled in the bunkers from the Atlantic wall (not hard, they are still very much a part of the landscape here in Denmark) I have seen the beeches in Normandy that are still marked by shell holes (or possibly granade holes). It is a nice reminder that major conflicts really did happen there.
I too used to think they would not happen in Europe ever again, because we could always count on the US as the backer of the peace and then nobody else would do anything. That got a shock on 9/11, and then the deal (which to be fair was never very good for the US) got a serious wack with the Trump administration.
Without guaranteed US backing, the peace in Europe seems a lot less solid. A united Europe (especially with the ability to buy weapons from the US, which I don't think is going to be an issue) is still very strong (and Russia isn't), but Europe is not united in much. And the public certainly isn't going to be happy with large scale war. We like our public safety nets, easy lives and long summers just as much as the next person.
Anyway that is a long armchair comment about the sentiment here in Europe.
It would depend entirely on how Europe and the US reacts of course. If Europe stand united then Russia would stay out. If the US was willing to get involved then Russia would stay out.
Possibly France and Poland could stop Russia from taking the Baltics, but I don't think so.
I would have said Turkey wouldn't do anything, but with Erodogan I don't know any longer.
As for major conflicts in Europe, I have seen, stood on and crawled in the bunkers from the Atlantic wall (not hard, they are still very much a part of the landscape here in Denmark) I have seen the beeches in Normandy that are still marked by shell holes (or possibly granade holes). It is a nice reminder that major conflicts really did happen there.
I too used to think they would not happen in Europe ever again, because we could always count on the US as the backer of the peace and then nobody else would do anything. That got a shock on 9/11, and then the deal (which to be fair was never very good for the US) got a serious wack with the Trump administration.
Without guaranteed US backing, the peace in Europe seems a lot less solid. A united Europe (especially with the ability to buy weapons from the US, which I don't think is going to be an issue) is still very strong (and Russia isn't), but Europe is not united in much. And the public certainly isn't going to be happy with large scale war. We like our public safety nets, easy lives and long summers just as much as the next person.
Anyway that is a long armchair comment about the sentiment here in Europe.
I think we can get some idea of what Russia would risk from how the acted with the Ukraine.
Shadow warfare, proxy warfare, territory annexation.
It would be a serious escalation in strategy and risk to invade and annex a Baltic state. It seems unlikely to me, for what it's worth.
Turkey is expanding their influence on their neighborhood, but they won't seek out conflict with the EU, that's suicide.
Turkey and Russia could be a problematic situation though. They're similarly sized economies, although Russia has a serious military advantage.
Shadow warfare, proxy warfare, territory annexation.
It would be a serious escalation in strategy and risk to invade and annex a Baltic state. It seems unlikely to me, for what it's worth.
Turkey is expanding their influence on their neighborhood, but they won't seek out conflict with the EU, that's suicide.
Turkey and Russia could be a problematic situation though. They're similarly sized economies, although Russia has a serious military advantage.
> Turkey and Russia could be a problematic situation though. They're similarly sized economies, although Russia has a serious military advantage.
Russia's GDP is twice the size of Turkey. Russia is more similar to UK/France/Canada than Turkey.[0]
[0]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nomi...
Russia's GDP is twice the size of Turkey. Russia is more similar to UK/France/Canada than Turkey.[0]
[0]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nomi...
Yes, but growing much more slowly than Turkey and with problematic demographics. This could be an issue in a couple decades.
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I think a lot of NATO and EU states would do something, which is why it is almost certainly not going to happen.
Turkey and Greece are both members of NATO, so if they went to war, would the remaining NATO states have to sit it out? Or would one of the two be designated the aggressor, and the rest of NATO obliged to come to the aid of the other?
NATO commits members to protect each other. If one member invaded another, it seems like a pretty clear violation of the treaty. In other words, grounds for being expelled from pact, so no more conflict about the remaining members coming to the invaded party’s aid.
