Telegram is anything but secure; even Facebook is safer, says Signal founder(phonearena.com)
phonearena.com
Telegram is anything but secure; even Facebook is safer, says Signal founder
https://www.phonearena.com/news/telegram-online-privacy-security_id137402
44 comments
Tweet thread from Signal's founder (that touches on some topics in the article) https://twitter.com/moxie/status/1474067549574688768
Of which there is a submission on HN. See my other comment. :)
Read why is Marlinspike wrong.
https://threej.in/article/Signal-founder-criticizes-Telegram...
https://threej.in/article/Signal-founder-criticizes-Telegram...
Telegram is a big no. Leaking phone numbers just by joining a group. Hong Kong police had arrested so many protesters through Telegram channels in 2019.
That was fixed years ago.
Signal is just as insecure because they can push any code they want to anyone they want to spy on.
> Signal is just as insecure because they can push any code they want to anyone they want to spy on.
What now? That's not "just as insecure", since Telegram can also "push any code they want to anyone they want to spy on," but they don't need to because your data is already plaintext on their servers.
Signal not being perfectly secure does not make it "just as insecure."
What now? That's not "just as insecure", since Telegram can also "push any code they want to anyone they want to spy on," but they don't need to because your data is already plaintext on their servers.
Signal not being perfectly secure does not make it "just as insecure."
I mean, if you were at all serious about security you'd just not use it. So it's just as insecure.
This is a bizarre take. What's considered "serious security" depends on the needs of the person and the kind of info they're transmitting.
To tell people that there is no advantage to use Signal instead of much less secure alternatives because your Area 51 security requirements aren't met is actively harmful and bad advice.
To tell people that there is no advantage to use Signal instead of much less secure alternatives because your Area 51 security requirements aren't met is actively harmful and bad advice.
LOL, "Area 51."
Whether Signal or Telegram, you rely completely on trust in the central third party for security.
The choice of whether to use Signal or Telegram should depend on which of these organizations you trust the most (their leadership, their internal employees, and their security from external infiltration), NOT based on what technology they use in the client & server.
But you simply shouldn't use either because real security is all about not having to trust anyone like that.
Whether Signal or Telegram, you rely completely on trust in the central third party for security.
The choice of whether to use Signal or Telegram should depend on which of these organizations you trust the most (their leadership, their internal employees, and their security from external infiltration), NOT based on what technology they use in the client & server.
But you simply shouldn't use either because real security is all about not having to trust anyone like that.
> you don't need to rely completely on trust in third parties because both produce reproducible open source clients (at least on android, not sure about apple) and if someone hands you at least a client that you can verify doesn't send out non-encrypted data you have some legitimate safety compared to a service that doesn't do that at all.
This is technically correct but not in a way that matters. Signal pushes everyone to depend on Google to distribute the software. Through this system, it isn't even just Signal, but also Google and anyone who breaks into Google that can inject a compromised client.
You don't know that the client on the other side isn't getting its Signal app through Google.
More importantly -- even if you DO know the client on the other side -- the WHOLE POINT of Signal is this massive network effect where you don't need to coordinate with the other side.
If we're talking about the much smaller network-within-a-network of users who installed Signal from a non-Google source -- it's no longer compelling. Why bother with it? Less error-prone to get both sides to set something else up.
This is technically correct but not in a way that matters. Signal pushes everyone to depend on Google to distribute the software. Through this system, it isn't even just Signal, but also Google and anyone who breaks into Google that can inject a compromised client.
You don't know that the client on the other side isn't getting its Signal app through Google.
More importantly -- even if you DO know the client on the other side -- the WHOLE POINT of Signal is this massive network effect where you don't need to coordinate with the other side.
If we're talking about the much smaller network-within-a-network of users who installed Signal from a non-Google source -- it's no longer compelling. Why bother with it? Less error-prone to get both sides to set something else up.
you don't need to rely completely on trust in third parties because both produce reproducible open source clients (at least on android, not sure about apple) and if someone hands you at least a client that you can verify doesn't send out non-encrypted data you have some legitimate safety compared to a service that doesn't do that at all.
And that's why technology matters, because security is not binary. Very concrete example, someone uses Facebook Messenger, the police get the hands on their phone, arrest them for some chat content. Signal cannot do that, and you can verify they cannot. That's a real use case that people in particular in countries with oppressive governments run into at this very moment.
And that's why technology matters, because security is not binary. Very concrete example, someone uses Facebook Messenger, the police get the hands on their phone, arrest them for some chat content. Signal cannot do that, and you can verify they cannot. That's a real use case that people in particular in countries with oppressive governments run into at this very moment.
