Emergency bridge loan for SVB customers(brex.com)
brex.com
Emergency bridge loan for SVB customers
https://www.brex.com/svb-emergency-line
172 comments
What would happen if SVB customer themselves went bankrupt? Say some risky investment startup was banking with SVB and had $1 million with them. They can now take out a bridge loan. What if that investment startup now suffers its own liquidity crisis (or even just waste all the money) and default themselves. How is brex covered in such a case? Wouldn't they have to get in line with all the other creditors/investors?
Isn't the loan backed by the deposit at SVB? That seems like the whole point of it.
Yes some startups will go bankrupt and most of the remaining ones won't be profitable any time soon.
Surely Brex isn't counting on the profit from operations of the borrower to repay the loan, but rather that company's deposits at SVB being released at some time in the future.
Yes some startups will go bankrupt and most of the remaining ones won't be profitable any time soon.
Surely Brex isn't counting on the profit from operations of the borrower to repay the loan, but rather that company's deposits at SVB being released at some time in the future.
Most likely Brex would structure the bridge loan so that they would be a secured creditor due to having a charge(?)/lien(?) over the rights of the client's SVB deposits.
Not sure how this works out in practice, IANAL, etc.
Not sure how this works out in practice, IANAL, etc.
That's why they charge interest, they would have calculated the risk of that happening to make sure the amount they charge in interest would still net them the desired profit.
97% of deposits in SVB exceeded the FDIC threshold. The question is, by how much on average?
The amount of risk here is significant. I think this is a desperate play by a company in a struggling industry.
The amount of risk here is significant. I think this is a desperate play by a company in a struggling industry.
Brex could offer loans up to 25% of the borrower's funds stuck in SVB. As long as depositors receive at least 25 cents on the dollar, the loans would be paid back in full, and the borrower would have gotten significant working capital in the interim.
SVB's carcass still has significant assets, so Brex can set that % number based on what they know about SVB's state, to make the loans almost risk-free.
I'm not a banker and have no idea if this is actually what Brex is offering. That public page doesn't discuss terms at all, which makes sense given the chaos. But there's certainly ways to structure these loans without much risk.
SVB's carcass still has significant assets, so Brex can set that % number based on what they know about SVB's state, to make the loans almost risk-free.
I'm not a banker and have no idea if this is actually what Brex is offering. That public page doesn't discuss terms at all, which makes sense given the chaos. But there's certainly ways to structure these loans without much risk.
Loaning money to a startup in this economy is far from risk free. Companies can go bust regardless of getting a part of their cash back
Loaning money to a risky borrower can be practically risk free if the borrower provides collateral. And the deposits in SVB are an excellent example of collateral. They are illiquid, but the funds are being held by the FDIC, which is highly reliable about (eventually) paying out (some portion, not necessarily the full amount).
Just because they exceed the FDIC threshold (i.e. they're over 250K) doesn't mean there's a lot of risk - it just means there's more than zero risk and you have to do some diligence.
Those deposits are backed by the assets on the balance sheet at SVB. They went under because they ran out of liquidity, not because they're massively upside down or their assets are crap. Those assets are largely medium-duration treasuries (10Y IIRC). They will pay out face value as they mature (they are the definition of risk free), and the losses on their balance sheet being reported are marked to market. Assuming they have to sell them immediately - which they did have to in order to meet withdrawals.
Now that the bank is in the FDICs hands, those medium-term treasuries need not be sold, and other liquidity options exist to make un-insured depositors mostly or entirely whole. One such option is just selling all accounts to a big guy like JPM, the way WaMu was handled in 2008. Or the FDIC can swap the treasuries for cash and since they have no time pressure, just wait until they mature.
Those deposits are backed by the assets on the balance sheet at SVB. They went under because they ran out of liquidity, not because they're massively upside down or their assets are crap. Those assets are largely medium-duration treasuries (10Y IIRC). They will pay out face value as they mature (they are the definition of risk free), and the losses on their balance sheet being reported are marked to market. Assuming they have to sell them immediately - which they did have to in order to meet withdrawals.
Now that the bank is in the FDICs hands, those medium-term treasuries need not be sold, and other liquidity options exist to make un-insured depositors mostly or entirely whole. One such option is just selling all accounts to a big guy like JPM, the way WaMu was handled in 2008. Or the FDIC can swap the treasuries for cash and since they have no time pressure, just wait until they mature.
Yes, but the assets of the balance sheet exceed the liabilities by a reasonable percentage. The vast majority of what will be paid out won't be from the FDIC's funds, it will be from those assets.
Uh, no? Do you know how they got into this mess to begin with? They were over-exposed to US treasuries. Let's talk about that for a moment:
1) When yields go up, treasury prices fall. 2) When yields go down, treasury prices rise. 3) The only way you get the basis cost for a treasury back is if you hold to maturity.
When a bank run happens, you (if you are bank) need cash. Lots of it. If you own assets, you have to sell those assets to come up with that cash. SVB had to sell ALL of their notes for less than they bought them for. See #3.
The losses by SVB were realized well before today. This has been going on for a while now. Outside of $250,000 per account type per person, the only additional money folks will get back is whatever a bank sale comes up with, which won't be as much as most folks think, since the core assets were already sold off. If I had to make an educated guess, most startups/investors will lose more than 50% of what they started with. Remember, high interest rates. SVB will NOT be sold at a good price. This is not a market for sellers, it is a market for buyers. Again, sky high interest rates and many of the very investors that could make that sale possible had money at this bank. That means a lower sale price.
1) When yields go up, treasury prices fall. 2) When yields go down, treasury prices rise. 3) The only way you get the basis cost for a treasury back is if you hold to maturity.
When a bank run happens, you (if you are bank) need cash. Lots of it. If you own assets, you have to sell those assets to come up with that cash. SVB had to sell ALL of their notes for less than they bought them for. See #3.
The losses by SVB were realized well before today. This has been going on for a while now. Outside of $250,000 per account type per person, the only additional money folks will get back is whatever a bank sale comes up with, which won't be as much as most folks think, since the core assets were already sold off. If I had to make an educated guess, most startups/investors will lose more than 50% of what they started with. Remember, high interest rates. SVB will NOT be sold at a good price. This is not a market for sellers, it is a market for buyers. Again, sky high interest rates and many of the very investors that could make that sale possible had money at this bank. That means a lower sale price.
I agree with your assesment but the impairment in those long maturity assets were not 50% to begin with, so the realized losses couldn't be as high.