> if they went to war, would the remaining NATO states have to sit it out
An interesting question, which i think you would need some legal expert on the NATO treaties to explicate. But mercifully for 50 years or so they haven't ever done such a thing, and I don't see the military forces of either country wanting to. The bonkers Turkish leadership is another matter, but the Turkish (and Greek, to be honest) military have a tendency to remove inconvenient leaders.
An interesting question, which i think you would need some legal expert on the NATO treaties to explicate. But mercifully for 50 years or so they haven't ever done such a thing, and I don't see the military forces of either country wanting to. The bonkers Turkish leadership is another matter, but the Turkish (and Greek, to be honest) military have a tendency to remove inconvenient leaders.
There is a huge different between Greece and Armenia in that case. Greece is EU and western. Armenia, I don't think most people even know where it is (I certainly don't, no offense to anybody from Armenia).
It's OK, France delivers. France will go to where the war is; which is a lot harder than it sounds. There are very few nations in the world capable of sustained, global, serious power projection, and France is one of them.
What, with one ageing aircraft carrier?
If needs be. They ran a ferocious pace of sorties for an extended period from off the coast of Libya a bit under a decade ago, and since then it's not exactly been sitting on the sidelines; the aircraft, the carrier, the weapons and the logistics. That experience is still present in the personnel, the carrier is still operational, they've still got the air power to go with it.
Basically, yes. They can and will. That's real, proven, global power projection. The number of other countries in the world capable of that can be counted on the fingers of one hand.
What, with one ageing aircraft carrier?
The way you ask that question suggests that the answer should be "no"; but it's not. The answer is "yes".
Basically, yes. They can and will. That's real, proven, global power projection. The number of other countries in the world capable of that can be counted on the fingers of one hand.
What, with one ageing aircraft carrier?
The way you ask that question suggests that the answer should be "no"; but it's not. The answer is "yes".
> That's real, proven, global power projection
No, it isn't. Libya is just across the Med from France, not in the Pacific.
> The number of other countries in the world capable of that can be counted on the fingers of one hand.
Well, really on one finger.
No, it isn't. Libya is just across the Med from France, not in the Pacific.
> The number of other countries in the world capable of that can be counted on the fingers of one hand.
Well, really on one finger.
Libya is just across the Med from France, not in the Pacific.
They didn't walk the resupply over. They have ships, they have friendly nations, they have the financing to purchase what they need, they have a real logistics organisation capable of resupplying globally. How inconvenient for this discussion that Libya wasn't on the other side of the planet, but there it is.
Well, really on one finger.
This is incorrect. Perhaps you're thinking of the USA, which is an order of magnitude more capable than any other. They are not, however, the only nation capable of delivering sustained global power projection.
They didn't walk the resupply over. They have ships, they have friendly nations, they have the financing to purchase what they need, they have a real logistics organisation capable of resupplying globally. How inconvenient for this discussion that Libya wasn't on the other side of the planet, but there it is.
Well, really on one finger.
This is incorrect. Perhaps you're thinking of the USA, which is an order of magnitude more capable than any other. They are not, however, the only nation capable of delivering sustained global power projection.
Is Great Britain and the Falklands global enough for you?
Britain has nowhere near the capabilities it had back then it terms of logistics (ie ships taken up from trade). Moreover, they are getting rid of a huge amount of airlift: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/c-130-hercules-fleet-to-be-r...
Even for Falklands conflict, they barely managed to win, and that was with assistance from their friends vis-a-vis missile codes, satellite imagery, etc.
Even for Falklands conflict, they barely managed to win, and that was with assistance from their friends vis-a-vis missile codes, satellite imagery, etc.
No. A very local war against a 3rd world country who almost beat us. A few more Exocet strikes and the task force would have been out of the game. If we now went to war using our bloated and incompetently designed new carrier, against a 2nd world power (say Russia, China, or even, dare I say it France) the thing would be at the bottom of the ocean in short order.
