Metallurgist admits faking steel test results for US Navy subs(bbc.com)
bbc.com
Metallurgist admits faking steel test results for US Navy subs
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-59186655
148 comments
> And from there it was relayed to the US Navy, which then fined the company. Which is how it should work.
US Navy should take the step further; terminate the contract and blacklist the company permanently (include the board of directors to ensure no hopping between companies to take advantage). Blacklist should be shared with federal agencies. This would be more effective for the company not to fuck around with it and cut off that "it is business as usual" mentality. The benefits of this is accountability.
US Navy should take the step further; terminate the contract and blacklist the company permanently (include the board of directors to ensure no hopping between companies to take advantage). Blacklist should be shared with federal agencies. This would be more effective for the company not to fuck around with it and cut off that "it is business as usual" mentality. The benefits of this is accountability.
reasonable if it's a systemic failure, but the company did notify the US Navy when it found out (though deflected the actual cause). sounds more like a rogue employee.
disproportionately severe penalties will have the opposite effect in future cases- as people will do more to hide faults than reporting them.
disproportionately severe penalties will have the opposite effect in future cases- as people will do more to hide faults than reporting them.
That provides a lot of incentive to bribe employees from your competitors to falsify data ... totally destroys their company and they can't even create a new company to compete!
And that in turn puts a very good incentive on companies to design systems where a single employee can't falsify the data!
This is why smart firms require employees to take vacation, and lock out computer access during that time. Many control frauds, particularly in accounting, are discovered when one employee is out and can not cover it up. Much of this would not get started if there is forced disconnect time.
I bribe TWO employees at my competitor ...
Independent validation.
It's not unheard of in manufacturing for random parts to be selected for testing to ensure compliance. In fact, I'd be surprise if this supplier could get away with the same fraud with GM or Ford. One of the side effects of having suppliers design just barely adequate parts is the need to rigorously test that those parts cut only the maximally necessary corners, and not one more.
It's not unheard of in manufacturing for random parts to be selected for testing to ensure compliance. In fact, I'd be surprise if this supplier could get away with the same fraud with GM or Ford. One of the side effects of having suppliers design just barely adequate parts is the need to rigorously test that those parts cut only the maximally necessary corners, and not one more.
Yes, this is the real solution, not over the top punishment for suppliers.
and TWO employees at your competitor can point at you for bribing if they get caught.
Which is the same as killing the company. If the executives are going to be permanently jobless and destitute, then there's a strong temptation to try to cover things up, which is the worst case scenario for the Navy.
ETA: in some ways, the Navy might have reasons to prefer this contractor in the future, because the issue seems to have been caused by a lazy rogue employee and the company seems to have strong enough ethical/internal standards that the Navy can reasonably expect issues to be brought to their attention.
ETA: in some ways, the Navy might have reasons to prefer this contractor in the future, because the issue seems to have been caused by a lazy rogue employee and the company seems to have strong enough ethical/internal standards that the Navy can reasonably expect issues to be brought to their attention.
> Which is the same as killing the company. If the executives are going to be permanently jobless and destitute, then there's a strong temptation to try to cover things up, which is the worst case scenario for the Navy.
My response might be harsh but tough shit for the company. If the company made a choice to fraud the government, then they should be accountable for their decision. The board of directors is fully responsible for every action of their company including their employees actions as the employee are in capacity and representative of the company. If the employee went rogue/lazy then it is the company due diligence to ensure that every data is verified and correct as the company is still responsible for everything.
They simply can fire the employee and could keep fudging the data. Whelps the company did it again, gee whiz. They can fire the another employee and say it is all good. This mentality is why companies are pushing the boundaries with the governments and still can blame on their employee and get away from the accountability.
My response might be harsh but tough shit for the company. If the company made a choice to fraud the government, then they should be accountable for their decision. The board of directors is fully responsible for every action of their company including their employees actions as the employee are in capacity and representative of the company. If the employee went rogue/lazy then it is the company due diligence to ensure that every data is verified and correct as the company is still responsible for everything.
They simply can fire the employee and could keep fudging the data. Whelps the company did it again, gee whiz. They can fire the another employee and say it is all good. This mentality is why companies are pushing the boundaries with the governments and still can blame on their employee and get away from the accountability.
I think the point of the post above is that if a company faces a death-or-lie scenario, they're incentivized to put as much effort as possible into covering things up. Whereas if there's some leniency, they're more incentivized to cooperate and be forward about things.
In that case drop criminal charges left and right. It's still illegal to commit treason right?
We do drop criminal charges left and right in order to bring forth information. We have whistleblower protections; we have immunity in exchange for testimony.
The world isn’t black and white.
That level of accountability is very expensive however - you might find yourself wishing for the good old days when government toilet seats only cost $600.
That level of accountability is very expensive however - you might find yourself wishing for the good old days when government toilet seats only cost $600.
> lazy rogue employee
Are we talking about the same individual? The one named in the article is "Director of Metallurgy". When you're in a position like that, you represent the company, especially for work orders.
Are we talking about the same individual? The one named in the article is "Director of Metallurgy". When you're in a position like that, you represent the company, especially for work orders.
> terminate the contract and blacklist the company permanently (include the board of directors to ensure no hopping between companies to take advantage).
Here, Bradken acquired a foundry that had been faking test results for decades before; eventually discovered it, and reported it to the Navy once they did. Giving Bradken the death penalty out of this seems absurd.
(Not all of Bradken's actions post-discovery were perfect, and it did take them several years post-acquisition before they detected the ongoing fraud-- so there was definitely a failure here, but...).
Here, Bradken acquired a foundry that had been faking test results for decades before; eventually discovered it, and reported it to the Navy once they did. Giving Bradken the death penalty out of this seems absurd.
(Not all of Bradken's actions post-discovery were perfect, and it did take them several years post-acquisition before they detected the ongoing fraud-- so there was definitely a failure here, but...).
The NYT article about this same issue (https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/08/us/metallurgist-navy-fals...) mentions that Bradken is "the Navy's leading supplier of cast, high-yield steel used for naval submarines." Without knowing the intricacies of the cast of suppliers for submarine parts, it's a safe bet that blacklisting Bradken would set back a _lot_ of naval construction projects by a significant amount. I imagine that dampens the enthusiasm within the Navy for crucifying Bradken as an example for the rest of 'em.