Back of the napkin, take the 10yr and 30 yr spot prices today for issues from 1-2 years ago, and that's your max haircut. I believe some are trading at 70 cents , so we are talking about 30%. And that's worst case (not all assets would have sold at that price, but better).
Remember this is highly liquid assets. Not some exotic stuff. Its a big loss, but not 50%
Brex's offer is collaterized up to 25 cents per dollar. SO, unless SVB lost huge money elsewhere, there's no way SVB lost > 75% mostly off their MBS portfolio (or other assets, for that matter).
Back of the napkin, take the 10yr and 30 yr spot prices today for issues from 1-2 years ago, and that's your max haircut. I believe some are trading at 70 cents , so we are talking about 30%. And that's worst case (not all assets would have sold at that price, but better).
Remember this is highly liquid assets. Not some exotic stuff. Its a big loss, but not 50%
Brex's offer is collaterized up to 25 cents per dollar. SO, unless SVB lost huge money elsewhere, there's no way SVB lost > 75% mostly off their MBS portfolio (or other assets, for that matter).
> Back of the napkin, take the 10yr and 30 yr spot prices today for issues from 1-2 years ago, and that's your max haircut. I believe some are trading at 70 cents , so we are talking about 30%. And that's worst case (not all assets would have sold at that price, but better).
Depends upon how much was liquidated and already went to paying out fleeing customers at 100% of deposits. The average haircut could be 30%, but late to move depositors could have it worse (this is why you participate in a run on the bank).
Depends upon how much was liquidated and already went to paying out fleeing customers at 100% of deposits. The average haircut could be 30%, but late to move depositors could have it worse (this is why you participate in a run on the bank).
> Brex's offer is collaterized up to 25 cents per dollar.
Do you know this? That's a number I (and some other posters) pulled out of a hat as a reasonable thing to do, but I don't think any of us had any sources for it?
Do you know this? That's a number I (and some other posters) pulled out of a hat as a reasonable thing to do, but I don't think any of us had any sources for it?
im sorry, im just repeating what was said. i dont know it. i misunderstood that item to be a fact
Over exposed to US treasuries? I don't think anyone has put those words together before. It's like saying they were over exposed to cash. You're saying a bank run occurred because they had a duration mismatch on US government debt where maturities were less than 1 year. I don't buy that explanation at all...
Let's say you're a bank. You have $1B in deposits. You use it to buy bonds that will be worth $1.1B in 2030. All good so far.
Then the government starts selling those bonds a lot cheaper. To buy the same bonds you have today would only cost $900k.
Even though the 2030 value of those bonds is the same, the 2023 value just plummeted. (And they will gain more per day to eventually make up the difference.)
When your customers demand their money, you have to give them 2023 dollars.
A bond that you can redeem early has the safety of cash here. A bond that you can't redeem early does not.
Then the government starts selling those bonds a lot cheaper. To buy the same bonds you have today would only cost $900k.
Even though the 2030 value of those bonds is the same, the 2023 value just plummeted. (And they will gain more per day to eventually make up the difference.)
When your customers demand their money, you have to give them 2023 dollars.
A bond that you can redeem early has the safety of cash here. A bond that you can't redeem early does not.
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There could be a bailout though. A massive fire in Silicon Valley caused by the Fed tweaking interest rates doesn’t look like a good thing, so we’ll likely see a fire brigade coming along and pouring some money in.
I really hope it's not the fed though, or any federal authorities. They shouldn't invent a new higher level of FDIC protection. They should allow losses here even if they want to do that. Just covering all of the losses which of course they could do, that's a bad precedent.
They’ve stepped in, so they should attempt to manage the thing to maximize the wealth generation long term. This is not a zero-sum game.
Treasuries can and do lose value. They are not like cash which does not lose face value.
Long term treasuries have declined 40% in value since they peaked in 2020.
https://www.google.com/finance/quote/TLT:NASDAQ
Banks hold a lot of treasuries as part of their capital requirements. So long as they intend to hold them to maturity, they don't have to mark them to market.
Banks collectively hold about $620 billion in loses in held-to-maturity securities right now since they have declined rapidly in value during the Fed's interest rate hikes.
https://www.aol.com/finance/why-silicon-valley-banks-crisis-...
If you can hold them to maturity, you're fine. If you need to sell them to raise cash (to cover other losses or during a bank run) those losses become real.
And if your startup had $10m in cash in SVB, but now you find out you're only getting back, say, $7m, that's very bad news for your business.
Long term treasuries have declined 40% in value since they peaked in 2020.
https://www.google.com/finance/quote/TLT:NASDAQ
Banks hold a lot of treasuries as part of their capital requirements. So long as they intend to hold them to maturity, they don't have to mark them to market.
Banks collectively hold about $620 billion in loses in held-to-maturity securities right now since they have declined rapidly in value during the Fed's interest rate hikes.
https://www.aol.com/finance/why-silicon-valley-banks-crisis-...
If you can hold them to maturity, you're fine. If you need to sell them to raise cash (to cover other losses or during a bank run) those losses become real.
And if your startup had $10m in cash in SVB, but now you find out you're only getting back, say, $7m, that's very bad news for your business.
> Treasuries can and do lose value. They are not like cash which does not lose face value.
> Long term treasuries have declined 40% in value since they peaked in 2020.
This is inaccurate. What you linked to (TLT) aren't bonds, these are bond funds. The way a bond ETF works is that they have a stack of bonds that track the benchmark interest rate. They periodically sell off their old bonds and buy new ones, they don't just sit on them and wait for them to mature. That means TLT's NAV goes down when interest rates go up because they're selling lower interest rate bonds, and buying higher interest rate bonds.
Treasuries cannot lose value just like cash. They are as good as cash in almost every context. You can always sit on them until they mature and you'll get the full amount plus interest. You cannot lose money this way.
Where you can lose money though is if you have to liquidate them sooner. Why would someone buy a 3% 30y treasury for $X from you when they can get a 4% 30y treasury from the source for the same price? You have to sweeten the deal by paying out the difference in rates. This is where you can lose money.
SVBs issue was a mismatch in durations. They had too many demands for money out now, and too little available now. They have plenty of money coming in the future, but that's too late.
> Long term treasuries have declined 40% in value since they peaked in 2020.
This is inaccurate. What you linked to (TLT) aren't bonds, these are bond funds. The way a bond ETF works is that they have a stack of bonds that track the benchmark interest rate. They periodically sell off their old bonds and buy new ones, they don't just sit on them and wait for them to mature. That means TLT's NAV goes down when interest rates go up because they're selling lower interest rate bonds, and buying higher interest rate bonds.