A new one is planned: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_French_aircraft_carrier
> will enter service in 2038; the year the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle is due to be retired.
So they end up with one, again, if they even build it. Even the UK can do better than that, though admittedly the French carriers are at least notionally more capable than the crap Gordon Brown foisted on us.
So they end up with one, again, if they even build it. Even the UK can do better than that, though admittedly the French carriers are at least notionally more capable than the crap Gordon Brown foisted on us.
It's not like you really need the aircraft carrier to bomb in the Mediterranean...
All this might explain the recent acute interest in French frigates or aircraft, even second hand, from Egypt and Greece...
The reason that France is concerned about conflicts in North Africa states is not because those countries have amphibious military capability and can strike metropolitan France. It is (besides the cynical suspicion that France likes maintaining some economic hegemony over its former colonies) because every North African conflict sends another wave of refugees and economic migrants north towards Europe.
I am not totally sure but I read it in a way they are preparing for a major war, not necessarily an invasion of France.
But if Turkey hypothetically starts occupying Greece islands or Russia one of the Baltics AND at the same time, the USA is unwilling or incapable of intervention, it probably would be France and the UK to fight at the front lines.
But if Turkey hypothetically starts occupying Greece islands or Russia one of the Baltics AND at the same time, the USA is unwilling or incapable of intervention, it probably would be France and the UK to fight at the front lines.
France, UK, and the rest of NATO, I guess.
Turkey is part of NATO at the moment, so it would not trigger an automatic NATO-wide engagement.
But for a Baltics invasion, it would.
But for a Baltics invasion, it would.
This would mean the disintegration of NATO, and likely at a time when China also decides to move on Taiwan. It's also unclear whether the US has the will to do more than protest strongly at UN meetings.
I, for one, look forward to Europe reasserting itself globally. They’ve been in time-out long enough. Sure it leads to great domestic social programs while their neighboring regions burn or are managed by others, but they could be doing more for the world than convening accords, agreements and half-hearted condemnations nobody really takes seriously.
They’re the Floyd[0] of global politics, laying on the couch smoking pot while reminding you to buy some cleaning products while you’re out.
[0] https://youtu.be/nIA-5l4tRyY
They’re the Floyd[0] of global politics, laying on the couch smoking pot while reminding you to buy some cleaning products while you’re out.
[0] https://youtu.be/nIA-5l4tRyY
Well, Turkey did invade a Mediterranean island - Cyprus, and the UK, France and the USA made no military response (despite the UK having significant military presence in the south of the island) - they did institute a lot of half-hearted economic sanctions.
Possibly at some point their response to the Mediterranean refugee crisis will be to invade Libya rather than just bomb it.
EU has mutual defense clause just like NATO. France is strong proponent of the clause and the only country to ever invoke it.
France is also NATO member like Turkey. But if Turkey and Greece go into war with each other, sides are taken. Greece is EU member, Turkey is not.
France is also NATO member like Turkey. But if Turkey and Greece go into war with each other, sides are taken. Greece is EU member, Turkey is not.
Greece would fall under NATO protection in this scenario (plus EU) as it's a member of NATO.
NATO is a defensive pact, so I think attacking a NATO member (even if you're a NATO member) likely results in NATO action against the aggressor.
NATO is a defensive pact, so I think attacking a NATO member (even if you're a NATO member) likely results in NATO action against the aggressor.
NATO has not rules for war between members. When NATO's Article 5 (mutual defense) is invoked, all decisions require consensus so that does not work.
When Greece-Turkey conflicts have happened in the past, NATO members have used strong diplomatic pressure. Turkey might be booted from NATO if war escalates.
France has made its choice clear. They are protecting Greece against Turkey.
(1) France challenges Turkey’s territorial and resource claims.
(2) French have conducted a joint military exercise with Greece and Cyprus as message to Turkey.