If I were a competing foundry, and I had seen this coming and was in a position to show up this week with detailed quotes and delivery dates for replacements for Bradken's upcoming work, that might be a huge win for me. My guess is that there's a way for another company to 'pull' the Navy out of this massive logjam, but the Navy can't easily 'push' itself out.
If you sell me a defective product, I'd expect some restitution, even if you in good faith told me the product was defective. A 10 million dollar fine is probably small compared to what the Navy will need to pay to deal with bad steel.
Had they not told the navy in good faith once they knew about the issue, the execs at the company would be facing jailtime just like the employee.
Had they not told the navy in good faith once they knew about the issue, the execs at the company would be facing jailtime just like the employee.
I'm sure that contractors have stiffed the Navy in bad faith in the past, and I'm also sure that most of the stiffing never resulted in penalties.
But, yeah, of course there's a incentive and risk landscape that executives considered when choosing whether to report or not. I'm curious about that process and also the process by which the Navy determined the fine amount. Did they take into consideration how it'd affect the company's books and levy a fine that'd amount to a slap on the wrist?
But, yeah, of course there's a incentive and risk landscape that executives considered when choosing whether to report or not. I'm curious about that process and also the process by which the Navy determined the fine amount. Did they take into consideration how it'd affect the company's books and levy a fine that'd amount to a slap on the wrist?
As someone who works in the manufacturing of steel components for marine use, the most surprising thing for me is that there's no mention of any quality-system auditor being involved. Did the auditor miss this? Is there no auditor? If so, why was their customer (the prime contractor) willing to tolerate this? Why were the company's insurers willing to tolerate it?
No doubt the metallurgist was grossly irresponsible here, but I do wonder whether they might be making a song and dance about this one aspect to distract from a whole chain of careless practice.
No doubt the metallurgist was grossly irresponsible here, but I do wonder whether they might be making a song and dance about this one aspect to distract from a whole chain of careless practice.
Depending on how records were kept, it could have been incredibly easy to falsify the records even with an auditor checking them over. The fraud went back to the 80s so I'm sure many of those records were paper-only and continued to be paper-only for many years later. There's only so much time for an auditor to pull every string. If they don't suspect fraud in the first place, they probably aren't going to find it if it's not obvious. The fraud may have been as simple as her saying she performed a test, making up results, and writing down a list of equipment used along with calibration dates. An inspector looks at the results, sees everything is in spec, looks at the equipment list and sees it's all in calibration, everything checks out but she never performed the test to begin with. Maybe she got caught because someone found that the equipment was in use for other tests at the time she said she performed them or that the equipment was used for a much shorter time than when others ran the same test. When I test something and use calibrated equipment or tools, no one is actually checking to make sure I actually used those specific items. Quality systems kind of fall apart when people straight up lie. They work well to catch mistakes or nonconformances but a straight up lie is hard to detect unless you enforce witness signatures.
The QA is extensive.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SUBSAFE
Regarding institutional incentives, it’s like this - company self-reports, is able to consider itself a victim of the person - that they were defrauded just like the Navy. They may or may not be bringing their own action against the former employee, but have every incentive to even bring something token just to get the ruling and make their victim status official. If they can be classified as a victim of the same fraud (by court, by DOJ) they can’t be held liable for the fraud. There may be some other liability the company has exposure to but this would take care of the lions share of it. Self-reporting in this framework is far better than incentivizing a cover-up. Company will likely still have an asterisk by their name insofar as contracts are concerned and have to spend a metric ton paying the audit grifters.
This happened at an aerospace company I worked for. Someone didn't read the paperwork closely and missed a critical yet very benign step in running a job. Engineer receives an angry wtf email from the customer which explained that because this detail was missed, the entire lot had to be scrapped. The engineer knew all too well the legal ramifications of lying so he directly told the customer "oops. our bad." This bypassed management causing a shit storm as there was no way to "smooth it over" once he admitted fault. Customer sued the company and they had to pay big $$$ to pay for the scrapped lot. Engineer was senior so all that happened was a chewing by the CEO.
> This offense is unique in that it was neither motivated by greed nor any desire for personal enrichment.
How... What? What was it motivated by, if not to still be able to sell material that didn't live up to the requirements of the purchaser? Why would you sell something you know is not what you say it is, if you're not motivated by selling just that thing?
How... What? What was it motivated by, if not to still be able to sell material that didn't live up to the requirements of the purchaser? Why would you sell something you know is not what you say it is, if you're not motivated by selling just that thing?
"she thought it was "stupid" that the Navy required the tests to be conducted at -100F (-70C)"
I'd be curious to know what that requirement is for too, though I'd likely not just ignore it.
I'd be curious to know what that requirement is for too, though I'd likely not just ignore it.
There are plenty of things to control for when designing and producing steel. An important consideration for some applications is the brittle to ductile transition temperature. Some steels have a DBTT around 0°C, which means that they loose most of their impact resistance below that temp. By adjusting the chemistry, processing methods, and post-processing methods, you can adjust the DBTT of steel down below -70°C. My guess is that they were being paid to supply steel with a DBTT below -70°C, and that the contract included proof testing. The standard testing method would be a Charpy impact test at various temperatures. It sounds like they were making complex castings, so they probably had some non-standard testing requirements.
More info:
https://www.punchlistzero.com/dbtt-ductile-brittle-transitio...
https://knifesteelnerds.com/2018/12/21/why-cold-steel-is-bri...
More info:
https://www.punchlistzero.com/dbtt-ductile-brittle-transitio...
https://knifesteelnerds.com/2018/12/21/why-cold-steel-is-bri...
So sounds like designing for surface collisions (other vessels, icebergs) in a very cold area maybe?
The Navy is understandably cagey about how they surface through ice-sheets, but this Smarter Every Day video is the best summary I have seen. https://youtu.be/XFJnWp1tAdU
Basically, some part of the sub needs to be strong enough to reliably break ice at sub-zero temps. The rest needs to maintain its strength at those temps.
Basically, some part of the sub needs to be strong enough to reliably break ice at sub-zero temps. The rest needs to maintain its strength at those temps.