Treasuries cannot lose value just like cash. They are as good as cash in almost every context. You can always sit on them until they mature and you'll get the full amount plus interest. You cannot lose money this way.
Where you can lose money though is if you have to liquidate them sooner. Why would someone buy a 3% 30y treasury for $X from you when they can get a 4% 30y treasury from the source for the same price? You have to sweeten the deal by paying out the difference in rates. This is where you can lose money.
SVBs issue was a mismatch in durations. They had too many demands for money out now, and too little available now. They have plenty of money coming in the future, but that's too late.
A HN comment for the ages.
Reply to two basically correct statements, make a claim that's completely false, and then — and here's the genius — say a bunch of true statements that come around to support the view you're disagreeing with!
Reply to two basically correct statements, make a claim that's completely false, and then — and here's the genius — say a bunch of true statements that come around to support the view you're disagreeing with!
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> Treasuries cannot lose value just like cash. They are as good as cash in almost every context. You can always sit on them until they mature and you'll get the full amount plus interest. You cannot lose money this way.
Be careful with absolute statements like that. While it hasn't happened so far with USA treasuries, its equivalents in many countries have lost value in the past.
Be careful with absolute statements like that. While it hasn't happened so far with USA treasuries, its equivalents in many countries have lost value in the past.
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> Treasuries cannot lose value just like cash. They are as good as cash in almost every context
No free lunch. Treasuries yield more than bills because they’re less liquid.
No free lunch. Treasuries yield more than bills because they’re less liquid.
> Over exposed to US treasuries? I don't think anyone has put those words together before.
Only if your definition of risk is limited to default risk.
It looks like a lot of their holdings were in MBS and a lot of the treasuries were recently sold at losses (which necessitated raising capital, which appears to have set this whole thing off), but there is no reason this couldn't have happened if they only held treasuries anyway.
Only if your definition of risk is limited to default risk.
It looks like a lot of their holdings were in MBS and a lot of the treasuries were recently sold at losses (which necessitated raising capital, which appears to have set this whole thing off), but there is no reason this couldn't have happened if they only held treasuries anyway.
Maturities were greater than > 1 year. It's been broken down pretty nicely on twitter by some of the larger VC partners.
Assume your guesstimate of 50% is right.
If I lend you 25% of your SVB deposit secured against your SVB deposit, I should still be fine (as long as my claim comes early enough in any ensuing bankruptcy).
If I lend you 25% of your SVB deposit secured against your SVB deposit, I should still be fine (as long as my claim comes early enough in any ensuing bankruptcy).
This is materially false. The issue was with their MBS holdings in their HTM book. Treasuries are so liquid institutions never hold them like that. MBS are not.
Those assets cannot plausibly be sold for their currently stated value in the near-term. That's the whole reason SVB got into this mess...
Right but that's why loans make sense. We know the assets are good quality but it will take time to liquidate them. Companies that can't wait for that to happen will benefit from taking a loan to buy themselves time.
Yes it's a good quality but have they been marked to market recently? Mortgages at 3% aren't worth near as much as they used to be. Ditto treasuries at 1%.
If they bought them near the peak value what they can actually sell the income streams for is going to be a lot less than what they paid.
If they bought them near the peak value what they can actually sell the income streams for is going to be a lot less than what they paid.
Yeah but they will get some money for them. Plus there might be some other options. The FDIC is going to try whatever they can, and it's only been a day.
In the meantime, impacted account holders can get their IOUs and borrow money to make payroll.
In the meantime, impacted account holders can get their IOUs and borrow money to make payroll.
> the assets of the balance sheet exceed the liabilities by a reasonable percentage
Until the FDIC pores over their books, nobody can say anything sensible about what they own, what they sold, what they sent out and what is secured as collateral.
Until the FDIC pores over their books, nobody can say anything sensible about what they own, what they sold, what they sent out and what is secured as collateral.
I mean, I'm just going off the FDIC's assertion that
> As of December 31, 2022, Silicon Valley Bank had approximately $209.0 billion in total assets and about $175.4 billion in total deposits.
And I'm not trying to claim that the balance sheet necessarily entirely reflects reality
> As of December 31, 2022, Silicon Valley Bank had approximately $209.0 billion in total assets and about $175.4 billion in total deposits.
And I'm not trying to claim that the balance sheet necessarily entirely reflects reality
> as of December 31, 2022, Silicon Valley Bank had approximately $209.0 billion in total assets and about $175.4 billion in total deposits
December 31st, or even March 1st, are virtually irrelevant to a bank collapse today. Assets were sold at a deep discount, presumably some were pledged, and deposits fled.
December 31st, or even March 1st, are virtually irrelevant to a bank collapse today. Assets were sold at a deep discount, presumably some were pledged, and deposits fled.
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Word is that 50% of assets already sold by FDIC. Which will allow a large chunk of each account to be unfrozen by Wed so companies can make payroll. FDIC is not fucking around. Hat tip to them.
Balance to take 2-3 months. Will require an actual application and paperwork.
Balance to take 2-3 months. Will require an actual application and paperwork.
> Hat tip to them
Depends on the price they got for those assets.
Depends on the price they got for those assets.
Treasuries are the probably the single most liquid market on the face of the earth.
Where did you find the 50% number?
The FDIC threshold is a minimum guarantee. If they are able to negotiate assets into liquidity, they will be able to pay more than the minimum guarantee.
so it sounds like a gamble on what brex expects that actual return to be
It's a gamble not only on what's recoverable but also future lifetime value of newly acquired customers from this effort (remember, there are a bunch of ventures looking for a new bank now that their banking provider is gone). Public service meets rapidly evolving growth marketing campaign. Can't fault Brex, there is no downside to anyone except them (correction: it appears a third party is taking the credit risk per gpm, even better for Brex as they're simply facilitating the lending ops and aren't exposing themselves to the credit risk). Kudos.
> Can't fault Brex, there is no downside to anyone except them.
Not actually clear who is taking the downside
> This credit line is funded by 3rd-party capital (and not Brex directly)
Not actually clear who is taking the downside
> This credit line is funded by 3rd-party capital (and not Brex directly)
All lending is a gamble, but if they only lend 25% of what you have stored with SVB it's (approximately) a gamble that the FDIC will pay out more than 25c on the dollar. Which as lending goes is a pretty safe gamble.
Brex isn't making the gamble, they're just managing it-
> This credit line is funded by 3rd-party capital (and not Brex directly), who are working with Brex to minimize the impact of this event to the startup ecosystem.
It sounds like a bunch of VCs are gambling on the return, while also knowing it helps stabilize the system that built (and likely holds, in some way or another) their wealth.