When Greece-Turkey conflicts have happened in the past, NATO members have used strong diplomatic pressure. Turkey might be booted from NATO if war escalates.
France has made its choice clear. They are protecting Greece against Turkey.
(1) France challenges Turkey’s territorial and resource claims.
(2) French have conducted a joint military exercise with Greece and Cyprus as message to Turkey.
When did France invoke the EU's mutual defense clause?
2015 after the Paris attacks.
The US is separated from Iraq by half a world, but invaded it twice.
France still has a top-10 military and maybe the most effective overseas force projection capabilities outside the US and Great Britain (maybe China, we'll see how effective their navy is, sooner or later). Not to mention a long-standing nuclear arsenal. If Europe—any of it, at least in the EU or NATO—is attacked from the East, the French will be on the front lines, and landing on beaches. Turkey, on its own or as a puppet of (probably—god, they've wanted it for like 200+ years at this point) Russia, is increasingly a realistic threat. Plus Russia itself.
Like other major European former-colonizer states, France maintains strong ties to many parts of the world and is relied on, or considers itself responsible for, security in those regions. Algeria is attacked? France will surely show up to the party. Algeria decides to take some kind of Cuba-like action against French property? France will likely be there, in a very different capacity. They have strong interest in Lebanon (threatened, potentially, by Syria and Turkey, among others) and much of West Africa, as well, where, if you follow international news, their foreign legion and special forces are often deployed and quite active.
Sidebar: They're also possibly the most experienced torturers in the West. You see them called in for it sometimes, if you read between the lines a bit. Yikes.
See also: Libya, and Italy's leadership there (for better or worse). France has similar ties to a dozen or more countries in Africa and the Levant. Warranted or not from some broader perspective, they'll tend to see intervention in conflicts there as obligatory and desirable.
France still has a top-10 military and maybe the most effective overseas force projection capabilities outside the US and Great Britain (maybe China, we'll see how effective their navy is, sooner or later). Not to mention a long-standing nuclear arsenal. If Europe—any of it, at least in the EU or NATO—is attacked from the East, the French will be on the front lines, and landing on beaches. Turkey, on its own or as a puppet of (probably—god, they've wanted it for like 200+ years at this point) Russia, is increasingly a realistic threat. Plus Russia itself.
Like other major European former-colonizer states, France maintains strong ties to many parts of the world and is relied on, or considers itself responsible for, security in those regions. Algeria is attacked? France will surely show up to the party. Algeria decides to take some kind of Cuba-like action against French property? France will likely be there, in a very different capacity. They have strong interest in Lebanon (threatened, potentially, by Syria and Turkey, among others) and much of West Africa, as well, where, if you follow international news, their foreign legion and special forces are often deployed and quite active.
Sidebar: They're also possibly the most experienced torturers in the West. You see them called in for it sometimes, if you read between the lines a bit. Yikes.
See also: Libya, and Italy's leadership there (for better or worse). France has similar ties to a dozen or more countries in Africa and the Levant. Warranted or not from some broader perspective, they'll tend to see intervention in conflicts there as obligatory and desirable.
> the French will be on the front lines, and landing on beaches.
They have never done so effectively in the past (Vietnam? Algeria? Suez?) and I don't see them doing it now or any time in the future.
They have never done so effectively in the past (Vietnam? Algeria? Suez?) and I don't see them doing it now or any time in the future.
I think it's safe to say they intend to do that, though, in the event of an outright invasion or hostile coup of one of their closely-tied states in Africa or the Levant, or an attack on Europe. Which explains the exercises.
France's military performance in WW I was outstanding. The only way to win was to take massive casualties. They incurred the massive casualties and won. Very few of the world's 193 or so countries will ever be able to summon what we might "collective national will and capacity for sacrifice" (for any purpose) to the degree France did in WW I.
(Russia and the Soviet Union have also performed outstandingly in war, but the French government treats its citizens much better much more consistently than Russia or the Soviet Union ever have.)