Yes, U.S. Navy nuclear submarines go under the polar ice caps somewhat frequently -- as did Soviet (and do Russian) nuclear submarines as well. It's a good place to hide from prying eyes, as not only can ships not (easily) follow you there, but the sound produced by all the ice moving and grinding makes passive sonar quite ineffective.
The YouTube channel Smarter Every Day recently had a video series on a nuclear submarine under the arctic ice.
The YouTube channel Smarter Every Day recently had a video series on a nuclear submarine under the arctic ice.
Presumably it makes you invisible to any magnetic anomaly detection via the air or satellites as well.
Its interesting, but poor quality steel with sulphur contamination is one of the theories behind the failures of the titanic.
>Metallurgical and mechanical analyses were performed on steel and rivet samples recovered from the wreck of the RMS Titanic. It was found that the steel possessed a ductile-to-brittle transition temperature that was very high with respect to the service temperature, making the material brittle at ice-water temperatures. This has been attributed to both chemical and microstructural factors. It has also been found that the wrought iron rivets used in the construction of Titanic contained an elevated amount of incorporated slag, and that the orientation of the slag within the rivets may hold an explanation for how the ship accumulated damage during its encounter with the iceberg.
Source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-C13-17a17f71ae2f9...
>Metallurgical and mechanical analyses were performed on steel and rivet samples recovered from the wreck of the RMS Titanic. It was found that the steel possessed a ductile-to-brittle transition temperature that was very high with respect to the service temperature, making the material brittle at ice-water temperatures. This has been attributed to both chemical and microstructural factors. It has also been found that the wrought iron rivets used in the construction of Titanic contained an elevated amount of incorporated slag, and that the orientation of the slag within the rivets may hold an explanation for how the ship accumulated damage during its encounter with the iceberg.
Source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-C13-17a17f71ae2f9...
Yeah, even a small % of sulfur can shave off 50% or more of your strength. A small amount of phosphorus (<1%) can raise the DBTT above 0°C. The average ocean temp at 200m is 4°C, so you could understand why the steel chemistry is important in subs. Luckily, these can be tested for non-destructively.
South pole mean winter low is -76F but -128F has been recorded. While the water isn't going to get that temperature, subs need to surface periodically. I bet they've looked at the probability of needing the ability to operate in extreme cold, and -100F is the compromise.
I used to design and build scientific equipment for the South Pole. We had to do all our own materials testing because manufacturers would only specify their products to the bottom of the MILSPEC temperature range and the South Pole goes below that.
I remember one spool of cabling in particular - it was beautiful stuff, highly flexible, high current carrying, just what we needed. It stayed awesome right to the bottom of the milspec temperature range, at which point the exterior sheathing went through some kind of phase transition and froze solid, followed by the interior insulation having a different coefficient of thermal expansion than the exterior sheathing resulting in the whole thing shattering itself into pieces just a few degrees below military operating temperatures.
I remember one spool of cabling in particular - it was beautiful stuff, highly flexible, high current carrying, just what we needed. It stayed awesome right to the bottom of the milspec temperature range, at which point the exterior sheathing went through some kind of phase transition and froze solid, followed by the interior insulation having a different coefficient of thermal expansion than the exterior sheathing resulting in the whole thing shattering itself into pieces just a few degrees below military operating temperatures.
That is a beautiful story of true engineering.
A submarine cannot surface at the south pole.
Yet. Give it time. Though, i believe they just meant the waters surrounding Antarctica.
Yet? There's land underneath the ice at the south pole.
I believe yet refers to https://www.sciencealert.com/scientists-think-earth-s-next-s...
I had assumed the tests were related to pressure and depth, where the temp isn't much off of 0C. Not an area of expertise for me though.
Likely it has to do with the scaling of the actual property being measured. For example with decreasing temperature, steels become less and less able to resist impact damage. Thus getting hit by something small at cryogenic temperatures is equivalent to being hit by something big at normal temperatures; so if you want to test whether a submarine can survive an impact that would be impractical to simulate in a lab, you could instead cool your test sample down a lot and test it with a smaller, cheaper device.
My knowledge of shipbuilding is limited but I believe the navy suffered quite a bit during WW2 from certain steels undergoing a transition in the low temperatures of the north atlantic that caused brittle fracture. I would imagine testing at ultra low temperatures accelerates the rate at which such brittle fractures can be detected.
My knowledge of shipbuilding is limited but I believe the navy suffered quite a bit during WW2 from certain steels undergoing a transition in the low temperatures of the north atlantic that caused brittle fracture. I would imagine testing at ultra low temperatures accelerates the rate at which such brittle fractures can be detected.
Brittle fracture toughness for carbon steels (resistance to cracking) gets really bad below about -20 °F. The colder you get, the more things you have to do to keep that toughness up, or else steel will crack like cast iron instead of bending and stretching like it's supposed to.
I come from the pressure vessel industry where impact testing is routinely required at temperatures below -20°F, sometimes at -320 °F for cryogenic applications.
Fracture mechanics and low temperature behavior of steels is a relatively "new" field in engineering, only emerging sometime in the last 80 years, so I can see why the metallurgist may not have known too much about it. Widespread study was kicked off in the US with the Liberty ship disasters:
https://metallurgyandmaterials.wordpress.com/2015/12/25/libe...
If you want to know more about stuff like that, ask away; it was far and away the most interesting part of my mechanical engineering education and career before I switched over to tech :)
I come from the pressure vessel industry where impact testing is routinely required at temperatures below -20°F, sometimes at -320 °F for cryogenic applications.
Fracture mechanics and low temperature behavior of steels is a relatively "new" field in engineering, only emerging sometime in the last 80 years, so I can see why the metallurgist may not have known too much about it. Widespread study was kicked off in the US with the Liberty ship disasters:
https://metallurgyandmaterials.wordpress.com/2015/12/25/libe...
If you want to know more about stuff like that, ask away; it was far and away the most interesting part of my mechanical engineering education and career before I switched over to tech :)
Which is sort of the same thing. "I don't want to run this expensive or complicated test because it's stupid" is certainly a kind of cost cutting.
