Exploiting DNS response parsing on the Wii U(garyodernichts.blogspot.com)
garyodernichts.blogspot.com
Exploiting DNS response parsing on the Wii U
https://garyodernichts.blogspot.com/2023/10/exploiting-dns-response-parsing-on-wii-u.html
26 comments
That link does not say that it uses a exploit with DNS parsing. DNS just lets you point the game at 3rd party servers run by a third party. It just happens that 3rd party servers can exploit the client.
You’re right! I misremembered this - it’s an SSL bug that’s really the first step in the chain in this case.
When you try to connect to the Nintendo WFC using this DNS server, the DNS redirects your login request to Wiimmfi instead. Wiimmfi then uses a specially crafted SSL certificate which some games consider valid due to an IOS bug, and then lets you go online.
After you are online, Wiimmfi is using a different bug in Mario Kart Wii in order to send and execute the rest of the Mario-Kart-specific Wiimmfi patches to your game, which is what happens during the loading screen when you are online.
When you try to connect to the Nintendo WFC using this DNS server, the DNS redirects your login request to Wiimmfi instead. Wiimmfi then uses a specially crafted SSL certificate which some games consider valid due to an IOS bug, and then lets you go online.
After you are online, Wiimmfi is using a different bug in Mario Kart Wii in order to send and execute the rest of the Mario-Kart-specific Wiimmfi patches to your game, which is what happens during the loading screen when you are online.
There’s a big 3rd party server scene for the PS2 as well using alternate DNS servers. Pretty awesome to see people care enough about these old games to set stuff up like this
This is actually the namewreck vulnerability which also affected thousands of devices running in production plants and using the Siemens tech stack.
Pretty interesting that they made the same naive implementation mistakes when it comes to message compression and the bytewise pointers resolution.
A simple fix for that is something like only accepting pointers that point to a lower position and never to a higher one, to prevent stack overflows and buffer overflows for the parsed label arrays.
Pretty interesting that they made the same naive implementation mistakes when it comes to message compression and the bytewise pointers resolution.
A simple fix for that is something like only accepting pointers that point to a lower position and never to a higher one, to prevent stack overflows and buffer overflows for the parsed label arrays.
> A simple fix for that is something like only accepting pointers that point to a lower position and never to a higher one, to prevent stack overflows and buffer overflows for the parsed label arrays.
Wouldn't the simpler fix be to perform bounds checking before writing to any buffer?
Wouldn't the simpler fix be to perform bounds checking before writing to any buffer?
Absolutely. Nor would that entail particularly onerous performance penalties in this instance, as DNS interrogation happens relatively rarely.
That said, I'd guess this is related to the use of string/array deserialization facilities that are either more general than the DNS parser or were copy/pasted from a domain that makes different assumptions re: the safety and inbound data provenance.
That said, I'd guess this is related to the use of string/array deserialization facilities that are either more general than the DNS parser or were copy/pasted from a domain that makes different assumptions re: the safety and inbound data provenance.
So this exploit requires control of the local network, since such a request isn't valid DNS and therefore wouldn't get forwarded through a typical users DNS resolver?
Yeh, that's typical for the console homebrew exploits though.
(Or at least control of the resolver - the instructions looks like the author has a exploit server running for ease)
At the very least (beyond the extra TCP DNS fields) you need to ignore/drop the two UDP DNS requests the Wii U makes before failing to TCP.
At the very least (beyond the extra TCP DNS fields) you need to ignore/drop the two UDP DNS requests the Wii U makes before failing to TCP.
It seems like you can set the DNS server directly on the device itself, bypassing the local DNS resolver.
See https://github.com/GaryOderNichts/DNSpresso#instructions
See https://github.com/GaryOderNichts/DNSpresso#instructions
Very nice - so this is the perfect exploit - pretty hard for evil people to do, but easy for the device owner to do to regain control of their own hardware.
ARP spoofing allows this attack to be run. Still needs to be in the local network though. (Pretend to be the router and intercept the DNS.)
No, you define a connection on the WiiU and provide the DNS server as a parameter. The author has a DNS server up there sending your WiiU a request that causes it to run a payload (which resides on your SD card).
> At this point I was interested and decided to take a look if the Wii U implementation suffers from the same issue. To my surprise the Wii U implementation looks something like this instead
So, how does the author got hold of Wii's code, is it publicly available or was it some kind of reverse engineering?
So, how does the author got hold of Wii's code, is it publicly available or was it some kind of reverse engineering?
Reverse engineering:
After reverse engineering parts of the Wii Us' NET stack for another project I was working on, I realized it's using a modified version of NicheStack.
oh, I have missed this and right at the top of the article, thanks!
It's also possible it was released depending on the DNS server license
Since a lot of embedded devices these days rely on software like Webkit they typically have a firmware release zip somewhere for license compliance
Since a lot of embedded devices these days rely on software like Webkit they typically have a firmware release zip somewhere for license compliance
Is this similar how str2hax works? That’s the most common jailbreak method nowadays https://wii.guide/str2hax
No, str2hax isn't a DNS exploit. str2hax exploits CVE-2009-0689 in opera. See https://wiibrew.org/wiki/Str2hax#How_it_works
Someone should probably write something about the importance of turning off updates if you want to keep this functionality, because Nintendo is probably working right now on wrestling your hardware back into their control...
Doubtful. Wii U has been thrown open for years, the last update was 13 months ago and weirdly only for North America and didn't break any current exploits. The store is dead, it loses online play in a few months and the hardware is long discontinued. I don't think they really care about it.
They fixed the easy to use exploits on the 3DS not too long ago after it had been discontinued and store shutdown etc
It wouldn't surprise me if Nintendo went back and fixed something that wouldn't make sense like this.
It wouldn't surprise me if Nintendo went back and fixed something that wouldn't make sense like this.
It was also a source of major shame and embarrassment for Nintendo and I would not be surprised if they just wanted to forget it.
calvin_art(1)
Since the Nintendo servers shut down, hacks have been the only way to play Wii games online - and this one is by far the easiest to use. Just change your DNS servers and you can play online again!
https://wiimmfi.de/patcher/dnspatch
There’s still a thriving Mario Kart Wii scene because of this! You can play Mario Kart online basically any time. I’d bet there are hundreds of players online right now (really brings home just how large the human population is…). Here are the current online stats: https://wiimmfi.de/stat?m=8