(Russia and the Soviet Union have also performed outstandingly in war, but the French government treats its citizens much better much more consistently than Russia or the Soviet Union ever have.)
> Vietnam? Algeria? Suez?
Vietnam and Algeria were asynchronous battlefields, and nobody seems to be able to win those. ( Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam)
Suez failed politically and internationally, and the French were forced to pull back because the British got forced by the US. Militarily it had a decent start before that.
And all of those were more than 60 years ago, so hardly applicable today.
Vietnam and Algeria were asynchronous battlefields, and nobody seems to be able to win those. ( Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam)
Suez failed politically and internationally, and the French were forced to pull back because the British got forced by the US. Militarily it had a decent start before that.
And all of those were more than 60 years ago, so hardly applicable today.
> Sidebar: They're also possibly the most experienced torturers in the West. You see them called in for it sometimes, if you read between the lines a bit. Yikes.
Can you expand on this?
Can you expand on this?
I have zero references, just that I've encountered that bit of "common knowledge" enough times among IR professors and military-connected people to take it as basically true. As any such hearsay/common-knowledge, it could be wrong. I've heard a lot of stuff like "headlines say French advisors arrived in Afghanistan, guess they needed some help with interrogations (ahem, torture)." I should have been more up-front about the quality of that statement (middling, I'd judge). The way those things are presented sometimes in e.g. Foreign Affairs sure seem to support that subtext. Strikes me as somewhat less "well it's denied officially, but nonetheless everyone knows..." than Israeli nuclear capabilities. Attempts to find any recent documentation of this are frustrated by modern search engines being terrible, and French torture in the Algerian conflict being so well-documented and infamous that results for that overwhelm everything else no matter how one tries to search past it (and Algeria would likely be mentioned in any long treatment of the topic, making it even harder to narrow in on more-recent examples). There's a definite sentiment of "the last Western government you want to come after you with black ops is France, because they'll be ripping out all your fingernails before they start asking questions, then they'll get really nasty"—sometimes stated almost exactly in those terms—that I've picked up, though. It's entirely possible this is a widespread but inaccurate notion, or even a deliberately-cultivated whisper campaign on France's part.
> If Europe—any of it, at least in the EU or NATO—is attacked from the East, the French will be on the front lines
Somebody forgot to tell Ukraine about this Gallic heroism.
Somebody forgot to tell Ukraine about this Gallic heroism.
Specifically why I added the caveat of "at least in the EU or NATO". If you don't think they'd show up to defend Poland or Greece against attack, I'd love to see your rationale.
Because the only time in last 250 years that French forces have shown up in Poland in numbers, it was to invade?
The above, combined with their inaction in the face of Russia annexing part of a European state means you're arguing for ambition contrary to history. You say things are different now, and maybe they are. Time will tell, I suppose.
I think it more likely that if Germany has her way and builds a EU army, France would take their lead in defending European nations. I'm really not trying to smear France here - I think they could be doing far more for global stability than they are, and would like to see it. But actions speak louder than words.
The above, combined with their inaction in the face of Russia annexing part of a European state means you're arguing for ambition contrary to history. You say things are different now, and maybe they are. Time will tell, I suppose.
I think it more likely that if Germany has her way and builds a EU army, France would take their lead in defending European nations. I'm really not trying to smear France here - I think they could be doing far more for global stability than they are, and would like to see it. But actions speak louder than words.
You expressed confusion about why France would claim to be preparing for war with North African or Near East states. I'm not making any claims about their effectiveness in combat, just that they probably do expect to take part in certain conflicts in those regions, should they happen. Whether they'd be useful once there, whether the conflict would last long enough for them to even show up, et c., are other matters.
Ukraine is contributing to this attitude, I expect. Western states at least want to project the image that they would, given enough pushing from Russia and others, intervene, in order to (they hope) make them think twice about further expansion. Exercises aren't just about actual preparation, but about sending messages. The intended audience may be domestic and foreign, and in this case they seem to be pretty up-front about some of the intended recipients.