Maybe, but not necessarily. I bet many of us paper over requirements we think don't add value, where we can get away with it. Solely because we think it adds no value.
While both might be illegal, there's a massive difference between papering over a requirement for a business application and papering over a requirement for a mechanical specification.
The former might cost a customer money; the latter puts lives at risk.
The former might cost a customer money; the latter puts lives at risk.
>the latter puts lives at risk
Maybe. There are certainly past cases of the military creating unreasonable/unhelpful specifications.
Edit: Not justification for what she did. Just curiosity, having spent a fair amount of time in the military.
Maybe. There are certainly past cases of the military creating unreasonable/unhelpful specifications.
Edit: Not justification for what she did. Just curiosity, having spent a fair amount of time in the military.
It is not the job of an individual to simply just ignore a spec instead of bringing up a complaint.
Yes, I'm not justifying what she did. I am, however, curious if the requirement was "stupid" or not.
There is always a chance it is, however without some deep knowledge on the reasons for the spec, its impossible to say why a spec exists in the first place.
Many of these large scale engineering specs are "take the worst possible situation you can ever think of and design it so that it can survive 1.3x of that". Yes it sounds stupid to the layman, but this is how you make shit that survives everything you toss at it.
Ignoring "dumb specifications" is the reason why SpaceX lost a payload. They used non aeronautical grade metal, which did not conform to the requirements for spaceflight, causing a mission failure.
Many of these large scale engineering specs are "take the worst possible situation you can ever think of and design it so that it can survive 1.3x of that". Yes it sounds stupid to the layman, but this is how you make shit that survives everything you toss at it.
Ignoring "dumb specifications" is the reason why SpaceX lost a payload. They used non aeronautical grade metal, which did not conform to the requirements for spaceflight, causing a mission failure.
Anyone who would paper over requirements that involve lives is a terrible engineer and should be blacklisted from anything resembling engineering.
It probably significantly improved her return on brain damage.
According to other coverage it was not a failure to run the tests, it was changing failed grades to passes.
https://www.wavy.com/news/military/navy/metallurgist-faked-s...
https://www.wavy.com/news/military/navy/metallurgist-faked-s...
It would be interesting to know how cold the ballast tanks (and connected pipes) gets when the compressed air get released. Air going from high pressure to low can quickly drop the temperature, especially if its already at a fairly low point to start with.
I don't know about how cold deep artic waters may be (I doubt that much), but strength-stress curves are likely why. The easiest way to make something last long and not have unexpected accidents is to overrate it big time - such that any wear would need to become blatant.
To take an ergonomically silly exampke shovel handle could be a three inch diameter of solid steel that can take five metric tons per square centimeter as pressure without bending. If it wears out enough that it could snap by human body weight it would have to be worn quite a bit.
To take an ergonomically silly exampke shovel handle could be a three inch diameter of solid steel that can take five metric tons per square centimeter as pressure without bending. If it wears out enough that it could snap by human body weight it would have to be worn quite a bit.
Salt water won't go much below zero. At oceanic salinity levels I doubt there's any place with liquid water below -2C.
Submarines don't stay all the time under water.
They're designed to spend as much time under water as possible (i.e., months, basically). That's the whole reason for nuclear power on submarines.
The official requirement of the US Navy seems to disagree and I tend to trust they know better than us what they design their gadgets for. The metallurgist also thought they knew better, because they're operating submarines for their lives... oh wait.
We have no knowledge of what those castings were used for. It's impossible to judge whether the requirement for these parts was excessive/copy-pasted, or not, and if it was, then by how much.
Okay I think I understand now where you're coming from and it was answered somewhere else in this discussion: when we receive a weird requirement we can ask for confirmation and clarifications and even express disagreement, but we will implement it after all that. Anything else would be at least disingenuous, if not worse.
I'm curious what the requirement was for, and why she thought it was stupid. Nothing justifies how she just skipped it, but it is interesting that she did, and how long it went undiscovered.
IT is entirely possible the requirement was stupid, over-specified, and irrelevant, but that is beside the point.
It sounds like it was motivated by laziness.
I've operated environmental testing chambers for automotive customers. It's comparatively quick and easy to do the +85C high-temperature testing, but it takes a long time and/or an expensive, oversized refrigeration unit for a chamber and the parts in it to reach the target -40C/F low temperature. -70C/-100F would probably take a very, very long time.
Even in the brutally suspicious automotive industry, it's common to have an operator manually copy the chamber temperature or thermocouple reading to the test report. Especially if you believed that the test requirement was excessive, there would certainly be a temptation to lie and say that the temperature had reached the target.
I wonder how the lie got discovered. Did her successor notice that they were less productive than she had been, because the chamber was slower than what she claimed it could do? Was the chamber incapable of reaching the target temperatures? Did the measured test results come out different?
Even in the brutally suspicious automotive industry, it's common to have an operator manually copy the chamber temperature or thermocouple reading to the test report. Especially if you believed that the test requirement was excessive, there would certainly be a temptation to lie and say that the temperature had reached the target.
I wonder how the lie got discovered. Did her successor notice that they were less productive than she had been, because the chamber was slower than what she claimed it could do? Was the chamber incapable of reaching the target temperatures? Did the measured test results come out different?
Other coverage says the tests were run, but fails were reported as passes.
https://www.wavy.com/news/military/navy/metallurgist-faked-s...
https://www.wavy.com/news/military/navy/metallurgist-faked-s...
Sloth perhaps and seeking the path of least resistance? If they receive no sales commission just check the box and get it done and them out.
If it was a random employee, then I'd agree with you that it would be possible. But she is/was the director of metallurgy at the foundry, so hard to remove her from any responsibility.
sometimes people are just lazy
Then you would just say "No, I won't do that, we can't offer you this service/product" instead of "Yes, I will do that, pay us and we make it happen", and then don't do it.
Indeed, it's a very silly statement. As if the specific requirement was not meant to be taken literally but the metallurgist should abide to it anyways.
The metallurgist just wanted to save some $$$ by selling rejected/out-of-specs products.
The metallurgist just wanted to save some $$$ by selling rejected/out-of-specs products.
That's a giant leap in logic. She wouldn't even save money, the company would. I doubt this was the only test they did on the steel. It might have been that from her perspective she got the same steel over and over again, and just didn't do the work, because she was lazy.