> This credit line is funded by 3rd-party capital (and not Brex directly), who are working with Brex to minimize the impact of this event to the startup ecosystem.
It sounds like a bunch of VCs are gambling on the return, while also knowing it helps stabilize the system that built (and likely holds, in some way or another) their wealth.
The run, predominantly by VCs, is what destabilized the bank.
In a regime of rising interest rates this gives them pricing power on the loans where they were just passive depositors previously. Since SVB loans were essentially only to companies who were already customers of these VCs, you could view this move fairly cynically.
In a regime of rising interest rates this gives them pricing power on the loans where they were just passive depositors previously. Since SVB loans were essentially only to companies who were already customers of these VCs, you could view this move fairly cynically.
I believe the only ones SOL are SIVB shareholders. It's my understanding that SVB has enough to mostly cover their liabilities.
that's not true -by "mostly" do you mean 70 to 80%? losing 20% of your principal is a huge loss
> losing 20% of your principal is a huge loss
losing 20% of your cash-on-hand, where that's above $250k. For most startups, that's going to be a haircut their investors take, where the founders can say "yeah, literally none of this was our fault".
For mature, profitable businesses with recurring income, this is going to bite, but they haven't lost 20% of their customers or 20% of the amount of money they expect to get paid next month.
For startups, where the money was investment, unlikely their investors are going to blame them for this loss. It might shorten runway by up to 20% for some pre-revenue startups, by less for startups with actual revenue.
losing 20% of your cash-on-hand, where that's above $250k. For most startups, that's going to be a haircut their investors take, where the founders can say "yeah, literally none of this was our fault".
For mature, profitable businesses with recurring income, this is going to bite, but they haven't lost 20% of their customers or 20% of the amount of money they expect to get paid next month.
For startups, where the money was investment, unlikely their investors are going to blame them for this loss. It might shorten runway by up to 20% for some pre-revenue startups, by less for startups with actual revenue.
Kind of a pedantic comment
I wonder though how big the risk is. SVB is, according to the business press, in trouble because they parked a large excess of deposits over loans in low interest rate US government debt. The mark to market value of that debt has fallen as interest rates have risen, but it's not like the bottom has fallen out. The bonds still retain 90+% of their value. Note that the capital hole SVB was trying to plug when the run started was that large relative to their deposits. If Brex is loaning a fraction of verified deposits, against the money those depositors will get back once a buyer is found for SVB, there shouldn't be that much risk. It's likely that depositors will get back most of their money - I don't think you'll see a fire sale, pennies on the dollar deal here.
> 97% of deposits in SVB exceeded the FDIC threshold. The question is, by how much on average?
That's just a math problem. If you assume all deposits are at least 250K, you can get a floor for that number. If 97% of deposits exceeded threshold, then the average deposit is at least $8.3 million.
That's just a math problem. If you assume all deposits are at least 250K, you can get a floor for that number. If 97% of deposits exceeded threshold, then the average deposit is at least $8.3 million.
Is that number by account? By assets? By client? ROKU just announced they have close to have a billion in cash there. So 97 percent doesn't really indicate how many individuals are affected.
FTA:
> This credit line is funded by 3rd-party capital (and not Brex directly), who are working with Brex to minimize the impact of this event to the startup ecosystem.
> This credit line is funded by 3rd-party capital (and not Brex directly), who are working with Brex to minimize the impact of this event to the startup ecosystem.
The money hasn't gone anywhere. It will be returned, whether today or a month from now.
SVB isn’t insolvent and has more assets than deposits. The FDIC move is meant to instill stability.
it is definitely insolvent
No, it’s not. It couldn’t liquidate assets fast enough to cover a run on the bank. But assets exceed liabilities substantially. What you’ll see is a line of credit issued that props up withdrawals as assets are liquidated until the bank stabilizes and it’ll reemerge under a new charter.
https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2023/03/DFP...
California has declared it insolvent. It literally by definition is now.
California has declared it insolvent. It literally by definition is now.
No, it’s not. SBV was unable to meet its obligations and was insolvent. Then the FDIC stepped in and a part of its function will be to ensure liquidity. So it’s is therefore not insolvent. The FDIC won’t take a loss so it may become insolvent again and might have to resort to insurance to make depositors partially whole. The fact that it has a) access to sufficient credit liquidity via governmental ownership b) assets to collateralize that credit means it isn’t insolvent any more. If they had secured emergency credit lines it would be still a private institution, but functionally that’s irrelevant if you have assets of functional business relationship with SVB. Beyond an operational delay as they reopen business next week it’s functionally a no-op. This stuff isn’t cut and dry, and it’s all complex, but I think the practical outcome of this is a big nothing burger for anyone but the principals of SVB.
> No, it’s not [insolvent]
from the article op linked, in "Findings of Fact", by the Commissioner of Financial Protection and Innovation:
> the bank is now insolvent
from the article op linked, in "Findings of Fact", by the Commissioner of Financial Protection and Innovation:
> the bank is now insolvent
> SBV was unable to meet its obligations and was insolvent. Then the FDIC stepped in and a part of its function will be to ensure liquidity. So it’s is therefore not insolvent. The FDIC won’t take a loss so it may become insolvent again
This is nonsense and contradictory
The bank was insolvent. FDIC took over (due to insolvency) and has no obligation to make the bank solvent again (other than the 250k insurance limit)
This is nonsense and contradictory
The bank was insolvent. FDIC took over (due to insolvency) and has no obligation to make the bank solvent again (other than the 250k insurance limit)
Ok, so given the recent announcements by the fed, treasury, and fdic i would just point out everything I said was right.
it is insolvent. It sold assets at firesale. That wiped out SVB's entire equity!!
If SVB literally had a way to hack the time-space continuum and wait out for asset prices they own , to stabilize ("maturity") , or to pay them back in full ( a loan)...SVB would STILL likely lack enough funds to pay back their deposits.
If SVB literally had a way to hack the time-space continuum and wait out for asset prices they own , to stabilize ("maturity") , or to pay them back in full ( a loan)...SVB would STILL likely lack enough funds to pay back their deposits.
That hack of space time is called “credit,” and they can collateralize their entire liability sheet if they had a credit willing to lend them massive amounts of cash on their illiquid assets. The FDIC owns them now and has access to credit. As a business they’re fine.
The issue wasn’t the selling of assets, it was the panic that their actions took to prop up a balance sheet hole. It’s not like Enron or Lehman.
The issue wasn’t the selling of assets, it was the panic that their actions took to prop up a balance sheet hole. It’s not like Enron or Lehman.