More directly, I don't think it's true that there's no possible level of aggression from certain states that wouldn't draw an actual military response from France, even well into Eastern Europe, the Near East, and North/West Africa (and, in such a case, almost certainly some of France's allies would be involved as well, outside smaller conflicts in West Africa particularly). Exercises and public statements about their purpose may be designed to make potential adversaries less certain about just how far they can go without crossing that line, while also providing actual preparation should a conflict happen. They're saying (bluffing, or not) that they're preparing for exactly the kind of greater intervention you're talking about. That's why they'd hold exercises like this and make the statements they have about them.
This and my earlier posts are an explanation for why France would, very publicly, hold exercises with the stated purpose that they did. Obviously they know Turkey and North African states aren't going to invade France herself. They're not preparing for an invasion by Tunisia. They're sending a message about the regions they will defend (claim they will defend, of course—the seriousness of this posturing is untested, but the new stance seems to promote the idea that they are now more serious), and which states they want to know they're concerned about—apparently Turkey, and with Turkey, implicitly, Russia, either defending them from Russia or defending against a Russia-aligned Turkey, which relationship is seemingly going to continue being a major component of European politics indefinitely, as it has been the last couple centuries.
Ukraine is contributing to this attitude, I expect. Western states at least want to project the image that they would, given enough pushing from Russia and others, intervene, in order to (they hope) make them think twice about further expansion. Exercises aren't just about actual preparation, but about sending messages. The intended audience may be domestic and foreign, and in this case they seem to be pretty up-front about some of the intended recipients.
More directly, I don't think it's true that there's no possible level of aggression from certain states that wouldn't draw an actual military response from France, even well into Eastern Europe, the Near East, and North/West Africa (and, in such a case, almost certainly some of France's allies would be involved as well, outside smaller conflicts in West Africa particularly). Exercises and public statements about their purpose may be designed to make potential adversaries less certain about just how far they can go without crossing that line, while also providing actual preparation should a conflict happen. They're saying (bluffing, or not) that they're preparing for exactly the kind of greater intervention you're talking about. That's why they'd hold exercises like this and make the statements they have about them.
This and my earlier posts are an explanation for why France would, very publicly, hold exercises with the stated purpose that they did. Obviously they know Turkey and North African states aren't going to invade France herself. They're not preparing for an invasion by Tunisia. They're sending a message about the regions they will defend (claim they will defend, of course—the seriousness of this posturing is untested, but the new stance seems to promote the idea that they are now more serious), and which states they want to know they're concerned about—apparently Turkey, and with Turkey, implicitly, Russia, either defending them from Russia or defending against a Russia-aligned Turkey, which relationship is seemingly going to continue being a major component of European politics indefinitely, as it has been the last couple centuries.
> you expressed confusion about why France
No, I don't think that can be read into my comments.
> they probably do expect to take part
You stated they'd be on the front lines with some certainty, and I chortled. You asked why. I explained why.
Diving into why a country engages in posturing is beside the point.
No, I don't think that can be read into my comments.
> they probably do expect to take part
You stated they'd be on the front lines with some certainty, and I chortled. You asked why. I explained why.
Diving into why a country engages in posturing is beside the point.
I wonder how much of it is part of the increased NATO requirements for a putting a increased percentage of GDP into defense, pushed in part by the US wanting to lower it's international defense outlays. And, to some degree, I wonder if the strategic change is driven by more erratic and less long term stability in the US's willingness and ability to defend the EU.
What is "high-intensity war" for the French armed forces?
Jacque: "Monsieur Commander, our allocation of Sauvignon Blanc 1961 for the samedi dinner has been redirected to the front!'
Claude: "Mon Dieu! Qel sorte du monde! Order the Malbec as soon as possible. Nou sommes perdues!"