I still can't wrap my head around there being only one individual involved here and this playing out over decades. Surely there was more than one person working to test and verify here, and an auditor involved somewhere. Then, once discovered something seemingly so impactful yields a paltry fine? Feels like there's a chunk missing from this story.
Speculation warning.
I would imagine a higher up got very angry every time a batch failed.
After awhile you learn to just keep your head down. Many people don’t feel safe enough to push back. Or they stop questioning after awhile.
Maybe someone was failing batches, and they kept getting replaced until the batches “improved”
At any rate. This is what audits are for.
Did this person never take a vacation, where someone else would come in and see issues? Banks force people to take a month off to force they issued out in the open
I would imagine a higher up got very angry every time a batch failed.
After awhile you learn to just keep your head down. Many people don’t feel safe enough to push back. Or they stop questioning after awhile.
Maybe someone was failing batches, and they kept getting replaced until the batches “improved”
At any rate. This is what audits are for.
Did this person never take a vacation, where someone else would come in and see issues? Banks force people to take a month off to force they issued out in the open
I've seen this happen first hand, albeit with far lower stakes.
I was a wire puller in a factory that refurbished subway cars. High voltage cables cannot have any breaks in insulation because they're carrying a huge amount of power and you could get shorts and fires.
Our supplier frequently shipped damaged cables. Our manager tried working with them to change their packing and shipping method to prevent this, but it still kept happening and it would cause serious delays on the line.
Our manager was under serious pressure from the top staff to straighten this out and would get livid if a new batch of cables came in damaged, often blaming us for improper handling.
Eventually employees learned to "fix" cables coming in with heat shrink and electrical tape to keep manager happy. This was dangerous and when eventually discovered by quality assurance it became a big issue. Manager was moved somewhere else.
I was a wire puller in a factory that refurbished subway cars. High voltage cables cannot have any breaks in insulation because they're carrying a huge amount of power and you could get shorts and fires.
Our supplier frequently shipped damaged cables. Our manager tried working with them to change their packing and shipping method to prevent this, but it still kept happening and it would cause serious delays on the line.
Our manager was under serious pressure from the top staff to straighten this out and would get livid if a new batch of cables came in damaged, often blaming us for improper handling.
Eventually employees learned to "fix" cables coming in with heat shrink and electrical tape to keep manager happy. This was dangerous and when eventually discovered by quality assurance it became a big issue. Manager was moved somewhere else.
> I would imagine a higher up got very angry every time a batch failed.
> After awhile you learn to just keep your head down. Many people don’t feel safe enough to push back. Or they stop questioning after awhile.
Worked at a foundry where a metal lab tech was caught fudging the numbers for this exact reason.
The floor manager would get angry at the tech for telling him the "wrong" mix of alloying elements to put in the melt after the main charge was molten.
In reality, the manager should have been mad at the suppliers sending him shoddy alloying elements of wildly varying quality. Or he should have been mad at the metallurgist for not putting in the correct info w.r.t. the quality of the alloying elements.
> After awhile you learn to just keep your head down. Many people don’t feel safe enough to push back. Or they stop questioning after awhile.
Worked at a foundry where a metal lab tech was caught fudging the numbers for this exact reason.
The floor manager would get angry at the tech for telling him the "wrong" mix of alloying elements to put in the melt after the main charge was molten.
In reality, the manager should have been mad at the suppliers sending him shoddy alloying elements of wildly varying quality. Or he should have been mad at the metallurgist for not putting in the correct info w.r.t. the quality of the alloying elements.
Last time I worked I the banking sector, the requirement was not a month, but just a week. It just had to be a contiguous week and not stacked on a banking holiday, or if it was you just needed an extra day. For example if this was going to me my week. I’d have to take Monday off since Thursday is a holiday.
All it takes is an auditor that can't see the minute discrepancies and on it goes for years.
Has anyone here worked in a big bureaucratic organization where you have to approve stuff? I get this every day, sometimes I have to "check" a list of 15,000 users to make sure they are correct then sign off. How many times have you given a big document to sign without reading most of it. We wont even talk about online "accept conditions" on sites.
I am working a big financial sector consulting job right now where disaster recovery tools managers have to check if primary servers really do have recovery servers ready to spring up and mount network storage and firewall rules.
It is an absolute cf because the current system is a bowl of manually verified spreadsheet spaghetti that exists mostly in two guys' heads. We are currently discovering that no one knows how many servers don't actually have recovery backups ready because the buck has been passed so often and so many people have come and gone.
So I totally believe some employee as the single point of buck-passing would absolutely rubber stamp metallurgical tests just to avoid jamming up the system.
It is an absolute cf because the current system is a bowl of manually verified spreadsheet spaghetti that exists mostly in two guys' heads. We are currently discovering that no one knows how many servers don't actually have recovery backups ready because the buck has been passed so often and so many people have come and gone.
So I totally believe some employee as the single point of buck-passing would absolutely rubber stamp metallurgical tests just to avoid jamming up the system.
Sounds like you should do your job properly CeeCee. But it isn't really comparable to sign off on the material that will incase hundreds of men under the sea.
Nah, because in the circumstances zz865 describes, taking the time to do the work right would get people mad at you. They don't actually want the work done. They want someone to say that the work was done so that blame won't fall on the higher-ups.
No, as someone who actually produces parts under DOD contracts, they really DO want the work done. Corrolary to Gen. Patton's statement, they are not in the business of getting our sailors to give their lives for our country, they are in the business of getting the enemy sailors to give their lives for their country.
I can also say that there are a range of engineering specs, and some are absolutely critical and some are just specified out of habit. It IS our job to communicate with the customer (whether DOD or prime contractor) and determine which is which, and charge appropriately.
I.e., if there is some spec that will cost a lot to build into the component and there is a more efficient or cost-effective way to get sufficiently similar results, then we should (and do) propose that change, and if they say "OK", get it in writing, and if they say "nope, we really need that feature as spec'd", then charge properly for it and make damn sure it is done and documented. Plus, get all the exchanges in writing, it doesn't always have to be formal proposals & change orders, often just email is fine.