I don't think it is even chicken or egg. I think you have it wrong here
I contend there is no private entity credit that would go near SVB because precisely they realized more losses than they had more depositors, and such credit would have never been secured at the top of the pile with the FDIC lurking nearby.
No credit facility would save a doomed bank after the realized losses. It was a matter of time.
The panic was not the cause. The panic was always going to happen. A public company would have never been able to do a firesale/equity raise without inducing a panic in the first place.
I contend there is no private entity credit that would go near SVB because precisely they realized more losses than they had more depositors, and such credit would have never been secured at the top of the pile with the FDIC lurking nearby.
No credit facility would save a doomed bank after the realized losses. It was a matter of time.
The panic was not the cause. The panic was always going to happen. A public company would have never been able to do a firesale/equity raise without inducing a panic in the first place.
That untrue. If they held the bonds to maturity they would be worth more than their face value. However due to time value of money other bonds with higher yields are in more demand making the current price lower. A private entity wouldn’t take the risk but a public one would. In fact the fed (quasi public) has been buying precisely these assets for over a decade. They actually made substantial returns by simply holding these MBS to maturity.
> the fed (quasi public) has been buying precisely these assets for over a decade
At market price, not face value.
At market price, not face value.
That’s correct, but they can also lend at net present value of the HTM value using it as collateral.
Credit doesn't help
If you need $80B before your 10Y bonds mature and borrow it today, you're paying minimum 4% interest. By the time your $80B in bonds mature you owe $118B
If you're saying it doesn't matter to FDIC because they can get "free" credit, that's equivalent to a bail out
If you need $80B before your 10Y bonds mature and borrow it today, you're paying minimum 4% interest. By the time your $80B in bonds mature you owe $118B
If you're saying it doesn't matter to FDIC because they can get "free" credit, that's equivalent to a bail out
I don’t think there’s any doubt the depositors and clients of the bank are being bailed out.
More like a 10% haircut given some of the losses they took on recent security liquidations.
>The FDIC will be returning most (or all) of the deposits in SVB
85% of accounts weren't FDIC insured
https://time.com/6262009/silicon-valley-bank-deposit-insuran...
85% of accounts weren't FDIC insured
https://time.com/6262009/silicon-valley-bank-deposit-insuran...
85% of _deposits_ weren't FDIC insured, not accounts. Every account is insured up to $250,000 by the FDIC.
I'm sorry for the people in that position but it's a distinction with a difference.
I'm sorry for the people in that position but it's a distinction with a difference.
Likely that Brex will loan you up to the max of your closing balance and 250K (the FDIC limit). Note that you need to link your account (so they can see your balance and transactions) to apply.
Right, so they aren’t guaranteed to get the money back, but SVB had large assets (likely enough to cover all deposits).
Those assets are year old long term bonds that have to be sold at a loss now (since interest rates are way up and brand new bonds pay better than these older ones).
The VCs collectively orchestrated a bank run that destroyed a bank that serviced them for 40 years, when they should have instead cooperatively organized an LTCM-style consortium bailout for it, and helped them raise capital. The selfishness and short-sightedness of VCs never ceases to impress.
> when they should have instead cooperatively organized an LTCM-style consortium bailout for it
I was on the phone with portfolio companies, friends and clients yesterday ensuring they pulled their funds to a back-up bank account. SVB was a national bank. It's not a charity, or even a local bank serving a niche community. It was a big bank, and a badly-run one at that. Nothing they do isn't done by others. I believe in my friends and their missions more than anything SVB was up to. (I'm not a VC.)
I was on the phone with portfolio companies, friends and clients yesterday ensuring they pulled their funds to a back-up bank account. SVB was a national bank. It's not a charity, or even a local bank serving a niche community. It was a big bank, and a badly-run one at that. Nothing they do isn't done by others. I believe in my friends and their missions more than anything SVB was up to. (I'm not a VC.)
> SVB was a national bank
It was more of a regional bank, specifically one servicing SV, with at most sporadic branches elsewhere, usually just one in a given state in its largest major city (e.g., one in NY: in NYC; one in D.C.; one in Colorado: in Denver). In many states they have no branches (e.g., Florida): https://www.svb.com/locations
> Nothing they do isn't done by others
Then why did so many startups and VCs bank with them?
> my friends and their missions
I would personally be hesitant to use this terminology for others, unless they're actually doing something truly impactful and impressive, like curing some horrible disease, going to Mars, or at least actually in the military on some mission.
It was more of a regional bank, specifically one servicing SV, with at most sporadic branches elsewhere, usually just one in a given state in its largest major city (e.g., one in NY: in NYC; one in D.C.; one in Colorado: in Denver). In many states they have no branches (e.g., Florida): https://www.svb.com/locations
> Nothing they do isn't done by others
Then why did so many startups and VCs bank with them?
> my friends and their missions
I would personally be hesitant to use this terminology for others, unless they're actually doing something truly impactful and impressive, like curing some horrible disease, going to Mars, or at least actually in the military on some mission.
> was more of a regional bank, specifically one servicing SV, with at most sporadic branches elsewhere
Top 20 by assets and with a branch in New York. That’s a national bank.
> why did so many startups and VCs bank with them?
They were first and did what they did well. That doesn’t make them preciously unique.
> would personally be hesitant to use this terminology for others, unless they're actually doing something truly impactful and impressive, like curing some horrible disease, going to Mars, or at least actually in the military on some mission
Over a bank?
Top 20 by assets and with a branch in New York. That’s a national bank.
> why did so many startups and VCs bank with them?
They were first and did what they did well. That doesn’t make them preciously unique.
> would personally be hesitant to use this terminology for others, unless they're actually doing something truly impactful and impressive, like curing some horrible disease, going to Mars, or at least actually in the military on some mission
Over a bank?
> Over a bank?
Over a financial contagion that could sap the liquidity and solvency of the startups these VCs have invested in, and possibly cause harm to the wider economy (which I doubt they care very much about)?
Over a financial contagion that could sap the liquidity and solvency of the startups these VCs have invested in, and possibly cause harm to the wider economy (which I doubt they care very much about)?
cyberlurker(1)
I think you massively underestimate how hard it is to coordinate under these kinds of conditions. Plenty of startups are going to be unable to make payroll, which can pierce the corporate veil in CA, it's not a situation where cooperation is the first thought.
> I think you massively underestimate how hard it is to coordinate under these kinds of conditions.