"And have you made room for the bound-and-gagged ISIS prisonnières? We want to be certain they can view our leisure dining, so as to torture and tempt them to abandon their Muslim faith for a carafe of excellent vin Francais, not to mention our excellent prostitues nicoise.
Do not forget that theese is indeed high-intensity warfare and we must bring our bunker-busters to the fore in an overwhelming move to close the gap! Oh, hon, hon, hon!
Jacque: Mais Senior Commander, the 5th Brigade of the American military, the pride of Black Fighting strength, will be attending the samedi dinner,
Claude: Nous sommes perdues! Peut-etre, peut-etre...oui, I have eet! Tell the cooks to spice the Americains' meals with saltpeter! Oh, hon, hon, hon! I am not a Commander for nothing! With nightfall the French will advance with high-intensity, while ze Americains fumble with their limp pythons! Hon, hon, hon! Commander indeed!
Jacque: "Monsieur Commander, our allocation of Sauvignon Blanc 1961 for the samedi dinner has been redirected to the front!'
Claude: "Mon Dieu! Qel sorte du monde! Order the Malbec as soon as possible. Nou sommes perdues!"
"And have you made room for the bound-and-gagged ISIS prisonnières? We want to be certain they can view our leisure dining, so as to torture and tempt them to abandon their Muslim faith for a carafe of excellent vin Francais, not to mention our excellent prostitues nicoise.
Do not forget that theese is indeed high-intensity warfare and we must bring our bunker-busters to the fore in an overwhelming move to close the gap! Oh, hon, hon, hon!
Jacque: Mais Senior Commander, the 5th Brigade of the American military, the pride of Black Fighting strength, will be attending the samedi dinner,
Claude: Nous sommes perdues! Peut-etre, peut-etre...oui, I have eet! Tell the cooks to spice the Americains' meals with saltpeter! Oh, hon, hon, hon! I am not a Commander for nothing! With nightfall the French will advance with high-intensity, while ze Americains fumble with their limp pythons! Hon, hon, hon! Commander indeed!
The context of large military operations is not necessarily new. It's about being prepared and not necessarily aggression.
>In his strategic vision for 2030 published last year, however, General Thierry Burkhard, the head of the French army, outlined the need to prepare for high-intensity, state-on-state conflict.
Flipside when the military gets a 46% boost in budget... that's politicians making it abundantly clear that this is more than operations. This is
Now place this in context.
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/france-thousa...
Anyone remember the Yellow vest protests? Ya they went away after the French government arrested them all.
>Between November 2018 and July 2019, 11,203 Yellow Vests protesters were placed in pre-charge detention.
As the link points out... France declared martial law pre-covid and has gotten significantly worse during covid.
So it makes me wonder. Is this just a continuation of martial law or escalation? Or do they expect their military will be up against other states?
>In his strategic vision for 2030 published last year, however, General Thierry Burkhard, the head of the French army, outlined the need to prepare for high-intensity, state-on-state conflict.
Flipside when the military gets a 46% boost in budget... that's politicians making it abundantly clear that this is more than operations. This is
Now place this in context.
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/france-thousa...
Anyone remember the Yellow vest protests? Ya they went away after the French government arrested them all.
>Between November 2018 and July 2019, 11,203 Yellow Vests protesters were placed in pre-charge detention.
As the link points out... France declared martial law pre-covid and has gotten significantly worse during covid.
So it makes me wonder. Is this just a continuation of martial law or escalation? Or do they expect their military will be up against other states?
> French officers tend to be more sceptical than British or American ones that technology will transform the battlefield. “Technology is never 100% effective,” warns General Burkhard. “Soldiers must always be able to fight in a degraded way…when the technology does not work any more.”
I would be interested to hear more on that from General Burkhard. Because right now - and based on my very limited understanding of the topic - this feels like the kind of statement that could look rather misinformed when looked back at in the future. This actually reminds me of the French army and French generals preparing for WW2; stuck with their existing organizational structures and mental models (that led them to victory in WW1), they discounted new warfare theories/technologies and strategies (such as: combining planes and tanks, blitzkrieg) that led them to a quick and complete defeat.