I'd say that the vast majority of the time when something creates a production problem, or some subcomponent, coating, etc. is unavailable (like one time a handful of component X was now out of production and the new minimum order quantity was like 20K parts, so a line item that should have been maybe $50 would now be $25K+), a quick discussion will usually resolve issue, such as "yes, it's ok to increase the radius there", "yes that other component/coating is an acceptable substitute" or "what do you recommend as a substitute?". But there are those times where the answer is "we really need it with those crazy tolerances to mate to this other component".
So, yes, unless you have some direct evidence of the CYA behavior you describe, I'd strongly recommend against treating it as you suggest.
I can also say that there are a range of engineering specs, and some are absolutely critical and some are just specified out of habit. It IS our job to communicate with the customer (whether DOD or prime contractor) and determine which is which, and charge appropriately.
I.e., if there is some spec that will cost a lot to build into the component and there is a more efficient or cost-effective way to get sufficiently similar results, then we should (and do) propose that change, and if they say "OK", get it in writing, and if they say "nope, we really need that feature as spec'd", then charge properly for it and make damn sure it is done and documented. Plus, get all the exchanges in writing, it doesn't always have to be formal proposals & change orders, often just email is fine.
I'd say that the vast majority of the time when something creates a production problem, or some subcomponent, coating, etc. is unavailable (like one time a handful of component X was now out of production and the new minimum order quantity was like 20K parts, so a line item that should have been maybe $50 would now be $25K+), a quick discussion will usually resolve issue, such as "yes, it's ok to increase the radius there", "yes that other component/coating is an acceptable substitute" or "what do you recommend as a substitute?". But there are those times where the answer is "we really need it with those crazy tolerances to mate to this other component".
So, yes, unless you have some direct evidence of the CYA behavior you describe, I'd strongly recommend against treating it as you suggest.
Just to be clear, I was talking specifically about "the circumstances zz865 describes", meaning generic large bureaucratic organizations. I meant that as distinguishing it from the circumstances of the original article, but I should have been more clear. I entirely believe there are situations like you describe where the checks are both necessary and properly funded.
Yes, tho for the metal they really needed the test, IDK about the bureaucracy "check these 15K users".
On that indefinite user list, but without knowing for sure the purpose of the checks, I'd strongly avoid putting my name on that document. Are we just checking that the approximate totals seem to match the org size, or are we after specific checks for hostile fake or obsolete accounts? I sure don't want my sig on the document stating that I made checks X, Y, & Z for fake/obsolete accts when I hadn't, and we get hacked next week.
I.e., if it is 'just bureaucracy' and they don't actually care about the result, then likely someone is trying to get your neck in the noose when the sht hits the proverbial fan.
On that indefinite user list, but without knowing for sure the purpose of the checks, I'd strongly avoid putting my name on that document. Are we just checking that the approximate totals seem to match the org size, or are we after specific checks for hostile fake or obsolete accounts? I sure don't want my sig on the document stating that I made checks X, Y, & Z for fake/obsolete accts when I hadn't, and we get hacked next week.
I.e., if it is 'just bureaucracy' and they don't actually care about the result, then likely someone is trying to get your neck in the noose when the sht hits the proverbial fan.
The DOD cares but that doesn’t mean the specific bureaucracy being mentioned (which may be at the company) really cares, besides not getting in trouble. Once you start crossing these different organizational boundaries, incentives get complicated.
Just to be clear, that "not getting into trouble" part rolls downhill.
That's why they want to get your sig on documents, get "Certificates of Compliance", etc.
And yes, that part is largely BS, until the sht hits the fan. What counts here is indeed ensuring that the subset of specs that the one-level-up contractor really cares about are truly met, and sorting out (in writing) what you can relax about because it was just cut/paste or generic/SOP specs on that particular feature.
That's why they want to get your sig on documents, get "Certificates of Compliance", etc.
And yes, that part is largely BS, until the sht hits the fan. What counts here is indeed ensuring that the subset of specs that the one-level-up contractor really cares about are truly met, and sorting out (in writing) what you can relax about because it was just cut/paste or generic/SOP specs on that particular feature.
I am curious how this story ended up at the BBC. The company settled for $11m over a 30 year fraud. I would be surprised if this was more than an ancillary supplier. Note the wording: they "supplied steel castings used by Navy contractors to make submarine hulls".
I haven't followed the row closely, but I wonder if this isn't a clever story placement by the French: https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/french-ambassador-accus...
I haven't followed the row closely, but I wonder if this isn't a clever story placement by the French: https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/french-ambassador-accus...
> but I wonder if this isn't a clever story placement by the French
of course - because the british press are famous for being sympathetic to the french /s
the daily mail picked it up as well - and if the comment section are to be believed this is clearly the fault of biden and 'Cackling Kamala' https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10182839/Metallurgi...
of course - because the british press are famous for being sympathetic to the french /s
the daily mail picked it up as well - and if the comment section are to be believed this is clearly the fault of biden and 'Cackling Kamala' https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10182839/Metallurgi...
The story comes from the Associated Press who wrote the article following the announcement that the metallurgist plead guilty in a court the previous day. The BBC has stories from all corners of the globe, unlike our major media who only print foreign stories if it has an American angle to it.
Maybe the ultimate "stupidity" is for someone to pass judgment on testing requirements without any real motivation or basis for doing so.
Imagine if the doctor in the prison this woman is going to decides it is "stupid" to give her decent medical care.
Imagine if the doctor in the prison this woman is going to decides it is "stupid" to give her decent medical care.
Doctors do that kind of thing all the time.
...especially prison doctors.
Doctors get sued and lose their license in some cases too.
Doctors (and nurses) get sued for tiny fraction of their blatantly wrong decisions that cause real harm. Take it from someone whose wife had a stroke at 35 and the triage nurse decided it wasn't worth her seeing a doctor or treating with TPA because they didn't bother to find out when the stroke occurred.
They write the history and it is your word against theirs.
This is an industry where insurance fraud is business as usual. They are excellent liars.
They write the history and it is your word against theirs.
This is an industry where insurance fraud is business as usual. They are excellent liars.
Does a day go by when a doctor preforms every test that may be recommended somewhere?
Or to take this in a sane direction, does a day go by when a doctor actually gives you the care and tests and advice you need rather than the CYA version?