I think you're unfamiliar with the Long-Term Capital Crisis, and the speed with which it was resolved (two days: Sep 22-23). In fact, it's partly because the NY Fed and big banks acted so swiftly and responsibly, that most people have never heard of this and don't realize how close we came to a financial crisis:
>The Fed came to be concerned that if LTCM’s extensive list of counterparties tried to exit their positions at the same time, it would create a rapid and widespread sale of assets, a fire sale, which could potentially impair the economy.
>On September 22, the New York Fed invited a core group of three firms to a meeting to discuss the LTCM situation. The core group, later expanded to a fourth firm, formed three working groups to consider possible solutions, one of which came up with the idea of a consortium approach. A broader group of thirteen firms was invited to the New York Fed that evening to discuss the approach. The firms disagreed over how much each firm should contribute to a rescue package and could not commit to such an effort on such short notice (Siconolfi 1998).
>The talks on a combined rescue reconvened on the morning of September 23, but were soon halted by news that an investor group led by Warren Buffet had made an independent offer to buy out the firm's partners for $250 million and subsequently inject $3.75 billion capital into the fund (Loomis 1998). This appeared a clean solution to both the creditors and the Fed, and McDonough advised Meriwether that it was likely his best bet (Schlesinger and Schroeder 1998). By the 12:30 p.m. deadline, however, the offer was not accepted due to reported legal issues.
>With no other solution in sight, the talks resumed with more haste inside the New York Fed. The consortium ultimately came to an agreement at about 6:00 p.m. on September 23. Together, fourteen firms put up $3.625 billion in capital in exchange for 90 percent of the fund’s ownership (two firms included in the talks declined to participate).
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/ltcm-near-failu...
Coincidentally, this took place ten years before, and nearly to the day (Sep 15th), of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, which had also been especially exposed to LTCM in 1998.
I think you're unfamiliar with the Long-Term Capital Crisis, and the speed with which it was resolved (two days: Sep 22-23). In fact, it's partly because the NY Fed and big banks acted so swiftly and responsibly, that most people have never heard of this and don't realize how close we came to a financial crisis:
>The Fed came to be concerned that if LTCM’s extensive list of counterparties tried to exit their positions at the same time, it would create a rapid and widespread sale of assets, a fire sale, which could potentially impair the economy.
>On September 22, the New York Fed invited a core group of three firms to a meeting to discuss the LTCM situation. The core group, later expanded to a fourth firm, formed three working groups to consider possible solutions, one of which came up with the idea of a consortium approach. A broader group of thirteen firms was invited to the New York Fed that evening to discuss the approach. The firms disagreed over how much each firm should contribute to a rescue package and could not commit to such an effort on such short notice (Siconolfi 1998).
>The talks on a combined rescue reconvened on the morning of September 23, but were soon halted by news that an investor group led by Warren Buffet had made an independent offer to buy out the firm's partners for $250 million and subsequently inject $3.75 billion capital into the fund (Loomis 1998). This appeared a clean solution to both the creditors and the Fed, and McDonough advised Meriwether that it was likely his best bet (Schlesinger and Schroeder 1998). By the 12:30 p.m. deadline, however, the offer was not accepted due to reported legal issues.
>With no other solution in sight, the talks resumed with more haste inside the New York Fed. The consortium ultimately came to an agreement at about 6:00 p.m. on September 23. Together, fourteen firms put up $3.625 billion in capital in exchange for 90 percent of the fund’s ownership (two firms included in the talks declined to participate).
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/ltcm-near-failu...
Coincidentally, this took place ten years before, and nearly to the day (Sep 15th), of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, which had also been especially exposed to LTCM in 1998.
The winning strategy is to pretend you are committing to the group (so as to maximize the time you have) while selling as fast as you can. See also: Bill Hwang's Archegos Capital.
> The winning strategy is to pretend you are committing to the group (so as to maximize the time you have) while selling as fast as you can. See also: Bill Hwang's Archegos Capital.
No, the consortium members actually made money by slowly unwinding LTCM's trade book. It's not clear that a fire sale of LTCM's collateral by a rogue counterparty would have done the same, and at best might have just minimized their losses had LTCM completely collapsed.
No, the consortium members actually made money by slowly unwinding LTCM's trade book. It's not clear that a fire sale of LTCM's collateral by a rogue counterparty would have done the same, and at best might have just minimized their losses had LTCM completely collapsed.
4 main firms, plus 11, and many of the players located in Manhattan with the Fed making the phone calls.
Does svb have a similar client list?
Does svb have a similar client list?
If you were interviewing for a mid-level software engineering job you might suggest "that seems like a single point of failure that could result in a big failure, let's think about how we can add redundancy."
Seems like you haven't needed to think about systems design as a VC! "Yeah go to the same place as everyone else I invest in, what could possibly go wrong?!"
Seems like you haven't needed to think about systems design as a VC! "Yeah go to the same place as everyone else I invest in, what could possibly go wrong?!"
The redundancy is knowing that FDIC liquidation can handle the problem soon enough.
Do mid-level software engineers typically diversify across every single point of failure? Architectures? Programming languages? Compilers? Too much diversification itself can be a point of failure.
As long as you have a sufficiently robust insurance backup (the FDIC) choosing a robust single point of failure seems like an okay idea for business operations (it's not like it's literal life support). The people at the FDIC aren't machines; they can do what's necessary to fulfill their function in a timely manner.
Do mid-level software engineers typically diversify across every single point of failure? Architectures? Programming languages? Compilers? Too much diversification itself can be a point of failure.
As long as you have a sufficiently robust insurance backup (the FDIC) choosing a robust single point of failure seems like an okay idea for business operations (it's not like it's literal life support). The people at the FDIC aren't machines; they can do what's necessary to fulfill their function in a timely manner.
Yeah, it's like a stampede in a crowded theater - once the panic sets in everyone's fleeing for the exit and telling everyone else to go too. You could call that coordination, but it's more like once the panic starts it will carry itself out.
> Yeah, it's like a stampede in a crowded theater
It was the same situation with LTCM, with their counterparties (large banks) rushing to liquidate before LTCM became insolvent, which the Fed feared would send shockwaves through the financial system. The banks quickly, collectively agreed to do the right, responsible thing and stopped the fire selling, and injected some emergency capital into LTCM, and then gradually unwound LTCM's postions (and made money in the process).
It was the same situation with LTCM, with their counterparties (large banks) rushing to liquidate before LTCM became insolvent, which the Fed feared would send shockwaves through the financial system. The banks quickly, collectively agreed to do the right, responsible thing and stopped the fire selling, and injected some emergency capital into LTCM, and then gradually unwound LTCM's postions (and made money in the process).