I would be interested to hear more on that from General Burkhard. Because right now - and based on my very limited understanding of the topic - this feels like the kind of statement that could look rather misinformed when looked back at in the future. This actually reminds me of the French army and French generals preparing for WW2; stuck with their existing organizational structures and mental models (that led them to victory in WW1), they discounted new warfare theories/technologies and strategies (such as: combining planes and tanks, blitzkrieg) that led them to a quick and complete defeat.
As opposed to a low-intensity war...?
Good - by preparing seriously in this way (if they go through with it) and browbeating the Germans and Dutch to do the same there is a possibility that Europe will not offer a post Putin Russia an easy out from whatever dire crisis overtakes it.
At the moment three divisions could waltz into Berlin and hold the whole project ransom, unless the yanks stopped them. The yanks can stop anything, but as the last whitehouse living person showed - the yanks can be fickle.
France must orchestrate a serious military capability in Europe for the sake of global stability, and it must do it now. The Germans must pay for this. Poles, Italians and Greeks could staff it.
At the moment three divisions could waltz into Berlin and hold the whole project ransom, unless the yanks stopped them. The yanks can stop anything, but as the last whitehouse living person showed - the yanks can be fickle.
France must orchestrate a serious military capability in Europe for the sake of global stability, and it must do it now. The Germans must pay for this. Poles, Italians and Greeks could staff it.
You're making kind of a big show of using "the yanks" - what's that about? Is that a British military thing (like how they don't refer to being "in Afghanistan" but "in Afghan")
Old term for americans: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yankee
I was just being silly, to try and get people to read.
It's a way of generating a stable income and something to do for those losing their jobs to automation.
Isn't the US military also a huge employer?
Isn't the US military also a huge employer?
It'd be cool for HN to have a [paywall] tag so I don't spend time opening these links.
Don't get me wrong, I'd bet the article is great, but I'm not interested in an Economist subscription right now.
Don't get me wrong, I'd bet the article is great, but I'm not interested in an Economist subscription right now.
Agreed
In this case, disabling JavaScript will get you through.
disabling the site visit is an alternative solution
The US led western coalition militaries are all now pivoting to peer level(Russia/China) military threats.
Russia was a great power in great decline, but still capable of great disruption(Georgia/Ukraine).
China is a great power with great momentum.
But this is not another Cold War.
During the Cold War the world was largely bifurcated into competing networks based on ideology.
Nations switching from one network to another were rare and switching costs were high.
Now in a highly integrated global economy value proposition is what matters and switching costs for nations is much lower.
Having 1 billion daily active users in the developing world on a Superplatform(Facebook/WeChat) is worth more than the 1 trillion sunk cost invested in Supercarriers(Nimitz/Ford Class).
This is not another Cold War, it is ruthless and relentless competition between competing value propositions.
Russia was a great power in great decline, but still capable of great disruption(Georgia/Ukraine).
China is a great power with great momentum.
But this is not another Cold War.
During the Cold War the world was largely bifurcated into competing networks based on ideology.
Nations switching from one network to another were rare and switching costs were high.
Now in a highly integrated global economy value proposition is what matters and switching costs for nations is much lower.
Having 1 billion daily active users in the developing world on a Superplatform(Facebook/WeChat) is worth more than the 1 trillion sunk cost invested in Supercarriers(Nimitz/Ford Class).
This is not another Cold War, it is ruthless and relentless competition between competing value propositions.
We are obviously seeing shifts in the global economy and power balance, with the US losing it's complete dominance, China becoming more confident and aggressive, countries like Turkey showing increasing aggression against the EU, and a more multi-polar balance in general.
I'd love to learn some more, but most of the books I find are too "pop-sci", have a strong "US good/China scary & evil" tint, or a too narrow focus.