Strawman argument. She claims exceptional circumstances. Doctor helping inmate is not exceptional by any standard
I don't see that in the linked article (maybe Reader view is hiding content?). What exceptional circumstances is she claiming?
>she thought it was "stupid" that the Navy required the tests to be conducted at -100F (-70C)
I don't see that as extraordinary (with literally ZERO knowledge of subs or arctic conditions). According to wikipedia, the lowest recorded temperature is -90.4°F / -68°C.
It seems reasonable for something being built to last generations in hostile conditions to want to be a little better than our recorded 'worst case', right?
I don't see that as extraordinary (with literally ZERO knowledge of subs or arctic conditions). According to wikipedia, the lowest recorded temperature is -90.4°F / -68°C.
It seems reasonable for something being built to last generations in hostile conditions to want to be a little better than our recorded 'worst case', right?
> According to wikipedia, the lowest recorded temperature is -90.4°F / -68°C.
According to which part exactly? https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lowest_temperature_recorded_...
Regardless I doubt the test specifications came from a Wikipedia search for "coldest weather" rather than some sort of stress event with desired error bars so refuting it with such a search seems foolish, not the test.
According to which part exactly? https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lowest_temperature_recorded_...
Regardless I doubt the test specifications came from a Wikipedia search for "coldest weather" rather than some sort of stress event with desired error bars so refuting it with such a search seems foolish, not the test.
Yeah, that doesn't sound exceptional in any way. Whether or not the Navy's spec was overly cautious wasn't her decision to make. She defrauded the government and potentially put sailors at risk.
That is an outside air temp though, where the hull isn't under pressure. Seawater wouldn't be much lower than 0C. Maybe something about contraction after surfacing?
No "exceptional circumstances" were put forth by her defense.
As someone who has been to jail, would be surprised to find any prison doctor who gives decent medical care.
Debating whether or not its stupid to do the steel test at -100F misses the point, the performance of the steel is plotable as a curve on a graph, and the cold test is one point of data that goes into the interpolation that makes that curve.
If you're assuming inputs to that equation that dont exist it has implications beyond just "how does that steel perform cold"; it means that you might actually have a quite different curve but won't know it because your data was bad to begin with.
Of course we hackers know how to avoid such obvious and silly mistakes; and make things like Zillow's home buying algorithms work perfectly...
If you're assuming inputs to that equation that dont exist it has implications beyond just "how does that steel perform cold"; it means that you might actually have a quite different curve but won't know it because your data was bad to begin with.
Of course we hackers know how to avoid such obvious and silly mistakes; and make things like Zillow's home buying algorithms work perfectly...
"Ms Thomas suggested that in some cases she gave metal positive results because she thought it was "stupid" that the Navy required the tests to be conducted at -100F (-70C)" - was she right, or was there a sound rationale for this?
>was she right, or was there a sound rationale for this?
It literally doesn't matter. You've been hired to do a job, or contracted to do a job. You decide on the front end whether it is a job you can perform or not. Not once the contract is signed.
Or, you use official channels to express your disagreement with the requirement and up the price by whatever it needs to be upped by.
You don't make arbitrary changes to expectations based on your gut feeling without telling anyone. That's called fraud at worst, and just plain dumb at best.
It literally doesn't matter. You've been hired to do a job, or contracted to do a job. You decide on the front end whether it is a job you can perform or not. Not once the contract is signed.
Or, you use official channels to express your disagreement with the requirement and up the price by whatever it needs to be upped by.
You don't make arbitrary changes to expectations based on your gut feeling without telling anyone. That's called fraud at worst, and just plain dumb at best.
I’m curious about the requirement too but I agree that it doesn’t matter. The client wants their steel tested at -100 deg F, so do it. Someone who is a Director of Metallurgy should take pride in delivering the product that was asked for, not in think they know better than the Navy.
If it results in some one death, it could be considered manslaughter.
The Navy has a mandate to operate their subs anywhere on earth. Global lowest temperatures on record are around -90C, with the lows (in [0]) outside of Antarctica still hitting -68C. Being in the ocean will mediate some of those lows, but there's still the potential for exposure to very low temperatures on the surface.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lowest_temperature_recorded_on...
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lowest_temperature_recorded_on...
In general, testing systems outside of their normal operational profile is a risk mitigator. Because that black swan event can happen.
Also, there are lives ate stake--not just reputations.
Also, there are lives ate stake--not just reputations.
It's a submarine, -70C means it's been frozen into a colder iceberg than exists on this planet.
I am curious if this is a mitigation for repeated stress cycles or an analogue of metallurgical properties in deep ocean water.
I am curious if this is a mitigation for repeated stress cycles or an analogue of metallurgical properties in deep ocean water.
... or it's sitting at the surface at a very cold place. (yes, it obviously won't completely cool down to that temperature, but is exposed to temperatures at least close to it)
My assumption is that very cold temperature conditions may be a proxy for some other set of conditions which are classified. Do cold temperatures mimic something like neutron bombardment, in a way that would be metallurgically useful?
The short version is, no, there is almost no chance that this is related to anything exposed to a relevant radiation flux.
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Steels can undergo a transition to becoming brittle when they get cold (called a “ductile-to-brittle” transition). It’s important to know what the properties would be like in this regime and -70C is enough to get there (even 0C can be enough, depending on the alloy).
The reason this person may have thought the -70C test eqs stupid is because a sub will never be working in conditions much colder than the freezing temperature of water (which is not strongly pressure dependent, btw), since the water would want to freeze - not good for the boat.
The reason this person may have thought the -70C test eqs stupid is because a sub will never be working in conditions much colder than the freezing temperature of water (which is not strongly pressure dependent, btw), since the water would want to freeze - not good for the boat.
I was talking to an engineer from Raytheon about a project and one thing came up I found interesting. When a system is developed the prototypes are built using lab conditions meaning very tight tolerances often coupled with equally ridiculous tests. This ensures the thing works reliably in any situation it might encounter and possibly beyond. Once you have a working prototype then the manufacturing design phase begins where you then look to relax the stringent lab standards. This means lower tolerances that still allow the thing to be reliable while now making it more easily manufactured at volume.