Why would they want to bankrupt the banks that holds their money and makes their loans?
The entire VC model is to make investments with 10+ year time-to-profit.
The entire VC model is to make investments with 10+ year time-to-profit.
SVB is basically solvent and had a panic bank run. It should be pretty low risk to offer startups credit collateralized against their SVB deposits.
No, SVB was solvent as long as their assets didn’t have to marked to market, once there was a bank run they became insolvent. If the SVB assets are liquidated they will not cover the deposits.
That's a liquidity crisis, not insolvency. They were invested in long term maturity US treasuries! The safest asset there is (arguably)
All they had to do was freeze withdrawals for 10 years and it all would have worked out fine.
Right. But that is exactly the distinction between being illiquid and being insolvent.
> a liquidity crisis, not insolvency
Ish. On a mark-to-market basis they had insufficient reserves. That's closer to insolvency than illiquidity. The mismanaged duration is closer to illiquidity. But not of the sort a lender of last resort could save them from.
Ish. On a mark-to-market basis they had insufficient reserves. That's closer to insolvency than illiquidity. The mismanaged duration is closer to illiquidity. But not of the sort a lender of last resort could save them from.
No it isn't? Not having access to enough quickly enough is a liquidity crisis; not having enough even when it is all liquidated is insolvency.
The income from them is safe, but the value of them is not.
Same with their mortgage-backed securities.
Same with their mortgage-backed securities.
It’s more complicated than that: debt assets can be classified in a number of different ways i.e. hold-to-maturity, available-for-sale or trading.
Hold-to-maturity assets are not required to mark to market, for example.
Hold-to-maturity assets are not required to mark to market, for example.
> Hold-to-maturity assets are not required to mark to market, for example.
This is irrelevant in a scenario where every client wants to withdraw their money, because the only way SVB can fulfill that is by selling their HTM assets at the current market price, which will be at a heft discount compared to where they bought them.
This is irrelevant in a scenario where every client wants to withdraw their money, because the only way SVB can fulfill that is by selling their HTM assets at the current market price, which will be at a heft discount compared to where they bought them.
It’s relevant to whether they were insolvent or not before the run.
Why do we let banks play these sorts of shell games? If they are holding an asset worth $0.80, I don't see why we allow them to claim it is worth $1.00 because that is what they paid for it.
Let me give you a simple example.
Imagine a bank takes demand deposits and pays a variable rate of the base rate minus 1%. The bank then makes fixed rate, 30 year mortgage loans that it intends to service itself at the base rate plus 2% (portfolio loans).
Interest rates then go up.
Bang: that bank just became insolvent. Is this actually the model of the world you want?
Imagine a bank takes demand deposits and pays a variable rate of the base rate minus 1%. The bank then makes fixed rate, 30 year mortgage loans that it intends to service itself at the base rate plus 2% (portfolio loans).
Interest rates then go up.
Bang: that bank just became insolvent. Is this actually the model of the world you want?
> Bang: that bank just became insolvent. Is this actually the model of the world you want?
I'm not sure what the problem is, this model to me actually seems reasonable. The alternative is to claim that "We are solvent as long as our clients keep deposits in our bank and are happy with an interest rate lower than our competitors for 30 years".
In fact the scenario you're describing is basically what happened to SVB except the interest rates increased more.
I guess the main issue is that generally banks do take a risk by borrowing short and lending long, and hope that things work out in the end.
I'm not sure what the problem is, this model to me actually seems reasonable. The alternative is to claim that "We are solvent as long as our clients keep deposits in our bank and are happy with an interest rate lower than our competitors for 30 years".
In fact the scenario you're describing is basically what happened to SVB except the interest rates increased more.
I guess the main issue is that generally banks do take a risk by borrowing short and lending long, and hope that things work out in the end.
I would guess that this incentivizes retail and commercial banks to invest in less volatile investments with guaranteed returns, and not the stock market or other more volatile markets.
And it's not based on what they paid for it from what I gather, it's based on what the total payout will be when it matures.
And it's not based on what they paid for it from what I gather, it's based on what the total payout will be when it matures.
They were still solvent despite the mark to market losses - they just couldn't meet reserve requirements (and planned to raise money through a stock sale to that effect) after the assets were marked to market. Meeting reserve requirements is a much higher bar than simply having assets worth more than liabilities.
That is not true. They initially had some withdrawals that they hoped to raise for, then it spiraled and they had to mark-to-market a larger portion of their portfolio which made them insolvent. Right now they are insolvent (they are also illiquid, but that's a smaller issue).
Wrong. SVIB is exempt from reserve requirements since 2018 as their assets are below 250b.
What reserve requirements? The last US reserve requirements were eliminated 3 years ago.
this is a lie, I am petty sure. why are you posting this stuff
I mean we'll find out shortly enough. If they can't find a buyer for SVB, then it's likely insolvent. If they do then it's obviously solvent.
So basically you're saying you don't know or you don't have concrete evidence, but you're going to confidently make a claim anyway.
I mean both Californian and federal regulators have specifically published press releases saying that the bank is actually insolvent...
let's say you have an emergency fund of 6x your monthly earnings. Instead of holding that in cash, you put that money into US treasuries at a price of 1:1.
When yields rise, prices fall. Remember that.
Now let's say you need to access that emergency fund, and the amount you need is 90% of it. However, what you've found is that treasury prices have fallen so far, your investment is now only worth 50% of what it was before unless you hold it for another 5 years. If you don't sell now, you will be homeless. If you do sell now, you buy a bit of time and can possibly get a loan, and barring that, you will be homeless.
That is what happened to SVB.
When yields rise, prices fall. Remember that.
Now let's say you need to access that emergency fund, and the amount you need is 90% of it. However, what you've found is that treasury prices have fallen so far, your investment is now only worth 50% of what it was before unless you hold it for another 5 years. If you don't sell now, you will be homeless. If you do sell now, you buy a bit of time and can possibly get a loan, and barring that, you will be homeless.
That is what happened to SVB.
I understand how they ended up with losses, having bought long duration securities at the top. I'm saying they were still solvent despite the losses. They just weren't liquid.
Solvent relative to the maturity date on the bonds though, right?
If you need a closer date (because you need to fulfill customer cash flow requests), then solvent plus illiquid can become insolvent quickly.
If you need a closer date (because you need to fulfill customer cash flow requests), then solvent plus illiquid can become insolvent quickly.
No I think more likely than not it's outright solvent if you look at current market value of the bonds. We'll find out by Monday whether it has been acquired or not.
Solvent how? Their 80 billion of 10 year MBS's are sitting on a tremendous loss.