> I mean, if you were at all serious about security you'd just not use it. So it's just as insecure.
That doesn't make any sense at all. Being "serious about security" doesn't mean letting the perfect be the enemy of the good (which is what you're doing).
That doesn't make any sense at all. Being "serious about security" doesn't mean letting the perfect be the enemy of the good (which is what you're doing).
It's not good though. It has these flaws I just described. You can avoid those flaws simply by using other software.
Such as?
What other software has verifiable client builds and a server that stores as little information as Signal?
What other software has verifiable client builds and a server that stores as little information as Signal?
They have reproducible builds on Android if you are that paranoid.
That doesn't help because the other end can be compromised.
If they verify their end, it does.
What software would not be vulnerable to what you’re describing?
What software would not be vulnerable to what you’re describing?
It's not about the software, it's about the distribution of the software. Signal distributes through Google as man-in-the-middle. So if you trust Google, you're OK. But if you're using Signal because you don't trust Google, it doesn't make sense.
In case you don't trust Google I really suggest OpenSSH or WireGuard, to establish a secure tunnel; and then run IRC, Jabber, SIP, or mumble (as needed) over the tunnel.
In case you don't trust Google I really suggest OpenSSH or WireGuard, to establish a secure tunnel; and then run IRC, Jabber, SIP, or mumble (as needed) over the tunnel.
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Give me Matrix protocol or death.
Does Matrix have consistent E2E yet? Or is it still leaking for some resources and features?
Senders and recipients aren’t encrypted on Matrix, are they? As I understand it, Matrix is a great chat product, but it’s not targeting the same use case.
Either that or XMPP.
I have not yet begun to IM!
Full remote code execution in signal desktop via an node context enabled and an XSS in a react application, rendering user messages with __dangerouslySetInnerHTML. A similar XSS in the webview on mobile signal allowed at the very least, compromising all of the contacts and messages of the user.
I wouldn't take anything that Signal developers/founders say about their product or others' products security seriously.
I wouldn't take anything that Signal developers/founders say about their product or others' products security seriously.
Not everything needs to be super secure. I can sit and talk with a group of friends at a cafe, and anyone can listen to us, and see that we're talking to each other. If we want to talk about something secret we can go somewhere private that's less convinient but more secure.
Same thing with messaging online. Everyday nonsense can use whatever app you want, and if there's something you really don't want anyone else knowing you can use a different solution. I think the trade-off is worth it for most people.
Same thing with messaging online. Everyday nonsense can use whatever app you want, and if there's something you really don't want anyone else knowing you can use a different solution. I think the trade-off is worth it for most people.
Sure, the objection Moxie has is people referring to Telegram as an “encrypted messenger” when the default usage is not encrypted. It means that people may download it wanting security and thinking they are covered, when in reality they aren’t because they are using a group chat.
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Of course he'd say that, having have a great many questionable decisions around Signal. Honestly I'm inclined to treat this as FUD until the same points are raised by someone with a more impartial (or at the very least, fair) expertise.
I have many comments about Telegram and how not-so-secure it is. Again, it does not have E2EE on desktop.[1] This secret chat is only for 1 on 1 conversations (IIRC), and it is not the default. I cannot comment on their E2EE because they may have changed it by now.
Telegram is fancy, it is a great replacement for WhatsApp, but it cannot replace Element, Conversations/Gajim (XMPP), Briar, Ricochet, or Wire. Please avoid Telegram for actually "secure chats".
I recommend checking out https://secushare.org/comparison. I disagree with "Telegram can be among the least worse [for smartphones]" though. It is Briar. I have also used Briar on desktop, I wonder where that will go.
[1] https://tsf.telegram.org/manuals/e2ee-simple#2-why-are-there...
Telegram is fancy, it is a great replacement for WhatsApp, but it cannot replace Element, Conversations/Gajim (XMPP), Briar, Ricochet, or Wire. Please avoid Telegram for actually "secure chats".
I recommend checking out https://secushare.org/comparison. I disagree with "Telegram can be among the least worse [for smartphones]" though. It is Briar. I have also used Briar on desktop, I wonder where that will go.
[1] https://tsf.telegram.org/manuals/e2ee-simple#2-why-are-there...
You’re right to be wary of Signal. Here, Moxie is spot on, though. Everything he’s saying is based on public information. There’s no FUD and nothing new under the sun. Telegram is spyware wrapped in clever marketing and branding.
The issue with Telegram has been brought up many times by many people. It defaults to insecure and is advertised as “encrypted messaging”. It’s a great messaging tool that offers one way to send e2ee chats, but the default is not and group chats aren’t. The comparison to Facebook messenger is apt.