BUT That isn't always the case because of deadlines and and some parts or the entire project never move past lab spec and retain insane tolerances. So yes, sometimes tests are "stupid" but that doesn't mean you ignore them and lie because of "feelings".
In the case presented here I think the accused wasn't very forward thinking. She only thought of the sub as a purely water born ship but fact is they operate both at and below the surface. They also need to operate near the earths poles where they might surface for hours exposing the hull to temperatures damn near -100F.
BUT That isn't always the case because of deadlines and and some parts or the entire project never move past lab spec and retain insane tolerances. So yes, sometimes tests are "stupid" but that doesn't mean you ignore them and lie because of "feelings".
In the case presented here I think the accused wasn't very forward thinking. She only thought of the sub as a purely water born ship but fact is they operate both at and below the surface. They also need to operate near the earths poles where they might surface for hours exposing the hull to temperatures damn near -100F.
I have no idea if there are systems on a submarine that might experience extreme temperatures. But for the hull, since it is constantly surrounded by liquid water, I would expect that it does not regularly experience temperatures less than ~0C. Maybe there's a concern when surfacing in the arctic? That said she obviously shouldn't have faked data whether it was stupid or not.
The sound rationale for the tests to be conducted at -100F is that the Navy contracted for the tests to be conducted at -100F.
If someone, and particularly a military organization, asks that something be tested according to a certain spec, then you do it. Who's to say the steel was even actually being used for submarines?
If someone, and particularly a military organization, asks that something be tested according to a certain spec, then you do it. Who's to say the steel was even actually being used for submarines?
Having worked for a test lab, I can say that she should have just followed the test procedure.
At the same time, we don't know her qualifications other than that she is a 'metallurgist'. We do know that the Navy assessed no impact in the end. Maybe she used her knowledge of metallurgy to determine that the 'stupid' requirement was not needed, and maybe she was right. But she obviously handled it the wrong way.
At the same time, we don't know her qualifications other than that she is a 'metallurgist'. We do know that the Navy assessed no impact in the end. Maybe she used her knowledge of metallurgy to determine that the 'stupid' requirement was not needed, and maybe she was right. But she obviously handled it the wrong way.
-70C can be expected in Arctic.
Not in sea water:
> Deep ocean water has a very uniform temperature, around 0-3 °C
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_ocean_water
> Deep ocean water has a very uniform temperature, around 0-3 °C
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_ocean_water
If it's on the surface for an extended period of time, presumably upper elements of the hull could reach that temp?
Even exposed portions of the hull can be expected to not reach equilibrium with surface air. There will still be liquid water splashing around and also conduction from the warmer parts of the hull. Maybe the sail surface could get much colder but I doubt that it's subject to impact hazard under these conditions.
Possible, but that is also the time when the hull is under the least amount of stress.
So maybe they are worried about sitting on the surface of the Arctic in the dead of winter for an extended period of time and then crash diving?
So maybe they are worried about sitting on the surface of the Arctic in the dead of winter for an extended period of time and then crash diving?
Subs come to the surface though.
Would you want your unit test to not run because it thinks "there's no way this code could be broken"?
Whether it's stupid or not is not her call to make.
Whether it's stupid or not is not her call to make.
This is how we get user-facing error dialogs with the text “This error will never happen!”
Perhaps the flow of water or air nearby could lower the temperature? Maybe pressure changes? Maybe coolant systems next to or integrated into the part? Hers was not to reason why…
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Incredible they got away with this for so long!
I worked as a developer, then architect, at oil and gas tooling companies for several years, and got to know many parts of the business. Something of note here is that they took their supply chain very seriously - some of their equipment will sit subsea for decades, and failures could be catastrophic for the environment as well as in monetary terms, so you can understand why.
For suppliers involved with fabrication or testing (e.g. pressure testing, weld inspections and xrays), our logistics people would routinely physically visit the supplier to audit their records and watch the process with their own eyes.
I worked as a developer, then architect, at oil and gas tooling companies for several years, and got to know many parts of the business. Something of note here is that they took their supply chain very seriously - some of their equipment will sit subsea for decades, and failures could be catastrophic for the environment as well as in monetary terms, so you can understand why.
For suppliers involved with fabrication or testing (e.g. pressure testing, weld inspections and xrays), our logistics people would routinely physically visit the supplier to audit their records and watch the process with their own eyes.
Is it just me or is it entirely wrong to have a contractor test themselves? It just begs for failure, like Boeing certifying the 737 Max or this. The incentives are all wrong, and they know they will get away with it with minimal fines.
Military testing starts the contractor testing and progresses into development testing and operational testing. As acquisitions pass through the wickets, there is an increasing amount of oversight from the both the Services and from independent testers.
This from the article:
When confronted with the falsified results, Ms Thomas suggested that in some cases she gave metal positive results because she thought it was "stupid" that the Navy required the tests to be conducted at -100F (-70C),
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Could someone explain to me why the tests would need to be at that temperature as well. I also find it pointless as it is way below the freezing point of water and also most of the coldest parts of the world when surfaced.
When confronted with the falsified results, Ms Thomas suggested that in some cases she gave metal positive results because she thought it was "stupid" that the Navy required the tests to be conducted at -100F (-70C),
-
Could someone explain to me why the tests would need to be at that temperature as well. I also find it pointless as it is way below the freezing point of water and also most of the coldest parts of the world when surfaced.
I think back to VW and the faked diesel test results... and strongly suspect that this is yet another case of trying to pin something, that was sponsored/supported higher up in the food chain, on the low person on the totem pole.
It seems like she just skipped the test because it made her job easier. I feel like most of us have probably taken shortcuts before and justified it after the fact with "well it wasn't really necessary anyway"
I know that if I was producing materials for the government/army, I'd stay way clear of anyone willing to cheat checklists. Not only can people die, but you'll get sued to oblivion as well as the government will make an example out of you so others don't screw them in the future.
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Why would someone even do this?
It's just I'm surprised how the institutional incentives worked out: there are many places where the fraud could have been covered up. If the Navy levied a debilitating fine on the company for good faith reporting of issues, it'd create incentives for the company to lie. And the fine was $10M... is that lower than might have been done if not for the good faith reporting?