> As of December 31, 2022, Silicon Valley Bank had approximately $209.0 billion in total assets and about $175.4 billion in total deposits.
Per the FDIC
Per the FDIC
From what I understand, the assets were allowed to be on the books at face value, under the assumption they would be held to maturity, but they're worth significantly less on the open market.
I thought the follwoing was an interesting analysis: Aside from the fact that those assets don't seem to be valued at the current price (i.e. are marked at cost basis, not market,) much of it is already pledged as collateral.
https://twitter.com/FedGuy12/status/1634031134505066496
https://twitter.com/FedGuy12/status/1634031134505066496
They had 45 billion in withdrawals before they ran out of liquidity and were taken over by FDIC, so that analysis would appear to be incorrect, since it implied they only had 80-55 = 25 billion of liquidity available.
I think the wording in the FDIC order was that customers were "initiating 42bn of withdrawals."[0] Doesn't mean those went through (in fact many from what I heard didn't.)
Still certainly very possible that the analysis is incorrect.
[0] https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2023/03/DFP...
Still certainly very possible that the analysis is incorrect.
[0] https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2023/03/DFP...
Ah yeah you're correct good catch.
obviously nobody believed those numbers. i had 50% of my 401K in a AAA bond index fund and it lost 15% in 6 months. SVBs assets aren't even close to AAA. They are loaning money to startups, creating deposits out of those loans, and then using those deposits as collateral to issue 10X more loans. That is all perfectly cool and legal, but when all of those startups run out of runway at the same time the party stops.
[deleted]
Just hold the bond to maturity.
A $100 in 10 years is just not worth $100 today in the current interest rate environment.
But that’s not an option if you have to pay out now.
That's a liquidity crisis
Let’s say I owe $100.
If I have assets worth $110 today but they are locked up, and I have to pay back what I owe today, then I’m facing a liquidity crisis.
If I have assets worth $90 today, but $110 in a few years, and I have to pay back the money I owe in a few years, then I’m solvent and everything is good.
If I have assets worth $90 today, but $110 in a few years, and I have to pay back what I owe today then I’m insolvent.
If I have assets worth $110 today but they are locked up, and I have to pay back what I owe today, then I’m facing a liquidity crisis.
If I have assets worth $90 today, but $110 in a few years, and I have to pay back the money I owe in a few years, then I’m solvent and everything is good.
If I have assets worth $90 today, but $110 in a few years, and I have to pay back what I owe today then I’m insolvent.
It's insolvency if the current market value (not the hold to maturity value) of the assets is less than the liability. As far as I can tell though, SVB was solvent despite its losses, and just needed to raise money to cover reserve requirements after it realized the losses. What did it under was a lack of liquidity after everyone panicked and did a run on the bank, with 45 billion (out of ~175 billion in deposits) in withdrawals overnight.
There's no reserve requirements
It started as a liquidity crisis (do they had to start selling or raise capital), it turned into a solvency crisis (they had to sell even more therefore marking assets as available for sale which made them marked to market).
Right now SVB, if fully liquidated, cannot repay all of the deposits.
Right now SVB, if fully liquidated, cannot repay all of the deposits.
People aren't waiting ten years for their money.
I’m inclined to say they will if it guarantees they get it back.
But a dollar in 10 years is worth less than a dollar today. In either case the result is the same: you take a haircut on the present value of your deposits.
No but $1 in ten years will be worth more than $0.50 today.
Specifically, it's worth about $0.65 today.
I wonder if Brex ACTUALLY has 3rd party capital lined up to fund these loans yet. It seems just as likely to me that they're getting out early with this message to drive account sign ups, while betting that they can piece together a lending partner on the backend over the next week.
Startup ecosystem is safe. VCs are very motivated to put everybody in the same basket here - small depositors, startups, themselves...
FDIC is VERY efficient. Most probably, the bank will be open on Monday morning, albeit with another owner, and most small depositors and startups wouldn't even notice if it's not for all these 'breaking news'.
The guys that are on the hook here, and their exact job is to manage money, are the VCs. They will most probably loose a relatively small percentage of money (say 10%).
FDIC is VERY efficient. Most probably, the bank will be open on Monday morning, albeit with another owner, and most small depositors and startups wouldn't even notice if it's not for all these 'breaking news'.
The guys that are on the hook here, and their exact job is to manage money, are the VCs. They will most probably loose a relatively small percentage of money (say 10%).
Props for moving fast.
This reminds me of how scammers swap lists of people who have previously fallen for their tactics, then phone them up and get them all over again…
I'm surprised that Stripe Capital hasn't extended a similar offer for customers of SVB.
where do you think Stripe Capital banks
They threw all their Atlas customers into SVB, according to Atlas customers
They threw all their Atlas customers into SVB, according to Atlas customers
I think they bank with Celtic Bank. I think this because it says on the Stripe Capital product page on the bottom: https://stripe.com/capital/platforms
> Loans are issued by Celtic Bank, a Utah-Chartered Industrial Bank Member FDIC. All loans subject to credit approval.
> Loans are issued by Celtic Bank, a Utah-Chartered Industrial Bank Member FDIC. All loans subject to credit approval.
The issuing bank for loans isn't necessarily where the company keeps the majority of their assets.
OP's claim was that Stripe Capital's loan underwriter was SVB, hence why they weren't extending loans to SVB affected customers.
Stripe itself was, and probably still is, using Wells Fargo for US corporate accounting, per https://qr.ae/pvERsZ
Stripe itself was, and probably still is, using Wells Fargo for US corporate accounting, per https://qr.ae/pvERsZ
Stripe is still saying they are extending loans via Capital with no change to recent terms they've been offering. Confirmed with our account manager this afternoon, just in case.
Exactly. Before they were all hyping about their valuation and now there are so awfully quiet. Perhaps that is why?
If a victim of SVB tries to use HN as Stripe customer support and asks if they are exposed, will they respond and admit that their business capital funds in Atlas is lost?
> They threw all their Atlas customers into SVB, according to Atlas customers
And removed all mentions about SVB in Atlas. Stripe has been very quiet about their own involvement in SVB for their entire business.
If a victim of SVB tries to use HN as Stripe customer support and asks if they are exposed, will they respond and admit that their business capital funds in Atlas is lost?
> They threw all their Atlas customers into SVB, according to Atlas customers
And removed all mentions about SVB in Atlas. Stripe has been very quiet about their own involvement in SVB for their entire business.
The sharks are circling.
For brex this has to be the best marketing ever. Sign up a bunch of customers with real businesses at someone else's expense.